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J .R . Nethercote and Samuel Furphy
One evening during the early 1980s the then speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Sir Billy Snedden, a former treasurer and leader of the Liberal 
Party, was in an expansive mood following a hearty dinner in the warm 
comfortable dining room of what is now called Old Parliament House. In the 
course of much reminiscence and anecdotage the topic of the ‘Seven Dwarfs’ 
came up – the formidable public service figures who rose to so much eminence 
in the Australian government during the Second World War and in the post-war 
reconstruction era. But who precisely were these dwarfs?1
Three names came readily to mind. First and foremost there was Sir Roland 
Wilson – Australian statistician; secretary of Labour and National Service 
(1940–46); economic adviser to the Treasury; secretary to the Treasury 
(1951–66); and thereafter chair of both the Commonwealth Bank and Qantas. 
There was Dr H.C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs – director-general, Post-War Reconstruction 
(1943–49); thence governor of the Commonwealth Bank and, following its 
establishment in 1960, the Reserve Bank of Australia; he was later chair of both 
the Arts Council (now the Australia Council) and the Council for Aboriginal 
Affairs. Later still, he headed the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration (1974–76). And, always on any list, Sir John Crawford – 
foundation director of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics; secretary, 
Department of Commerce and Agriculture (1950–56), thence Trade (1956–60); 
followed by a succession of posts at The Australian National University 
culminating in the vice-chancellorship and, finally, in succession to Coombs, 
the chancellor.
Various other names were suggested: Sir Frederick Shedden, long-time head 
of Defence; Sir Kenneth Bailey, the solicitor-general and head of Attorney-
General’s, subsequently high commissioner to Canada; the statistician Stan 
Carver; Sir Allen Brown, Coombs’ successor at Post-War Reconstruction, later 
head of Prime Minister’s Department; Sir Henry Bland at Labour in Melbourne, 
later secretary, Department of Defence; and Sir Richard Randall, Wilson’s 
successor at the Treasury.
But was there no definitive list? Sir Billy would find out from the experts. 
The Parliamentary Library was contacted and it went to work with a will. 
1  The first part of this preface is largely based on an article published in 2010: J.R. Nethercote, ‘Unearthing the 
Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins’, Canberra Times, 5 October 2010, ‘Public Sector Informant’, 26–7.
The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins
xvi
Not long afterwards, a very senior figure from the library personally provided 
the speaker with the answer to his question: Doc, Dopey, Sleepy, Sneezy, Happy, 
Bashful and Grumpy. The speaker was incandescent! – fortunately this was the 
era before performance bonuses. Next day the lofty figure from the library 
defended himself rhetorically – well, what would you have said?
Even to this day, the identity of the seven dwarfs remains a matter of dinner 
party conversation. As also is the identity of Snow White. Conventional wisdom 
usually sees Ben Chifley as Snow White. But was it Menzies? What is not in 
doubt is why the seven dwarfs and their generation were important. They were 
not simply present when the Australia of the middle years of the twentieth 
century took shape; they were, in many respects, the architects. Sparked by the 
Second World War, but continuing through the long post-war boom, the size of 
government and the range of its responsibilities grew. Central to this growth was 
the increasing ascendancy of the Commonwealth in the affairs of the federation. 
Government became more active and more interventionist. Extensive activity 
within Australia was reflected by comparable activity in numerous conferences 
abroad, to which Australia sent representatives, ranging from Bretton Woods 
where the international monetary system was established, to the creation of the 
United Nations itself, as well as the Food and Agriculture Organization, and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The policies being promoted were 
markedly Keynesian in character, especially in advocacy of full employment, 
and, in the welfare field, strongly influenced by the 1942 report by Sir William 
Beveridge.
This was the era of the first sustained endeavours by the Commonwealth to 
equip itself with substantial policy capacity. Hitherto, the Commonwealth, to the 
extent it recognised a need for strength in policy, relied on ad hoc arrangements, 
usually involving academics to fill the need. For example, several professors 
of economics had been on hand as the Commonwealth tried to deal with the 
Depression, including L.F. Giblin and Douglas Copland from the University 
of Melbourne, Edward Shann from Western Australia (later Adelaide), and 
Leslie Melville from Adelaide. The need for greater strength had been felt by 
S.M. Bruce, prime minister from 1923 until 1929, but not effectively addressed; 
the Depression revealed, however, serious weaknesses in the public service in 
terms of policy capacity. 
An exception to this early rule was Sir Robert Garran, secretary of the Attorney-
General’s Department from the inception of the Commonwealth and solicitor-
general from 1917. Garran was unquestionably a mandarin, a statesman in 
disguise. Relatively unusually for the time, he had university degrees, in arts 
and law. Prior to his Commonwealth career he was a barrister in Sydney. He did 
not work his way up through the ranks – he came in at the top. When he retired 
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in 1932, however, he left a public service hostile to graduates except those with 
professional degrees, mainly law, engineering and medicine. It was also a public 
service in which the road to the top largely began at the bottom.
Sir Robert Garran, c1930
Source: National Library of Australia, nla.pic-an23435998
An important and necessary step forward was taken in 1935 when the Lyons 
Government secured an amendment to the public service legislation authorising 
direct recruitment of graduates to administrative posts, albeit on very restrictive 
terms. It is doubtful that even this modest move would have eventuated had 
its principal advocate not been General Sir John Monash. His interest at least 
neutralised opposition from returned servicemen who then dominated the 
general administrative ranks of the public service, and the applicable unions. But 
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the strength of union opposition, indeed, hostility, to any special appointments 
was very evident a few years later when Roland Wilson was recruited to the then 
Bureau of Census and Statistics (now the ABS), and shortly afterwards elevated 
to the post of statistician. The then Department of External Affairs (now Foreign 
Affairs and Trade) commenced recruitment of graduates in 1937; early recruits 
included Keith Waller, subsequently a secretary of the department; and Peter 
Heydon who, as secretary to the Department of Immigration during the 1960s, 
played an influential role in overturning the White Australia policy.
The Treasury organised its first search for graduates in 1939. Frederick Wheeler, 
who had already come to Canberra with Copland, was the first recruit; he 
would later head the department. Wheeler had previously worked for the 
State Savings Bank of Victoria whilst completing a degree in commerce at the 
University of Melbourne. The banks were a major source of quality personnel 
for the Commonwealth public service. Coombs came from the Commonwealth 
Bank, to which he returned as a board member in 1943 and as governor in 
1949. The Bank of New South Wales, now Westpac, was especially significant. 
Alfred Davidson, the general manager, had systematically developed the bank’s 
capacities in economics since the 1930s. Under the guidance of Edward Shann, 
an Economics Department was built up. Among its alumni who eventually 
found their way into government were Arthur Tange (who also attended the 
Bretton Woods meetings), James Plimsoll, John Crawford, Walter Ives, and Ron 
Mendelsohn.
Other famous names came directly to government from university. John Burton, 
secretary at External Affairs from 1947 to 1950, secured the first public service 
postgraduate scholarship for doctoral research at the London School of Economics. 
L.F. ‘Fin’ Crisp joined the Department of Labour on return from Oxford where 
he had been studying on a Rhodes scholarship. He later shifted to Post-War 
Reconstruction and was director-general when the department was abolished 
in 1950. Among the early graduate recruits, economists predominated. In those 
days, economics had a breadth that it has largely lost in later more specialist 
times. More interestingly, many of these graduates had studied Keynes’ General 
Theory first hand, directly from proof copies of the book sent to economics 
professors around the Empire. But other disciplines were not unrepresented – 
there were some lawyers and even some graduates in arts.
From the beginning there were differences of opinion among this new elite, in the 
first instance over the relative roles of tax and loans in financing the war effort. 
With the passage of time, and as the focus increasingly moved from fighting 
the war to preparing for peace, argument grew around the relative merits of 
government activity and intervention versus market-based methods. There were 
likewise contests between those for whom the primary purpose was growth and 
those with an eye to distribution. These battles continued for several decades 
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and their ghosts are still present today. In institutional terms they centred 
around the Treasury, apostle of growth and sceptical of intervention, and the 
Department of Trade, especially keen on government activism, particularly in 
its guise from 1963 as the Department of Trade and Industry.
Other countries took a similar path to Australia, with certain national 
variations. In New Zealand, for example, the minister of finance, Gordon 
Coates, established a ‘brains trust’ of economists and civil servants to advise 
him in the mid-1930s. In Whitehall, the influx of new people occasioned by 
the war included a number of women; not very long afterwards the Attlee 
Government removed the prohibition on permanent employment of married 
women. At the administrative level, women hardly figure in the Australian 
story. One who did was Wilmot Debenham, wife of Jock Phillips, Coombs’ 
successor as governor of the Reserve Bank. Having worked as an assistant to 
Leslie Melville at the Commonwealth Bank in the 1930s, Debenham joined the 
Commonwealth Rationing Commission during the Second World War. Coombs 
wrote that she ‘was in many ways the mainstay of the team which devised the 
clothes rationing “scale”’.2 She was subsequently secretary (1943–44) to the 
Commonwealth Housing Commission, for which she co-authored an influential 
report. In the Department of Labour and National Service, two other women are 
notable: the welfare activist Constance Duncan produced a report in 1944 on 
the children of working mothers; while the teacher and author Flora Eldershaw 
gave advice on women’s legal rights, working conditions, and equal pay. The 
contribution of women to the Australian public service was limited, however, 
by both prevailing attitudes to gender roles and a prohibition on the permanent 
employment of married women, which was not lifted until 1966.
By a quirk, a number of the most able of those coming into the Commonwealth 
public service in this period, especially after the outbreak of war in 1939, were 
conspicuous for their diminutive height as well as for their intellectual qualities. 
All the ‘dwarfs’, whether the long list or the shorter more definitive list, became 
departmental or agency heads, and many of their generation rose to the top of 
the public service in succeeding decades. Their careers were unusual. Many of 
them dealt only with people at the top – ministers or department heads; because 
of the circumstances of the war and post-war reconstruction they had a much 
broader canvas on which to work than did later generations of officialdom. It 
was a fascinating period of government and in society. The dwarfs and their 
peers give the period character, colour, personality and vitality, which the story 
might otherwise lack.
The impetus for this volume, and the 2010 conference upon which it is based, 
was a realisation that the ‘Seven Dwarfs’ and their colleague mandarins had 
2  H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1981), 18.
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begun to appear in the pages of the Australian Dictionary of Biography (ADB), 
notably in volumes 17 and 18, and in the lists of names for volumes currently in 
preparation. While all were granted longer than usual entries, the biographical 
chapters in this book provide a fuller portrait than is possible in the ADB, 
which is primarily a work of reference. A further aim of this book is to place 
these important lives in context – to conceive of them as a discernible group 
representing a highly significant period in the history of the Australian public 
service. The book is divided into two parts: the first contains four thematic 
chapters; the second is composed of 10 biographical chapters. The 14 chapter 
authors represent a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, including history, 
political science, sociology, and economics. The biographical chapters are varied 
in style and intent. Some are the distilled conclusions of academic research; 
others are lively recollections of senior public servants with extensive personal 
experience of their subjects. Some offer a conventional narrative-style sketch; 
some are impressionistic; while others focus on a specific theme or event in the life 
of their subject. This rich combination of academic disciplines and biographical 
styles is deliberate, adding greatly to the depth of the book. Several of the seven 
men most commonly considered to be the ‘Seven Dwarfs’ are featured in this 
book. The omission of others, and the inclusion of taller but otherwise similar 
contemporaries, is a product of the expertise available at the conference in 2010.
In Chapter 1, the first of the thematic chapters, Nicholas Brown provides a 
detailed assessment of the possible identities of the ‘Seven Dwarfs’, but more 
importantly considers the usefulness of the phrase (and the related term, 
‘Mandarin’) as a means of understanding a significant era in the history of the 
Australian public service. This is followed by Stuart Macintyre’s account of the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction and its importance in the era of the 
public service mandarin; not only did three of the seven dwarfs play key roles 
in the department, but it was a training ground for a large number of future 
department heads. In Chapter 3, Alex Millmow explores the impact in Australia 
of the revolution in economic theory sparked by John Maynard Keynes, noting 
the significant influence of Keynesian thought on many of the key public 
service figures in the post-war period. John Martin’s Chapter 4 then provides 
a valuable point of comparison, exploring the history of New Zealand’s public 
service during and immediately after the Second World War.
In the first of the biographical chapters, David Horner draws on his biography of 
Sir Frederick Shedden to paint a more concise portrait; Shedden is often counted 
one of the seven dwarfs, but differed from his colleagues in significant ways, not 
least because he rose to the top during the 1930s after two decades in the ranks. 
In Chapter 6, Selwyn Cornish assesses the life and influence of Sir Roland Wilson, 
whom he credits with transforming the Treasury into a department whose 
key role was the provision of economic advice to government. In Chapter 7, 
Preface
xxi
Tim Rowse provides not a biographical sketch of ‘Nugget’ Coombs, but a 
detailed analysis of his engagement with Keynesian economics immediately 
prior to the Second World War. In Chapter 8, David Lee focuses particularly 
on Sir John Crawford’s 10 years as a public service head, during which time he 
was instrumental in reshaping Australia’s trade policy. This is followed by Sir 
Peter Lawler’s engaging recollections of Sir Allen Brown, Coombs’ successor at 
Post-War Reconstruction before heading a reinforced Prime Minister’s 
Department. In Chapter 10, Ian Hancock charts the four-decade career of Sir 
Frederick Wheeler, which included more than 10 years as chairman of the 
Public Service Board and seven years as secretary of the Treasury, during which 
time he had to cope with what has become known as the Loans Affair.
The book then shifts focus to four leading figures in the Department of External 
Affairs, Paul Hasluck, John Burton, Arthur Tange, and James Plimsoll. In 
Chapter 11, Geoffrey Bolton, author of a recent biography of Hasluck, assesses 
Sir Paul’s pre-political career, notably his attendance with Dr H.V. Evatt at the 
San Francisco Conference that founded the United Nations. Adam Henry 
reappraises the career of Dr John Burton, secretary of External Affairs (1947–50), 
who left the public service for an academic career in international relations, and 
peace and conflict studies. Peter Edwards, author of a full-length biography of 
Sir Arthur Tange, considers Tange’s earlier career in External Affairs rather than 
his later role as secretary of the Department of Defence. In the final chapter, 
Jeremy Hearder provides an impressionistic account of the career diplomat Sir 
James Plimsoll, complementing his recently published biography of Plimsoll, 






The Seven Dwarfs: A Team of Rivals
Nicholas Brown
The persistence of the idea of the ‘seven dwarfs’ in the fairly thin soil of 
Commonwealth Public Service (CPS) history testifies to its usefulness – although 
just as the actual composition of the group remains a matter for debate, so does 
the question of their significance continue to prompt varied interpretations. In 
a general sense, the term is well enough understood. The expression, ‘seven 
dwarfs’, refers to the careers and characteristics of a group of men who secured 
great influence and authority within and around the CPS from the 1940s until, 
in some cases, well into the 1980s. They represented a marked expansion in 
the reach, standing and professionalism of public policy in Australia. They are 
also a neat encapsulation of ‘the new mandarins’ – a wider company of senior 
bureaucrats – who rose to prominence in that period, and were associated with 
a distinct ethic of independence and authority.
As a descriptor, then, the term is fairly settled. But the explanations it embodies 
are less agreed. Not only the individuals concerned but also the starting point 
for their ascendancy varies in accounts, depending on the emphasis given to 
internal factors within the CPS (recruitment, mentorship, opportunity), external 
factors (the role of elected governments, the impact of major events such as the 
Great Depression and the Second World War, or of ideas such as Keynesianism), 
and the interplay between them. More important, perhaps – although a good 
deal less discussed – is how to mark the end of their ‘period’. At what point 
can the distinctive combination of factors they reflected – the ‘age’ of these 
mandarins – be said to have ‘passed’?
It is notable, for example, that in the surge of CPS ‘reformism’ that commenced 
in the early 1980s, the scrutiny of an allegedly pervasive inefficiency, rigidity 
and insularity reached back usually within a 20-year span of memory or political 
purchase. As the prime minister, Bob Hawke, declared in 1986:
The Public Service has, in many ways, reflected the easy-going, ‘she’ll-
be-right-mate’ management and work style of the lucky Australia of the 
1960s and 1970s. We can afford this no longer.1
1  R.J.L. Hawke, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 September 1986, 1448.
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Before that, and perhaps untouchable in terms of collective or institutional 
memory, or deemed irrelevant to political bargaining over the reach and 
repercussions of government from the 1960s onwards, was the land of the seven 
dwarfs. How are we to understand the transition both in to, and out of, that 
land? From this perspective, the endurance, and usefulness, of the dwarfs’ story 
is not just the CPS folklore it is sometimes seen to be. It also raises questions 
about how we are to understand the changing relations between government, 
politics and society in Australia.
Most contributors to this collection engage with these questions in ways arising 
from a close study of individuals who were either likely members of the company 
of dwarfs, or who presided as mandarins – figures who acquired high bureaucratic 
office on the basis of exactingly examined merit – over that transformation within 
the CPS. Stuart Macintyre, in the next essay, considers how formative the context 
of wartime management and especially post-war reconstruction was for this cohort. 
My task is to set a different kind of context. What was the nature of the networks 
in which these figures became so prominent, and how might the relationships 
between them help us understand their significance as a group? In particular, 
I want to outline what came to be understood and expected of the figure of the 
senior public servant in those years: the range of roles, skills, behaviours and 
attitudes associated with that figure, as exemplified by the dwarfs. Rivalry, as 
my title suggests, was as much a characteristic of those relationships as cohesion, 
and underscored the extent to which these individuals were making their context 
on the basis of highly personalised resources and recognition rather than simply 
finding roles within established institutions.
From this perspective, it is important also to consider the character of the 
community and institutions within which these figures worked – the Canberra 
that suddenly, if austerely and incompletely, acquired the status and functions 
that might at last be said to be appropriate for a national capital; and the 
institutions that were charged with the functions of an equally sudden, austere 
and incomplete new vision of national government. This was the dwarfs’ 
landscape, and one in which we might begin to understand their historical 
significance, even in the larger pursuit of that endemic Australian ‘blood 
sport’ (so it seemed to the 1983 Review of Commonwealth Administration) of 
rubbishing the CPS.2
Just to remind ourselves that there is nothing new to this sport, in April 1945 
the Sydney Morning Herald unkindly quipped that:
If V-2’s had completely obliterated London, surviving Londoners could 
have built elsewhere a city that in tradition and spirit would again be 
2  Review of Commonwealth Administration, Report (Canberra: AGPS, 1983), x.
1. The Seven Dwarfs: A Team of Rivals
5
London. If similar disaster overcame Canberra, surviving Canberrans 
would emerge as a flock of homeless people without real ties of common 
interest other than nationality and community in distress.3
A good deal of what has been invested in the ‘seven dwarfs’ and their period 
hinges on an attempt to rebut such an assessment. As an idea, the dwarfs 
assert that the Canberra, and the CPS, that emerged from the Second World 
War had undergone a qualitative as well as a quantitative change, and acquired 
a marked competence, if not quite a ‘tradition and spirit’. Commentators in 
the early 1940s lamented that Australia had been forced to cobble together an 
‘all in’ war effort in ‘the absence of an effective Federal seat of government’ 
due to the long-term ‘passive resistance’ of many interests to all that Canberra 
might be.4 Towards the decade’s end it was argued instead that improvements in 
the capacity and quality of Australian government ‘may be expected as [it] … 
becomes more diversified [and] firmly rooted in an alert Canberra community’.5 
Self-serving that last assessment might be – it came from Dr P.W.E. Curtin, an 
official who benefitted from being a part of that emerging community. But this 
transition nonetheless suggests some of the ways in which we might assess the 
collective significance of the individuals studied elsewhere in this book, and – 
from my particular perspective – how we might characterise (in Tim Rowse’s 
formulation) the ‘competitive collegiate’ ethic they established in government.6
There is, however, a fundamental question to be addressed first. Who were the 
seven dwarfs? At one level, to pose this question is to risk being drawn back 
into CPS nostalgia. As John Nethercote has observed, debate over the names to 
be included in their ranks has long been standard fare at national capital dinner-
party conversations, the pre-occupation of Canberra aficionados and tragics. So, 
too, has been the question of when the term itself was first coined. Responses 
to the announcement of the conference on which this book is based proved that 
these issues still cause a measure of perturbation. Reputations and legacies are in 
the balance, especially in a city in which even street addresses were, not too long 
ago, read as rankings of CPS seniority. And, perhaps more fundamentally, up for 
grabs in finalising the cast are characterisations of the inner circles, and the core 
functions and ideas, of government during a period of pronounced change.
The enumeration of the company in itself influences how we are to account for its 
significance – for its nexus between the talents, personalities and commitments 
of individuals, and a context punctured by major events: depression, war, and 
not least the change of government in 1949. At one end of the spectrum, there 
was a depth of personal experience common to most of the contenders. They 
3  Sydney Morning Herald, 14 April 1945, 8.
4  F.A. Bland, ‘Public Administration in Wartime’, Australian Quarterly, 14, no. 4 (1942), 52.
5  P.W.E. Curtin, ‘Politics and Administration II’, Public Administration, 8, no. 1 (1949), 18.
6  T. Rowse, Nugget Coombs: A Reforming Life (Port Melbourne, VIC: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 154.
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came from relatively modest backgrounds, scholarship educations, and were 
products, as John Crawford (one undisputed member of the group) put it, of 
‘the thirties when our minds were beset by problems of the depression, of social 
misery and of threatening events on the world scene’.7 Bright, direct, defiant in 
insisting (as Roland Wilson, another certain member, stated) on never ignoring 
‘the voice of the people’ in dealing with the cautions or ambitions of politicians, 
they worked with an expansion of public policy into new areas of economic and 
social management, and geared towards ensuring that such crises did not return.8
The stamp of the ‘Keynesian Crusade’ – H.C. Coombs’ term (he is also a sure bet 
for a place) – was to some extent on them all, if worn over time with varying 
levels of comfort.9 That crusade – going well beyond questions of economic 
management to images of social progress – defined the frontiers they often 
broached as individuals, not only in policy but in new ways of behaving in often 
unprecedented contexts. If they were products, as mandarins should be, of merit-
based education systems, those systems in themselves were far from entrenched at 
the time of their ascendancy. Each of the figures discussed in this book benefitted 
from initiatives taken by schools and universities, and in newly consolidating 
academic disciplines such as economics, to redress a paucity of knowledge and 
skill amid the crises of the time. And such training still stood in a rather equivocal 
relation to established structures of government, which were only overcome under 
the pressure of extreme circumstances. The image of the ‘seven dwarfs’ is often, in 
retrospect, one of mature men, advanced, secure, wise and worn in their careers. 
They rose, however, on the wave of a desperate search – in the aftermath of the 
First World War – by teachers, academics and then official mentors to find in a 
younger generation some redress to the heavy hand of the old.10
Balanced against this emphasis on personal experience and commitment is a 
characterisation of the bureaucratic systems that the dwarfs came to exemplify. 
In moving from nine years of wartime and reconstruction mainly under Labor 
into an unprecedented 23 years under the Coalition parties, the dwarfs were 
associated with a paradigm of public service neutrality and impartiality. For 
figures who, in several cases especially, were closely associated with Labor’s 
post-war agenda, their acceptance by a new government, with an explicitly 
contrasting free enterprise ideology, was testimony to another set of qualities. 
Navigating this transition after 1949 itself made a priority of strict professionalism. 
Into the post-war decades, over and above their individual attributes, they were 
7  J. Crawford, University and Government (Canberra: Royal Institute of Public Administration, A.C.T. 
Group, 1969), 2.
8  R. Wilson, quoted in S. Cornish, Sir Roland Wilson: A Biographical Essay (Canberra: Sir Roland Wilson 
Foundation, ANU, 2005), 30.
9  H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1981).
10  See N. Brown, Richard Downing: Economics, Advocacy and Social Reform in Australia (Carlton South, VIC: 
Melbourne University Press, 2001), 42–43.
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increasingly seen to have embodied the concept and responsibilities of the 
‘permanent head’ of government departments. And they invested this position 
with its own pragmatism and power. The role of the permanent head might have 
demanded (as Frederick Wheeler, a central mandarin but not a dwarf, dryly 
noted) ‘an onerous career involving much self-denial’. But its performance was 
also the stuff of the legend surrounding these figures, of the power of ‘Canberra’ 
and the authority of government associated with them at its pinnacle.11
In this interplay of personalities and processes, as well as between internal CPS 
and external intellectual and political influences, the identity of the dwarfs has 
been debated for years, and related back to tensions in the group itself. Were there 
contests between – to take an example flagged by Nethercote – those for whom 
the primary purpose of public policy was to generate growth as a reward for 
enterprise, and those with an eye to the more equitable distribution of the gains 
from that growth? Or – anticipating later debates about the representativeness 
of the CPS – over the insularity of ‘Canberra’, and the dominance of influences 
such as a ‘Treasury line’ in the making and implementation of policy? Or more 
simply about the competition for resouces – including for people, and in turn 
for influence – in the very constrained environment that was Canberra until at 
least the 1960s. For a group identified collectively with a transformation of the 
CPS in general, they have also gone down in history and myth individually as 
‘great haters’, deeply resentful of the claims each other made for their specific 
terrain.12 Is it possible to bring any resolution to these tensions and questions?
Early in the 1990s, Geoffrey Bolton instigated a poll on the question of who were 
the seven dwarfs at a time when more of those with some first-hand acquaintance 
with the phenomenon were still able to contribute. Yet even then, it would seem 
from an extensive correspondence between Bolton and many others, to some extent 
mediated by the Australian Dictionary of Biography, no clear contingent emerged.13
The names that were canvassed in this exchange are familiar enough, although 
some shoot quicker across the sky than other more constant stars. A consolidated 
list of contenders includes Coombs, Wilson, Crawford, Wheeler, Richard Randall, 
Allen Brown, Henry Bland, Frederick Shedden, Trevor Swan, Frank Strahan, 
Kenneth Bailey, William Dunk, Jock Weeden and Stan Carver. In itself, this is an 
interesting field, indicating areas of government identified as potentially fitting 
within the matrix of factors associated with the dwarfs. Many, however, can be 
set aside fairly quickly – again, in a process of elimination that is revealing of 
the boundaries set for the dwarfs and their significance.
11  F.H. Wheeler, ‘The Professional Career Public Service: Some Reflections of a Practitioner’, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, 39, no. 2 (1980), 165.
12  R. Beale, quoted by P. Shergold, Once was Camelot in Canberra? Reflections on Public Service Leadership, 
Sir Roland Wilson Foundation Lecture, 2004 (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2005), 3.
13  The following draws on a file of correspondence and clippings, kept by Bolton and in possession of the ADB.
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Strahan, head of the Prime Minister’s Department until 1949, and a confidante 
of several prime ministers, had few backers in Bolton’s poll; he described himself 
as ‘just a clerk’, and cannot be associated with the transition from Labor to the 
Coalition in power, which is central to the collective identity of the ‘dwarfs’. 
So he can be scratched fairly quickly. So can Bailey. Secretary of the Attorney-
General’s Department (1946–64) and solicitor-general (1946–65), he was a 
significant figure in advising government on the legality of the powers sought 
in the expanding domain of Commonwealth legislation. But – in addition to 
being judged too tall by Robert Parker, an ANU political scientist who knew the 
field well – Bailey did not have the instrumental engagement with policy that 
came with dwarfdom. 
Dunk, briefly secretary of External Affairs (1945–47), then chairman of the Public 
Service Board (1947–60), was also too tall and mostly outside direct engagement 
with the high policy, if not the intrigue, of Canberra. Dunk’s mantra, ‘civilisation 
is management’, expressed his commitment to the rejuvenation of a ‘run-down’ 
post-war CPS, but a good deal of his time was spent in managing both the 
political and industrial strains of seeking such improvement rather than with 
the processes of policy reform itself.14 Weeden, who guided the Commonwealth’s 
move into education, was deemed to lack the highly desirable qualification in 
economics that characterised most of the dwarfs, but also to work in a field that 
was not sufficiently central to the core policy priorities of the time. Swan, while 
undeniably an influential economist closely in touch with those priorities, moved 
to the fledgling Australian National University in 1950 with the hope that some 
research–government fusion might develop, but this never happened. Whatever 
the extent of his back-door or ‘brown bag’ advice to government through the 
1950s, he stood on one side of the divide between academic analysis and policy 
professionalism that was increasingly deeply scored in Canberra through those 
years. Swan was nominated by Sir Harold White, who was an ambitious advocate 
for his own bastion, the Parliamentary and National libraries. Certainly canny, 
White has also sometimes been mentioned as a possible dwarf – but he at least 
did us the service of declining inclusion in the corps.
Confounded by such a list of contenders, Parker suggested that the play of the 
concept was perhaps more important than a settled company. Even so, such 
a first cut gets a good deal closer to a manageable list of names and claims. 
Building on such possibilities, and spurred by Bolton’s inquiry, the Canberra 
Times confidently declared in 1992 that the team was:
• Crawford: Post-War Reconstruction, then secretary of both Commerce and 
Agriculture (1950–56) and Trade (1956–60)
14  N. Brown, ‘Dunk, Sir William Ernest (1897–1984)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 17 (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2007), 345–6.
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• Bland: director-general of Manpower then secretary of Labour and National 
Service (1952–67)
• Wilson: secretary of Labour and National Service (1940–46), then 
Commonwealth statistician (1946–51) and secretary to the Treasury (1951–66)
• Randall: Treasury, succeeding Wilson as secretary (1966–71)
• Coombs: director-general of Post-War Reconstruction, then governor of the 
Commonwealth Bank (1949–59) and Reserve Bank (1960–68)
• Carver: Commonwealth statistician (1951–62)
• Brown: Post-War Reconstruction, then secretary of Prime Minister’s 
Department (1949–58).







• Shedden: secretary, Department of Defence (1937–56).
In one of the few instances of a contender actually associating himself with the 
company, Bland gave Crawford, Randall, Wilson, Coombs, Brown, Carver and 
himself as the definitive list, citing as the formative context a working party 
established in 1947 to serve the Investment and Employment Committee, with 
Chifley as chairman, and a brief to get to grips with the reality of post-war 
government.15 But the exclusion of Shedden from Bland’s account is problematic, 
and Carver does not rate a place in more recent ‘official’ guides.16 In a sign of how 
contested the last seat on the bench could be, the ADB itself questioned Carver’s 
standing as a possible ‘dwarf’ by describing him as ‘essentially a statistician’.17 
Equally, while Shedden rather than Carver figured in a profile of ‘The Biggest 
Little Men in Australia’ published in the Financial Review in 1965, that profile 
also noted that his ‘inclusion is usually regarded as being mainly coincidental 
in that he was a department head and happened to be about the same physical 
size as the other six’.18
15  Australian, 21 January 1967, 9; Sir Henry Bland, interviewed by Mel Pratt, 8–10 January 1975, National 
Library of Australia (NLA) TRC 121, 60.
16  J. Adams and C. Oates, Serving the Nation: 100 Years of Public Service (Canberra: Public Service and Merit 
Protection Commission, 2001), 146–7.
17  M. Kerley, ‘Carver, Sir Stanley Roy (1897-1967)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 13 (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1993), 93.
18  Financial Review, 12 November 1965, 2–3.
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The various permutations of this list perhaps in themselves reflect rivalries 
among candidates – and no doubt the debate will continue, spurred once again 
by this collection of essays. But, drawing this particular auction to a close – 
however provisionally – the most likely seven are (in a rough order of certainty): 
Coombs, Wilson, Crawford, Brown, Bland, Randall, and Shedden.
Likely – but perhaps not all equally deserving. In one of the clear signs of 
competition for recognition, or just plain bitchiness, David Horner quotes 
Arthur Tange – secretary of the Department of External Affairs (1954–65), 
certainly a mandarin but not a dwarf – saying of Shedden that he fulfilled the 
dictionary definition of ‘bureaucrat’: ‘an official who works by fixed meetings 
without exercising intelligent judgement’.19 That might have been the insider’s 
perspective, and reflective of the tensions developing between an External 
Affairs department self-consciously preening its intellectual ascendancy and a 
Defence establishment a good deal more ‘grounded’ in its business. It is also 
worth noting in passing a more populist perspective of 1964, which praised 
Carver as the only public servant who at least had a tangible output, being the 
‘figure-juggling juggernaut’ in charge of an agency that could tell the nation 
something useful about itself. Carver’s command of the facts of population, 
productivity and prosperity was then contrasted by journalist Frank Clune to 
higher-minded public servants who were consumed in a ‘vast amount of political 
and social manoeuvring and rumours’: ‘If you want to see the Australian ruling 
class’, Clune concluded, ‘go to Canberra. The air of life here is superannuation.’20
Already, these variations on the list of dwarfs suggests something of what was at 
stake in being included. One qualification is indisputable: the Financial Review 
gave the height range for its selection as running from Wilson at 5 feet (152.4 cm) 
and 9 stone (57 kg) to Coombs at 5 feet 3 inches (160 cm) and 10 stone (63.5 kg) – 
roughly the height of the average Spanish man of the 1950s. But, beyond shared 
stature, what does such a list suggest?
As argued already, what rides on the shoulders of this group is a characterisation 
of a – if not the – major period in the consolidation of the CPS. And, as also 
already noted, there are two central elements to this consolidation – personal 
attributes and experience, and professional role – that do not necessarily sit 
easily together. The groupings offer one way into figuring out how the tensions 
between these elements were managed at the time, and might be evaluated in 
retrospect.
Turning to that first element: personal experience and commitment. The seven 
dwarfs symbolise the transformation of government under the pressures of the 
19  Tange, quoted in D. Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of Australian Defence 
Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 7.
20  F. Clune, Journey to Kosciusko (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1964), 245–6.
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Second World War, both in the rapidly centralised functions and expanding 
reach of what in 1939 was termed the Federal Government but by 1945 was the 
Commonwealth, and in the recruitment of specifically identified expertise to 
manage these processes.21 This element is exemplified by the Keynesian paradigm: 
government transformed by young, university-trained, and theoretically 
informed reformers. These figures sought to translate a broad domain of civic 
concern formed in contexts of depression and unemployment into careers spent 
dealing with pressures first of wartime mobilisation and reconstruction, then of 
inflation and full employment, and with the expanding role of public investment 
in general. These iterations developed their own tensions as well as ideals. As 
Weller, Scott and Stevens put it, ‘peace and prosperity engendered expectations 
and hope among public servants that they could improve conditions for the 
community’.22 But in the process, some aspects of that paradigm in themselves 
came under strain. Not least among these aspects were the judgments made in 
attributing relative weightings to the virtues practised in public and private 
spending and saving, work and enterprise, to the old solidarities of labour and 
class, the new claims of enterprise and welfare, or the ideals of citizenship and 
security. These weightings went beyond calculations of economic growth or 
national income in determining the merits or impact of policies on a society in 
itself posing new issues for government. In responding to these issues, the post-
war mandarins were learning and testing themselves and their convictions as 
they went.
These men were emphatically not the economic rationalists of the 1980s, with 
their deference to the discipline of the market. They were instead conscious – 
as Coombs would put it – of using ‘other people’s money’ to achieve a range 
of social outcomes within the context of a tight bargain between stability and 
growth, prosperity and regulation, the respective roles and responsibilities 
of the government and the people.23 Crawford is recalled for ‘the restrained 
bitterness with which he spoke of those bureaucrats to whom the poor and 
the unemployed were not persons but simply component figures in a statistical 
index’.24 That tension was implicit within their shared professionalism: how 
was it best to evoke the society over which they exercised influence?
As Harold Perkin has argued, public service professionalism through the 
twentieth century developed in an unsteady bargain between ‘an old loyalty 
to class-based politics’, embodied in ideas of ‘service’, and a rising ethic of 
21  See F. Brennan, Canberra in Crisis (Canberra: Dalton, 1971), 150.
22  P. Weller, J. Scott and B. Stevens, From Postbox to Powerhouse: A Centenary History of the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2011), 48–9.
23  H.C. Coombs, Other People’s Money: Economic Essays (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1971).
24  O. Spate, ‘Sir John Crawford (1910–1984)’, Obituaries Australia, National Centre of Biography, The 
Australian National University, oa.anu.edu.au/obituary/crawford-sir-john-grenfell-jack-1391/text1390, 
accessed 13 September 2011.
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‘equality of opportunity’, relating more to formations of the ‘public’ to be 
served, or represented.25 The post-war social contract was informed by an 
increased negotiation of these values, albeit with its own Australian inflections. 
One of its leading exponents, R.I. Downing, who had his own place in the 
‘official family’ of advisers that grew around the Labor Government in Canberra 
in the 1940s, and in the ‘Keynesian crusade’, phrased it from his Melbourne 
academic vantage in 1956 in these terms:
This is precisely what we are trained for – to identify what it is we have 
to give up, and how much, in order to get a little more of something else 
we want; to present the facts to the people; and to leave them to choose 
what they want.26
The dwarfs presided over a model of government framed by that sense of 
responsibility, that idea of managing the needs and demands arising from a 
pluralistic if regulated society: to ‘present the facts’ if not persuade on ‘the 
wants’, and to mark out an appropriate domain of ‘choice’.
Equally, in that same address to a Canberra audience, Downing could not resist 
the parting shot: ‘In my strictly personal platform for economic policy, in fact, 
my main plank is the abolition of Canberra. You all ought to come back and live 
with us’. That aside touches on the second element of the dwarfs’ landscape: the 
entrenching of concepts of public service professionalism into the practices of 
policy development, ministerial advice and public responsiveness in the context 
of a marked expansion of central government.
Patrick Weller has offered a neat summary of this professionalism from the 
time of the dwarfs: ‘the official adviser, buoyed with expertise and knowledge, 
bolstered by a monopoly of access, dominating many of the ministers’.27 This was 
the domain of the ‘mandarin’ – the figure who not only exercised a considerable 
element of control over what was ‘left’ to ‘the people’ to choose, but also over 
what went to the minister to decide. And this practice permeated deeply into 
departmental cultures, with a range of effects.
After 1939, telegraph boys were increasingly unlikely to rise to the top of the 
public service, but scholarships boys – so the dwarfs showed – had a better 
chance, and steadily, if slowly, so did university graduates in general. From the 
margins of dwarfdom, a figure such as Dunk recognised this as he lobbied for 
public service reform through the 1950s. Without a university degree himself, 
he conceded that his generation of managers must effectively ensure their own 
25  H. Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880 (London: Routledge, 2001), 517.
26  R.I. Downing, ‘Is an Economic Policy Possible?’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 15, no. 4 
(1956), 273–4, 281.
27  P. Weller, Australia’s Mandarins: The Frank and the Fearless (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 9.
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obsolence given the demand for new policy skills. In the first stages of this process, 
however, a distinct, perhaps more innately competitive ethic characterised 
Commonwealth departments at the forefront of policy development.
Always conscious, in their inter-war educations, of insecurity in the lives around 
them, and of the rare opportunities extended to them, the dwarfs imbibed 
certain precepts about the work of government. They understood both its powers 
(which were not to be exploited in ways that – as the 1930s showed – could fail, 
resulting in waste and unrest) and its privileges (from which they benefitted, 
but which were not to be assumed or exploited). Even in the resistances they 
faced in bringing their expertise into systems still largely defined by seniority 
and its tribalisms, they realised that the structures of government were to be 
worked with (or at least within), not challenged. As Wheeler – who would savour 
these processes more than most – reflected in 1980, the senior ‘professional, 
career public servant’ (each of those terms mattering exactly to him) was ‘richly 
rewarded by the fascination of being associated with the political while not 
being of it’.28 For all their conspicuous markers of higher education, the dwarfs 
would often make their way with a reflex rejection of ideology and abstraction. 
Their role was to ensure the system worked as efficiently and effectively as 
possible: they were its creatures, not the other way around. They were also its 
custodians, and gatekeepers.
Even so, there was a qualification, or a twist, to this relationship. Paul Hasluck 
– not a dwarf, but potentially a mandarin until his own turn to politics in that 
climactic election of 1949 – observed what he took to be a distinctly Australian 
phenomenon of the immediate post-war decades. Well-educated public servants, 
he argued, now found themselves dealing with politicians who had risen to 
ministerial rank but tended to lack an education ‘comparable to that of their 
advisers’.29 Such a disjunction was new, and enhanced the power of the dwarfs. 
The structures of government within which they worked were not seen as theirs 
by right, but theirs to influence, guide and protect. Again, as Hasluck noted 
of the connection between the public servant and politics, with his own slant 
on the fascination observed by Wheeler, ‘one has to recognize that a policy 
decision does not freeze politics [to the extent it must be taken into account by 
the public servant], but only turns political energy into the chosen direction’, 
which it then became the public servant’s responsibility to pursue.30 The domain 
of the senior public servant was newly energised by these responsibilities in the 
expanding compass of post-war government.
28  Wheeler, ‘The Professional Career Public Servant’, 165.
29  P. Hasluck, The Public Servant and Politics (Canberra: Royal Institute of Public Administration, A.C.T. 
Group, 1968), 15.
30  Ibid., 3.
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Importantly, these distinctions were not just learnt on the job; they were part 
of the education that an inter-war generation tested as they journeyed forward. 
‘A bureaucracy’, Henry Bland’s father, Professor F.A. Bland, wrote in a 1923 
Workers’ Education Association textbook on government in Australia (a book 
itself addressing the scarcity of any local work reflecting on these issues), ‘is 
mainly distinguishable by its irresponsiveness to the public will’. To that extent, 
for those schooled on Bland’s textbook and the larger British and American 
literature on which it drew, ‘bureaucracy’ was to be unfavourably distinguished 
from the more plain-spoken, plain-acting concept of ‘public administration’, 
dealing more directly with matters of policy implementation, not policy 
formation. Bland further cautioned that:
The development of an expert official class, the multiplicity of 
departments, their imperfect coordination, the impossibility of adequate 
ministerial supervision, the unwillingness of Parliament to adapt its 
procedure to modern economic and social needs, all tend to widen the 
gulf between expert officialdom and the public.31
Dealing with that ‘gulf’ – even if implicitly rejecting it as anachronistic – required 
careful footwork. When Roland Wilson (with two doctorates in economics) was 
appointed secretary to the Treasury in 1951, the move was seen as ‘the first 
Australian experiment of this kind’ – a perception that Wilson moderated by 
offering the assurance that he would ‘never be guilty of ignoring the voice of 
the people’. He also undertook ‘to subject my thinking to the supervision of my 
political masters’, a discipline necessary to correct for the tendency of ‘some of 
our public service administrators … [to become] too much infatuated with their 
own crack-pot ideas’.32 But, from the late 1940s and into the 1950s, each side of 
this bargain – the ‘people’ and the ‘masters’ – were often far from stable entities. 
‘Frank and fearless advice’ was itself premised on an expertise that transcended 
the flux of opinion and politics. The transition of 1949 highlighted this – new 
Liberal ministers reportedly finding themselves ‘completely incapable of coping 
with the voluminous duties’ that represented the changed dimensions of policy 
through the 1940s, and equally wary of advice from those who had served the 
previous government, and on questions that saw divergent options on those 
issues of enterprise or equity, distribution or growth.33 None of the dwarfs 
is remembered for doing what they were told by ministers still finding their 
feet. They are, instead, remembered for the innovation, the consolidation and 
the character they brought to the tasks of and demands on government as it 
weathered such transformations.
31  F.A. Bland, Shadows and Realities of Government (Sydney: WEA, 1923), 5.
32  Wilson, quoted in S. Cornish, Sir Roland Wilson: A Biographical Essay (Canberra: The Sir Roland Wilson 
Foundation, 2002), 30.
33  Inside Canberra, 12 January 1950, 8 June 1950, 26 October 1950.
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Each of the individuals studied in this book draws out specific aspects of these 
elements in transition. Some are intangible. Wheeler, for example, emphasised 
the concept of ‘style’ – manner more than matter – when he came to reflect 
on what defined the most effective senior officials in his experience.34 And 
– if not quite style in itself – a certain brusque efficiency and impatience 
seems to have characterised many of the dwarfs in their personality, and their 
determination that the work of government take place in a domain clearly 
demarcated from the flux of mere opinion or politics, and in departments that 
they ruled closely. Overwork was no doubt part of the explanation for that 
terseness – and the demands of their jobs were never far from candid exchanges 
among them. But such a demeanour was also cultivated as an expression of 
the responsibility they carried, and the terms in which they carried it. Allen 
Brown – one of the two lawyers among the dwarfs (the other was Bland) – was 
noted by the Australian in 1971 as having the reputation as ‘a ruthless, abrupt 
administrator’. The London Times was a little softer, welcoming him in 1959 as 
Deputy High Commissioner in Australia House at end of his time at the Prime 
Minister’s Department:
Wiry and normally placid, and neither hearty nor arty, he is a much 
more than fair sample of highly professional civil servants developed 
in Canberra.35
If part of the success of the dwarfs was that – as John Bunting (Brown’s 
successor in Canberra) put it – they were ‘companions’ to Sir Robert Menzies 
as an equally shrewd, enduring prime minister (and presumably their Snow 
White – he himself was heard to claim this role), it was also the case that each 
carved out a formidable authority of their own.36 ‘Neither hearty nor arty’ 
reflects something of that careful cultivation – perhaps in that particular 
instance filtered through a British search for a way of comprehending this new 
kind of Australian on the Strand. Not all were as ‘naturally taciturn’ as Brown, 
but the Times’ sense of a type is revealing. All faced the challenge of securing 
support for the business of national government that was often under scrutiny 
for its partiality, its extravagance, and its distance from the ‘reality’ of the rest 
of the nation.
34  Wheeler, ‘The Professional Career Public Servant’, 162.
35  Australian, 28 September 1971; Times, 3 January 1959.
36  H.W. Arndt to G. Bolton, 27 February 1992; Bunting, quoted in Adams and Oates, Serving the Nation, 
146; Weller, Scott and Stevens, Postbox to Powerhouse, 52.
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Robert Menzies, c1950
Source: National Library of Australia, nla.pic-an12265907
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The Department of Post-War Reconstruction, which bulked large in many 
careers as an emblem of the new reach of government, became in itself an 
object of planned obsolescence in this process, even under a Labor government 
as concerned about trimming the costs of a ‘multiplicity of departments’ 
as it was about containing perceptions of its addiction to ‘planning’. With 
solid foundations still in industrial unionism and an ethic of egalitarianism, 
Labor had no necessary affiliation with big government. In 1946, it gave the 
task of trimming a wartime accretion of some 60,000 temporary CPS officers 
to J.T. Pinner, who was renowned for holding building contractors to account 
by counting the number of empty cement bags around Canberra’s new 
Administrative Building.37 Especially in the wake of the failure of the 1944 
referendum on Commonwealth powers, the government itself was in no mood 
for allegations of excess or inefficiency. And with each post-war budget being 
rumoured, well into the 1950s, as being called to bring, or actually bringing, 
cuts to the public service, part of the skill of a mandarin was to preserve their 
domain under such scrutiny. Again, as Wilson made clear to Tange:
What mattered for public servants was how their department was faring 
in a constant battle for influence. A truly successful public servant was 
one who led a department that was at or near the top of an imaginary 
league table. Standing in this table depended on perceptions of the 
department’s strength and influence, particularly in the eyes of senior 
ministers and other departmental heads.38
At a basic level, as the post-war structures of government settled down, there 
was that inherent rivalry among the company – and it was transacted at the 
most basic levels of differentials in salary and opportunities for initiative. The 
announcement of an increase in salary to Allen Brown in 1954, for example, 
was enough to prompt Crawford to voice candid reservations to his minister, 
John McEwen, about his future in a service that seemed not to equally value 
his skills or commitment, and for McEwen to suggest that Menzies as prime 
minister needed to take note of such disquiet spreading among other largely 
indispensable permanent heads. As McEwen insisted, the matter was not simply 
one of ego, it was one of ‘dignity’.39
Beyond such delicate dealings, however, was the more fundamental 
question of what would define the figure of the public servant through such 
transitions. In 1923, F.A. Bland had identified the pressing need to attend to 
the appropriate training of a public servant if the dangers of bureaucracy were 
to be avoided. His counsel then was that an administrator needed a general, 
37  G.E. Pettit, ‘John Thomas Pinner’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 16 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2002), 5–6.
38  Wilson, quoted in P. Edwards, Arthur Tange: The Last of the Mandarins (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006), 83.
39  McEwen to Menzies, 3 March 1954, NAA M2576/1.
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liberal university education as both ‘a protection against the disillusionment 
which accompanies life’s inevitable routine’ but also as a way of recognising 
the social transformation impelled by the First World War. Bland cited the 
perception of J.A. Hobson in 1921:
Rude, unformed, wasteful energy counted more heavily in the rough and 
tumble of the world that has passed away. Now, conscious, calculated 
policies are demanded in all those departments of life in which the 
struggle for survival and success is carried on.
‘Conscious, calculated policies’ were not so much matters of expertise, but of 
reflection and sound judgment, seasoned by a perspective that encompassed a 
necessary understanding of the strained nature of social cohesion as well as of 
the endurance of ‘disillusionment’. Into the 1930s, the service the dwarfs and 
their cohorts entered was slowly edging towards benefitting from the kind of 
scholarship and part-time study provision Bland encouraged.40 Such provision 
would, he hoped (this time quoting the Macdonnell Commission on the British 
Civil Service of 1915), enable ‘the clever sons of poor parents to benefit by 
University training and thereby enter the Civil Service’, so that ‘the interests of 
democracy and of the Public Service can and ought to be reconciled’.41
And so a few of these Australian ‘clever sons’ were finding their way up 
the ladder of an education system that was highly competitive, working 
through a curriculum that was strong on a meritocratic ‘impulse to select and 
differentiate’, to identify the boys who wanted to ‘get on’, and to cultivate – 
in the introduction of uniforms, houses and badges – an ethic of loyalty and 
good citizenship.42 Their secondary schooling might have culminated in a 
leaving certificate that – at least in New South Wales – was characterised as 
having ‘a halo around it as big as a bale of hay and worth about as much’, but 
at least that was some recognition of an educational ideal.43 Once through that 
process, they might proceed to universities – where the dwarfs mostly studied 
part-time, and for several with interruptions demanded by family or personal 
economic circumstances – which had also begun to urge bright students to see 
the public service as a worthwhile career. What was sought was a fusion (again 
in Macdonnell’s formulation, endorsed by Bland) of ‘Civil Service’ and ‘Public 
Service’. But still this did not necessarily translate into ready opportunities. 
It was only when senior university economists – such as L.F. Giblin and 
D.B. Copland – were called to advise on the urgent demands of ‘total war’ 
40  See R.D. Scott and R.L. Wetherell, ‘Public Administration as a Teaching and Research Field’, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, 29, no. 3-4 (1980): 480–1.
41  Bland, Shadows and Realities, 17, 30, 34.
42  See C. Campbell and G. Sherrington, Comprehensive Public High School: Historical Perspectives (London: 
Palgrave, 2006), 30–3.
43  A. Barcan, Two Centuries of Education in New South Wales (Kensington: UNSW Press, 1988), 249.
The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins
20
mobilisation that they could follow through on acts of patronage for their 
best students. That mentorship shaped several early careers for dwarfs and 
mandarins, but perhaps also further conditioned a sense of debt, duty, and 
deference; responsibilities to be bestowed and honoured, continuing in the spirit 
of the educations they had gained so far. These young men were disciplined and 
clever, but not encouraged to be simply smart.
In 1939, to take one example, Fred Wheeler was among those select few drawn 
into the wartime ‘kindergarten’ of junior officers in Canberra. Copland borrowed 
Wheeler, whom he had taught as a part-time commerce student, from the State 
Savings Bank of Victoria – where his placement in the loans arrears department 
offered its own exposure to the lingering hardship of the 1930s – to work with 
him as wartime Prices Commissioner, an office established early to contain the 
black-marketing and distortions of the First World War. Clearly able, Wheeler 
soon moved to a position as assistant research officer in Treasury. In a Christmas 
card to Wheeler’s wife, Copland reassured her – the gesture itself indicating 
the depth of personal patronage – that in moving to the Treasury ‘Fred has 
made an excellent impression in the office with the regular men in the Service’. 
That phrase, ‘regular men’, suggests something of the ranks into which a figure 
such as Wheeler, with (as Copland noted) his ‘economic training’, needed to fit. 
Copland continued:
If he stays in Treasury he must expect to move slowly in advancement at 
first, and the atmosphere can’t be quite the same as in Price Fixing, nor 
will the work be quite as exciting or as exacting. I have no doubts as to 
his ultimate success, but you must always remember that the glittering 
prizes seem remote at first, and are in fact remote.44
These emphases are revealing. Such tactical patience no doubt bred its own 
instincts of competition and of protecting turf. What was understood, however, 
was that a career in government might eventually offer its own ‘glittering 
prizes’ in recognition and seniority for those who at once ‘fitted in’ and slowly 
rose above.
A transformation, of sorts, had clearly begun in framing the ideal of the public 
servant, recognising the need for the kind of skills and expertise associated with 
a university education, but also for the balances to be struck in translating that 
education into practice. Care went into framing who the new, post-war public 
servant ought to be. The first post-1945 annual report of the Public Service Board 
noted a ‘distinct change’ in the functions of government during the Second 
World War. This change was characterised as a move from ‘regulation’ to the 
emerging ‘positive and constructive responsibilities’ of government. Further, 
44  D.B. Copland to P. Wheeler, 22 December 1939, Wheeler Papers, NLA MS 8096, Box 2.
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the imperative was to explain these new responsibilities to a public that was, 
as a whole, increasingly implicated in its business, from welfare to health, from 
saving to spending. In 1947, the Board presented its new identikit for the type 
of officer appropriate to these demands:
men must have an opportunity of executive practice and … to make 
mistakes before the age of 30 if they are ever to reach the ranks of 
successful executives. Delay in giving this experience often means that 
an officer is called on to take an important executive post at a time when 
he has lost the mental resilience which would make him fully effective.45
While much of this formulation was borrowed from early British advocacy (the 
threshold of 30 came from W.H. Beveridge in 1920 and was quoted by Bland), the 
emphases were distinct. The capacity to endure inter-war boredom became the 
post-war challenge of individual responsibility, to muster ‘mental resilience’. The 
test of democracy was now a more specifically defined task of framing policies 
which could secure popular consent. Equally marked was an implicit break 
from the established Australian model of public service security as a reward for 
military service. Gavin Long has calculated that the average age of enlisted men in 
1940 was 27, and even allowing for the impact of conscription in 1942, the new, 
rising public servant was clearly not intended to build on the ranks of such men.46 
The public service was to make a generational and attitudinal leap with an ethic 
embellished in the 1948 Public Service Board report:
He (the ideal public servant) is intelligent but with a full share of 
earthiness. He thrives on the gross air of everyday affairs. He has the 
common touch … he is a well-rounded, well-balanced man, broadbacked, 
with a certain simplicity of nature and the sense of proportion that goes 
with a sense of humour.
The profile went on, concluding with ‘we are looking for the sort of youngster 
who, with right handling, great care and great patience, will turn out sometime 
in his thirties or forties to be that sort of man’.47
This culture of carefully cultivated generalist professionalism sought a balance 
between qualities of personality and capacities of management. It envisaged 
officers who would back-fill the paths forged by the dwarfs and their like, and 
build a service that matched the changes they represented. This is one reason why 
the ‘seven dwarfs’ mattered so much in the dinner party conversations among 
those who were of their age, and defined themselves through what this select, and 
selected, company stood for. And in this process of consolidation, other resistances 
45  Public Service Board, Twenty-Third Annual Report (Canberra: AGPS, 1947), 7.
46  G. Long, To Benghazi (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), 58.
47  Public Service Board, Twenty-Fourth Annual Report (Canberra: AGPS, 1948), 5–6.
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relaxed. As H.F. Whitlam noted in the first Garran Memorial Oration in 1959 – a 
lecture series in itself indicating a CPS keen to reflect on its own evolution – the 
rising currency of the word ‘bureaucracy’ was becoming less the ‘continental 
nuisance’ Carlyle (and Bland) had dismissed. Its increasing currency indicated 
‘a public consciousness that more and more government power is concentrated 
in the public service’. The tasks of effectively handling those ‘positive and 
constructive’ interventions in the widening and interdependent fields of social 
and economic policy had become more generic public service attributes as post-
war prosperity settled into its own orchestrated balances and disciplines. Just as 
the ‘public administration’ Bland had taught in the inter-war years became the 
‘political science’ of the post-war years – an older instrumentalism giving way 
to a new amalgam of social, economic and political pressures to be mastered – so 
did the public servant settle into more sophisticated practices of (in Hasluck’s 
formulation) training ‘political energy into the chosen direction’.48
In the expansion of the post-war CPS – even despite Pinner’s stringency – from 
12 departments in 1939 to twice that number and nearly 160,000 under the 
Public Service Act in 1957, the time available for ‘right handling’ was both 
scarce and frugally bestowed.49 The truth of Wilson’s advice to Tange on the 
necessity of inter-departmental rivalry was hammered home in a tight control 
of staffing, let alone innovation, however much the actual composition of the 
service might have become steadily younger, better paid and better educated. 
But something of its goals can be glimpsed in the foundation of the Australian 
Administrative Staff College in 1957, by then expressing a concept of professional 
administration that united both public and private sector officers in new tasks 
of what was termed ‘statecraft’. Aspiring officials were to be assessed on their 
capacity to take ‘maximum responsibility’ as individuals called upon to judge 
and act, to delegate and manage the spread of talents beneath them, and to 
apply the precepts of vocational guidance and aptitude testing in acheiving a 
more subtle mix of task and personality in the service.50
A similar framework informed the hearings conducted in the late 1950s by the 
Committee of Inquiry into Public Service Recruitment, chaired by Sir Richard 
Boyer, as it tackled the task of developing a senior ‘administrative civil service’ 
appropriate for the times, while also noting that the prejudices against such a 
stratum had scarcely altered since the war. Boyer’s report made a strong case 
for recognition of a ‘liberal education’ alongside the dominance of economics 
as a suitable training for a ‘second division’ of administrative officers. ‘Equality 
of opportunity’, the report argued, could no longer be simply addressed by 
48  Scott and Wettenhall, ‘Public Administration as a Teaching and Research Field’, 461.
49  These figures are taken from the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Public Service Recruitment 
(Canberra: APGS, 1959), 9.
50  D.B. Copland, Administrative Staff Training: A New Frontier in Education (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1957), 
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recruitment ‘from below’ in a society in which access to education was greatly 
expanding. The opportunities that could be safely bestowed on the ‘clever sons 
of workers’ now had to be spread across a citizenry created by prosperity and its 
wise government.51 And the responsibilities of such government equally centred 
on economic stability and all that was associated with a ‘full employment goal 
and reality’ – the promise of prosperity (and its challenges to recruitment for 
what was still an often disparaged public service) on the one hand; the prospect 
of inflationary and growth-induced pressures (and their associated demands on 
public policy) on the other.52
Both the interests and pressures encompassed in Boyer’s consultations and final 
report exemplified the Keynesian contract in operation into the 1950s and later. 
That contract, clearly, had its strengths – and Boyer’s call for the more systematic 
recognition of education and talent was one element of the commitment to 
public sector reform it hoped to support. But the report and its reception also 
reflected the boundaries within which that reform might occur. A course at 
the Staff College went to only a few, and several of Boyer’s recommendations – 
including to end the marriage bar for women – were largely dismissed as ‘overly 
theoretical’, and likely to upset the fragile balance of roles and responsibilities 
in the labour market as well as in government. The spirit of Boyer’s inquiry was 
only ‘slowly and unspectacularly’ implemented by the Public Service Board, 
largely under Wheeler’s influence, through the 1960s.53
Each dwarf – and each mandarin – had their own perspectives on such challenges. 
As secretary of the Department of Labour and National Service, for example, 
Bland (the younger) was – as Tom Sheridan notes – interventionist in everything 
from executive government and the secret surveillance of industrial activists 
through to the determination of wage awards and trade union governance.54 
Bland is perhaps the least frequently mentioned/remembered of the dwarfs, in 
part because of his very equivocal relationship to Canberra – which he found 
‘incestuous’, and prone to make a ‘song and dance’ about policy – and because 
of his predisposition to step outside the world of the bureaucrat, believing that 
‘an awful lot can be achieved by having quiet lunches with people, going for 
walks in gardens and not telling the world what one is doing until the time 
is right’.55 In another perspective on the terms of rivalry, it is revealing that 
when Wheeler and Bland were under close consideration to succeed Dunk at 
the Public Service Board, Bland was dismissed as too combative and lacking 
51  Committee of Inquiry into Public Service Recruitment, Report, 10.
52  Ibid., 9.
53  See G. Caiden, ‘Administrative Reform’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 29, no. 3–4 (1980), 441.
54  T. Sheridan, ‘Regulator Par Excellence: Sir Henry Bland and Industrial Relations 1950–1967’, Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 41, no. 2 (1999), 228–55.
55  J. Farquarson, ‘Sir Henry Bland (1909–1997)’, Canberra Times, 13 November 1997, 11.
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in ‘the intellectual integrity which is the prime quality required’.56 Held in 
this balance were those elements of personal style, of the specific structures of 
government and policy networks, and of the politics of bargaining in general, 
which clearly shaped the work of the dwarfs and gave them distinct Australian 
inflections. Bland had close relations with his first minister, Harold Holt, with 
the National Civic Council of right-wing Catholic trade unionists, and with the 
then president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, Albert Monk, but less 
so with Holt’s successor, William McMahon, and the more fractured, public, 
controversialist style of politics that characterised the second half of the 1960s. 
He was, like each of the dwarfs in their own ways, of a time that was passing.
It is important to note again – as with Perkin’s sense of the political alignments of 
public sector professionalism – that the Australian aproach to cultivating these 
generalised skills of oversight and management reflected wider patterns. In his 
study of Whitehall, for example, Peter Hennessy observes similar processes in 
Britain. Hennessy’s account suggests that while the UK Home Civil Service had 
a jump on its Australian counterpart in thinking of the ‘higher bureaucracy 
… as a distinctive career’ in the inter-war years, similar ideals, constraints and 
reservations were prevalent as it adjusted to post-war circumstances. Between 
the wars, Sir Warren Fisher, permanent secretary of the Treasury, still held to the 
view that taking bright young things fresh from civil service exams was no way 
to build real bureaucratic leadership: ‘if you do that they will then get to work 
and take their little pens in their infant hands and will write away little criticisms 
of every sort and kind, very clever ones no doubt, but there is no training 
for constructive work’. It was only under the pressure of the Second World 
War, Hennessy argues, that Whitehall – like Canberra – became of necessity ‘an 
adventure playground for all the talents’. Given the interconnections of British 
elites, and perhaps the immediacy of the threat, Britain benefitted from a more 
systematic recruitment of experts than occurred in Australia.
Yet it was still the case that a range of factors saw the gains in ‘fluid, capable 
and managerial’ capacity in government won during the war sacrificed in the 
post-war years. The ‘type’ of public servant to be preferred in post-war Britain, 
whether under Labour or the Conservatives, was not – Hennessy insists – a 
figure of specialisation or expertise, of the kind that had found a place during 
the pressures of total war mobilisation. They were instead those who assumed 
a largely manufactured mantle of general professionalism, capable of containing 
processes of adjustment to post-1945 circumstances that ranged from anxieties 
over upward class mobility to concerns over the expanding welfare state. Overall, 
Hennessy argues, the result in discarding specific expertise was ‘probably the 
greatest lost opportunity in the history of British public administration’.57
56  Dunk to Crawford, 31 August 1959, Crawford Papers, NLA MS 4514, Box 81, folder headed ‘Staffing 
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Sir Henry Bland, 1966
Source: National Archives of Australia, A1200, L58484
Does this judgment apply to Australia? Is it part of the legend, and the legacy, of 
the ‘seven dwarfs’? In this survey, I have attempted only to suggest some themes 
that might be borne in mind in seeing a pattern in the more detailed accounts 
of careers and contributions that follow. Certainly, as noted at the outset, the 
land of the dwarfs was to be comprehensively challenged by the 1980s, and was 
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already under siege by the 1970s. It was threatened by a range of pressures, to 
some extent coalescing around another crucial change of government in 1972. 
Labor returned to power in that year with its own suspicions of officials still 
captive to 23 years under the Coalition, and with its own aspirations for a more 
socially representative bureaucracy, extending beyond the ‘well-balanced, 
broadbacked man’ to a figure, or figures, more attuned to the diversity then 
increasingly characterising Australian society. The ‘impartiality’ of a permanent 
head began to seem less than an asset in managing this transition, or in being 
accountable to governments embracing a more explicit mandate for change. 
Again, however, the question of balancing factors internal and external to the 
CPS should be taken into account in making sense of these pressures.
The dwarfs, while path-breakers in many ways, were also well-matched to the 
tasks their times gave them – to that balance of judgment, attitude and influence 
required to regulate that restless beast, the fully employed Australian economy. 
Bland faced industrial issues associated with those pressures very directly, if 
discretely, as did Coombs, adjusting monetary mechanisms as governor of the 
Commonwealth (later the Reserve) Bank in Sydney. In Canberra, the Treasury 
was at it all the time. Sir Richard Randall’s triumph, as its secretary, was said 
to be a campaign to cut income tax, and his responsibility for the phrasing of 
budget speeches that got the fiscal messages of admonition and exhortation right 
for a restless electorate.58 External Affairs wrestled with an attempt to boost its 
own standing in the ruck of public service recruiting, but its cultivation of 
a diplomatic intake in a highly competitive employment market never quite 
achieved the balance sought between generalist skills, the right ‘type’, and 
a representative range in backgrounds to diffuse easy jibes at elitism. Across 
the board, it remained the case, as Ruth Atkins observed, that, in the rapidly 
expanding national capital, the concept of ‘the public’ morphed seamlessly into 
that of the ‘public servant’ as a custodian, a safe pair of hands, a continuity to 
be balanced against the more uncertain commodity of ‘the private’, whether in 
politics, pressure groups or policy. Increasingly becoming the home for central 
agencies, and for the deals within government, the city itself boomed, acquired 
sophistication, and exemplified a tendency for debates over priorities and values 
to be cast in terms of disputes between departments rather than in society or 
the economy beyond them.59 As critics were to note into the 1960s – confirming 
Downing’s alarm – Canberra seemed locked in a spiral of ‘few industries and too 
much industry’, becoming more insular, and insulated, in this growth.60
58  Bulletin, 14 November 1970; see generally G. Whitwell, The Treasury Line (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
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Sir Richard Randall, 1966
Source: National Archives of Australia, A1200, L57983
Rivalries remained intense. Bastions such as the Commonwealth Club grew 
to accommodate, diffuse and civilise the jostling of many of the mandarins 
engaged in these processes (Crawford, Dunk, Brown and Tange were among 
its earliest members in 1955, although it remained more a roost for External 
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Affairs officials – perhaps self-consciously a ‘flock of homeless people’ – than for 
other departments well into the 1960s). And it was perhaps from the vantage of 
this select club that Wheeler (a member since 1960) observed that ‘the attitude, 
behaviour and standards of the corps of Permanent Heads is of far greater 
importance in determining the tone and ethos of higher Public Service than all 
the rules and regulations’.61 Style, again, mattered – by now, it was a badge of 
acceptance.
There were, however, increasing signs of fracture within this landscape. 
Boyer’s unaddressed recommendations nagged – how should the public service 
of the late 1940s and 1950s adjust to the changing world of the 1960s? An 
increasingly analytical academic and journalistic perspective on the CPS and 
on policy development more generally began wondering whether the business 
of government, as it increasingly intersected with a diversification of social 
aspirations and attitudes, was perhaps no longer best served only by the 
priorities of economic management, but needed to take advice from other fields.62
Even within the domain of economics there was pressure. Crawford, for example, 
sought, through his participation in the Committee of Economic Enquiry – 
established by the Menzies Government in 1963 under the chairmanship of 
industrial executive (Sir) James Vernon – to expand the capacity of economic 
policy to engage with the intersecting dynamics of demographic trends, 
educational opportunities, public health, physical infrastructure constraints, 
natural resource possibilities, and industrial productivity in Australia. Released 
in 1965, the Vernon Report espoused a concept of ‘growth’ which, beyond 
its material benefits, ‘endows the community with a sense of vigor and social 
purpose’. ‘Growth’ was the concept that, the committee argued, ‘will make 
it easier for the community to exercise an even more fundamental kind of 
choice’ about the conduct of their lives.63 But it also required a more concerted 
program of planning, and this was the core recommendation from Vernon that 
the government and the Treasury in particular rejected. In this stand-off came 
perhaps the most public display of the rivalries and tensions that had always 
nagged away at the company of dwarfs, but now became public, and fed into 
public questioning.
It was the ‘mauling’ of the Vernon Report – despite it being, as Crawford noted, 
only ‘mildly critical’ of the government’s record in economic management – that 
prompted the Financial Review in 1965 to bring the idea of the seven dwarfs 
61  Wheeler, ‘The Professional Career Public Servant’, 173.
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back into the spotlight. The Report was not asking for much in terms of an 
independent group of economic policy advisers. It was trying, perhaps, to achieve 
what Allen Brown had hoped to secure in the early 1950s, in salvaging the 
best of Post-War Reconstruction’s experts for the Prime Minister’s Department 
before they were scattered to other departments. Yet even in this tussle over 
the Vernon Report, the Financial Review concluded, ‘the seven dwarfs … have 
proven to be a most unradical group with a decided bias towards conservatism’. 
As individuals, in their internalised and externalised stances of (in Wheeler’s 
term) ‘self-denial’, they had not sought to recast the structures of government. 
Nor in 1965 would they enter too far into public debate – that was not their 
role.64 They tended, instead, to hold tight to the established places.
In the mid-1960s, then, the tensions that had – as Nethercote suggests – been 
with the dwarfs from the start, in their backgrounds and their dispositions, 
remained salient. But where once those tensions had been contained within 
a series of assumptions about the fit between the role and figure of the public 
servant and the settings of public policy, they now were steadily exposed by 
changes in those settings. Individual careers were far from over, but they were 
diversifying. Crawford was at ANU, building the research culture on big issues 
he had long sought within government; Brown spent a decade in diplomacy; 
Wilson became chairman of the Commonwealth Bank and QANTAS; Bland 
retired to corporate directorships, though he found time to conduct several 
government reviews and, briefly, to chair, and cut, the ABC. Coombs left the 
Reserve Bank in 1968 and became closely associated with several dimensions of 
the social and cultural questioning in Australia over the following years – in the 
arts, over the environment, and most particularly in Aboriginal affairs. Wheeler, 
securing at last the ‘glittering prize’ of becoming secretary of the Treasury in 
1971, would confront a prime minister whom he judged to be breaking with 
the proprieties that underpinned accountable government. Around Whitlam, 
as Wheeler despaired, there had clustered an ‘ebullient community … in which 
groups claim the right to push and act on the basis of self-interest, often using 
whatever power is to hand regardless of the consequence to others’.65 This was 
no way to behave; it was a fracture in all that the age of the seven dwarfs had 
represented – or a loss of control over the forces they had always feared.
In 1958, Sir Robert Garran assured readers of his memoirs that the national 
capital had long passed the point where its petty insularity could be evoked 
by the motto, ‘by their incomes you shall know them’.66 But with the passing 
of the dwarfs it was not just the austere and unimpeachable authority of a 
few wise and feared permanent heads that was slowly, at first imperceptibly, 
64  Financial Review, 12 November 1965, 3.
65  Wheeler, ‘The Professional Career Public Servant’, 179.
66  R. Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1958), 286.
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being consigned to history. It was also a way of characterising a contract of 
government, and a figure to embody it, which set a distinct stamp on formative 
processes of post-war national development. It is hard to imagine the dwarfs 
enduring the charge of presiding over a ‘“she’ll-be-right-mate” management 
and work style’ in the 1980s. It is equally hard to imagine that such a charge 
would ever have been made against them in their time; Wheeler, as Ian Hancock 
notes in his chapter, stared down parliamentary scrutiny of his actions. That 
parliament would presume to push even further into the actions of officers at 
much lower levels within departments was inconceivable – then. Yet, if the 
‘age’ of such figures now seems discontinuous with much that has followed, it 
is worth checking such nostalgia, or such dismissal, to ask instead what rose 
and fell with them in the work of government, and created the space in which 
such change was possible. The biographically informed chapters that follow go 
a long way in teasing out the extent to which the seven dwarfs were not simply 
a settled company in a faraway land, but a group characterised by tensions, 
rivalries, and ‘styles’ that were a part of transitions with long-term significance.
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The Post-War Reconstruction Project
Stuart Macintyre
Yet out of evil cometh good.
– John Dedman, tabling the White Paper  
on Full Employment1
Post-War Reconstruction is a term with a distinct Australian resonance. All of 
the participants in the Second World War had aims that informed their planning 
of arrangements for the end of hostilities. Among the Allies these goals found 
expression in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, whereby Churchill and 
Roosevelt affirmed the principles on which their countries based ‘their hopes 
for a better future for the world’. The principles included the assurance that 
‘all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and 
want’. The two freedoms were drawn from President Roosevelt’s State of the 
Union address at the beginning of 1941, and he took the other two freedoms 
it enunciated, freedom of speech and freedom of worship, as implicit in the 
Charter.2
For the first year of his premiership, Churchill had resisted any statement of 
Britain’s objectives; he said later that the planners of the post-war order should 
not overlook the recipe given in a cookery book for jugged hare, which began 
‘First catch your hare’.3 But Roosevelt’s State of the Union address was intended 
to reconcile the American public to the Lend-Lease scheme and therefore 
included a provision for free trade, which inevitably drew the Allies into 
protracted negotiations over the post-war economic order.
In any case, there were insistent pressures in wartime Britain for a post-war 
commitment, especially after the Labour Party entered the government and the 
Beveridge Report identified freedom from want as one of ‘the five giants on 
the road of reconstruction’, the others being ‘disease, ignorance, squalor and 
1  Digest of Decisions and Announcements, 103 (26 May – 14 June 1945), 11.
2  W.L. Langer and S.E. Gleason, The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy: The Undeclared War 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), chs 9, 21.
3  D. Reynolds, ‘The Atlantic “Flop”: British Foreign Policy and the Churchill–Roosevelt Meeting of August 
1941’, in D. Brinkley and D.R. Facey-Crowther, eds, The Atlantic Charter (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994), 
129–50.
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idleness’.4 Duff Cooper, the minister of information, persuaded the War Cabinet 
in August 1940 to establish a sub-committee on war aims, and Labour’s Arthur 
Greenwood assumed ministerial responsibility for the Reconstruction Committee 
in January 1941; his colleague, William Jowitt, was appointed minister in 
charge of reconstruction in February 1942. Other ministers began planning 
post-war projects and numerous non-government organisations contributed 
their own blueprints. It was the same in Canada, where the president of McGill 
University chaired an Advisory Committee on Reconstruction from 1941 to 
1943, and then C.D. Howe, a senior member of Mackenzie King’s Cabinet, was 
appointed minister of reconstruction.5 New Zealand followed a similar course of 
consultation and planning.
There was a marked similarity also in the range of activities that the Allies 
envisaged. An immediate task would be demobilisation, repatriation and 
rehabilitation of members of the armed forces, along with generous schemes 
of education and training. Then there was the conversion of the wartime 
economy to civilian production, including disposal of assets and redeployment 
of munitions workers. All the Allies embraced full employment as an official 
objective and issued statements that explained how government would manage 
the economy to sustain growth. Making good the backlog of housing was 
another priority, along with restoration of investment in industry and public 
utilities. While New Zealand and the United States had introduced measures 
of social welfare during the 1930s, they joined the other Allies in extending 
income support and increasing provision for health and education. Population 
policy was a common concern, joined to ambitious schemes of immigration. 
Town planning and community development were also prominent.
All these initiatives made for an expansion of government and an enlargement 
of citizenship, but it was only in Australia that they were comprehended under 
the rubric of post-war reconstruction. That term had restricted currency in 
the United States, which emerged from the war as the dominant world power. 
Its Gross Domestic Product doubled between 1939 and 1945, providing both 
guns and butter, and a Gallup poll early in 1945 found that only 36 per cent of 
respondents believed they had made any real sacrifice for the war.6 While the 
United States took on new international responsibilities after the war, it did 
not see any need to plan new domestic arrangements; on the contrary, the task 
was to return the country to normality as quickly as possible. Canada enjoyed 
a good war for it too served as an arsenal for the Allied forces.7 When Douglas 
4  P. Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London: Jonathon Cape, 1975; 
rev. edn, London: Pimlico, 1994), 17.
5  R. Bothwell and W. Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), ch. 12.
6  J. Gilbert, Another Chance: Postwar America, 1945-1968 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), 8.
7  The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective; Volume 2: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 
2006), 462.
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Copland, the Australian Prices Commissioner, visited Canada early in 1945, he 
was struck by the country’s prosperity – industry was booming, most goods 
were in ample supply and, when he asked what was happening in the Ministry 
of Reconstruction, he found that it was principally concerned with the disposal 
of government-owned plant and equipment.8
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, emerged from the war exhausted 
and impoverished. Reconstruction was undoubtedly necessary to make good 
the effects of the blitz, yet the Attlee Government embarked on an economic 
and social program of heroic proportions while struggling to preserve the 
country’s status as a world power. The Labour Party’s electoral program in 
1945 was entitled, Let Us Face the Future, but those who set about doing so 
coined far grander phrases: they were creating ‘The New Order’, building a 
‘New Jerusalem’ that would support all citizens ‘From Cradle to Grave’.9 Talk 
of reconstruction, so common in early wartime discussion, fell into disuse, 
partly because it reminded many Britons of the conspicuous failure of an earlier 
ministry of that name created during the First World War to redeem David Lloyd 
George’s pledge of ‘A Land Fit for Heroes’. For that matter, the associations in the 
United States were equally unattractive. The Reconstruction that followed the 
Civil War (which seems to be where the term originated) had only compounded 
the rancour of the former Confederate states.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction were included in the functions of the 
Department of Labour and National Service created in October 1940; a 
Reconstruction Division was established in that department at the end of the 
year, and in February 1941 an interdepartmental committee was formed to 
coordinate the planning. The new Labor Government attached the term to a 
variety of initiatives taken during the critical phase of the war against Japan. 
In opening the Constitutional Convention in November 1942, John Curtin 
explained that extensive new powers were required for ‘the vital task of post-
war reconstruction’. Following the undertaking by the states that they would 
transfer these powers to the Commonwealth, he formed the Department of Post-
War Reconstruction.10
By this time reconstruction had taken on an enlarged meaning. When Roland 
Wilson, who as head of the Department of Labour and National Service guided the 
initial work of the Reconstruction Division, appeared before the Parliamentary 
Committee on Social Services to explain progress, he conceded that the word 
could mean constructing again or constructing anew, but suggested that 
reconstruction should be distinguished from restoration. Its usage, he noted, 
8  ‘Notes on 1944-45 Trip’, 9 February 1945, Copland Papers, National Library of Australia (NLA) MS 3800, 
Box 152.
9  P. Clarke, The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 309.
10  Digest of Decisions and Announcements, 46 (12 November – 6 December 1942), 22.
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stretched from the ‘severely practical and rather humdrum tasks’ of beating 
swords into ploughshares to the ‘aspirations of a people to build Jerusalem in 
Australia’s brown and pleasant land’.11
It was the work of the Department of Post-War Reconstruction that gave the 
term its expanded Australian valency. New Zealand provides an instructive 
contrast for there was a marked similarity between the two countries in the 
scale of their war effort and the methods they employed to sustain it, as well 
as a close correspondence of their post-war aspirations. But New Zealand chose 
to pursue them through a Cabinet sub-committee of senior ministers and an 
executive committee of the departmental heads, coordinating activity by 
means of an Organisation for National Development located within the Prime 
Minister’s Department and generating a host of national and regional planning 
committees. This unwieldy structure was impractical and soon abandoned.12 
Canada briefly used a Department of Reconstruction, but C.D. Howe preferred 
to work through his major portfolio of Munitions and Supply, and was 
unsympathetic to the expansive schemes devised by the earlier Committee on 
Reconstruction.13 Similarly, the British Ministry remained small and devoid of 
substantial responsibilities. Accordingly the appellation fell into disuse. Few 
Australians remarked on its persistence here, and Australian historians took it 
over as a shorthand term for an epoch and an ethos.
The Department of Post-War Reconstruction contained three of the seven 
dwarfs – Dr H.C. Coombs, J.G. Crawford and Allen Brown. It emerged out of 
another department headed by a fourth dwarf, Dr Roland Wilson, and nurtured 
a remarkable number of future departmental heads – Harold Breen, John 
Bunting, Lenox Hewitt, John Knott, Cecil (Eske) Lambert, Peter Lawler, Charles 
McFadyen, William McLaren, Arthur Tange and Geoffrey Yeend. All three heads 
of the Prime Minister’s Department between 1949 and 1971 were former officers 
of Post-War Reconstruction. Established at a time when Prime Minister’s was 
little more than a secretariat and Treasury a budget office, the new department 
was able to initiate policy. It had powerful ministers in Chifley and Dedman. 
A new creation, it recruited extensively from outside the ranks of the pre-war 
public service and thus escaped the overhang of ageing ex-AIF functionaries. 
The leading officers were young university graduates who flourished as the 
Commonwealth Public Service (CPS) took on a new professionalism.
11  ‘Research on Internal Subjects, Economic and Social – Evidence Submitted to the Social Security 
Committee’, 20 June 1942, National Archives of Australia (NAA) A9816, 1943/413.
12  J.V.T. Baker, The New Zealand People at War: War Economy (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 
Department of Internal Affairs, 1965), 527–30.
13  R. Bothwell, I. Drummond and J. English, Canada since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1981), 65–9.
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H.C. Coombs with Prime Minister Ben Chifley in London, 1946
Source: National Archives of Australia, M2153, 6/2
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Yet the department was also a product of wartime improvisation, a somewhat 
belated device to bring together a number of disparate ventures. Initially, it was 
not intended to undertake administrative activities; rather, it would support 
and coordinate the work of commissions of inquiry on rural reconstruction, 
housing, public works and secondary industry (and for this reason it was 
initially designated as a ministry), and then plan their implementation by other 
departments (so that it was represented in a very wide range of interdepartmental 
committees). It soon embarked on additional activities – such as immigration, 
regional planning and community development – that were usually suggested 
by Coombs as director-general to Chifley as minister and justified by their 
relevance to the declared goals of national development, full employment and 
rising living standards. Some of the proposed commissions, such as one on 
public works, fell victim to obstruction by the states; others, such as education 
and Aboriginals, were rejected by Chifley, who enjoyed close relations with 
Coombs but remained instinctively cautious. The department also acquired 
administrative functions, some of them taken over from the Department of War 
Organisation of Industry when that department was absorbed in 1945, and then 
hived off to other departments before its abolition at the end of the decade. In 
1945 it had a staff complement of just under 1,000.14
The results were uneven. Coombs’ energetic leadership was interrupted by long 
periods abroad and some of the divisional heads lacked his political acumen. 
The failure of the Commonwealth to obtain the additional powers sought 
by referendum in 1944 necessitated reliance on the cooperation of the often 
uncooperative states; among the casualties were the housing program and the 
scheme for technical training. The abrupt conclusion of the Pacific War threw 
plans for an orderly transition into disarray. So, too, the immediate cessation 
of the Lend-Lease program, the dollar shortage and deteriorating industrial 
relations imposed severe constraints on the plans for industrial development. 
With the onset of the Cold War, a deteriorating political climate diminished the 
public support on which post-war reconstruction was premised. 
Most of all, the project was seriously handicapped by its association with 
wartime austerity. A country that was weary of manpower direction, regulation 
and rationing, expected peace to bring relief from state control. It did not help 
that Coombs had been director of Rationing and Dedman was remembered as 
the man who cancelled Christmas.
14  First Report of the Committee of Review of Civil Staffing of Wartime Activities, 27 July 1945, NAA 
M448, 105.
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John Dedman, 1941
Source: Australian War Memorial, 010015
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Closely linked to this mood of disenchantment was a suspicion of the planner. 
Joanne Pemberton has noted how the idea of planning was born out of the misery 
and chaos of the inter-war years. The wartime emergency brought intellectuals 
confident of their capacity to build a new order on the ruins of the old into new 
positions of influence, and planning achieved a ‘rhetorical dominance’.15 But 
their participation in a Labor government steeped in ancestral memories of class 
conflict meant that planning lost its earlier connotations of science and social 
progress. As demonstrated in the all-too-frequent paeans to planning delivered 
by Lloyd Ross, the director of Public Relations in the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction, it had become a political creed.16
Paul Hasluck writes in the second volume of his war history that ‘[i]n the 
public service, and on the fringes of the public service, in various agencies 
created for the purpose, there grew up towards the end of the war a group of 
persons who might best be described as the planners’. But Hasluck was himself 
an early planner, the joint secretary of the Inter-Departmental Committee on 
External Relations established in 1941, and head of the post-war section of the 
Department of External Affairs created in April 1942. He goes on to suggest that: 
The planners were a new phenomenon in Australian government and 
the administrative arrangements made for post-war reconstruction gave 
them unusual opportunities. They were a new and devout group who 
had believed in the planned state and had communed about it when 
they were only a devout few in the political catacombs, and now the 
Emperor himself had embraced their religion.17
Ronald Walker takes a different perspective. An early adviser to government on 
post-war reconstruction, and then deputy director-general of the Department of 
War Organisation of Industry, he was better placed to assess the transformation of 
the public service. In his subsequent account of The Australian Economy in War 
and Reconstruction, he noted how the sudden expansion of wartime administration 
spawned many new departments and directorates, with overlapping functions, 
inconsistent reporting lines and a maze of interdepartmental committees and 
councils to coordinate their efforts. Generally speaking, he observed, federal 
ministers took a less active part in the administration of their departments 
than their state counterparts and permanent heads carried a heavier burden of 
15  J. Pemberton, ‘The Middle Way: The Discourse of Planning in Britain, Australia and the League in the 
Interwar Years’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 52, no. 1 (2006), 48–63; ‘“O Brave New Social 
Order”: The Controversy Over Planning in Australia and Britain in the 1940s’, Journal of Australian Studies, 
83 (2004), 35–47.
16  L. Ross, ‘A New Social Order’, in D.A.S. Campbell, ed., Post-War Reconstruction in Australia (Sydney: 
Australian Publishing Company in conjunction with the Australian Institute of Political Science, 1944), 183–237.
17  P. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942–1945 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1970), 445.
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responsibility. The absence of a senior administrative class, as in Britain or the 
United States, made it necessary to recruit from business, the universities and 
the legal profession.18
In Walker’s opinion, businessmen often found it difficult to adapt to different 
methods and expectations, though they quickly acquired ‘the civil-service 
custom of appraising the status of an officer by the number of drawers in his 
desk’. The lawyers, with their familiarity with paperwork and orderly minds, 
were more easily absorbed. Academics brought a certain literary facility and 
an ability to master large bodies of information, and Walker judged them to be 
readier than businessmen to appreciate the professional qualities of the regular 
public servant. He singled out his own profession: ‘the building of the war-time 
administrative machine fell very largely to economists’.19
Walker might be thought here to be indulging in self-service, though he 
acknowledged that the economists who acquired executive duties were not 
always viewed favourably by members of the permanent public service or 
the public, which expected them to advise on policy rather than execute it. 
‘If the Australian public service were nearer the British in quality’, he added, 
‘economists would not have figured so prominently in war administration’ and 
could have made a greater contribution as expert advisers.20 L.F. Giblin, the 
father figure of the economics profession, who exercised considerable influence 
from the chair of the advisory Financial and Economic Committee, judged that 
Australian economists possessed ‘an acute political sense’. They were frequently 
‘more practical and realistic than the business men’ and thus given responsibility 
for some of the ‘most acutely practical’ administrative tasks such as price control, 
rationing and labour allocation. ‘The word of complaint or abuse is “academic”; 
but in truth they are the least academic of God’s creatures.’21
There were indeed complaints of impractical academics invading the public 
service. The director of the Associated Chamber of Manufacturers denounced 
the ‘economists, ranging in hue from full pink to deep red mostly deep red’ 
who had descended upon Canberra to impose their schemes on the nation.22 
Arthur Fadden, the leader of the Opposition, criticised the Curtin Government’s 
reliance upon ‘men who had little or no experience of business and industrial 
life’.23 His Country Party colleague, Larry Anthony, decried the ‘itch to interfere 
on the part of professors, economists and other cap-and-gown gentlemen’.24 
18  E.R. Walker, The Australian Economy in War and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1947), ch. 5.
19  Ibid., 126–8.
20  Ibid., 128.
21  L.F. Giblin, ‘Reconstruction in Australia’, Agenda: A Quarterly Journal of Reconstruction, 2, no. 3 (1943), 216. 
22  ‘Pink and Red Economists Find Sanctuary in ACT’, Canberra Times, 14 April 1943.
23  ‘Mr Fadden Attacks New Department’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 August 1943.
24  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 173 (3 February 1943), 245.
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We should remember also the advice given by Copland when the head of the 
Prime Minister’s Department asked why his assistant was occupying a bench in 
the parliamentary gardens: ‘Mr Downing does his best work in a rose garden’. 
There was also the occasion when Dick Downing, resplendent in the purple 
scarf of his Cambridge college, entered a room in Parliament House in search 
of Copland. Seeing that he was interrupting a meeting chaired by the prime 
minister, Downing withdrew. ‘Tell me’, asked John Curtin, ‘who was that very 
distinguished-looking gentleman with a bath-towel round his neck?’ Informed 
that it was the assistant economic consultant to the prime minister, his only 
comment was ‘Oh, indeed’.25
These observations have particular relevance for the dwarfs and other senior 
public servants whose careers progressed through the Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction. Many of them were economists seconded to government duty 
in an advisory role, sometimes from universities and sometimes – like Coombs, 
Crawford and Tange – from banks. They soon became administrators and were 
caught up in the tangled web of wartime decision-making. Some returned 
subsequently to academic posts, while others stayed on to put their stamp 
on public policy over the following decades. And perforce their duties in the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction meant that they were all planners.
In the space that is available to me I shall trace out these patterns in the formative 
wartime years. I suggest there were two phases. The first lasted from late 1940 to 
the end of 1942, when the planning of post-war reconstruction was neglected 
and ineffective. The second begins with the advent of Coombs as director-
general of the new department, when planning became an urgent necessity.
The Menzies Government made provision for planning reconstruction as a result 
of its political difficulties. Following the election in September 1940, the Coalition 
lacked a majority in the House of Representatives. After protracted negotiations 
with Labor failed to secure a wartime National government, Menzies acceded to the 
conditions that Curtin attached to his support of the war effort – that there should 
be an Advisory War Council and that a start should be made on reconstruction 
planning. Hence a Reconstruction Division was included in the newly formed 
Department of Labour and National Service. At the beginning of 1941, Menzies 
formally requested Harold Holt, the minister, to investigate the tasks of post-
war reconstruction and especially the re-employment of servicemen and war 
workers. Holt explained that the investigation would need to be coordinated with 
other federal departments and the Cabinet approved establishment of an Inter-
Departmental Advisory Committee on Reconstruction.26
25  N. Brown, ‘“Mr Downing Does His Best Work in a Rose Garden”: An Economist in Canberra in the 
1940s’, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, 80 (September 1996): 33–45; G. Firth to H. Arndt, 4 June 
1976, Firth Papers, NLA Acc. 01/273, Box 9A.
26  Minister for Labour and National Service, ‘Co-ordination of Reconstruction Planning’, 7 February 1941, 
NAA A9816/3, 1943/550; see also Holt in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 165 (4 December 1940), 438.
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Dr H.C. (Nugget) Coombs, 1942
Source: Australian War Memorial, 136412
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Ronald Wilson accordingly invited representatives of the service departments, 
Postmaster-General’s, Supply and Development, Trade and Customs, the 
Treasury, the Tariff Board, the Prices Commissioner, the Coordinator-General of 
Works, the Repatriation Commission, the Financial and Economic Committee and 
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to a first meeting. The 
committee that assembled in Canberra on 14 March 1941 is more aptly described 
as a conference. It was chaired by Holt, with Herbert Evatt – the former justice 
of the High Court who had recently arrived in the House of Representatives 
and was impatient for office – accepting appointment as director of research 
and serving as the deputy chair. After noting some dimensions of the task, the 
participants decided that specialist sub-committees should pursue them.27
This was the first and last meeting of the Advisory Committee. In its aftermath a 
number of departmental heads submitted statements amplifying the views they 
had expressed at the meeting and suggesting how the sub-committees might 
proceed. Several were anxious to volunteer their services (so the Tariff Board 
took charge of investigating the post-war prospects for industry) and others 
warned the Advisory Committee from trespassing (hence the secretary of the 
Department of the Interior insisted that the committee should not concern itself 
with migration, and Wilson had to remind him that his department had joined 
its deliberations at the express request of his minister).28 Giblin, as the chair of 
the Financial and Economic Committee, and Copland, as Prices Commissioner, 
provided perceptive comments about economic aspects of reconstruction, while 
David Rivett, as head of the CSIR, offered the mordant observation that ‘the 
only completely satisfactory manner of dealing with unemployment’ seemed 
to be war. He also remarked on the paradox of reconstruction in its Australian 
usage: ‘Reconstruction implies prior destruction. So far there has not been much 
destruction here … We can therefore to an extent determine our immediate 
“destruction” for war purposes, with an eye to reconstruction.’29
Six sub-committees were constituted, and the one that made most substantial 
progress was the Inter-Departmental Committee on External Relations, which 
worked with Treasury, External Affairs and the Financial and Economic 
Committee on the implications of Article VII of the Lend-Lease scheme, which 
pledged Australia and other beneficiaries of American assistance to liberalise trade 
restrictions. The states agreed to begin their own post-war planning, but a mid-
year meeting of their liaison officers in Canberra revealed a low level of activity. 
27  ‘Report of the First Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Reconstruction’, NAA A9816/3, 
1943/553. 
28  Statement by Tariff Board, 22 April 1941, NAA A9816/3, 1943/555; J.A. Carrodus, Secretary of the 
Department of the Interior, to R. Wilson, 2 October 1941, and Wilson to Carrodus, 24 November 1941, NAA 
A9816/3, 1943/441.
29  D. Rivett, ‘Notes’, NAA A9816/3, 1943/555.
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The universities were enlisted to undertake investigation of aspects of 
reconstruction, using a Commonwealth grant for social science research that 
Roland Wilson established, but this too was of limited utility.
These activities were coordinated by the Reconstruction Division of the 
department, which was also responsible for gathering and disseminating 
information. The Division consisted of a small group of research officers 
recently recruited to the public service: P.W.E. (‘Pike’) Curtin, a contemporary 
of Coombs who had studied at the London School of Economics; P.R.H. (‘Perce’) 
Judd, formerly economics teacher at Adelaide High; L.F. (‘Fin’) Crisp, who 
studied economics at Oxford as a Rhodes scholar until the outbreak of war; 
G.G. (Gerald) Firth, an Englishman who had come to Australia as a research 
fellow in the economics department of the University of Melbourne; and A.H. 
(Arthur) Tange, an economics graduate of the University of Western Australia 
who had worked for the Bank of New South Wales. Curtin and Judd were in 
their early thirties, the others still in their twenties. Their location in the Old 
Hospital Building in Canberra separated them from the rest of the department in 
Melbourne, though they were encouraged and assisted by E.R. Richard (‘Dick’) 
Hayward, formerly personal assistant to Wilson and now assistant-director of 
the Industrial Welfare Division, and K.C.O. (‘Mick’) Shann, Wilson’s current 
assistant. They dealt principally with young and rising officers of the public 
service in Canberra, notably Fred Wheeler in the Treasury and John Burton, who 
had moved from Labour and National Service to External Affairs in the previous 
year. The Division’s other function, encouraging the study of reconstruction 
throughout the community, was hampered by the reluctance of the Cabinet to 
authorise publication of the literature it prepared.30
The change of government in October 1941 brought no greater urgency. Eddie 
Ward, the new minister, showed a conspicuous lack of interest in this part of 
his portfolio and had to be prodded by Chifley to revive the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on External Relations so that Australia could establish its position 
on Article VII for imminent negotiations.31 Ward also allowed the Tariff Board 
to retain responsibility for advising on the post-war conversion of wartime 
industries, a task for which it was ill equipped.32 Chifley showed increasing 
interest in reconstruction during 1942, as did the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Social Security. Its fifth report, presented in October 1942, stressed the need 
for a comprehensive plan, criticised the Inter-Departmental Committee as too 
30  Weekly reports of Division’s activities, August–November 1941, NAA A9861/3, 1943/743.
31  Chifley to Ward, 18 March 1942, NAA A9816/3, 1943/441.
32  Ward, Cabinet submission, 5 May 1942, NAA M4481, 109.
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unwieldy to direct and coordinate such planning, and recommended a minister 
be given responsibility with the assistance of a new National Planning and 
Coordination Committee.33
Throughout 1942 the officers of the Reconstruction Division chafed at the 
restrictions they encountered. Arthur Tange, who joined it in February 1942, 
later recalled that ‘I more than once wondered just what was expected of us 
and what purpose I was serving’. There was almost no direction from above – 
the Cabinet was preoccupied with the war crisis, Wilson was more than fully 
occupied, and if anyone had stopped a minister or senior officer in a corridor 
and said he wanted to talk about post-war housing, rural reconstruction or 
other such matter, ‘he was probably in peril of his life’.34
Gerald Firth, who shared the feeling of futility, sought solace from Giblin and 
Copland, his former colleagues at the University of Melbourne. With Giblin’s 
encouragement, he hit upon the idea of ‘handing the whole show’ over to 
Coombs, who was at that time adviser to the Treasury. Firth could see one 
impediment to such an arrangement, the unlikelihood that the head of Treasury, 
Stuart McFarlane, would accept responsibility for reconstruction. He did not 
see another, the fact that Coombs was about to become director of Rationing. 
Nevertheless, early in April 1942, he approached Coombs, who suggested 
that it might be possible to resolve the problem ‘by getting Chifley to take on 
Reconstruction more or less as a separate portfolio – Coombs being responsible 
in regard to reconstruction’.35 Firth assumed that Coombs’ appointment a 
week later nullified the scheme but, from this point, Chifley assumed greater 
responsibility for reconstruction. In May, he took a submission prepared by the 
Reconstruction Division for the creation of a Rural Reconstruction Commission 
to Cabinet, and in August he was appointed to the chair of a new Cabinet sub-
committee to coordinate and direct reconstruction planning.36
The only remaining obstacle to creation of a department was the prime minister. 
Throughout 1942 John Curtin was preoccupied by the threat of invasion 
and wanted no distraction from the urgent tasks of national mobilisation. As 
late as September 1942, he insisted that the government had no intention of 
establishing a ministry of reconstruction.37 If backbenchers such as Arthur 
Calwell were prepared to challenge Curtin – and Calwell claimed credit for the 
33  T.H. Kewley, Social Security in Australia 1900–1972 (2nd edn, Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1973), 
176–9.
34  Arthur Tange, interviewed by J.D.B Miller, 1–23 April 1981, NLA TRC 1023; and see his memo to 
Coombs, 8 February 1942, Crisp Papers, NLA MS 5243/12/2.
35  Firth diary, 9–10 April 1942, NLA, Acc. 01/273.
36  Cabinet submission on ‘Rural Reconstruction’, NAA M448/1, 109; Digest of Decisions and Announcements, 
36 (26 July – 10 August 1942), 14.
37  Digest of Decisions and Announcements, 43 (17–28 September 1942), 19.
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resolution calling for a department of post-war reconstruction carried at the 
federal conference of the Labor Party in November 1942 – Chifley would not 
gainsay the leader he served so faithfully.38
It would seem that Roland Wilson played a decisive role. This most diminutive 
of the seven dwarfs, aptly described by Gerald Firth as a ‘redoubtable little 
bastard’, could see that his minister was wholly unsympathetic to the work of 
the Reconstruction Division.39 Eddie Ward, the minister for Labour and National 
Service, was preoccupied with industrial relations, frequently clashing with 
Cabinet colleagues as he sought to strengthen the position of trade unions. Ward 
had little time for economists, whom he blamed for their part in designing the 
Premiers’ Plan during the Depression, and he was suspicious of grandiose talk 
of a new social order. ‘There is only one new order acceptable to the workers’, he 
said in the House of Representatives during discussion of the Atlantic Charter, 
and ‘that is the social ownership and control of production, distribution and 
exchange’.40 Despairing of the inaction, Wilson met with Curtin sometime in 
the spring of 1942 and advised him that reconstruction should be taken out 
of Labour and National Service and put into a new department with Coombs 
as its director. Curtin accepted the proposal and advised Wilson to see Chifley 
and talk him into accepting responsibility for it.41 It is clear that Chifley was 
predisposed to agree and, on 22 December 1942, he was appointed minister for 
Post-War Reconstruction.42
Two months earlier, Chifley had asked Coombs for advice about how the new 
entity might operate. The two men had already devised the Rural Reconstruction 
Commission as a mechanism for consultation, investigation and planning; a 
commission could be established under the national security regulations, gather 
evidence in a manner that allowed interested parties to put their case, yet 
operate with a level of autonomy that would protect it from capture by vested 
interests. Coombs envisaged additional commissions on secondary industries, 
housing, public works, education and Aboriginal policy. In providing these 
commissions with technical and research support, officers of the department 
would guide and direct them; collectively they would comprise a ‘central 
reconstruction secretariat’ that would ensure coherence. The problem exercising 
Coombs was implementation. It would be necessary to ensure the cooperation of 
other departments responsible for activities involved in reconstruction, and he 
38  A. Calwell in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 170 (6 May 1942), 913–14; and letter to Coombs, 
19 January 1942, NAA M448/1, 39.
39  Firth diary, 11 November 1940.
40  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 168 (21 August 1941), 99.
41  This account was given by Wilson in discussion at the 1981 Conference on Post-War Reconstruction; 
NLA TRC 1096.
42  Digest of Decisions and Announcements, 46 (12 November – 6 December 1942), 21–9; 48 (8–18 December 
1942), 17.
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thought this was best pursued through ‘joint projects’. But the body responsible 
for reconstruction could not be simply ‘another Commonwealth department’, 
and should report directly to the treasurer.43
To emphasise that it was not another department, Post-War Reconstruction 
began as a ministry, that title encompassing the link between the commissions 
of inquiry and the research and administrative apparatus that served them. But 
as the commissions completed their work, they were replaced by departmental 
divisions (hence the Rural Division and the Secondary Industries Division) 
so that Post-War Reconstruction became a department, albeit one that was 
intended from the outset to have a finite existence. Its functions encompassed the 
preparation of plans for the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy, 
along with a collaborative role in re-establishment of members of the services 
and war workers; the disposal of wartime buildings, plant and equipment; 
the maintenance and expansion of employment and the national income; the 
prevention of want and attainment of social security; and the development and 
conservation of the country’s resources.
Coombs canvassed his ideas among colleagues and knowledge of his new role 
spread well in advance of its announcement. Ronald Walker wrote to Chifley 
early in November 1942 to welcome the Government’s new resolve and endorse 
the combination of commissions and a ‘central reconstruction secretariat’. While 
acknowledging the prior reluctance to embark on post-war reconstruction 
planning for fear of provoking domestic disunity, he warned that ‘business men 
are already busy with their own plans to better their position in the post-war 
period’, and stressed the urgency of mobilising public support for a genuine 
reconstruction.44
Coombs needed no such persuasion of the importance of public support. As 
Tim Rowse has explained, he paid particular attention to this aspect of the 
work of the Rationing Commission,45 and had already advised Chifley that the 
reconstruction organisation would need ‘to provide a channel through which 
public and sectional desire for reconstruction can flow and canalise this political 
energy into effective channels and prevent the development of a sense of 
frustration’. At this formative stage he took advice from Brian Fitzpatrick, then 
working as industrial liaison and research officer for the Rationing Commission, 
who reinforced the importance of stiffening morale.46 He seems also to have been 
briefly impressed by the enigmatic Alf Conlon, who, in May 1942, had persuaded 
43  Coombs, memorandum to Chifley, 22 October 1942, NAA M448/1, 109. 
44  Walker to Chifley, 6 November 1942, NAA A9816/3, 1943/787.
45  T. Rowse, Nugget Coombs: A Reforming Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 92–9.
46  B. Fitzpatrick, ‘Notes for Submission to the Honourable the Treasurer on Post-War Reconstruction 
Planning Organisation’, n.d. [October 1941], NAA M481/1, 109; see also letters to Coombs, 27 September, 
13 October 1942, Fitzpatrick Papers, NLA MS 4965/6/1-7.
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Curtin to establish a Committee on National Morale ‘responsible directly to the 
prime minister and consisting only of distinguished and disinterested minds’ 
– though the prime minister’s confidence in these experts was dispelled by 
their overblown proposal at the end of the year for a ‘National Public Relations 
Service’ with an annual budget of more than £1,000,000.47 The new department 
embarked on a range of activities to publicise its work – publications, broadcasts, 
service education – and established a substantial network of discussion groups.
The central office of the department was in Canberra, along with a policy and 
research division, but most of the commissions and the divisions that carried 
out the work were based in Melbourne and Sydney. First came the Rural 
Reconstruction Commission, announced on New Year’s Day; the Reconstruction 
Training Committee was formed in March 1943, the Housing Commission 
in April, the National Works Council in July and the Secondary Industries 
Commission in October 1943. The department also inherited some initiatives, 
such as the Universities Commission, which was incorporated into an Office 
of Education in 1945. In the same year it absorbed the Department of War 
Organisation of Industry.
Other components of reconstruction were undertaken elsewhere. Hence the 
department played little part in the expansion of social services, which began 
with child endowment under the Menzies Government and extended to widows’ 
pensions, the National Welfare fund, unemployment and sickness benefits, free 
medicine and hospital care. It was given responsibility for preparation of the 
White Paper on Full Employment, which lagged behind similar statements in 
Britain, the United States and Canada; and Coombs failed to carry one of his 
most ambitions proposals, a Department of Economic Planning.
No attempt will be made here to assess the work of these agencies.48 Rather, 
I shall venture some observations about the way the department worked that 
have implications for the era of the seven dwarfs.
My first observation is that Australia came late to the task of planning 
reconstruction. Coombs had scarcely begun his appointment as director-general 
before he was sent abroad to advise Evatt on negotiations in London, Washington 
and Hot Springs on post-war economic proposals, leaving Leslie Melville of the 
47  ‘Report of Committee on Civilian Morale’, n.d. [April 1942], and ‘Plan for National Public Relations 
Service’, n.d. [January 1943], NAA A5954, 328/21.
48  See H. Gallagher, We Got A Fair Go: A History of the Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme, 
1945-1952 (Melbourne: H. Gallagher, c. 2003); E. Jones, ‘Post-World War Two Industry Policy: Opportunities 
and Constraints’, Australian Economic History Review, 42, no. 3 (November 2002), 312–33; T. Whitford and 
D. Boadle, ‘Australia’s Rural Reconstruction Commission, 1943–46: A Reassessment’, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, 54, no. 4 (December 2008), 525–44; A.W. Martin and J. Penny, ‘The Rural Reconstruction 
Commission, 1943-1947’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 29, no. 2 (1983), and other papers 
presented at the 1981 Conference on Post-War Reconstruction.
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Commonwealth Bank in charge of the new ministry. It was here that Coombs first 
expounded his ‘positive approach’ to Article VII of the Mutual Aid agreement, 
which linked domestic policies of full employment to the reduction of trade 
barriers, and he also found time to investigate the organisation of reconstruction 
planning in Britain. Reporting the failure of Jowitt’s ‘reconstruction secretariat’ 
to exert any influence over the separate endeavours of various departments, he 
advised Chifley in July 1943 that ‘[t]his experience throws a lot of light on the 
problems which lie ahead of us’. But it would be some months before he could 
tackle them.49
The original idea was that the ‘central reconstruction secretariat’ would operate in 
tandem with the commissions, but in practice it lagged behind their investigations 
while they in turn were late in submitting the reports that were needed to set 
administrative arrangements in train. Coombs took care with his appointments 
– he sought out economics graduates such as Trevor Swan and Noel Butlin, and 
fought hard to secure the services of Flora Eldershaw – but sometimes had to 
make do with what he could get. One key appointment, that of Lloyd Ross as 
director of Public Relations, was imposed on him by the prime minister.
The recruitment of John Crawford revealed the flaws in the ministry’s design. 
Crawford was working for the Rural Bank of New South Wales, and advising 
the Department of War Organisation of Industry, when Coombs invited him to 
become executive officer of the Rural Reconstruction Commission in January 1943. 
Crawford was wary of the ambiguities in this role, quickly fell out with members 
of the commission (whom he accused of ‘preconceived and stupid prejudices’) 
and within two months was threatening to resign. Coombs arranged for Crawford 
to become director of the Research Division, and his de facto deputy.50 When 
this dwarf left to become director of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in 
1945, his replacement was Allen Brown, an equally redoubtable bureaucratic 
infighter. Crawford and Brown honed their skills in the maze of interdepartmental 
committees – the department was represented on a score of them by 1945 – but 
other divisional heads with more specialist expertise struggled.
The director-general was absent for long periods after the war, representing 
Australia in international negotiations over finance and trade, but he alone 
was able to resolve the frequent disputes with other departments. ‘You must 
remember’, Firth advised a scholar investigating the history of post-war 
reconstruction, ‘that in his prime Coombs was able to charm birds out of trees’.51 
Tange recalled Coombs as idealistic and rather romantic, but ‘one of the most 
persuasive men that I have ever met’.52 Alan Renouf, who accompanied Coombs 
49  Coombs to Chifley, 12 July 1943, NAA M448/1, 109.
50  Correspondence between Crawford and Coombs, 21 January – 30 March 1943, NAA M448/1, 39.
51  G. Firth to M. Howard, 14 February 1975, NLA MS Acc. 01/273, Box 9A.
52  A. Tange, interviewed by J.D.B. Miller, March 1981, NLA TRC 1023.
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at the Havana Trade Conference, knew of no other Australian who exercised the 
same measure of intelligence, charm and persuasion.53 His special relationship 
with Chifley enabled him to overcome Treasury resistance to some of the programs 
prepared by Post-War Reconstruction, but not all of them – his proposals for 
community centres and special assistance to women with family responsibilities 
were among the casualties. After 1945, when Chifley passed the portfolio to 
Dedman but kept the Treasury, he was increasingly inclined to follow its advice. 
R.H. Tawney’s comment on the British experience after the First World War – 
‘For five years the Treasury had led a forlorn life. Now it crept from its corner 
making mournful noises’ – had special force in Australia from 1945.54
A further difficulty was the uncertainty about the Commonwealth’s powers for 
post-war reconstruction. At the Constitutional Convention in November 1942 
the states undertook to transfer a wide range of powers, but in February 1943 
the South Australian Parliament amended the enabling bill and it soon became 
apparent that other methods would be required. With an election due before 
the end of the year, however, Curtin was anxious to allay accusations that these 
powers would be used to impose socialism by stealth. Speaking at the Fremantle 
Town Hall on 29 April 1943, he declared that ‘we have not socialised Australia 
and we don’t intend to do so’.55 Moreover, he was still adamant that invasion 
remained a real threat. Launching the third Liberty Loan on 28 March 1943, the 
prime minister said:
I am not interested in the kind of world we are to have when the war is 
over. I have given thought to it, but I do not delude myself. You need not 
worry about the Beveridge plan … or Mr Chifley in his important task 
of reconstruction unless Japan is beaten.56
By June, Curtin was ready to concede that the imminent danger had passed, 
and in the subsequent election campaign he made much of Labor’s plans for 
a new peacetime order. Yet it was not until August 1944 that the government 
sought the transfer of powers by referendum. That Curtin allowed Evatt to draft 
the terms of the referendum (especially the provision that all 14 powers should 
stand or fall together) and conduct the campaign remains a mystery.
The defeat of the referendum left the government reliant on wartime powers 
due to expire six months after the end of hostilities. This limitation bedevilled 
almost every field of reconstruction but its hampering effects were apparent long 
before the plebiscite. Many arrangements had to be determined during 1943 
53  A. Renouf, The Champagne Trail: Experiences of a Diplomat (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1980), 37.
54  R.H. Tawney, ‘The Abolition of Economic Controls’, Economic History Review, 13, no. 1–2 (1943), 1–30.
55  Digest of Decisions and Announcements, 58 (12 April – 13 May 1943), 29.
56  Ibid., 56 (4 March – 1 April 1943), 43.
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and the first half of 1944 at meetings with the state premiers, and necessitated a 
series of debilitating compromises. The failure to catch the wartime enthusiasm 
for reconstruction at its flood was costly.
The problem was compounded by ministerial rivalries. Dedman, who hoped 
in 1942 that he would be given responsibility for reconstruction, maintained 
a millenarian fervour that contrasted with Chifley’s more restrained advocacy. 
Coombs suggested that his minister make an early statement of the broad 
objectives, and provided a draft. ‘There is a danger’, it warned, ‘that 
reconstruction will become a magic word and create dreams that cannot be 
realised’.57 The minister became more expansive after the 1943 election removed 
these constraints, though tight controls were maintained on statements from 
departmental staff.
The machinations of Evatt were far more damaging. His interest in post-war 
reconstruction fluctuated after his initial appointment in 1941 as director of 
research, which was conspicuously unproductive. Through John Burton, he kept 
up an interest during 1942 in the Inter-Departmental Committee on External 
Relations. As attorney-general, he was responsible for preparing the Constitutional 
Convention and summoned Crisp and Firth to join a team of public servants in 
Melbourne who prepared a lengthy Case for Greater Commonwealth Powers.58 
Evatt came late to an appreciation of the ‘positive approach’ to international 
economic arrangements, but took it up as part of his endeavour to assert an 
Australian influence in world affairs. To this end he had Tange transferred to the 
Department of External Affairs as a liaison officer early in 1944.59
Evatt’s ally, J.A. Beasley, represented Australia at the International Labour 
Organization conference at Philadelphia in April 1944; against the advice of the 
economists, Beasley pursued an explicit commitment to full employment so ham-
fistedly that the Americans withdrew their support for a broader endorsement. 
When the Australians did not get their way at the United Nations Monetary 
and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods in July 1944, Evatt instructed the 
delegation led by Leslie Melville not to sign the final record. It was fortunate 
that Roland Wilson accompanied Evatt and Frank Forde, the deputy prime 
minister, to the founding meeting of the United Nations at San Francisco in 
1945, for Wilson was conspicuously immune to browbeating, but Evatt persisted 
nevertheless in inserting a weak provision for full employment into the United 
57  Coombs to Chifley, ‘Draft Policy Broadcast’, 20 April 1943, NAA M448/1, 109; Chifley’s use of these 
words is recorded in the transcript of his broadcast on 17 May 1943, Dedman Papers, NLA MS 987/1/508.
58  H.V. Evatt, Post-War Reconstruction: A Case for Greater Commonwealth Powers Prepared for the 
Constitutional Convention at Canberra (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1942); the minutes of the editorial 
committee are in the Fitzpatrick Papers, NLA MS 4965/6/86-92.
59  Tange to Crawford, ‘Liaison Work in External Affairs’, NAA M448/1, 110. 
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Nations Charter that lacked any machinery for its realisation.60 Evatt was a 
constant vexation to Curtin; the normally imperturbable Chifley referred to him 
as ‘my learned and no doubt very able friend down the passage’.61
The rise of the seven dwarfs brought economists into senior administrative 
posts, but they remained answerable to their ministers and the Cabinet, and it 
was their skill in managing this relationship that enabled them to prosper. There 
is an instructive contrast with James Brigden, the secretary of the Department 
of Munitions, who was dismissed after he clashed with his minister. Brigden 
(born in 1887), along with Copland (1894), Giblin (1872) and Richard Mills 
(1886), was one of the cohort of older economists who occupied important posts 
in the wartime government; but they came late to public service and did not 
aspire to build careers in it. They did nurture the careers of younger economists 
such as Coombs (born 1906), Crawford (1910) and Wilson (1904), who rose to 
prominence during the war and who by 1945 had overtaken their mentors 
in rank and influence. Giblin accepted this transformation readily; hence his 
recommendation of Coombs to Keynes as ‘a good fellow, solid, no frills, no 
disturbing ego, very reasonable, though there is ground where I – Wilson also – 
cannot follow him’.62 Copland found the supersession more difficult. 
Those economists, younger still, who began their public service careers in the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction encountered a particular challenge. As 
Tange would recall, ‘We in PWR were seen as inexperienced new boys wearing 
fancy academic dress, theorising without the benefit of ever having negotiated 
a tariff agreement or a bulk commodity arrangement’.63 Some reverted to 
academic dress – hence Firth, Butlin, Swan and Crisp, the last head of the 
department before its abolition in 1950. Others stayed on to apply their newly 
acquired skills to departmental administration. At the outbreak of war the 
Commonwealth Public Service consisted of 47,000 persons; by the last years of 
the war it had doubled in size and in the post-war period it continued to grow. 
In the course of the war 17 new departments were created as the Commonwealth 
began a lasting involvement in banking, employment, primary and secondary 
industries, shipping and transport, power, irrigation, health and social services. 
To direct these activities a new cadre of senior public servants was required, 
skilled in policy, administration and the exercise of power. This was the setting 
for the seven dwarfs.
60  The fullest account is S.R. Turnell, ‘Monetary Reformers, Amateur Idealists and Keynesian Crusaders: 
Australian Economists’ International Advocacy 1925–50’, PhD thesis, Macquarie University, 1999.
61  As reported by E.H. Cox, 1 November 1946, Cox Papers, NLA MS 4554.
62  Quoted in W. Coleman, S. Cornish and A. Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon: The Trials and Triumph of the 
Economist in Australian Public Life (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006), 178, n. 9. 
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Australia and the Keynesian 
Revolution
Alex Millmow
When the Nobel prize-winning economist Joe Stiglitz visited Australia in 2010 
he commended the Rudd Government’s policy response to the Global Financial 
Crisis as a proper and effective pre-emptive measure. The stimulus, which staved 
off any creeping sign of recession, bore a considerable Treasury imprint; and it 
could be said that the official family of economic advisers, that is, the Treasury 
and the Reserve Bank of Australia, were in their concerted action never so 
Keynesian in practice. It is appropriate then to visit the Keynesian revolution in 
post-war Australia recalling that three of the mandarins, Roland Wilson, John 
Crawford and H.C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs, were professionally trained economists. 
Moreover, as J.K. Galbraith reminds us, the Keynesian revolution was really a 
‘mandarin revolution’, that is, an intellectually powered one.
The romanticist and rationalist account usually attributes the arrival of the 
Keynesian revolution in Australia to the outbreak of the Second World War and 
the enforced mobilisation of resources. While Keynes wanted America to be the 
laboratory where his new doctrines could be tested, it is a little known fact that 
it was Australia that proved the true testing ground. Australian economists were 
ahead of their counterparts elsewhere in adopting Keynes’ insights into demand 
management, not just to prosecute the war but also to avoid any reoccurrence 
of depression. It was in November 1939, though, that a Keynesian revolution in 
economic policy may be said to have ‘arrived’ in this country. Like all revolutions 
it was to become compromised and sidetracked by political exigencies. One 
figure who saw this process was the New Zealand-born economist Douglas 
Copland, whose dissenting views on post-war economic management punctuate 
the second half of this chapter.
Usually the so-called ‘golden age’ of Keynesian economic management is 
associated with the years 1945 to 1973, after which the Keynesian consensus 
became unstuck as the anchors underpinning it came loose. However, as 
Selwyn Cornish has pointed out, even the first seven years of that period were 
pockmarked by policy error, aberrations and a reluctance to use market-friendly 
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policies.1 This chapter adopts Cornish’s approach and extends it to the 1960 
credit squeeze and beyond, showing how acceptance of Keynesian economic 
management always came second to politics.
Sir Douglas Berry Copland, 1951
Source: National Library of Australia, nla.pic-vn3942118
1  S. Cornish, ‘The Keynesian Revolution in Australia: Fact or Fiction’, Australian Economic History Review, 
33, no. 2 (1993).
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This chapter is divided into four parts. The first provides a little detail on the 
small Australian economics community that spearheaded the acceptance of 
Keynes’ doctrine on national income determination. The second part concerns 
how economists received Keynes and sought to impart change in the policy 
settings up to the early stages of the Second World War. It briefly describes the 
mobilisation of economic expertise into the Australian war effort – a mobilisation 
of economics expertise far ahead of Britain and America at the time. The third and 
fourth parts address post-war economic issues using and examining, for instance, 
the debate about full employment but from the view of Copland who had, since 
war’s end, been largely excluded from policy making circles. The last part of the 
chapter offers a retrospective about the revolution in economic practice.
The inter-war Australian economics community
The leading economists of the inter-war period were an extraordinary bunch 
of men. The two most significant figures, Douglas Copland and L.F. Giblin, 
were larger than life. Giblin was described as having the body of a prizefighter 
and being a natural leader of men. There have, in the last few years, been two 
monographs celebrating their contribution. One, Giblin’s Platoon, celebrates the 
rise of the Australian economics profession through the lens and activities of 
Giblin.2
The other monograph, The Power of Economic Ideas, delves into the origins 
of macroeconomic management largely through the lens of Copland who was 
Foundation Dean of the Faculty of Commerce at the University of Melbourne.3 
Only he had formal, systematic training in economics.4 Copland noted how 
his contemporaries were free of academic reserve and willing to enter into the 
fray of public debate. He would later remark that the post-Second World War 
generation of economists did not have the same gusto to enter into the fray of 
policy making.5 This was partly because the Commonwealth Government had 
established its own pool of economic expertise after 1945.6
2  W. Coleman, S. Cornish and A. Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon: The Trials and Triumph of the Economist in 
Australian Public Life (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006).
3  A.J. Millmow, The Power of Economic Ideas: The Origins of Macroeconomic Management in Australia 
(Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010).
4  S.J. Butlin, ‘The Hundredth Record’, Economic Record, 42, no. 100 (1966), 509.
5  D.B. Copland, Inflation and Expansion (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1951), 9–10.
6  M. Corden, Australian Economic Policy Discussion: A Survey (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1968), 58–9.
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Professor L.F. Giblin, portrait by Sir William Dobell, c1945
Source: University of Melbourne Archives, UMA/I/1026
While the inter-war generation of economists were great practitioners they 
were not renowned as theoretical innovators. The genius of inter-war Australian 
economists came in adopting theoretical tools to deal with these problems. 
Giblin summed up the axioms and values that characterised his contemporaries:
In Australia economists are a peculiar tribe. Rarely are they nourished 
by the pure milk of the word. Mostly they have been advisers to 
governments for many years – permanently or intermittently, publicly 
or privately. Governments do not love them but are inclined to believe 
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them honest … They are frequently more practical and realistic than 
businessmen … They are resented, of course, by sectional business 
interests. The word of complaint or abuse is ‘academic’; but, in truth, 
they are the least academic of God’s creatures.7
Following the relative success of the Premiers’ Plan, Keynes invited Copland to 
give the 1933 Marshall lectures at Cambridge. As the ‘public relations man of 
Australian economics’, Copland reported on the rehabilitation of Australia from 
near bankruptcy to one of the first economies to recover from the Depression.8 
The process had been helped by having four key economic agencies coming 
under the influence of independent economic advice. One of those tribunals, 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Court, ordered the emergency wage cut of 
10 per cent in 1931.
Copland was the expert witness appointed by the Court to urge the necessity 
for wage cuts. This advice confirmed Labor opinion that Copland was in the pay 
of employers and the banks. And they would never let Copland forget it. In the 
post-war years Arthur Calwell and Bert Evatt made reference to it, though the 
former, more kindly, could not believe how much Copland had changed. This 
was a Copland trademark: to change his position and be open to charges of 
inconsistency.
By the mid-1930s Australia was regarded by one Indian economist, B.P. Adarkar, 
as ‘the Utopia of practical economists’ because problems like wage fixation, tariff 
setting, monetary management and federal finance were dealt in a scientific way 
by experts and governments working together.9 The English economic historian, 
C.R. Fay, congratulated his Australian counterparts for their ‘good fortunes to 
live in a country where economists are occasionally heeded.’10 
Australian economists did not commit the same mistake as their American 
counterparts in 1937 by advising the federal government to cut spending 
now that recovery was underway. The former prime minister and treasurer, 
7  T. Hytten, ‘Giblin as an Economist’, in D.B. Copland, ed., Giblin; The Scholar and the Man (Melbourne: 
Cheshire, 1960), 96.
8  N. Cain, ‘Australian Keynesian: The Writings of E.R. Walker’, Working Papers in Economic History, 13 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1983), 2.
9  C. Goodwin, The Image of Australia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1974), 236. In a letter to Keynes 
in November 1941 the English-born and raised economist, Colin Clark, explained how he had fallen in love 
with Queensland: ‘When you leave England for Australia you get a strange feeling you have somehow jumped 
ten years into the future, and when you come to Queensland you jump ten years further. Queensland is 
a predominantly rural and small enterprise economy, with a very equalitarian distribution of income and 
property, very generous social services, compulsory Trade Unionism, and all matters of wages hours and 
working conditions judicially controlled by the Arbitration court, which now has such prestige that both 
sides always accept its decision’. C. Clark to J.M. Keynes, 10 November 1941, University of Queensland 
Library, Colin Clark Papers, UQFL87.
10  Goodwin, The Image of Australia, 236.
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R.G. Menzies, always wary about economics, dryly observed that ‘[i]n the 
economic history of the last fifteen years nothing will be more notable than the 
rise in influence and authority of the professional economist’.11
Giblin encouraged the Commonwealth Public Service to recruit more 
graduates instead of being a repository for returned servicemen. The growing 
professionalisation of economics was matched by gradual placement of 
economists within the CPS. The first two appointees had been outstanding 
academic economists. Leslie Melville joined the Commonwealth Bank in 1931 
and, in the following year, Roland Wilson joined the Treasury. Coombs, a 
doctoral graduate of the London School of Economics, found employment in 
the Commonwealth Bank working under the supervision of Melville.
The rising Turks of the Australian economics profession were all more receptive 
to Keynes’ General Theory than their older colleagues. Names like Trevor Swan, 
Heinz Arndt, Peter Karmel, Gerald Firth and Richard Downing come to mind. The 
most eminent, though, must be Coombs and Wilson. The Keynesian revolution 
would, in J.E. King’s words, ‘conquer Australia like the Spanish inquisition’.12
Certainly, by 1939, Melville and Downing would independently recall that the 
small corps of economists in Australia were all Keynesian in policy persuasion, if 
not analytical framework.13 It was helped in that process both by Keynes’ dealings 
with Copland and Giblin and also by having two of his associates, Colin Clark 
and Brian Reddaway, spend time in the Antipodes. Reddaway’s thoughtful and 
incisive précis of what Keynes was saying became the first published academic 
review of The General Theory. Clark had gone to Australia in 1937 on a visiting 
lectureship but was expected to return to Cambridge to head a department of 
applied economics. When Keynes asked when Clark would be coming home, he 
could only sing of the attraction of remaining in Australia: ‘People have minds 
which are not closed to new truths … and with all the mistakes Australia has 
made in the past, I still think she may show the world, in economics … in the 
next few years.’14 They were poignant words.
11  R.G. Menzies, ‘The Australian Economy During War’, Joseph Fisher Lecture in Commerce (Adelaide: 
Hassell Press, 1942), 6.
12  J.E. King, ‘Notes on the History of Post-Keynesian Economics in Australia’, in P. Arestis, G. Palma and 
M. Sawyer, eds, Capital Controversy: Post-Keynesian Economics and the History of Economic Thought (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 298.
13  S. Cornish, ‘The Keynesian Revolution in Australia Fact and Fiction’, Australian Economic History 
Review, 33, no. 2 (1993), 19; R.I. Downing, ‘Review of M. Keynes (ed.), Essays on John Maynard Keynes’, 
Economic Record, 52, no. 137 (1972), 11–12.
14  J.M. Keynes, in D. Moggridge, ed., The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 27, Employment 
and Commodities (London: Macmillan, 1981), 808.
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War finance
The last year of peacetime in Australia was marked by difficult economic choices 
and political turbulence. The necessity to divert resources into defence as the 
security environment grew darker was jeopardised by the federal structure of 
government and traditional ideas about public finance. By the end of 1939 there 
came, however, a moment of economic revelation. As Copland later styled it:
The lesson of the war is unmistakable in its demonstration that, given 
a clear and generally accepted objective, we can erect an economic 
structure far superior to that which we knew during the dark days of 
the thirties.15
In 1939, Australia smoothly switched to a total war economy because 
economists serving on a key advisory committee known as the Financial and 
Economic Committee were uncommonly influential. Formed in late 1938, 
the F and E Committee under Giblin’s leadership convinced the then Acting 
Federal Treasurer, Percy Spender, that, before resorting to taxes and borrowing 
expedients, the war effort could be met by putting all human and physical 
resources to work.
Coombs was adamant that the committee gave ‘economic planning of the war’ 
a Keynesian pedigree. The idea for the committee came from Wilson. It was 
the realisation of his ‘central thinking agency’ that he had spoken of in 1934.16 
Wilson had in mind a ‘small thinking committee to which all sorts of problems 
could be submitted for general advice.’17
The committee’s primary task would be to advise the treasurer and his 
department. Eventually this would amount to the committee challenging the 
Treasury’s orthodox canons of war finance. While Giblin is credited with 
leading the way, some influence should be credited to E.R. Walker who had 
written a book on war economics. Singing its praises, Copland said the ‘great 
virtue’ of Walker’s book was that it got ‘behind the veil of money’ and put the 
defence problem ‘in real terms’.18
Copland reckoned that a war effort of 15  per  cent of resources was possible 
before any strain on resources would emerge. Australian economists advised the 
government therefore to shepherd resources by borrowing until the economy 
reached full employment. This was around the same time Keynes applied the 
General Theory framework to war economics in How to Pay for the War (1940). 
15  D.B. Copland, The Road to High Employment (Melbourne: Angus & Robertson, 1945).
16  W.G.K. Duncan, National Economic Planning (Melbourne: Angus & Robertson, 1934).
17  G. Whitwell, The Treasury Line (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 2.
18  D.B. Copland, ‘News and notes’, Economic Record, 15 (1939), 230–1.
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In short, Spender assimilated a physical resources view as distinct from a 
monetary view. It was Giblin, then, who encouraged Spender to attempt 
more with fiscal policy. Giblin demonstrated how Australia, with 10 per cent 
unemployment, could painlessly increase its defence budget without facing 
resource pressures. Instead of a heavy-handed resort to economic controls 
that would intimidate business, Giblin felt that expenditure could be raised 
through credit expansion. Convinced, Spender raised the matter with Menzies, 
highlighting how the financial costs of the war effort could be lightened by 
putting the unemployed back into work. While the unemployed had, hitherto, 
been a state matter, Spender believed the initiative ‘would not only be good 
politics on our part, but sound economics, if we take the lead in this matter’.19
Spender took Giblin’s proposal to Cabinet and announced, in dramatic words, 
‘One of the objectives of our present policy is to restore and increase the national 
income. This will enable us to divert resources to defence without encroaching 
unnecessarily on existing standards of consumption’.20 Spender made it clear in 
a submission to Cabinet how borrowing for defence would be from the central 
bank thus sparing private enterprise from a greater tax burden. Once capacity 
and full employment were reached, however, taxation would assume its rightful 
duty and prevent any inflation. This ‘changeover’ point was projected to occur 
by May 1940.
Cornish has identified this as the moment when a Keynesian revolution in 
economic policy ‘arrived’ in Australia. An English newspaper hailed Spender’s 
budget as ‘the answer to an economist’s prayer’.21 Until then, at the official 
policy level, there had been little recognition of expanding economic activity 
by bringing idle resources into circulation. It revolved around the necessity of 
how quickly, and the means by which, to increase military spending. Raising 
taxes, issuing public loans or recourse to credit finance, that is, budget deficits, 
would disrupt economic activity. This spelt sacrifices not only to programs but 
also political reputations. Indeed, the Commonwealth Bank, then Australia’s 
central bank, recycled a version of the British Treasury’s view; namely, that 
using resources for defence needs, even amidst 10  per  cent unemployment, 
would reduce the amount of consumer goods that could be produced when the 
economy recovered.
Before the outbreak of the war Copland had wanted the same array of economic 
controls Nazi Germany had. With the outbreak of war he had his wishes partly 
granted. Menzies asked him to come to Canberra as Commonwealth Prices 
Commissioner and also as economic consultant to the prime minister. The need 
19  Cited in Millmow, The Power of Economic Ideas, 263.
20  Ibid., 263.
21  Cited in P. Spender, Politics and a Man (Sydney: Collins, 1942), 45.
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for price control was immediate, albeit taking place in an environment of suitable 
macroeconomic policies. The need for price control was urgent if production 
was to be directed to areas of greatest national need rather than to areas of 
greatest profit. As Prices Commissioner, Copland recognised that a leading 
problem of price control was that of limiting increases in the price structure 
to the unavoidable increases in costs while preventing, as far as possible, a 
general upward movement in prices brought about by the operation of outside 
influences. He saw that a general increase in the prices of basic commodities 
would cause a rise in the cost of living and a consequent rise in the basic wage, 
which was automatically adjusted to the cost of living.
With the coming to office of the Curtin Labor Government, and the entry of 
Japan into the conflict, Australia entered a more difficult and demanding stage 
of the war. The government resorted to planning and regulations, and newly 
created government departments, headed by the likes of Wilson, superseded the 
work of the F and E Committee. As the Japanese threat receded, planning for 
post-war reconstruction received increasing attention.
The post-war challenge
There was a general fear that the end of hostilities would see, after a brief post-
war boom, the return of the slump. It gave urgency to the task of preventing 
a rerun of the 1930s, with governments undertaking to make elimination of 
unemployment ‘a fundamental aim’ of economic policy. Australia reached 
the crowning glory of Keynesianism when the Chifley Government presented 
the White Paper on Full Employment. As Selwyn Cornish has detailed, the 
document took an inordinate amount of redrafting with plenty of material 
from economists, along with Curtin and Chifley. The White Paper was a more 
circumspect and considered document than its British counterpart, with clauses 
on fiscal balance, the mobility of resources, productive efficiency, wage stability, 
stabilisation by government spending and concerns about the external account. 
The successful management of war finance alleviated concerns about the efficacy 
of fiscal policy to fulfil the promise placed on it.
Memories of widespread unemployment in the inter-war years cut deeply. 
Australian economists invested their hopes in the White Paper and the political 
authorities observed the target. Indeed, the economic history of the post-war 
era was that the authorities were too zealous in pursuing it. The reluctance 
to consider checking aggregate demand policies might have had something 
to do with anxieties about the return of depression. There was an element of 
a depression mentality in the air. It is astonishing to recall that the Menzies 
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Government nearly lost office because it let unemployment reach 3.1 per cent 
by 1961–62. In contrast, the collective consciousness held little fear of severe 
inflation yet it became the prevailing problem during the Keynesian era.
Inflation had been contained during the war years by a comprehensive prices 
and rationing system. The Labor Government had allowed excessive liquidity 
to build up in the economy which was kept in check by controls on prices, 
wages and capital. This problem carried over into the peacetime economy with 
economic activity potentially excessive. The post-war economy was marked, 
therefore, by high levels of economic activity, full employment and inflation. 
Inflation was suppressed by retaining the wartime administrative controls 
including price and capital controls.
The Chifley Government was reluctant to engage in containing demand by 
fiscal and monetary means even though the White Paper had envisaged their 
use. The 1948–49 budget was stimulatory and involved capital spending on 
infrastructure to further development. The Menzies Government also embraced 
developmentalism, a mindset that was promoted by the Treasury. It was only after 
the inflationary boom of 1951 that both the Treasury and the Commonwealth 
Bank persuaded the Menzies Government to cut back outlays.
The tendency, though, towards maintaining the economy at a high pitch of 
activity was the outstanding pattern of macroeconomic policy during the 
Keynesian era. It was compounded by commitments to a high rate of immigration 
and development without resorting to credit restrictions and import controls to 
counteract inflationary pressures and balance of payments problems. Neither 
the electorate nor politicians found the prospects of budget deficits too galling 
in the early post-war years. The prevailing political milieu was to oppose raising 
taxes and to regard budget surpluses as the opportunity to reduce taxation. 
Perhaps it was reasoned that with rationing still in tow there was enough 
austerity being administered. The Chifley Government also had ideological 
concerns about using interest rates to choke off excessive aggregate demand. 
The Menzies era, too, was also marked by a perceptible reluctance to use market 
controls to fine-tune aggregate demand.
Overall, the political economy of the first 15 years after the war was one of 
continuous economic growth coupled with inflation and pressures upon the 
external account. Coombs identified that there was both political resistance and 
interest group resistance to undertaking the necessary deflationary measures that 
the Australian economy needed. The short life of the electoral cycle reinforced 
the reluctance to act just as officials were hesitant about advice unacceptable 
to ministers. In the same vein, Gerald Firth spoke in 1951 of an asymmetry 
problem, in that every interest group backed expansion but there was resistance 
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to confronting inflation.22 It partly derived from the unwillingness of most 
Australian economists during the post-war reconstruction era to speak about the 
dangers of inflation. Only the Menzies Government in 1951 and again in 1960 
was prepared to bite the bullet but only after the Treasury and Commonwealth 
Bank were pulling in concert to curb a boom.
Keynes and the Australian Keynesians
Not all economists in Australia adhered to the early post-war consensus about 
Keynesianism. The old guard were not totally swept away by The General Theory 
as the young were. There was the added question of interpreting Keynes and, on 
that note, the difference between Keynes and the Keynesians. There was Keynes’ 
famous jibe that, after attending a dinner party in Washington with American 
Keynesians, he recollected ‘I was the only non-Keynesian there’. Keynes had 
told Hayek that he would put the young heretics in their place but he did not 
live long enough to do so. Nor did Keynes get round to writing a sequel to The 
General Theory.
Giblin was worried that full employment would trigger a wages problem and 
asked Keynes about it. Keynes demurred, saying the control of wages at full 
employment was ultimately ‘a political problem’.23 Keynes was equally concerned 
about avoiding inflation at full employment as he was about avoiding another 
slump. He felt that the workers and trade unionists would show a degree of 
community-mindedness.
James Brigden’s reaction, later encapsulated in a short and querulous article in 
the Economic Record, noted how credit expansion would result in rising wage 
costs as full employment was approached. The problem was that there was ‘no 
coordination between wages policy and finance policy’ to prevent wage inflation 
from occurring. Consequently, Brigden concluded that if credit expansion and, 
thus, full employment, were pursued, there would have to be controls upon 
labour, foreign exchange and investment.24
In Brisbane, Colin Clark, director of the Queensland Bureau of Industry, state 
statistician and economic adviser to the Queensland Treasury, was working on 
the thesis that too much spending by the federal government ultimately meant 
inflation. The idea had come from Premier Hanlon, who was concerned that the 
22  G.G. Firth, ‘Disinflation in Australia: A Democratic Dilemma’, Paper presented to the ANZAAS 
Conference 1951, Brisbane, Queensland.
23  Cited in A. Millmow, ‘The Evolution of John Maynard Keynes’ Wage and Employment Theory, 1920–
1946’, History of Economics Review, 71 (1992).
24  J.B. Brigden, ‘The credit theory of full employment’, Economic Record, 15 (1939).
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mooted post-war expenditures on social goods and nationalisation reminded 
him that it had been excessive taxation that had been the undoing of empires 
and countries in the past.
Clark investigated and subsequently deduced that the maximum rate of 
taxation was 25 per  cent of net national product and submitted his research 
to the Economic Journal, which Keynes edited. If a nation did engage in over 
taxing, he predicted that, after some lag, rising inflation would result. In other 
words, it was high and rising taxation that stimulated rising prices; and rising 
government expenditure was the main cause for this rising taxation.25
Clark was adamant that Keynes agreed with his contention and that he had 
been working on the matter when he had died in April 1946. Clark never 
deviated from being ‘Mr. 25%’.26 Whether Keynes would have stayed constant 
with the principle is debatable given his penchant to change his mind when 
the circumstances changed. Clark, who had worked with Keynes, would later 
write that his mentor was a liberal who believed in the free market ‘because it 
provides the maximum possible decentralisation of economic decision’.27
The most vocal dissident to the Keynesian crusade, though, was Copland. In his 
Godkin lectures, given at Harvard in 1945, Copland focused upon the eternal 
problem of the relation of state control to private enterprise or, more broadly, 
the relationship between the private and public sectors. Copland contended that 
the pre-war economy failed to operate in the best interests of the community 
at large, that it could not avoid depressions, and that it would not employ all 
available factors in the long run. To stabilise the economy and ensure a certain 
measure of security for all, he continued, it would be necessary for the nation as 
a whole to engage in public investment and not be fearful of national debt. While 
praising the power of entrepreneurial talent, Copland argued that some degree 
of social control, expressed through a large public sector, would give capitalism 
a more benign, ordered traverse. Copland, however, was not enamoured of full 
employment, preferring high employment.
Unlike many others in the profession, Copland quickly realised that it was rapid, 
almost unnerving, economic progress that would be the normal state of affairs for 
market economies, not stagnation of the pre-war era. Contrary to fears of a post-
war depression, the new era was marked by astonishing rates of technological 
and economic growth for most countries, none more so than Australia, which 
would grapple with a bold development and migration program in the post-war 
25  A. Millmow, ‘Colin Clark and Australia’, History of Economics Review, 56 (2012).
26  A. Millmow, ‘Mr. 25%’, Australian Financial Review, 2 July 2010.
27  C. Clark, ‘Keynes and Others: A Personal Memoir’ (1982), 18, University of Queensland Library, Colin 
Clark Papers, UQFL87.
3. Australia and the Keynesian Revolution
65
period. Australia, though, found itself in the early post-war period beset by 
bouts of inflation and external deficits, which led to corrective action followed 
by another spurt of expansionism.
As the first vice-chancellor of The Australian National University, Copland 
was not expected to engage in public debate about economic management but 
no one dared silence him. His views rubbed hard against those of the ‘inside’ 
economists. Copland, however, was not the only isolated voice. Heinz Arndt has 
argued that in the post-war era, until the 1970s, economic policy was conducted 
by the inside economists with academic voices shut out. He goes on to remark:
The Commonwealth Government in the 1950s and 1960s had the advice 
of better economists inside than were to be found outside – seven of 
the best, as it happened all men of good minds but short stature, were 
nicknamed ‘Mr Menzies’s Seven Dwarfs’. They did not feel the need 
for outside help, so that university economists were more remote from 
government than in most other western countries.28
There was also a chasm in how economists within the Department of Post-
War Reconstruction, headed by Coombs, interpreted the ‘new economics’ of 
Keynes and how Copland did. Copland was seen as somewhat detached from the 
great post-war ‘crusade’ of Keynesian economic thought and practice led and 
propagated by Coombs.29 There was undoubtedly some animus between the two 
that sprang from the bureaucratic power struggle during the war years. While 
he was economic consultant to the prime minister during the war, Copland had 
never been part of Chifley’s circle of advisers. For his part, Coombs felt Copland 
was a rather pedestrian economist.
Copland wanted to participate in the ‘dynamizing’ of Keynes’ conceptual 
revolution. For Australia, this meant channelling resources into investment, 
rather than consumption; of having capacity-building rather than full 
employment. Copland lamented that ‘Keynes didn’t live to castigate his followers 
who turned his theory of full employment into one of economic stability and 
security at all costs’.30 Copland would further maintain that the Chifley and 
Menzies governments did not address the full criteria and economic challenges 
set out in the White Paper on Full Employment. He bemoaned that post-war 
Australia was not meeting the economic objectives contained in Part IV of 
the White Paper, which covered questions like fiscal balance, the mobility of 
resources, productive efficiency, wage stability, stabilisation by government 
spending and concerns about the external account. Coombs and Walker felt a 
28  ‘Antipodean Economics’ (1987), National Library of Australia, Papers of Heinz Wolfgang Arndt, 1933–2002.
29  H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1981).
30  D.B. Copland to Michael Barkway, 15 February 1961, Copland Papers, National Library of Australia 
(NLA) MS 3800, Box 11, Series 1, Folder 88.
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state of full employment was more likely with extensive planning. Copland felt 
that this was unnecessary and that the maintenance of high employment would 
not require any extensive state authority over the prerogative of capital, only a 
degree of regulation.
The ragtime of Australian economic policy, 
1948–1952
When Copland became vice-chancellor of The Australian National University 
in 1948, he told a businessman how he ‘was appalled at both the state of the 
economy and the state of the mind of economists’.31 He campaigned to get 
Australian economic policy on a more fundamental footing and waged a critique 
of ‘the younger brethren’ of economists in a series of speeches and provocative 
articles. The earliest of these articles were designed to make ‘a splash’ in order to 
further a political ambition as a prospective Senate candidate for the Coalition in 
the forthcoming election. Apart from this, however, the string of commentaries 
mirrored his deep concerns about the orientation of the Australian economy 
and the rubric of economic policy. He informed Menzies there was a ‘deplorable 
state of affairs’ in Canberra with the Chifley Government struggling with post-
war demands on the economy.32 Copland later told the English economist, 
Edith Penrose, that the period from 1948 to 1952 was ‘the ragtime of Australian 
economic policy’ – a period of immense policy error.33 He had a point. Australia 
would endure aberrations like an attempt at bank nationalisation, coal strikes, 
raging inflation, a needless devaluation against the American dollar, relaxation 
of physical controls and then their reimposition, and a boom and bust within 
the space of five years.
Back to Earth in Economics: Australia 1948 was a critique of the supposed 
Keynesianism practised by Australian economists. They were to be ‘brought 
back to earth’. In short, Copland felt that the post-war economic forecasts had 
been much too dire about the Australian economy and that the subsequent 
‘obsession with security’ and pumping up aggregate demand was no basis 
on which to develop the nation. That is, there should be an equal stress upon 
raising the rate of economic growth and augmenting the supply side of the 
economy. There would be difficulties, too, he noted, if the government had to 
curtail expenditure to contain inflation.
31  D.B. Copland to G. Foletta, 10 May 1954, Copland Papers, NLA MS 3800, Box 8.
32  D.B. Copland to R.G. Menzies, 9 January 1949, Copland Papers, NLA MS 3800, Box 8.
33  D.B. Copland to E. Penrose, 28 November 1955, Copland Papers, NLA MS 3800, Box 9.
3. Australia and the Keynesian Revolution
67
Copland also set out to dispense with the ‘depression psychology’ permeating 
the Australian economic policy establishment, which held back the embrace of 
growth and development. To develop his case, Copland took the line that the 
post-war boom was more a case of accident than design, that is, full employment 
was basically inevitable. It had been achieved by creating a business environment 
conducive to an increase in private investment above pre-war levels. While there 
was a post-war investment boom it was not, Copland argued, ‘a good ground on 
which to claim the success of a full employment theory of full employment’ 
when that condition was inevitable. The main reason for the buoyant level 
of economic activity was due to the legacy of the war economy, demands of 
reconstruction and expansion of universal welfare.
There was also the ephemeral fortune of high export prices. Copland’s argument 
anticipated that of R.C.O. Matthews’ controversial paper in 1968 that the 
reason why unemployment had been low in the post-war years in Britain and 
elsewhere was a prolonged investment boom as countries made good on the 
war damage and that ‘the decline of unemployment … is to a large extent not 
a Keynesian phenomenon at all’.34 Copland also wanted to deride the idea that, 
with simple demand management, Australia was bound for a ‘golden age’ in 
economic performance when, in fact, the objectives of post-war reconstruction 
were ‘not being attained’. Copland feared that Australian policy-makers were 
becoming complacent with the return of good times, which masked underlying 
weaknesses within the economy. Post-war advantages had been frittered away 
by labour unrest, the wasting of record high export earnings and lower taxes. 
Nor was Australia investing sufficiently in key industries to secure vigorous and 
sustained growth. The culprit was the doctrine of over-full employment – that 
is, more jobs than people to fill them – which prevented resources flowing to 
the most productive ends and enticed absenteeism, overmanning and labour 
indiscipline. There were shortages of coal and steel in 1948, which gave the lie 
to the government’s obsession that maintaining full employment was sufficient 
to maintain productive well-being. More importantly, the doctrine of full 
employment lulled policy-makers into a false sense of security that they had the 
means to handle exogenous economic shocks. Copland was concerned that the 
veneer of prosperity made policy-makers blind to Australia’s low productivity 
which apparently lagged behind other western economies and that, once the 
export price boom passed, the nation would find itself in a familiar set of 
difficulties. So it proved.
Copland was, moreover, apprehensive about the possibilities of implementing 
a stabilisation package if the economy needed to be wound back because of 
an external deficit. By the same token, the old ‘pioneering spirit’ that kindled 
Australia’s economic development in the past had to be revived. Copland 
34  D.B. Copland, Back to Earth in Economics: Australia, 1948 (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1948).
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identified three matters that needed immediate attention: first, to secure more 
supplies of coal and other materials; secondly, more housing; and, finally, the 
need to develop more export potential instead of relying upon the existing 
staples. This meant ridding the economy of rationing and regulation and 
setting the sails for growth. Copland’s overall recommendation was to develop a 
general plan to recruit resources that were basic to immediate needs and long-
term priorities. It was a classic long-term Keynesian program that shunned 
short-termism. Copland seemed quite unaware that Coombs also lamented that 
Australia did not seem to be following the dictates of Keynesian functional 
finance which underpinned the White Paper. There was too much focus on 
full employment and too little on inflation. Consequently inflation within the 
economic system was suppressed by the use of controls.
In 1949, Copland made another telling comment about the fabric of Australia’s 
economic development, drawing attention to the imbalance in production 
patterns between capital goods and consumption goods, arguing that it was 
impairing Australia’s development. He memorably stigmatised Australia’s post-
war economy as a ‘milk-bar’ one, preoccupied with meeting consumption 
needs rather than overall development. The imbalance could only be rectified 
by redirecting resources to the basic industries, by allowing more access to 
foreign borrowing, more immigration, and a longer working week. It remained 
a perennial issue throughout the 1950s.
Elsewhere Copland adumbrated upon the new social and economic framework 
for a private enterprise economy and deviated slightly from his long-run 
bearings. Copland outlined six areas where ‘social control’ or state activity 
in various spheres of the economy had been largely beneficial, not only 
in terms of economic development but also remunerative for the business 
sector. Those spheres were macroeconomic management and stability; public 
investment spending; establishment of state-owned utilities; social security 
and redistribution; arbitration and conciliation; and, lastly, restraints upon 
the power of monopolies. While he welcomed increasing the degree of social 
control, Copland believed there was an optimal level of intervention. Copland 
now felt that Australia, at least, had reached that level and that ‘a stay order’ on 
further extensions of state activity was now warranted. More intervention or 
social justice in the economy, he felt, would enfeeble the entrepreneurial spirit 
that had made Australia.
There was little support from most of his peers about the need to make 
fundamental adjustments to the economy to secure long-term growth, 
productivity and development. The neglect of the younger economists bemused 
him. Their complaints ignored his heroic efforts to change economic policy in 
the mid-1930s. Whilst reading Roy Harrod’s biography of Keynes, Copland 
wrote to a friend:
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Still reading Keynes and I remember most of the controversy and 
the discussion he was involved from the 1920’s onwards. A few of 
us had been working on similar lines and I have somewhere a set of 
memorandums to the government of NSW from 1932 to 1936 urging 
with all the persuasion I could muster an expansionist policy, but we 
could not get past the Commonwealth Treasury. It would be fun to dig 
them out now and circulate for the younger brethren who still think we 
are past praying for. I’m sure he [Keynes] would disown Coombs and his 
school if he was with us now.35
Some time later, Copland would suggest that ‘the over-enthusiasm for the 
Keynesian theory and its extravagant expectations in a theory of full employment 
would have been disowned by the Master’. Copland was unrepentant about 
his differences with the younger economists even if he was guilty of over-
dramatising them.
There was no spring clear-out of the economic mandarins when the Menzies 
Government came to power in 1949. Coombs remained as governor of the 
Commonwealth Bank and sought to be within earshot of Menzies. Copland 
would have some intermittent influence especially with the new Federal 
Treasurer, Arthur Fadden. Moreover, Copland lobbied to get Roland Wilson 
into the Treasury as secretary in a bid to counter Coombs’ influence over the 
prime minister.
Copland returned to assailing the economic perfectionists in May 1950 in a 
speech marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Victorian Branch of 
the Economic Society. He warned how the ‘more extreme devotees’ of planning 
were ‘much too confident of their ability to control the powerful forces arranged 
against them’. Apart from an illusion about their omniscience, they had not 
factored into their analysis the requisite degree of public acceptance needed 
for the new doctrine, especially from the business sector. Copland feared that 
the planners would not have the courage to prune expenditure when it was 
needed most, nor would there be public acceptance for doing so. Maintaining 
the economy at over-full employment would jeopardise price stability and 
put pressure on Australia’s external account. Finally, acute supply shortages 
interfered with development while full employment meant that workers had 
little incentive to raise productivity.
Copland, in addition, sought to redress the social balance within the economy, 
arguing that the entrepreneurial spirit was still the engine that powered a 
mixed economy. This signified his embrace of a mild form of corporatism. He 
reaffirmed his long-held faith in the restorative and civilising powers of public 
35  D.B. Copland to M. Lundy, 1951, courtesy of Marjorie Harper.
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investment for economic development and dismissed notions that the increase 
in public debt would impoverish future generations. Since the early 1930s, 
Copland had consistently praised the role of public investment as the means 
to economic recovery from the slump. Now he saw it spearheading Australia’s 
economic development.
In July 1950, in an address entitled ‘Problems of an Expanding Economy’, 
Copland demonstrated how he differed from the policy outlook of his 
contemporaries. With a large-scale immigration policy in train, Copland 
felt it imperative that policy-makers not be hidebound by the past. More 
importantly, Australia had to become a high investment economy instead of a 
high consumption one. The migration program spelt huge outlays in housing 
and infrastructure, meaning that consumption had to be cut, if necessary, 
by taxation. The ‘motto of the age’, he suggested, might be ‘Houses before 
hotels, tractors before motor cars, electricity before refrigeration’. If not cut 
voluntarily, consumption could be wound back by taxation and some inflation. 
Copland felt that the attendant risks of becoming a high investment economy, 
namely, a lack of final demand, would not eventuate, and that Australia could 
easily revert to a high consumption economy.
The last requirement needed for a rapidly expanding economy was to draw 
upon foreign supplies of capital goods and, if need be, to access foreign funds 
to acquire them. Here Copland contemplated a new financial nexus with the 
United States. He was particularly damning of the ‘anti-borrowing psychology’ 
and, with one eye on the stalled Australian National University construction 
program, he vented his spleen, asking, ‘How can you develop this country with 
picks, shovels and wheelbarrows?’ He closed by stating that Australia had to 
choose between stability and progress. To his mind, the instability that comes 
with large-scale development must come first. He never wavered on this. Four 
years later he maintained that ‘[w]e are apt to concentrate on the instability 
and to ignore the development, as though a high rate of development and 
stability were natural bedfellows’. The debate about the scale of Australian 
post-war immigration mirrored, therefore, the divide between the meek and 
mild ‘planners’ and the ‘brave’ advocates of development.
One of the slogans on which the Coalition had campaigned in the 1949 election 
was ‘to put value back into the pound’. It would come back to bite them. By 
mid-1950 the Menzies Government was caught by their own inflationary crisis 
stemming from the Korean War boom reflected in high wool and metals prices. 
The Chifley Government had unwisely devalued the currency by 30 per cent 
to align Australia with the sterling bloc. Besides encouraging exports, it led 
to a speculative inflow of capital in anticipation of revaluation. With a fixed 
exchange rate, the terms-of-trade boost meant exporters’ foreign exchange 
receipts flowed directly into the monetary system fuelling consumption. 
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Apart from poor productivity growth, inflation ensued from the levels of social 
investment needed to absorb a large immigration intake, along with increased 
defence spending incurred amidst a full-employment economy.
One solution would have been revaluation, which all Australian economists, bar 
Copland, recommended. He dismissed the idea, stating that an appreciation would 
have damaged other exporters and also jeopardised the profitability and development 
of Australia’s manufacturing industries. If Australia really wanted to stifle inflation, 
it had to resort to more domestic options like monetary tightening. Working through 
the back channels, Copland’s advice might have swayed Wilson and Fadden, though 
the latter would by definition always uphold rural exporting interests.
The more intelligent expedient to both an appreciation and terms-of-trade boom 
was to quarantine the wool export bonanza into a price stabilisation fund, which 
would immobilise spending power and thereby contain its inflationary effect. 
First outlined in September 1950, some of the fund could also be used for rural 
betterment. Funds could then be released when the fortunes of wool exporters 
turned against them. While the Menzies Government adopted a variation of 
Copland’s prescription, implementing a wool stabilisation plan came too late 
to prevent an inflationary impulse surging through the economy. Ultimately, 
inflation would be quelled by the collapse of commodity prices, a surge in 
imports and the so-called ‘horror budget’ of 1951–52.
In the meantime Copland called for radical measures like Australia leaving the 
sterling bloc because it aligned Australia’s trade with the empire and led to 
trade discrimination against non-members. He thus called into question the old 
imperial connection with Britain, believing that Australia should strike out into 
the Asia-Pacific where its economic destiny lay. Relying upon the British market 
and the sterling area meant limited export growth and constrained development 
of the Australian economy. This stand raised eyebrows. When he first raised the 
idea of an American loan in 1948 to deal with Australia’s own dollar shortage, 
the result of a trade imbalance with the United States, he reported much later 
that his then critics felt he ‘had gone over the edge’.36 Australia, he motioned, 
should leave the sterling area, free up the exchange by means of dollar loans and 
bargain with the United States for further dollars on the basis of the Australian 
immigration program, which relieved the refugee problem in Europe. He 
held that ‘the one unused resource’ of productivity could break the logjam of 
competing inflationary pressures, which were the product of the boom in export 
prices, a huge investment program and the very absence of productivity gains.
Copland returned to a variation of the ‘milk-bar economy’ theme when his book, 
Inflation and Expansion (1951), was published. The overriding theme of the 
36  D.B. Copland to H. Cox, 15 April 1954, Copland Papers, NLA MS 3800, Box 8.
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book of essays was how mixed economies, like Australia, became constrained 
in meeting their welfare and full employment obligations such that they could 
not channel enough resources to meet their development aspirations. There was 
none of the impelling urge there had been in wartime to allocate resources to 
basic industries. Australia, in particular, faced this imbalance, though it was, 
Copland stressed, primarily a political problem of collective choice. The logical 
outcome was inflation, which could only be dealt with by higher productivity.
Given his outspoken views on growth and expansion Copland would have been 
bemused to find himself singled out by the press and the Australian Labor Party 
leadership for the Australian economy’s maladjustment during 1951–52. In the 
reaction to Fadden’s budget of 1951–52, when a counter-cyclical budget surplus 
was implemented, the Sydney Morning Herald held Copland, along with other 
academic economists, responsible. It was a strange line of attack when it was 
really all the Treasury’s handiwork. Wilson had told Fadden shortly after he 
had been appointed secretary that inflation was out of control and endorsed the 
deflationary measures taken in the 1951–52 federal budget.
Copland must have felt some sense of vindication, however. For some time he 
had anticipated the likely anger from Australians unaccustomed to cutting 
expenditure outlays consistent with fiscal restraint. The commitment to full 
employment meant that exuberance could only be checked ‘in the last resort’ by 
the exercise of ‘a measure of restraint for which there was no precedent in the 
history of Australia’. Such was the prospect presented by Fadden’s federal budget.
In an ABC radio commentary, Copland praised the budget as ‘economically 
sound’, ‘courageous’, and a ‘landmark in Australian finance’. The budget 
strategy of increasing taxes and deferring public works would allow more 
resources to be channelled towards development and defence. Moreover, the 
tax imposts could be easily reversed and had a low disincentive effect. 
Copland’s praise of the budget was not contrived. He saw the circumstances 
of over-full employment, coupled with inflation, as posing a distinctly new 
challenge to economists: 
But on the problem of preventing undue expansion we have yet to learn 
a good deal more about technique and still more about how to influence 
government and public opinion to accept restraints ahead of danger. 
This was the new task confronting the new generation of economists. 
If they succeed they will achieve even more than their predecessors.37 
It was a challenge only partly met.
37  D.B. Copland, ‘Economic Study and Public Opinion in Australia: The Role of the Economist’, Australian 
Highway, 34, no. 2 (1952).
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By 1952 Australia faced what Copland called ‘the old Adam of the Australian 
economy’ – a liquidity crisis brought about by a deteriorating external account. 
Wool prices had steadily fallen since April 1951 while there had been a flood 
of imports resulting from buoyant economic activity. The Menzies Government 
responded to the challenge by resorting to import licensing.
The announcement resulted in a quite extraordinary attack upon Copland 
by Australia’s new business newspaper, the Australian Financial Review. The 
editor, Jack Horsfall, penned a front-page story, entitled ‘The Dire Economic 
Consequences of Sir D. B. Copland’.38 Horsfall’s attack had followed a Copland 
address, ‘The Balance of Payments and Money Incomes in Australia’, which 
had been reproduced in the same paper. Surveying the economic conditions 
that had led to the government imposing trade controls, Copland concluded 
that Australia was facing a fundamental disequilibrium which necessitated 
either devaluation or deflation. Full employment, cheap money, an ambitious 
development and migration policy and a short-lived export price boom had led 
Australia to this crisis. The ‘grievous expedient’ of import controls, Copland 
argued, did not address the true cause of the malaise. Copland drew vindication 
from what he had been saying over the past seven years, namely, that economic 
activity had been run too strongly and that productivity had been falling 
because of the unbalanced nature of investment and poor work practices. 
Without sourcing enough foreign capital to keep the expansion going, Copland 
had already warned that an external deficit was imminent.
In a long public diatribe against Copland’s views upon economic expansion, 
Horsfall pinned the imposition of import controls on Copland’s crusade for 
growth and expansion. Horsfall did not pull his punches:
No single voice has been more responsible than his for bringing 
Australia to the point where import restrictions were unavoidable. 
He has persistently plugged the case for unbridled development and 
unlimited immigration in face of disastrous inflation and the dissipation 
of overseas funds.39
In accusing Copland of pushing the cause for expansion even when Australia 
had not secured dollar loans and when he had just supported the Fadden 
budget, Horsfall questioned Copland’s reading of the economy. Copland, 
Horsfall suggested, might have to give away his policy advocacy skills. Few 
Australian economists have been subject to such front-page denigration in 
Australia’s national press. Horsfall had been a former student of Copland’s at 
the University of Melbourne and differed strongly on the growth parameters 
needed for Australia.
38  ‘The Dire Consequences of Sir D.B. Copland’, Australian Financial Review, 20 March 1952. 
39  Ibid.
The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins
74
With a life-long interest in rural exports, Copland had long anticipated the 
problem of the external deficit and bemoaned how Australia’s trade pattern 
was hamstrung by imperial preferences when its development aspirations far 
exceeded the scale of the 1920s. Australia, for instance, received fixed prices for 
her wheat, butter and meat in the British market while the bulk of her imports 
came from there. Copland felt that expedients like credit restriction, import 
restrictions and special trade arrangements to deal with the yawning trade 
deficit were only ‘playing with the problem’ and their ultimate effect would be 
to dampen the pace of economic development.40
With the bursting of the wool export boom Copland sensed a new reality in 
Australian economic management. Australia was returning to ‘traditional 
policy’ of coping with ‘the vigorous forces of the outside world’ away from a 
‘naïve’ Keynesianism of instruments and controls.41 Apart from pursuing full 
employment, other distortions like the sheltered markets of the sterling bloc, 
the lack of sectoral balance within the economy, and cheap money were being 
discarded. All this reminded Australian economic planners that, apart from 
being compatible with the social milieu, economic policies had to be tailored 
to fit the fact that Australia was still a small, open, vulnerable economy. With 
a fixed exchange rate, Australia had to ensure it did not get its price and cost 
structure out of alignment with the rest of the world. Expanding global trade 
meant that, for commodity exporting countries like Australia, the long-term 
prognosis was mostly good. Moreover, with better macroeconomic control 
over expenditure and the establishment of a viable manufacturing sector, the 
Australian economy would be more stable than in the past.
The golden age
The age of the mandarins was the age of Keynes. Two of the mandarins, Coombs 
and Wilson, had different visions of economic management. Wilson, however, 
seemed more a big picture man like Copland than Coombs, who focused on 
short-term macroeconomic management. Both agreed, however, that, with 
continuous economic growth, it was inflation rather than unemployment 
that had to be monitored. Academic economists reinforced this view and 
occasionally sought to impress a point. In a manifesto issued in February 1956, 
‘The outlook for the Australian economy’, eight leading professors of economics 
recommended an increase in taxation and interest rates in a bid to dampen 
‘spendthrift prosperity’ and generate more savings. As government investment 
spending had not been rising rapidly, and because there was a desperate need 
40  ‘Copland Urges a Grand Course’, Australian Financial Review, 12 December 1951, 12.
41  D.B. Copland, ‘The Australian Post-war Economy: A Study in Economic Administration’, Canadian 
Journal of Economic and Political Science, 20, no. 4 (1954), 436–7.
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to implement various infrastructure projects, the manifesto opposed cuts in 
government expenditure. It also dismissed direct controls as a solution for excess 
demand. Not long afterwards, the government brought down a mini-budget of 
deflationary measures to strike at the ‘root cause’ of Australia’s current account 
deficit problem.
Upon returning home from a diplomatic posting in 1956, Copland was amazed to 
find that the main policy debate among academic economists was still whether 
Australia was growing too fast. Not for the first time, he preached adventure 
and expansion. He was convinced that economic progress since 1953 had been 
‘relatively sound and vigorous’ and in no need of restraint.42
Neither the Treasury nor his academic colleagues shared his optimism. The 
new generation of economists, he continued, worshipped ‘the false god of 
stability’ when ‘there was no future in stability’.43 It was much better, Copland 
reasoned, to be discussing growth and expansion ‘than to be worrying about 
the problems of devastating depression’ of 25 years ago. Copland was concerned 
that the authorities were going to suppress expansion because of worries 
about inflation. Heinz Arndt represented academics expressing concern that 
Australia’s creeping inflation rate, if left unchecked, would compound economic 
difficulties, particularly with the external account, in the near future. Copland 
was not just on the outer but fast losing his credibility. Coombs warned that 
community passivity about tolerating ‘creeping inflation’ would build into 
something monstrous.
Copland remained unrepentant and urged policy-makers to push on with 
‘the adventure of economic expansion on the grand scale whilst enduring the 
restraints that are necessary for its success’. This meant that consumption and 
the obsession with security and employment took a lower priority. Ideally, the 
title of his co-edited anthology, The Conflict between Stability and Expansion 
(1957), encapsulated the dilemma facing Australian economic policy-makers.
He repeated his prescription of expansion before stability in one of his last 
scholarly contributions. After discussing the conflict between growth and stability 
Copland listed the policy settings needed for Australia to focus upon the former. 
Fiscal policy, perhaps in the form of higher personal income tax, would channel 
a higher level of savings into capital formation, which, in turn, would realign 
the balance between consumption and investment. This policy, if successfully 
implemented, would make it unnecessary to resort to a credit squeeze to ensure 
proper distribution of resources between consumption and investment.
42  D.B. Copland, ‘The Australian Economy: A New Look’, Economic Record, 33, no. 65 (1957), 141–52.
43  D.B. Copland to W.S. Robinson, 23 January 1961, Copland Papers, NLA MS 3800, Box 11, file 85. 
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Despite the warning about the build up of excessive demand there was to be 
another stop-go episode that was almost comical. In a bid to free up supplies 
Roland Wilson urged the new treasurer, Harold Holt, to abandon import controls 
in February 1960. There was an immediate surge in imports, which led to a 
deficit on the trade account. In November 1960, Holt had to announce a mini-
budget, which amounted to Australia’s first post-war credit squeeze. ‘Holt’s Jolt’ 
quickly turned into recession. Copland told Fadden, who had only just retired 
as treasurer, that the current policy pronouncements seemed to him one of ‘the 
most confused’ he had ever witnessed.44 He argued that import controls should 
not have been relaxed when Australia’s export prices had fallen 25 per cent since 
1952. Now Copland queried how a credit squeeze could ever promote growth and 
development.45 He felt that the Commonwealth Government had become easily 
intimidated by a slight increase in inflation and a balance of payments deficit 
problem. With his friend and mentor, W.S. Robinson, Copland dismissed the 
threat of inflation, vouching that he would rather have a slight lift in prices than 
dampen economic growth.46 Menzies was unrepentant about the credit squeeze:
Nobody can get rid of inflationary booms without treading on someone’s 
corns. It is the duty of the practical statesman to select the corns and 
not be afraid of treading on them. To achieve this I must be content to 
annoy thousands.47
In 1963, Copland turned his mind towards economic planning and growth 
targets but no one in the bureaucracy (except perhaps Crawford) was much 
interested. He rather crudely lamented to Robinson:
It is very funny that nobody in Australia is seriously interested in 
growth: but then we must remember that we have among the economists 
the Seven Dwarfs, who naturally would hardly be interested in growth.48
Some of the 1960s imbroglio was repeated the next decade with the Whitlam 
Government but this time it spelt the end of the Keynesian era. It was elected 
against a backdrop of a fully employed economy and a balance of payments in 
surplus. The economic bounty suggested that it would be practical to implement 
Whitlam’s election promises. The only apparent bugbear was that their 
predecessors had allowed an inflationary problem to linger. Annual inflation 
rates of 7.3 per cent were significant for the time, coming from both domestic 
44  D.B. Copland to Sir A. Fadden, 15 December 1960, Copland Papers, NLA MS 3800, Box 11, Series 1, 
Folder 88.
45  ‘The Credit Squeeze and the Balance of Payments: A Key Problem in Economic Statesmanship’, Sydney 
Mirror, 15 February 1961.
46  ‘Import Controls Best’, Age (Melbourne), 11 May 1961.
47  Cited in A. Millmow, ‘Eye on the Money’, in A. Cornell, ed., The Best Australian Business Writing 2012 
(Sydney: New South Publishing, 2012), 222.
48  D.B. Copland to W.S. Robinson, 21 March 1963, Copland Papers, NLA MS 3800, Box 12.
3. Australia and the Keynesian Revolution
77
cost pressures and rising import prices. By refusing to deal with average wage 
increases of over 10 per cent for 1972 and then by not revaluing, the McMahon 
Government exposed the economy to underlying tensions. Whitlam was 
committed to significant social reform through government spending despite 
these economic clouds on the horizon. Gerald Firth had identified the incipient 
problem of stagflation in May 1972. He recommended greater wage discipline 
to disarm it.49
With the economy in boom through 1973, the Federal Treasury, aghast at 
the growth in outlays, advised caution. In his first budget as treasurer, Frank 
Crean allowed the inflationary problem to loom larger by allowing a significant 
growth in federal outlays financed by Treasury notes and cash balances with 
the central bank. Fred Gruen, Whitlam’s economic adviser, later recalled that 
the demand pressures building in 1973–74 were of ‘a greater intensity’ than 
anything since the end of the Second World War. A 25 per cent tariff cut and a 
further revaluation helped alleviate matters by diverting demand pressures to 
imports. There was also price control aimed at big business in the form of the 
Prices Justification Tribunal, which might have reduced the inflation rate from 
what it otherwise would have been. However, on the fiscal policy front, Crean 
was not sufficiently tough enough to exercise restraint of the growth on outlays 
which the Treasury felt advisable.
With fiscal policy already prescribed, the Labor Government endeavoured 
to contain the inflation problem by sharply increasing interest rates. The 
subsequent credit squeeze went on for far too long and thus led to the 
subsequent recession. Firms and businesses were caught short, having built up 
their stocks and over-ordered to catch up with a booming domestic demand. 
Given the sudden weakening of markets, Australian firms could not easily pass 
on wage and other cost increases.
The quadrupling of oil prices by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) cartel in the year from December 1973 exacerbated Australia’s 
domestically generated inflation and unemployment problems. Continuing 
strong wages expansion in the first two years of the Labor Government further 
facilitated a booming economy. As a result, the wages’ share of national income 
rose at the expense of profits.
The 1974–75 budget, described by Crean as ‘a budget of many hands’, was an 
inappropriate response to the situation. By this time the Treasury had been 
marginalised because the government had lost faith in its approach. Cairns 
replaced Crean at the end of 1974 largely because the latter was perceived as 
dominated by the Treasury. The Labor Party caucus did not feel that containing 
49  ‘The Problem of Stagflation: Unemployment with Rising Prices’, May 1972 Public lecture at University 
of Tasmania, Firth Papers, NLA. 
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inflation should be the priority when unemployment was rising. This budget 
was therefore unorthodox in a period of very high inflation, providing urban 
renewal to deprived areas, some income tax relief and a 33 per cent increase in 
government outlays, together with increased taxes for the business sector. The 
idea was to encourage union agreement for wage restraint, thus limiting the 
pass-on of international inflation through cost pressures in Australia.
Cairns received a missive from the governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Sir John Phillips, with his ‘solution’ to stagflation. Phillips was an early convert 
to monetarism and had been tracking money supply growth. The malaise in 
the business sector, Phillips felt, was deep-seated in character and could not be 
resolved by a boom in spending led by government expenditure. Phillips felt 
it advisable that government expenditures and the rate of monetary expansion 
be reined back as inflation was badly disrupting business planning. Apart from 
keeping wage pressures under check, reducing the rate of government spending 
would restore confidence to the private sector.50
Phillips’ advice stemmed from the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 1973 Annual 
Report that was noticeable for joining with the Treasury in arguing that inflation 
mattered more than unemployment. The dominant culture amongst the RBA’s 
economists had recently become monetarist. It was symbolised the year before 
(1973) by the presence of a leading English monetarist, Michael Parkin, within 
the Bank’s Research Department.51
Economists and senior officials within the RBA were the first to accept 
‘inflationary expectations’ as a significant factor within the policy domain. 
Treasury economists, too, accepted the importance of inflationary expectations 
before comparable acknowledgement by their academic brethren. Despite its 
misgivings about some of Milton Friedman’s work, the Treasury became more 
monetarist in outlook following the experience of the late 1973 credit squeeze.
In April 1975, a small-statured man who was neither a dwarf nor a mandarin 
arrived in Canberra. It was the father of monetarism, Milton Friedman. He 
had come to administer the last rites of Australian Keynesianism. The message 
he hammered home was that the choice between inflation and unemployment 
disappears when inflation is out of control; any action to create more jobs merely 
adds to inflationary expectations and, in turn, a further rise in unemployment. 
It was a new wisdom for a new age – full employment was replaced by a concept 
called NAIRU (the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment).
50  Sir J. Phillips to J.F. Cairns, 18 December 1974, National Archives of Australia (NAA) A5931 CL 155.
51  ‘Reserve Bank Backs the Treasury Line’, Australian Financial Review, 28 August 1974.
3. Australia and the Keynesian Revolution
79
Retrospect
Despite two recessions, stop and starts, trade deficits and policy errors, the age 
of Keynes was, to quote the economic historian Angus Maddison, ‘a golden 
age’. It was thus for Australia as it was for other western countries. Despite 
Copland’s protestations about not growing fast enough, Australia still registered 
an average growth rate of 4.7 per cent during the period 1945–73, higher than 
most comparable industrialised countries. During the post-war era Australia’s 
population grew on average at 2.5 per cent, one of the highest growth rates in 
the world. Inflation averaged 4.6 per cent over the same period. In the 1970s, 
macroeconomic performance deteriorated markedly as growth fell to 3.1 per cent 
while inflation soared to an average of 9.7 per cent.52
While the post-war period enjoyed propitious factors like reconstruction, pent-
up demand and the liberalisation of international trade, Ian MacFarlane also 
notes that there was widespread restraint in economic behaviour along with 
governments committing themselves to full employment and robust economic 
growth. There was a high savings rate and little reliance upon foreign savings. 
MacFarlane says fiscal and monetary policies were adjusted to smooth the 
business cycle but this did not mean that fiscal policy was too expansionary. 
If anything, demand management was restrained. In the 12 years between 
1961 and 1973, the budget was, on balance, in surplus. In the earlier period, 
1950 until the 1970s monetary and fiscal policy could not be too expansionary 
without threatening inflation, the balance of payments or the exchange rate. 
When, moreover, there was a recession, there was also a quick recovery. While 
in recent times there has been talk of ‘The Great Moderation’ in macroeconomic 
performance from the mid-1990s onward without any explicit Keynesian 
economic management, one should point out that it only lasted for less than 
half the period known as the Keynesian golden age.




An Age of the Mandarins? 
Government in New Zealand,  
1940–511
John R . Martin
The passage of more than half a century allows us to view the period following 
the end of the Second World War until the 1950s genuinely as history. Research 
materials, principally in archives, are supplemented by official histories, and 
biographies, with a few interviews enriching the story. I have been struck by 
the number of leading public servants of the period who were still in office 
during the 1950s and 1960s and who influenced the public service in which I 
spent 35 years. I was privileged to have known a number of them.
In this chapter, after sketching the political and economic situation in New 
Zealand in 1945, I identify two principal challenges – managing the economy 
and national development – facing the Labour Government led by Peter Fraser. I 
also examine changes in organising government business made after the National 
Government came to office late in 1949. I then describe briefly the state of the 
public service as New Zealand emerged from the war. I consider the role played 
by several prominent public servants – a team to set against the Seven Dwarfs – 
and reflect on what we know about their working relationships with ministers.
In essence, the picture is, first, of a group of outstanding and long-serving public 
servants who worked very closely with Prime Minister Fraser and his deputy, 
Walter Nash, the minister of finance, through the war and afterwards. With the 
change of government in 1949, the close, personal and somewhat haphazard 
methods of working under Labour were succeeded by a more conventional (in 
the Westminster model) relationship between ministers and officials, conducted 
within a more formal machinery for the handling of Cabinet business – a change 
sought unsuccessfully by officials when the Labour Government was in office.2
1  In writing this chapter I have benefited greatly from discussions with Dr Brian Easton, Professor Gary 
Hawke, Sir Frank Holmes and Mr Noel Lough. Needless to say the responsibility for what is said rests entirely 
with me. I have also gained much from two books by a Canadian scholar, J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa 
Men: The Civil Service Mandarins (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1984); A Man of Influence: Norman A. 
Robertson and Canadian Statecraft 1929-68 (Deneau Publishers, 1981).
2  A recent discussion of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements in the immediate post-war period is 
H. Kumarasingham, Onward with Executive Power: Lessons From New Zealand 1947–57 (Wellington: Institute 
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Peter Fraser, c1940
Source: S.P. Andrew Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library
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I conclude with reflections about the influence that the immediate post-war 
period had on New Zealand public administration at least until the ‘revolution’ 
of the mid-1980s. This was, in part, a matter of personalities: the heads of 
departments in the 1960s and 1970s were the ‘bright young men’ of such agencies 
as the Economic Stabilisation Commission of the 1940s; they were shaped by the 
mandarins of that period and, in turn, guided key public servants of the 1970s 
and 1980s. Beyond personalities, the ‘mildly corporate’ style of government – 
some would say, in Keith Middlemas’ phrase, ‘corporatist bias’3 – that persisted 
for nearly half a century owed a great deal to the conventions and arrangements 
that emerged during the war and in the transition to peace.
Setting the scene
New Zealand entered the Second World War in a state of ‘economic emergency’.4 
Although commodity prices had improved since the mid-1930s, increased 
imports (flowing from expanded government activity and guaranteed dairy 
prices) and an upturn in capital withdrawal during 1938 led to an exchange 
crisis. In December 1938 import and exchange controls were imposed; they 
remained in place with variations for five decades. After long and humiliating 
discussions in the City of London seeking to roll over maturing loans, the 
minister of finance, Walter Nash, returned to New Zealand the day after war 
was declared.
New Zealand was radically different at the end of the war. Exchange reserves 
were in a healthy state and loans had been repaid. In 1947, the ‘Government 
and people of New Zealand’ were in a position to make a ‘gift’5 of £10 million 
sterling to the United Kingdom. Export income had been enhanced through 
bulk purchase agreements under which the United Kingdom purchased exports 
of meat, dairy products and wool at guaranteed prices. These arrangements 
remained in place until the 1950s. Imports had been restrained. Fiscal and 
monetary policies were deflationary6 and based on ‘sound finance’. Crucially 
they were complemented by stabilisation measures – income and price controls 
3  In the British context, ‘the tendency of industrial, trade union and financial institutions to make reciprocal 
arrangements with each other and with government while avoiding overt conflict’. Keith Middlemas, Power 
Competition and the State, Vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1986), 1.
4  J.V.T. Baker, The New Zealand People at War: War Economy (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 
Department of Internal Affairs, 1965), 2. I am indebted to Baker, and also to G.R. Hawke, The Making of New 
Zealand: An Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and B. Easton, In Stormy Seas: 
The Post-War New Zealand Economy (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1997) for their discussions of the 
New Zealand economy before, during and after the war.
5  The ‘gift’ was not only an act of generosity; it was linked with negotiations on sterling and bulk purchase.
6  Hawke, The Making of New Zealand, 172. Price rises in New Zealand between 1939 and 1945 at 18 per cent 
(and 5 per cent during the stabilisation period from 1942 to 1945) were significantly below the United Kingdom 
and United States, and Australia (23 per cent).
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– that were supported by a ‘willingness of groups within the community to 
subordinate their interests to the perceived need for resources to be mobilised 
towards the war’.7 The machinery of stabilisation and the thinking behind it 
influenced both economic management and the style of government for many 
years to come.
New Zealand’s first Labour Government held office throughout the war and 
for four years afterwards – a total of four parliamentary terms. It had won in 
a landslide at the general election at the end of 1935 and remained in office 
until 1949. It was led, first, by Australian-born Michael Joseph Savage. He died 
in 1940 and was succeeded by Peter Fraser, who headed the government for 
nine years until the National Party led by Sydney Holland defeated it. Fraser, 
as prime minister and minister of external affairs, and Walter Nash, as deputy 
prime minister and minister of finance, dominated the Cabinet throughout the 
war and in the immediate post-war years. Their distinctive styles of leadership 
and their relations with the public service are considered below.
When Labour came to office, New Zealand was emerging from the Depression. 
Ministers had no hesitation in using the state as the engine of development. 
Extensive public works programs (notably roads, housing and hydro-electric 
power development) got under way. Benefits were increased. Industrial 
relations legislation was amended to improve the position of workers and 
unions. Guaranteed prices for dairy products were introduced. The Industrial 
Efficiency Act 1936 signalled the government’s commitment to ‘the promotion of 
new industries in the most economic form’. And, in 1938, passage of the Social 
Security Act ‘restored New Zealand’s status as a social laboratory’8 and laid the 
foundations of the modern welfare state.
Mobilisation of the country for war of necessity further extended the role of 
the state, facilitated by the existence of widespread controls already in place. 
The wartime framework of public agencies and regulatory instruments was 
available to the Labour Government to pursue national development in the 
post-war period.
The post-war challenges
Like all other countries that had been engaged for five years in total war, New 
Zealand had immediate issues with which to deal in making the transition to 
peacetime. Employment was at the forefront. Returning servicemen needed to 
find jobs; the place in the workforce of women (who had filled the gap left by 
7  Ibid.
8  P.M. Smith, A Concise History of New Zealand (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 157.
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men called into the forces) required attention – a particular issue for the state 
services; and ‘manpower’ controls had to be unwound. Unlike the situation after 
the Great War, the shortage of labour after the Second World War was ‘to make 
the problem of rehabilitation comparatively simple’.9 Indeed, the persistence of 
‘full employment’10 – most economists at the time and later would say ‘over-full 
employment’ – and the consequential threat of inflation preoccupied policy-
makers in the post-war period.
To illustrate the nature and style of governance in New Zealand in the post-war 
years I have focused on economic management (the short term) and national 
development (the long term). But there were also activities of interest in other 
fields of public policy – and the public service – to which I will allude below.
Economic management
At what point was the influence of Keynes on New Zealand economic management 
felt? We know that when the minister of finance, W. Downie Stewart, and 
the secretary to the Treasury, A.D. Park, were in London in 1932, they met 
Keynes who offered views on New Zealand’s exchange problem (including ‘to 
approximate the Australian rate of exchange’).11 We know, too, that Keynes’ 
ideas (The Means to Prosperity)12 – to stimulate growth through increased 
government spending – influenced representations to the minister of finance, 
Gordon Coates,13 early in the 1930s, but were dismissed as irrelevant. Keynesian 
views on the place of ‘cheap money’ (low interest rates) were understood by 
officials such as Ashwin (see below) and shared by the apostles of Douglas 
Credit.14 But the influence of economists on the New Zealand governments of 
the 1930s was largely confined to recommendations to devalue the New Zealand 
pound against sterling that came from a government-appointed committee in 
1932. The New Zealand Treasury was more inclined to deal with bankers and 
businessmen than economists.
9  Baker, The New Zealand People at War, 504.
10  Hawke, The Making of New Zealand, 190. After the Second World War and until 1967 not more than 
0.2 per cent of the labour force was registered as unemployed.
11  M. McKinnon, Treasury: The New Zealand Treasury 1840–2000 (Auckland: Auckland University Press 
in Association with the Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2003), 137. Downie Stewart, who resigned his 
ministerial post when the Cabinet decided to devalue, described Keynes in his diary as ‘a peculiar looking 
man, very tall, with dark hair and black moustache’.
12  J.M. Keynes, The Means to Prosperity (London: Macmillan, 1933).
13  J.G. (Gordon) Coates (1878–1943), Reform Party prime minister between 1925 and 1928, was minister of 
finance in the Coalition Government between 1933 and 1935. He served in the war cabinet from 1940 until 
his death in 1943.
14  Hawke, The Making of New Zealand, 154.
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B.C. (Sir Bernard) Ashwin, c1955
Source: New Zealand Treasury
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There is no evidence that the influence on economic policy of economists, 
Keynesian or otherwise, increased after Labour assumed office in 1935. Indeed, 
McKinnon, in his history of the New Zealand Treasury, contrasts the ‘movement 
of young Keynesians into other British Commonwealth Treasuries’ with their 
absence from the New Zealand Treasury. In particular, the ‘exciting’ experience 
of H.C. Coombs in Australia in the mid-1930s is recalled.15
At this point the first of the ‘mandarins’ around which this chapter is constructed 
enters the narrative. B.C. (later Sir Bernard) Ashwin had been an influential 
adviser to the United/Reform Coalition Government, which held office from 1931 
to 1935, a period which included negotiations over establishment of the Reserve 
Bank. Although Ashwin did not become secretary until 1939 – at the age of 42 
– there is no disagreement with the proposition that he was the principal official 
advising New Zealand governments on economic management from the early 
1930s until his retirement in 1955.
Brian Easton, writing about Ashwin as one of New Zealand’s nation-builders, 
states that he was the Treasury’s only economist in the 1930s.16 Ashwin had 
graduated as a Master of Commerce in economics in 1925 from Victoria University 
(part-time study). He was a member of the Economic Society of Australia and 
New Zealand from the 1920s and a contributor to the Economic Record.
Ashwin worked in close association with the Labour Government throughout 
its long period of office. Walter Nash was the minister of finance for the entire 
14 years. Ashwin was deeply involved in the Social Security Act 1938 (seeking to 
moderate the claims on the public purse); in buying out the private shareholders 
in the Reserve Bank and increasing the Bank’s powers over the trading banks; 
in the exchange crisis of 1938–39, meeting ministers daily while negotiations 
proceeded in London; and in the various aspects of what is generally accepted 
to be a ‘symbolic’ new direction of economic management that can be dated 
from the decisions in December 1938 to impose import and exchange controls 
that continued long after the initial crisis.17
‘Insulationism’ (or ‘planned insulation’)18 was the term in use from the late 1930s 
through to the post-war period to represent ‘a broad decision that the course 
of the New Zealand economy should be determined less by events overseas and 
more by the choice of local people, especially those holding official positions’.19 
By contrast, with the onset of the Depression in 1930, the government at the end 
of the war in 1945 had at its command not only the levers of fiscal policy, but 
15  McKinnon, Treasury, 159, citing G. Whitwell, The Treasury Line (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 10, 
11, 61–5.
16  B. Easton, The Nationbuilders (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2001), 47.
17  Hawke, The Making of New Zealand, 163.
18  J.B. Condliffe, The Welfare State in New Zealand (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1959), 58.
19  Hawke, The Making of New Zealand, 163.
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also control of monetary policy (through the Reserve Bank and, in theory, the 
ownership of the Bank of New Zealand – nationalised in 1945 and responsible 
for 40 per cent of banking business), import, exchange and price controls, and, 
in effect, an incomes policy through the instrument of the Arbitration Court.
The Reserve Bank, established in 1934, perhaps surprisingly, does not feature 
prominently in this story. In matters of general monetary policy, Ashwin was 
undeniably the principal adviser:
He had been prominent in the foundation of the bank, and he looked 
on it as to some extent his child. But he considered that it had had an 
unfortunate beginning and he did not regard it as playing a major role 
in economic policy in the 1940s. By the late 1940s and the early 1950s 
… Ashwin was too well established as the senior financial adviser to 
Government to regard the bank as a rival …20
The role of the Arbitration Court warrants recognition here. The Court (a 
judge flanked by nominees of the social partners, the employers and unions), 
with its power to issue general wage orders, played a significant role in the 
economy. Judge Arthur Tyndall shared a number of characteristics with other 
‘mandarins’ who feature in this chapter. He was a long-time public servant (an 
engineer, lawyer and accountant). After some years in road construction, he was 
successively secretary of Mines (1934–36), and director of Housing (1936–40) – 
heading a flagship program of the Labour Government – becoming judge of the 
Arbitration Court in 1940 and remaining in that position until 1965.
In the words of J.B. Condliffe, one of New Zealand’s most eminent economists, 
writing in 1959, ‘[t]he New Zealand economy emerged from the war taut with 
suppressed inflation’.21 With international reserves at very comfortable levels, 
a balanced budget, and the continuation of an assured market for primary 
products in the United Kingdom, there were pressures on the government to ease 
wartime restraints. But, by comparison with the situation when Labour assumed 
office a decade earlier, notable for under-employment, resources, including the 
workforce, were now fully employed. There was also an appreciation among the 
policy-makers of the
lesson of Keynesian economics that fiscal policy could be used to balance 
aggregate demand and supply in the economy as a whole, and that the 
20  G.R. Hawke, Between Governments and Banks: A History of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Wellington: 
Government Printer, 1973), 223. Particularly after Ashwin’s retirement in 1955 and on the technical aspects 
of monetary policy E.C. Fussell (deputy governor, 1941–48 and governor, 1948–62) was a respected adviser.
21  Condliffe, The Welfare State in New Zealand, 99.
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budget was not merely a matter of government housekeeping. But this 
was grafted on to an economy where official controls were widespread 
and not regarded as a transitory phenomenon.22
At the centre of the government machinery that administered this web 
of controls was the Economic Stabilisation Commission (ESC) – ‘that very 
remarkable institution’.23 In December 1942, a comprehensive economic 
stabilisation scheme was announced and a six-person commission established 
with Ashwin as director of Stabilisation. Ashwin took over as chair of a three-
person commission in July 1943.24
The ESC had what may now seem to be a disproportionately large influence on 
economic policy making and public administration during the next 30 years. 
First, as an ‘independent semi-representative body’25 it demonstrated the ‘mildly 
corporate’26 nature of New Zealand politics that persisted until the Rogernomics 
revolution in the 1980s. One interpretation is that ‘the government was engaged 
in an elaborate piece of social engineering. Ministers were attempting to 
construct a wartime economy that would treat all sections as fairly as possible’.27 
The government – represented by Ashwin – was in the chair flanked by 
F.P. Walsh28 representing the Federation of Labour and a representative of the 
farming industries. This was an expression of the agreement between the trade 
union movement and the farmers underpinning the stabilisation policy of 
the government. The unions, notably the Federation of Labour, and farming, 
through the producer boards and Federated Farmers, carried a great weight in 
determining economic policy through the next four decades.29
22  Hawke, The Making of New Zealand, 173.
23  L.C. Webb, ‘The Making of Economic Policy’, in R.S. Parker, ed., Economic Stability in New Zealand 
(Wellington: NZIPA, 1953), 24.
24  In some respects there is an affinity between the ESC and the Australian ‘F and E’ (the Financial and 
Economic Advisory Committee) – see Whitwell, The Treasury Line, 65–79.
25  M.J. Moriarty, ‘Administering the Policy of Economic Stabilization’, New Zealand Journal of Public 
Administration, 7, no. 2 (March 1953), 30.
26  A term attributed to John Roberts, Professor of Public Administration at Victoria University of 
Wellington (1966–88). Roberts also wrote about ‘the stabilization game’ – ‘a symbolic construction of policy 
consensus among a broadly dispersed political elite’ – a consensus of ‘fair shares’. See John Roberts, ‘Society 
and its Politics’, in Thirteen Facets: Essays to Celebrate the Silver Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth the Second 1952–77 
(Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, DIA, 1978).
27  M. Bassett and M. King, Tomorrow Comes the Song: A Life of Peter Fraser (Auckland: Penguin, 2000), 202.
28  G. Hunt, Black Prince: The Biography of Fintan Patrick Walsh (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2004), 133. 
Fintan Patrick Walsh (1896–1963), a founding member of the Federation of Labour and president from 1953, 
and member of the ESC (1942–50). His key role in economic policy making in the immediate post-war period is 
exemplified by the publication of Economic Stabilization in the Post-War Period in early 1946. Soon known as 
‘The Walsh Report’ but written by ESC officials, Lloyd White and Alan Low, the report warned of the dangers 
of inflation. Walsh, with Fraser’s endorsement, ‘sold’ the report to reluctant trade unions. 
29  This proposition as it applies to the union movement may be challenged by citing the conflict with 
the National Government that reached its peak in the waterfront strike of 1951 followed by a ‘snap’ general 
election. The industrial relations system based on the Arbitration Court remained, however, and the Federation 
of Labour without doubt had a very large influence on the administration of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s.
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Secondly, the commission played an important role ‘in easing the pressure on 
the political executive: it carries out negotiations on prices and payouts with 
representatives of the farming industries, the manufacturing industries, and 
other economic interests’.30 McKinnon suggests that negotiations at the level 
undertaken by the ESC in New Zealand were carried out by ministers in the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia (cf. the role of the Australian price 
stabilisation committee).31
Thirdly, the ESC reached across the whole range of government agencies. While 
other tribunals and departments administered the regulations on prices, wages, 
goods and services – there were 18 controllers in the Ministry of Supply and 
Munitions – the commission called the shots. As Moriarty wrote at the time:
Economic Stabilization covers prices, wages, rents, transport – in fact 
every economic activity of the individual. The Departments dealing 
with these activities all have problems which are also the concern of the 
Commission. The Commission is the central intelligence and ‘economic 
general staff’ service for the Government. It must maintain contact, 
through its officers, with the various departments dealing with economic 
affairs, recommend particular courses of action which it believes to be 
in harmony with the general policy, and withal keep the Government 
continually informed of the economic state of the country.32
The ESC in this respect clearly foreshadows the coordinating role of the Treasury 
in future, both as the ‘principal economic and financial adviser’ and as chair and 
secretariat of the Officials Economic Committee structure that developed in the 
1940s and took a central place in economic decision-making (see below).
Fourthly, the ESC was a fruitful training ground for a remarkable number of public 
servants33 who would lead the public service in the 1960s and 1970s (as well as 
Robert Parker34 and Leicester Webb,35 who had distinguished academic careers 
30  L.C. Webb, ‘Politics and Administration’, in Horace Belshaw, ed., New Zealand (Berkeley: University. of 
California Press, 1947), 288.
31  McKinnon, Treasury, 173.
32  Moriarty, ‘Administering the Policy of Economic Stabilization’, 30.
33  Among the names are: M.J. Moriarty (secretary of Industries and Commerce, 1965–72), H.G. Lang 
(secretary to the Treasury, 1968–76), N.V. Lough (secretary to the Treasury, 1976–80), Sir Alan Low (governor, 
Reserve Bank, 1967–77), G.D.L. White (deputy secretary, Foreign Affairs, 1964–72, Ambassador, Washington, 
1972–78), A.C. Shailes (controller and auditor-general, 1975–83), K.C. Durrant (deputy director-general, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1969–82).
34  R.S. (Robert) Parker was lecturer in public administration at Victoria University College, Wellington 
from 1939 to 1945, with some years in war service (including time at the Economic Stabilisation Commission), 
and returned as professor of political science from 1949 to 1954 when he took up the position of reader (later 
professor) in political science at The Australian National University.
35  Leicester Webb (1905–1962), after a career in journalism and study in Europe, became director of 
stabilisation from 1945 to 1948 and later professor of political science at The Australian National University. 
See J. Warhurst, ‘Leicester Webb and the Foundation Years of Australian Political Science’, Australian Journal 
of Political Science, 37, no. 3 (November 2002).
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in Australia). The staff of the ESC featured a number qualified in economics – the 
Treasury was then, and for a decade into the future, predominantly a department 
of accountants. But this was a generation of public servants whose formative 
years were spent in an environment of regulation born not of ideology but of a 
pragmatic resort to the apparatus of the state to deal with the problems of the day. 
Such an approach was not incompatible with an underlying belief in the virtues 
of markets. This eclectic approach characterised the policy stance of people like 
Moriarty and Lang throughout their influential careers. The commission itself 
became an advisory committee to the minister of industries and commerce in 
1948. It was abolished in 1950 and a number of the staff (including Moriarty, 
Lang and Lough) transferred to the Treasury.
The heyday of the ESC also marked the dominance of Ashwin within the 
Wellington governance system.36 This dominance was starkly emphasised 
between 1942 and 1944 when Walter Nash, although remaining minister 
of finance, was also resident minister in Washington DC. While his central 
role in the business of government remained, in the last years of the Labour 
Government Ashwin was not always successful in persuading ministers to avoid 
inflationary spending. Although the head of the Prime Minister’s Department, 
Alister McIntosh, told Sir Norman Brook, secretary to the Cabinet in the United 
Kingdom, in February 1950, that the ‘Treasury have succeeded all too well in 
scaring the new Government stiff’, Ashwin apparently fell out with Holland in 
his final years.37
Among the major economic events that stand out in the five years following the 
war are the decision in 1948 to revalue the New Zealand pound to parity with 
sterling, and the Korean War commodity boom in 1950–51 – after Labour had 
been defeated at the polls and the National Party had begun its uninterrupted 
period of eight years in office. Many wartime controls were relaxed in Labour’s 
last years. In the early 1950s, the National Government, consistent with rhetoric 
about ‘freedom’, reduced price controls and limits on exchange payments and 
imports. Balance of payments pressures soon led to their tightening. Coupled 
with monetary controls, constraints at the frontier and regulation of prices and 
wages continued to mark economic management in New Zealand for the first 
four decades after the war.
Symbolising the readiness of successive governments to resort to regulatory 
powers when confronted by problems of economic management was retention 
until 1987 of the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948. This statute retained the wartime 
emergency powers of the Executive to ‘control prices, wages, and take almost 
36  While Ashwin was secretary to the Treasury he also served as director of the Reserve Bank; director 
of the State Advances Corporation; chairman of the Local Authorities Loans Board; member of the Dairy 
Products Marketing Board; and, during the war, paymaster-general of the armed forces.
37  McKinnon, Treasury, 216.
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every economic measure conceivable (short of raising taxes) by regulation’.38 
Around 200 regulations were made under the authority of this Act. As Sir 
Robert Muldoon said in 1976, ‘you can do anything provided you can hang 
your hat on economic stabilisation’.39
Associated with such controls were policies of industrialisation40 – behind 
the mechanisms of ‘import selection’ or ‘import substitution’ – central to the 
broader objective of national development. In this respect, Hawke’s observation 
is apposite. He notes that the best reason for import licensing ‘was probably that 
it was desirable to have a variety of industries so as to provide opportunities 
for New Zealanders to develop a range of skills and aptitudes’ and that the 
alternative, quoting Drummond41 on industrialisation programs in general, was:
A small scattered population of farmers, shepherds and miners, a few 
market towns, a scanty clutch of civil servants, lawyers, doctors and 
clerics. New Zealand in 1900 in fact. Or Gold Coast in 1950.42
National development
Above all, New Zealand was a ‘dependent economy’.43 After the war a ‘programme 
of planned development behind the insulation of exchange control’44 could be 
built on the foundations put in place in 1938 and later extended. New Zealand’s 
national development in the 1940s and 1950s had three principal components. 
First, increased productivity in the farming industries (these were the years 
of aerial topdressing, irrigation, and application of state-funded scientific 
innovation to the grasslands); second, enhanced infrastructure; and, thirdly, 
industrialisation.
Expanded public works activity was a key element in Labour’s pre-war program: 
roading, hydro-electric power generation, airport development, irrigation 
schemes and housing projects. All resumed after the cutbacks of the Depression. 
But the outbreak of war diverted resources to military requirements. The Public 
Works Department became increasingly ‘the constructional agency of the armed 
38  G. Palmer and M. Palmer, Bridled Power (3rd edn Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), 171.
39  Ibid., 172.
40  See S. Leathem, ‘Industry and Industrial Policy’, in H. Belshaw, ed., New Zealand (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1947) and Michael Bassett, The State in New Zealand 1840–1984: Socialism without Doctrines? 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998), 208–10.
41  I.R. Drummond, ‘The British Empire Economies in the “Great Depression”’, in H. van der Wee, ed., The 
Great Depression Revisited: Essays in the Economics of the Thirties (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 233.
42  G.R. Hawke, Government in the New Zealand Economy, Planning Paper No. 13 (Wellington: New Zealand 
Planning Council, 1982), 44.
43  H. Belshaw, ‘Stabilisation in a Dependent Economy’, Economic Record Supplement, April 1939; C.G.F. 
Simpkin, The Instability of a Dependent Economy: Economic Fluctuations in New Zealand, 1840-1914 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1951).
44  Condliffe, The Welfare State in New Zealand, 63.
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services’.45 The extent of military requirements and the claims from overseas 
theatres on manpower and equipment were an unparalleled challenge. The 
departmental structure was demonstrably inadequate and, from March 1942, 
wartime arrangements were put in place.
A Defence Construction Council was established with the prime minister as 
chairman and with the newly appointed commissioner of defence construction 
as vice-chairman. This latter appointment, with sweeping powers, had a 
significant influence on post-war organisation of public works. James (later 
Sir James) Fletcher, the founder of what is still a major construction company, 
had been a dominant figure in the government’s state housing schemes. He was 
instrumental in creation of a new statutory agency – the Ministry of Works46 
– to ‘establish more appropriate control over the execution of all construction 
works, including housing construction’, and became the first commissioner 
of works. The Ministry, separate from the Public Works Department (PWD), 
worked with the Treasury in examining the economic and technical aspects of 
all projects from central government agencies, local government or subsidised 
from the public purse. Responsibility for carrying out public works remained 
with the PWD.
It was envisaged from the outset that the ministry would continue after the war 
and, from 1946, the commissioner of works took over the responsibilities of the 
permanent head of the PWD. Thus was born the Ministry of Works, the powerful 
department that played such a major part in New Zealand’s development until 
its demise during the 1980s ‘Revolution’. 
From its inception the ministry – and its minister, the redoubtable Robert Semple 
– aspired to a ‘planning’ role. Semple, indeed, referred to it as the Ministry of 
Works and Planning.47 He spoke of the haphazard way in which public works 
had proceeded and of ‘political roads and bridges’. Initially, it was envisaged 
that Fletcher as commissioner would supervise the execution of a plan for post-
war recovery approved by Cabinet. Some credence was given to the ‘planning’ 
function of the ministry when administration of the Town Planning Act 1926 was 
transferred from the Department of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Works in 
1946 (the Act was not amended until 1948). The Town and Country Planning 
Branch was an integral part of the ministry until the 1980s.
Despite Semple’s claims, there was some uncertainty about where ‘planning’ 
should be located in the governance structure of the post-war period. Early 
in 1944 Cabinet established the Organisation for National Development 
45  R. Noonan, By Design: A Brief History of the Public Works Department, Ministry of Works 1870–1970 
(Wellington: Government Printer, 1975).
46  Ministry of Works Act 1943.
47  Noonan, By Design, 188.
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(OND) as a branch of the Prime Minister’s Department – the counterpart to 
Australia’s Department of Post-War Reconstruction. The initiative seems to 
have come from the Department of Industries and Commerce (and Ministry of 
Supply) that carried the major burden of administering wartime controls. The 
mandate was ‘not only to study and plan for long-range development of the 
Dominion but also to make special preparation for practical measures to meet 
the period of transition which will occur on the cessation of hostilities.’48 The 
Organisation itself, working within policy set by a Cabinet sub-committee of 
the prime minister, and the ministers of Finance, Industries and Commerce, 
Works, Agriculture, and Rehabilitation, consisted of a chief executive officer, 
a coordinating committee of five permanent heads (chaired by Ashwin), and a 
small research staff. Planning was to be undertaken by a series of committees 
chaired by ministers: construction, power development, rehabilitation and 
personnel, transport, tourism and publicity, immigration and labour, imports 
and shipping.
On 19 November 1945, Cabinet disbanded the OND. Cabinet committees already 
established would deal with any ‘major problems involving rehabilitation and 
post-war reconstruction’. The executive committee was replaced by a special 
departmental committee chaired by the secretary to the Treasury ‘and making 
recommendations to Cabinet whenever necessary’. Various planning committees 
continued at the discretion of the appropriate responsible minister. The Ministry 
of Works would assume all ‘physical planning functions’. Regional councils set 
up under the auspices of the OND were ‘to take full responsibility for managing 
their own affairs’.49
Polaschek, writing in 1958, assessed the OND as having ‘accomplished a good 
deal’ despite its short life, specifically important surveys of coal mining and 
forestry, population estimates and demobilisation plans.
Nevertheless, New Zealand governments must face an election every three 
years. This coupled with their typical pragmatic approach to problems 
gives them a preference for action rather than plans. So the existence of a 
purely planning body divorced from the carrying out of policy is always 
likely to be precarious. Particularly is this so if its functions cut across 
those of old established departments, like Treasury and Works, which 
are concerned both with forming policy and applying it.50
48  Hon. D.G. Sullivan (Minister of Industries and Commerce and acting Prime Minister) announcing the 
establishment of the Organisation for National Development in 1944 (quoted by Leathem, ‘Industry and 
Industrial Policy’, 174).
49  Archives New Zealand, AAFD 816/1, Shanahan’s personal file on Cabinet organisation.
50  R.J. Polaschek, Government Administration in New Zealand (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public 
Administration, 1958), 49.
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The OND failed, in Polaschek’s view, ‘primarily because too much was expected 
from it too soon’ – in announcing its demise to the House of Representatives, 
Fraser spoke of impracticability; he wanted quick results – but also ‘because it 
cut across the lines of departmental authority and responsibility’.51 Permanent 
heads were already overburdened. This is consistent with Sutch’s comments 
that underline the location of power in Wellington:
Sullivan [Minister of Industries and Commerce] as Acting Prime 
Minister, established the OND early in 1944, when Nash was busy as 
New Zealand Minister in Washington and Fraser was at a war conference. 
When Fraser returned to find an economic planning group in his own 
department he was more than displeased and by 1946 he had disbanded 
it. He was supported in his action by the older and stronger government 
departments, for example, Treasury and Works, but had he wanted to, 
Fraser could easily have made an economic unit the most important part 
of the machinery of state.52
Similar impressions were recorded in a discussion in 1964 of a paper by Foss 
Shanahan (see below).53 There was a feeling that the OND had been ‘suffocated’ 
by senior officials in the Ministry of Works and the Treasury, ‘partly because it 
sought to interpose itself between major Departments and their Ministers, partly 
because it seemed to usurp departmental responsibility for implementing plans, 
partly because its plans (which were not always discussed with departments 
responsible) were too ambitious and unreal, and partly because the youth and 
experience of some of its officers caused jealousies’.54
As ‘indicative planning’ came into vogue in the 1950s and 1960s – the New 
Zealand manifestations are found in sectoral planning conferences, the National 
Development Conference (1968–72) and the New Zealand Planning Council 
(1977–91) – there were echoes of the issues that surrounded the OND.
Cabinet and coordination
Leicester Webb, writing in 1940, observed that:
It might be expected that, notwithstanding the variety of a cabinet 
minister’s work, it would be possible for a dozen men to govern New 
51  Ibid., 270.
52  W.B. Sutch, The Quest for Security in New Zealand 1840–1966 (Wellington: Oxford University Press, 
1966), 345, 346.
53  F. Shanahan, ‘Planning in War and Peace’, in J.P.M. Cornwall, ed., Planning and Forecasting in New 
Zealand (Wellington/London: NZIPA/Oxford University Press, 1965), 19–32.
54  Cornwall, Planning and Forecasting, 10.
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Zealand, which has fewer inhabitants than Liverpool, is not troubled 
by racial minorities, and has no pressing problems of foreign policy, 
without shortening their lives by overwork and lack of sleep and 
without creating around themselves an atmosphere of flurry and crisis. 
But it is not so. The machinery of government in New Zealand works 
with as much jamming and overheating as the machinery of government 
in a great empire.55
Five years of war were years of achievement but, if anything, they highlighted the 
problems of the machinery of government suggested by Webb. At the ministerial 
level, the credit for achievement can largely be attributed to two people: Peter 
Fraser56 and, to a lesser degree, Walter Nash.57 ‘In effect, throughout the war, 
the key political decisions were made most of the time by two men. The pressure 
flicked from one to the other according to whichever was in New Zealand at the 
time.’58 The situation did not change significantly in the aftermath of the war.
Fraser’s health declined and both men conducted their business with a degree 
of idiosyncrasy that was the bane of officials. Fraser’s sight was not good and 
officials, notably A.D. (later Sir Alister) McIntosh, head of the Prime Minister’s 
Department and secretary of External Affairs, were on call late into the evening 
to read telegrams to him. Nash was a hoarder of files, a habit that continued in 
his one-term prime ministership between 1957 and 1960. These characteristics 
simply underlined the need, obvious to officials, for a more systematic conduct 
of government business.59
What detracted from an atmosphere of dignity in conducting cabinet 
meetings was [Fraser’s] lamentable disregard for method and order. This 
led to endless rambling discussion and excessive waste of time with 
himself as the most notable offender leading the pack in the pursuit of 
many a hare. He just would not be organized. An agenda was an affront, 
and any attempt by an official or a colleague to introduce order would 
only make him mulish and antagonistic …60
55  L. Webb, Government in New Zealand (Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1940), 67–8.
56  For an account of Fraser in New Zealand politics see Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song.
57  For a similar account of the life of Nash see Keith Sinclair, Walter Nash (Auckland: Oxford University 
Press, 1976).
58  Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, 223.
59  ‘For my part I wished that [Nash’s] good intentions had not rested on his egregious inability to organise 
his work. As with Fraser, time meant nothing to Nash. As a Minister he boasted that he never went home on 
the day he left it … Papers piled up in his office. They stayed there for days and weeks, or months or years, 
and sometimes forever … This habit of holding papers caused serious dislocation of public business.’ Sir Carl 
Berendsen in Hugh Templeton, ed., Mr Ambassador: Memoirs of Sir Carl Berendsen (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 2009), 7.
60  A.D. McIntosh, ‘Working with Peter Fraser in Wartime’, in M. Clark, ed., Peter Fraser: Master Politician 
(Wellington: Dunmore Press, 1998), 163 (reprinting a 1973 address by McIntosh). There is a resemblance to 
the practice of Mackenzie King in Canada: ‘King’s lack of, and aversion to, system.’ Granatstein, The Ottawa 
Men, 203.
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But in the domestic Cabinet for which there was no secretariat, until after the 
end of the war, chaos often prevailed.
This provides an opportunity for introduction of three mandarins who made 
an indelible mark on the New Zealand public service. C.A. (later Sir Carl) 
Berendsen, ‘an Australian New Zealander’, departed from New Zealand as the 
first high commissioner in Canberra early in 1943 and retired as ambassador to 
the United States in 1952. But through the 1930s and until he left Wellington, 
he was the government’s adviser on external affairs. From 1935, Berendsen was 
also permanent head of the Prime Minister’s Department and, from June 1940, 
secretary of the War Cabinet. Berendsen was something of a one-man band. As 
his successor (McIntosh) commented, ‘Berendsen had always been reluctant to 
take on staff not only because he was more competent than anyone else to handle 
the drafting and the decision-making involved but there was, in fact, no room 
physically within the Prime Minister’s Department in Parliament Buildings in 
which to put staff’.61
McIntosh, a librarian and historian, was effectively Berendsen’s deputy in all 
roles. In 1943, at the age of 37, he became secretary of the War Cabinet and 
permanent head of the newly created Department of External Affairs. In 1945 he 
also became head of the Prime Minister’s Department. He remained in the dual 
roles, heading the two departments, until 1966. McIntosh laid the foundations 
and built the department now known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, and guided New Zealand foreign policy for more than 20 years.62 He was 
at the right hand of four prime ministers – Fraser (for six years), Holland (for 
eight), Nash (for three) and Holyoake (for seven). It is his part in establishing 
the machinery that institutionalised the way in which New Zealand cabinets 
and officials have, in fundamental respects, functioned to the present day that 
is of interest.
Even more directly concerned with the organisation of Cabinet than McIntosh 
was the third of the trio of diplomat-cum-prime ministerial advisers, Foss 
Shanahan. A lawyer, Shanahan transferred from the Customs Department to the 
Prime Minister’s Department in 1938 as assistant secretary to the Organisation 
for National Security (ONS), established within the Prime Minister’s Department 
in 1937 to prepare the ‘War Book’. In 1940, at the age of 30, Shanahan became 
61  A.D. McIntosh, ‘Origins of the Department of External Affairs and the Formulation of an Independent 
Foreign Policy’, in New Zealand in World Affairs, Vol. I (Wellington: Price Milburn/NZIIA, 1977), 17.
62  McIntosh’s place in New Zealand’s administrative history is well covered in his published correspondence: 
Undiplomatic Dialogue: Letters Between Carl Berendsen and Alister McIntosh 1943–1952 (1993) and Unofficial 
Channels: Letters Between Alister McIntosh and Foss Shanahan, George Laking and Frank Corner (1999) both 
volumes edited by Ian McGibbon; McIntosh’s own story of the early years in ‘Origins of the Department’; 
McIntosh’s speech accepting an honorary degree from Canterbury University in 1965, reprinted in 
M. Templeton, ed., An Eye, an Ear and a Voice: 50 Years in New Zealand’s External Relations 1943–93 
(Wellington: MFAT, 1993).
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secretary of the ONS. He then became assistant secretary to the War Cabinet 
and secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and, in 1945, secretary to Cabinet 
and assistant (later deputy) secretary of External Affairs. In the 1950s Shanahan 
served abroad but tragically died at the age of 54 in 1964 (still deputy secretary 
of External Affairs, with McIntosh’s retirement from the New Zealand public 
service only a couple of years away).
The archives tell a story of persistence by McIntosh and Shanahan in their 
efforts to persuade the government ‘to establish a Cabinet Secretariat with a view 
to placing Cabinet business on an orderly basis, in contrast to the notoriously 
haphazard procedures which had characterised the War Cabinet’63 – and the 
peacetime Cabinet.
In a file note of 30 September 1946,64 Shanahan observed that the British Cabinet 
Secretariat ‘had now, with experience in the Second World War, reached a 
very high stage of perfection’ and that the Whitehall model was paralleled in 
Canada and Australia, particularly the former. Wartime experience, Shanahan 
argued, had emphasised the need for coordination among departments and the 
formal machinery in place on defence questions had proved its worth. But the 
work was more than one person could handle. The range of Cabinet standing 
committees recently established was serviced through arrangements organised 
by the minister in the chair. The ‘weakness’ of these committees was that ‘they 
may trend [sic] in their discussions to proceed without the Ministers concerned 
always being informed of developments in sufficient time … there is scope for a 
Cabinet Secretariat in New Zealand’.
A further paper of 5 June 1947 pointed to ‘the number of important policy 
matters with which Cabinet must deal, some reorganization of the business 
could be effected so as to reduce the amount of time spent by Cabinet on matters 
not of the same relative importance’ and again commended the British system 
and developments in Australia.65 Specific proposals were made for the approval 
of expenditure with delegation to individual ministers. A formal agenda should 
be circulated in advance. Ministers should be required to ‘formulate precisely’ 
recommendations and circulate papers five days in advance. Minutes on the 
British model should be prepared. The secretariat should check that effect had 
been given to decisions made by Cabinet.
63  McGibbon, Unofficial Channels, 28. A War Cabinet had been formed in July 1940 with three Labour 
members and two from the National Party. It was to deal not only with service matters but also production 
for war purposes, financing the war and generally to implement the policy of parliament in relation to New 
Zealand’s participation in the war. This was not a ‘national government’ as the National Party Opposition was 
seeking: the Labour Cabinet continued as ‘the government’. The War Cabinet held its last meeting on 9 August 
1945 and, despite Holland’s unwillingness to participate a degree of bipartisanship was achieved.
64  Archives New Zealand, AAFD 816/1, Shanahan’s personal file on Cabinet organisation.
65  Ibid.
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McIntosh and Shanahan made little progress in the remaining days of the 
Labour Government in setting up a secretariat on the Whitehall model although 
Shanahan was present at Cabinet meetings from January 1948. The results of the 
1949 general election presented the opportunity for officials to take the initiative.
In a memorandum of 2 December 1949 – between election day and the 
swearing in of the new government – McIntosh, acknowledging that this was 
‘substantially Mr Shanahan’s draft’, put before the prime minister-elect, Sydney 
Holland, a number of proposals ‘to assist in the conduct of Cabinet business’. 
The memorandum:
presupposes that the concern of Cabinet with routine details would be 
reduced and the attention of Cabinet would be concentrated mainly on 
policy questions … Ministers would be informed of problems before they 
were discussed and thus be in a better position to discuss them when 
they were being considered in Cabinet. Under a system where minutes 
were made and circulated the Ministers would be better informed and 
could better instruct Permanent Heads.66
McIntosh associated Ashwin and R.M. Campbell, chairman of the Public Service 
Commission, with his urgings 
that some such procedure should be instituted, with a view not only 
to increasing the efficiency of the Cabinet itself but, more especially, to 
enabling the Public Service to carry out the policy decisions Cabinet 
wishes Government Departments to implement.
Shortly afterwards, Shanahan (who had been abroad and had spent time with 
Norman Robertson, secretary to Cabinet in Ottawa) made specific proposals to 
the prime minister relating to procedures for the agenda, minutes, expenditure 
control (on which Ashwin was reporting separately) and servicing Cabinet 
committees. Shanahan was not lacking in ambition for the Cabinet Secretariat. 
But the trouble-shooting role to which he aspired as Cabinet secretary – 
perhaps emulating the dominance in Whitehall of Norman Brook (on whom he 
had called) – was not something that commended itself to such ‘mandarins’ as 
Ashwin in the Treasury or, it can be supposed, E.R. McKillop, the commissioner 
of works (1945–55). Although Shanahan, as deputy to McIntosh in the Prime 
Minister’s Department and External Affairs, remained a powerful figure within 
the Wellington bureaucracy until his death, the Cabinet secretary and the 
secretariat were essentially there to service the Cabinet and its committees, a 
role executed efficiently and effectively, but not to set the directions for the path 
of government.
66  Ibid.
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A further definition – and restriction – of the role of the Cabinet Secretariat was 
associated with another important and long-enduring institutional innovation 
from the early post-war years. This was the Officials Economic Committee that 
became a central feature of the policy making machinery in Wellington for 
30 years. The origins of this committee can be traced to a Balance of Payments 
Working Party formed in 1947 to forecast overseas exchange transactions (OET) 
in the context of the Sterling Area difficulties in the aftermath of the Second 
World War.67 Members represented the Treasury, the Reserve Bank, Industries 
and Commerce, Customs and Agriculture.68 It continued into 1949, focusing 
on OET forecasting and the import licensing schedule. After the change of 
government various arrangements were made to advise the Holland Government 
on economic matters including an Import Advisory Committee, and the Board 
of Trade. From 1952, the Cabinet Economic Committee, initially the Cabinet 
Committee on Economic Policy, usually chaired by the deputy prime minister, 
was supported by a standing Officials Economic Committee, itself served by 
a standing working party. Officials participated in discussion in the Cabinet 
Economic Committee, which met monthly.69
When Shanahan, in his capacity as secretary to Cabinet, called on the secretary 
to the Treasury in 1952 to discuss the arrangements for servicing the Cabinet 
Economic Committee, Ashwin agreed to Shanahan’s proposals with one 
exception – he was insistent that the secretariat for the Officials Committee and 
the Working Party should be in the Treasury, not the Cabinet Secretariat.70 From 
the outset, the Treasury chaired and provided the secretarial services for the 
committee and the working party (and signed all submissions to the Cabinet 
Committee).71
On some issues from the 1940s to the 1980s there was a long-standing divergence 
between departmental ‘lines’ – notably on industrial policy and border 
protection between the Treasury and Industries and Commerce – and some 
‘patch protection’ between Industries and Commerce and Foreign Affairs on 
67  B. Galvin, Policy Co-ordination, Public Sector and Government (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 
1991), 12; Baker, The New Zealand People at War, 569.
68  McKinnon, Treasury, 187.
69  For a contemporary discussion of the official economic policy making arrangements in the early 1950s 
see G.J. Schmidt, ‘Some Administrative Problems Associated with a Vulnerable Balance of Payments’, Paper 
presented for Diploma of Public Administration, Victoria University of Wellington (1952).
70  Personal information: H.G. Lang ONZ, Secretary to the Treasury (1967–76).
71  Other departments represented on the Officials Economic Committee (OEC) were Industries and Commerce 
(from 1972 Trade and Industry), Agriculture, External Affairs (from 1972 Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Customs 
and Statistics. The Reserve Bank attended when internal economic policy was under discussion. Permanent 
heads or their deputies usually attended meetings of the OEC; the working party was chaired by a divisional 
director in the Treasury. The range of topics was very wide with a heavy emphasis on overseas trade policy 
as well as the more obvious matters such as regular reporting on the economic situation and the overseas 
exchange forecasts. Significantly, the budget and taxation fell outside the scope of the committee – these were 
matters for the Minister of Finance and the Treasury.
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trade policy.72 Nonetheless, the machinery of coordination among departments, 
especially on economic matters, through the post-war period until the fourth 
Labour (Lange) Government’s ‘Revolution’ in the 1980s can be given a strong 
pass assessment.
The post-war public service
On the cessation of hostilities an immediate problem facing the government 
and the controlling authority, the Public Service Commission, was absorption 
into the permanent staff of ‘the huge temporary army of public servants’ that 
had entered the public service during the war.73 This was not an easy task. 
The Public Service Commission had to balance the claims of the temporaries 
– often not meeting the criteria for permanent employment – with the equity 
promised to those returning from military service. After intense negotiations 
with the public service trade union, the Public Service Association (PSA) – 
whose significance in this period cannot be overstated – the necessary statutory 
amendments were enacted in the Public Service Amendment Act (1946).
The principal change74 ushered in by the 1946 amendment – the first major 
change to the governing statute since 1912 – was replacement of the sole Public 
Service commissioner by a three-man commission, one of whom was to be a 
representative of the PSA (following a precedent set in some Australian states).75 
Appointed as chairman for a seven-year term was the last of the ‘mandarins’ 
in this particular narrative, Dr R.M. (Dick) Campbell – ‘an unusual choice’, in 
the words of the State Service Commission’s historian.76 Campbell, at the time, 
as he had been for some 10 years, official secretary (effectively deputy high 
commissioner) in London, had worked with Reform Party minister Coates 
during the 1920s and 1930s (latterly as one of the ‘brains trust’).77 An economist 
72  T. Woodfield, Against the Odds: Negotiating for New Zealand’s Future (Palmerston North: Dunmore 
Press, 2008).
73  J.H. Boyes, Public Service Commissioner, quoted by Alan Henderson, The Quest for Efficiency: The 
Origins of the State Service Commission (Wellington: Historical Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 
1990), 173.
74  Other changes were the opening up in a limited way of the appointment of people from outside the 
service who were shown to be ‘in great degree’ more suitable than applicants from within, and the exemption 
of a number of Permanent Head positions from the Public Service Act – thus leaving the way open for political 
appointments. (Those excluded were the Secretary to the Treasury, the Solicitor-General, the Secretary of 
External Affairs, the head of the Prime Minister’s Department, the Commissioner of Works, the Director of 
Broadcasting and the Commissioner of Supply.)
75  Webb, ‘Politics and Administration’, 282.
76  Henderson, The Quest for Efficiency, 189.
77  In 1934–35 Gordon Coates, as minister of finance, employed in his private office advisers who collectively 
became known as the ‘Brains Trust’. They were Campbell, Professor Horace Belshaw from Auckland University 
(with a Cambridge doctorate and an association with Keynes), and Dr W.B. Sutch, a 27-year-old graduate of 
Columbia University and later secretary of Industries and Commerce (1958–65).
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(with a doctorate from the London School of Economics), he had no experience 
of administration on the scale of the public service. Fortunately, another 
commissioner was very experienced; George Bolt had been with the commission 
since 1916.
There was no doubting Campbell’s sharpness of mind (and of pen). ‘[H]e was 
consistently innovative, if unpredictable and unorthodox in his methods. 
In matters of efficiency and economy, he was a breath of fresh air, with his 
enthusiasm to promote change tempered constructively by Bolt’s experience.’78 
J.K. (later Sir Jack) Hunn, then on the staff of the commission and later a 
commissioner, observed that ‘Dick Campbell was an inspirational force in 
either trying out ideas of his own or invigorating others. He was the soul of 
unorthodoxy … Dick Campbell tried hard to humanize the Public Service but it 
was a Sisyphean uphill struggle.’79
What was the direction of change in which Campbell sought to take the service? 
Campbell placed considerable emphasis on improving departmental efficiency 
and introduced the O&M (‘Organisation and Methods’) approach thus emulating 
innovations of the British Treasury. Long overdue, the commission also embarked 
down the devolution route, delegating personnel authority to departments and 
establishing the commission’s presence in offices in Auckland and Christchurch. 
More controversially, Campbell sought to open up the service with proposals 
to remove provisions that were solidly embedded in the regime. Among these 
were abolition of appeal rights above a certain salary ceiling and reduction of 
the statutory protection against competition from outside applicants; opposed 
by the assertive PSA, neither proceeded into legislation.
In the longer view, the most interesting questions that might be asked about 
the New Zealand Public Service of the immediate post-war period concern 
its quality. Leicester Webb, though not unkind, had been a consistent critic 
through the 1940s:
The genius of the New Zealanders expresses itself in the sphere of 
government, not in a capacity for solving difficult problems of sociology 
or economics, but in a capacity for carrying through successfully 
projects requiring organising ability and technical skill and resource … 
since the nature of the problem is clearly defined and the type of ability 
needed for its solution easily measurable. But when the task involves 
excursions into abstract thought and calls for ability of the type which 
is difficult either to define or measure, government in New Zealand is 
78  Henderson, The Quest for Efficiency, 191.
79  J.K. Hunn, Not Only Affairs of State; An Autobiography (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1982), 55, 
62–3.
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frequently at a loss and tends either to fall back on shallow definitions 
of common sense or to become dominated by ideas which are ingenious 
and misleading simplifications.80
In 1944, Webb defined ‘two public services in New Zealand today’: one, the 
new agencies set up to deal with the issues of wartime ‘staffed in a large measure 
by men and women without public service training’; and the ‘old-fashioned 
departments’, a public service that had been 
markedly reluctant to prepare itself for the work of regulating or actively 
directing economic enterprises; in these respects it is still very much 
the product of the reforms of 1912 – reforms conceived by men whose 
instinct was to set the narrowest possible limits to State activity.81 
While Webb was focusing particularly on economic policy making, Lipson82 in 
1948 raised a general concern about the impact of an undue preoccupation with 
a ‘perverted equalitarianism’.83
New Zealand is notoriously ungenerous to talent. In its anxiety to raise 
minima, the country has deemed it necessary to lower maxima … There 
is not enough encouragement for each to do his best and for the ablest 
to display their full capacity.  Everything tends toward a norm, and 
deviation from the average becomes a cardinal sin.84
This was to return to an issue that was high in the agenda in the years 
immediately before the Second World War, namely the perceived disadvantages 
faced by graduates who, after full-time study, sought to join the state services; 
they could be appointed only if there were no suitable internal candidate. While 
there was a place for science and professional graduates, this was not the case for 
those who were majoring in arts or ‘cultural’85 disciplines. Discussion between 
the university and the Public Service Commission continued until the war. 
The minister of education (Fraser) set up a representative committee, chaired 
by the vice-chancellor of the University of New Zealand, Professor T.A. (later 
Sir Thomas) Hunter, and including the ubiquitous Bernard Ashwin. It did not 
report and was overtaken by the outbreak of war. The commission had continued 
to emphasise the value of work experience – from cadet to permanent head. 
80  L.C. Webb, Government in New Zealand (Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1940), 158–9.
81  L.C. Webb, ‘The Future of Wartime Control’, NZJPA, 7, no. 1 (September 1944), 17.
82  Leslie Lipson, an Oxford graduate teaching at the University of Chicago, was appointed in 1938, at the 
age of 26, as the first Professor of Political Science at Victoria University College, Wellington.
83  L. Lipson, The Politics of Equality: New Zealand’s Adventures in Democracy (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1948), 456.
84  Ibid.
85  Ibid., 491.
The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins
104
The recently formed Institute of Public Administration submitted that 
‘preferential treatment for the university graduate, such as is given in the 
administrative grade in England is not suitable to New Zealand conditions’.86
Any suggestion that New Zealand initiate some aspect of the 
administrative class at once runs afoul of strong antipathy to the British 
method of recruitment … the Public Service Association will assail this 
insidious advocacy of a privileged class … In general, those who have 
joined the service at the age of eighteen or under have felt that they had 
a prior claim on opportunities for promotion and have sought to exclude 
the holders of nonprofessional degrees.87
The view of the Public Service Commission (PSC), the Institute of Public 
Administration and, no doubt, the generality of public servants appeared to 
have been shared by Labour ministers. McIntosh’s efforts after 1943 to establish 
a distinctly New Zealand diplomatic service received no encouragement from 
Peter Fraser who decided that no permanent appointments should be made to 
External Affairs until the returned servicemen became available.88 (From 1946 
External Affairs, almost alone among departments, recruited a very high quality 
of graduates as well as some outstanding officers discharged from the military.)
While arts graduates were not welcomed into the New Zealand Public Service 
until the 1950s, accountants were ranked highly. Before the war the professional 
accountant’s qualification (Accts. Prof) was earned by part-time study at private 
colleges rather than the university (which took over accountancy education in 
1946). By the end of the 1930s about 65 public servants acquired accountancy 
diplomas annually while something like 40 gained qualifications in other fields. 
‘Usually the expert was employed on expert work but accountancy training 
became a recognised qualification for advancement on administrative duties.’89
After the war the reliance on accountancy began to be questioned. As Sam 
Barnett, then superintendent of Staff Training in the PSC and later secretary of 
Justice, wrote in the Institute of Public Administration’s journal in 1946, ‘the 
education of the Public Service in New Zealand has for the past 30 years been 
conducted under the auspices of the N.Z. Society of Accountants, if it can be 
said that that professional body educates anyone’.90 Nonetheless, Acct. Prof. 
remained a common hallmark of a very high proportion of senior management 
in the New Zealand Public Service into the 1960s at least.
86  J.R. Martin, Spirit of Service: A History of the Institute of Public Administration New Zealand (Wellington: 
IPANZ, 2006), 23.
87  Lipson, The Politics of Equality, 457–8.
88  McIntosh, ‘Origins of the Department of External Affairs’, 19.
89  Polaschek, Government Administration in New Zealand, 112.
90  S.T. Barnett, ‘Education for the Public Service’, NZJPA, 9, no. 1 (1946), 6; quoted by Polaschek, 
Government Administration in New Zealand, 122.
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An important development in the preparation of officials for leadership came 
with the establishment of the Department of Political Science and School of 
Public Administration at Victoria University, Wellington, in 1939. Strongly 
urged by the Institute of Public Administration and supported by the PSC, the 
School inaugurated the Diploma of Public Administration (DPA) that continued 
until the 1970s when the Master of Public Policy (MPP) replaced it. One course 
ran in 1940–41. After wartime suspension, the DPA resumed in 1947. The initial 
staff was Leslie Lipson and R.S. Parker from the University of Sydney (later 
to succeed Lipson as professor). Of the eight students on the first course, two 
became chairmen of the State Services Commission, one headed the Post Office, 
one became the secretary of Industries and Commerce, one headed the South 
Pacific Commission, and one became Professor of Political Science at Victoria. 
Later courses, if not quite matching this record, provided a number of permanent 
heads and their deputies.
Conclusion
From the distance of more than 60 years, revisiting the aftermath of the Second 
World War provides some insights into the development of the governance of 
New Zealand – particularly the public service – in the succeeding decades. An 
obvious, but often forgotten, proposition is that history is continuous. In this 
case, we cannot ignore the experience of the war or the long-term impact of 
the 1930s. First, the damage to New Zealand society caused by the Depression 
and prolonged and widespread unemployment. Second, the first Labour 
Government’s willing resort to instruments of the state – willing but driven by 
the issues rather than doctrinaire socialist ideology. And, third, the exchange 
crisis of 1938 and the imposition of controls at the frontier.
Writing in 1953, Leicester Webb correctly observed that ‘the content of political 
action in our time is almost wholly economic’.91 This chapter has, therefore, 
concentrated on the post-war challenges to the system of governance posed by, 
first, economic management in the short term (‘insulationism’ and ‘stabilisation’) 
and, secondly, the issues of development for the longer term (‘planning’). There 
are, however, other issues that could have repaid more detailed examination: 
the issues raised by the urbanisation of Maori, for instance; the expansion of 
the welfare state; or the ‘formulation of an independent foreign policy’.92 But 
the focus of this chapter has been on the way in which policy was made and 
executed rather than on its substance – on the machinery, mechanics and style 
of government rather than the outcomes.
91  Webb, ‘The Making of Economic Policy’, 12.
92  McIntosh, ‘Origins of the Department of External Affairs’.
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In political terms exploration of these matters has been almost exclusively with 
the latter period in office of the first Labour Government (1935–49). The general 
election of late 1949 brought the National Government to power. National 
occupied the Treasury benches for 27 of the next 34 years and this study identifies 
the central core of continuity in style and approach of Labour and National 
governments. This is thrown into relief by the contrast with the ‘revolutionary’ 
years between 1984 and 1990 when the fourth Labour Government (Lange, 
Palmer, Moore) was in office.
As Simkin observed, ‘New Zealand is a singularly pure example of a dependent 
economy’.93 From the 1930s on, New Zealand governments sought to ‘insulate’ the 
country from the effects of the instability that went with dependence. Creation 
of the Reserve Bank in 1934; the advent of exchange and import controls to deal 
with the 1938 run on the currency; the action taken by Labour to centralise 
commodity marketing and introduce guaranteed dairy prices; and the Social 
Security Act 1938 all symbolise acceptance of the role of the state in mitigating 
external influences on New Zealand’s welfare. Thus, when the resources of the 
country were mobilised to meet New Zealand’s wartime obligations, the basic 
elements of the machinery of ‘insulation’ were already in place.
Central to economic management from 1942 through the 1940s was the Economic 
Stabilisation Commission (ESC). Its all-embracing range over the activities of 
producers and consumers was, during the war, effectively under the control of 
a triumvirate of appointed office-holders: Ashwin together with representatives 
of the labour movement (F.P. Walsh) and the farming industries. Ashwin and 
Walsh during 1945 worked on a post-war stabilisation regime, retaining most 
controls, which Walsh, with difficulty, sold to the union movement – which was, 
however, to chafe at the restraint applied to wages that led to the confrontation 
between the watersiders and the National Government in 1951.94
Ashwin and Walsh were both close to the prime minister, Peter Fraser; Ashwin 
saw him almost every day during the war.95 ‘[Fraser] established a working 
relationship with the able if unlovable F.P. Walsh of the Seamen’s Union at an 
early stage in the life of the government.’96 Ashwin was directly responsible to 
the minister of finance but Nash was in Washington DC between 1942 and 1944.
The tripartite nature of the ESC signals the crucial role played in New Zealand 
public policy and politics in the post-war period by ‘the three great economic 
93  C.G. Simkin, The Instability of a Dependent Economy: Economic Fluctuations in New Zealand 1840–1914 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1951), v.
94  Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, 298.
95  B. Easton, ‘Fraser and the Development of the Nation-Building State’, 125; quoting from a 1970 interview 
of Ashwin by John Henderson.
96  M. Bassett, ‘The Political Context of the Prime-Ministerial Years’, in M. Clark, ed., Peter Fraser, Master 
Politician (Wellington: Dunmore Press, 1998), 47.
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pressure groups, the Federation of Labour, Federated Farmers, and the Employers’ 
Federation’97 – with the government holding the ring. Parallel with the ESC, 
and central in industrial relations until the 1980s, was the Arbitration Court. 
Providing an essential background was, as John Roberts argued persuasively, ‘a 
society of fair shares’ that endured until the 1980s upheaval.98
The Economic Stabilisation Commission did not survive the arrival of the 
National Government. But the significant array of controls that remained and 
the influence of the officials who had served their formative years in the ESC 
ensured that its influence continued to be felt. The policy of insulationism in 
the cause of stability also persisted. Balance of payments crises in 1957–58 
and at intervals through the 1960s and 1970s meant that import and exchange 
controls, administered with varying degrees of severity, remained in place. 
Similarly, persistent bouts of inflation saw governments of different persuasions 
intensify price and incomes controls. Pragmatic recourse to the instruments of 
the stabilisation policies of the 1940s was the hallmark of economic policy until 
the 1980s. At the same time, what can be identified broadly as Keynesian fiscal 
and monetary policies were subscribed to.
Taking the longer view, at one level, wartime initiatives resulted in a ‘permanent’99 
addition to the machinery of government – the role of the Ministry of Works as 
a planning influence on physical investment.100
At a broader level of national planning of the economy, to which some at least 
believed the short-lived Organisation for National Development (OND) should 
aspire, the record is patchy at best. In bureaucratic terms, the demise of the 
OND can be attributed to the ability of Ashwin (and the Treasury) in particular 
to influence government thinking. They probably shared Leicester Webb’s 
judgment expressed in 1947 that ‘perhaps because the scope of its activities was 
both too wide and too nebulous, it did not have much effect on administration 
and was finally allowed to lapse.’101 The output of the OND was likely to have 
been contrasted with the very practical responsibilities being assumed by the 
Ministry of Works.
At the political level, the Fraser Government was well aware that once the war 
had ended, there would be strong pressures from the business community in 
97  J. Roberts, ‘Society and its Politics’, in I. Wards, ed., Thirteen Facets: The Silver Jubilee Essays Surveying 
the New Elizabethan Age; A Period of Unprecedented Change (Wellington: Government Printer, 1978), 71.
98  Ibid., 73.
99  The Ministry of Works was privatised in 1988.
100  For a discussion of the Ministry’s role see R. Noonan, By Design and Polaschek, Government 
Administration, 260–70.
101  Webb, ‘Politics and Administration’, 288.
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particular, in concert with the National Party, to reduce the extent of controls.102 
The narrow majority achieved at the 1946 general election underlined the 
first Labour Government’s declining hold on office.103 But the OND would 
have converted New Zealand’s economic policy into a centrally coordinated 
detailed plan. Commenting on a 1944 document, Interim Report on Post-War 
Reconstruction and National Development, J.V.T. Baker, historian of the war 
economy (and later government statistician), observed ‘though the Labour party 
has often been accused of being socialistic, it was not ready for this.’104
A striking feature through this period is the continuity of public service 
leadership. Ashwin in the Treasury was a towering figure for three decades. 
McIntosh and Shanahan were at the centre of New Zealand governance from the 
outbreak of war to the 1960s. Others such as Moriarty, Lang and Lough were 
central figures in economic policy making into the 1970s. The same continuity 
features in other areas of public policy. Dr C.E. Beeby, director of Education, 
1940–60, was synonymous with education in New Zealand for more than 
20 years. Sir Joseph Heenan, secretary of Internal Affairs (1935–49), was 
the Labour Government’s ‘go to’ person in many matters. In the labour and 
employment field, James Hunter, then Herbert Bockett, played leading roles 
from the 1930s to the mid-1960s.105 A.R. (Pat) Entrican106 was director of Forests 
from 1939 to 1961 and E.J. Fawcett, director-general of Agriculture from 1943 to 
1957.107 All made major contributions and were individuals with personalities 
that could not be ignored.108
Others have identified the contribution of this group of key public servants 
to governance in the 1940s and 1950s. John Roberts, for example, writing in 
1978 in the aftermath of the first oil crisis, was pessimistic about the prospects 
for reform in economic management in New Zealand ‘in the face of the inert 
administrative system’.
New Zealand has an honest, intelligent and public bureaucracy which 
is incapable of major reform. This is largely due to the insulation of 
the service from politics instituted in 1912 and confirmed in 1962. 
The effects were masked in the crisis of the depression and war, partly 
102  The public too was restless. As early as 1944, Webb noted that ‘[t]here are signs that the public 
generally, irrespective of their economic interests or political opinions, have grown very weary of coupons, 
forms and regulations’. Webb, ‘The Future of Wartime Control’, 10.
103  Labour had a majority of four – the four Maori seats. Bassett and King, Tomorrow Comes the Song, 312.
104  Baker, The New Zealand People at War, 531.
105  J.E. Martin, Holding the Balance: A History of New Zealand’s Department of Labour 1891–1995 
(Canterbury: Canterbury University Press, 1996), 235.
106  J.R. Martin, ‘Entrican, Alexander Robert’, in The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Vol. 5, (2000), 
164–5.
107  Tony Nightingale, White Collars and Gumboots: A History of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
1892–1992 (Wellington: Dunmore Press, 1992), 237–8.
108  Entrican, for example, wore bow ties and a broad-brimmed cowboy-style hat.
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because the Labour Party simply circumvented the rules and brought their 
men into administrative power, and partly because obsessive institutional 
separatism had to be abandoned in the face of wartime exigencies.109
Certainly, these outstanding public servants give the lie to the generally held 
belief that appointments in the ‘old’ public service were made in accordance with 
‘Buggins’ turn in the five years or so before superannuation became available. 
Ashwin was appointed as secretary to the Treasury at the age of 42; Berendsen, 
secretary of External Affairs and head of the Prime Minister’s Department at 
38 and 42 respectively; McIntosh, to these positions at 37 and 39 respectively; 
Beeby, director of Education at 37; Heenan, secretary of Internal Affairs at 47, 
and Entrican director of Forests at 41.
It is beyond dispute that these public service leaders of the 1940s and 1950s all 
enjoyed a close relationship with Peter Fraser. Equally, there are indications that 
the same permanent heads may not have had a comparably easy relationship with 
the Holland-led National Government after 1949. One overseas commentator, 
after spending some time in New Zealand, noted that ‘like the Republicans 
in 1953 [in the United States], the Nationalists in 1950 were imbued with a 
suspicion of, almost a hostility towards, the administrators’.110 But this can 
be attributed, on the experience of other changes of government after a long 
period, to quite understandable doubts about the enthusiasm for new masters 
that would be shown by those so close to the previous administration. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, by 1949 only one permanent head had been in office before 
Labour had come to power in 1935.
Nevertheless, all the permanent heads mentioned above except Beeby (who had 
been director of the Council of Educational Research until invited by Fraser to 
apply for the position of assistant director of Education with the expectation 
of ascending to director)111 were career public servants. All except Campbell 
(appointed as chairman of the Public Service Commission by the governor-
general on the advice of ministers in accord with statute) were appointed by the 
Commission.
Since the 1980s the bureaucratic memory in New Zealand has become focused 
on the present and what came immediately before. The people who form the 
subject of this essay, and the context in which they carried out their important 
109  Roberts, ‘Society and its Politics’, 96 (emphasis added).
110  Political scientist, P. Campbell, ‘Politicians, Public Servants and the People in New Zealand: II’, Political 
Studies, 4, no. 1 (February, 1956), 21, quoted by McKinnon, Treasury, 206. Also conversation with Dr Beeby.
111  Beeby was appointed under the usual public service procedures, a point he emphasised later in his life. 
See Noeline Alcorn, To the Fullest Extent of his Powers: C.E. Beeby’s Life in Education (Wellington: Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1999), 90–2. The influence of the prime minister, is, however, suggested by a 
reference to ‘Peter Fraser’s stacking the interview panel to ensure that C.E. Beeby became Director of Education’. 
I. Carter, Gadfly: The Life and Times of James Shelley (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1991), 224.
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public responsibilities, are virtually forgotten. Nonetheless, an exploration 
of governance in the immediate post-war period has served to emphasise the 
continuity in public service as well as acknowledging the contribution to New 





Sir Frederick Shedden:  
The Forerunner
David Horner
Sir Frederick Shedden occupies an interesting and perhaps unique place in any 
consideration of the great mandarins of the Commonwealth Public Service who 
flourished, exercised their power, and helped to build modern Australia in the 
quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War.1 In many respects he 
fitted neatly into this characterisation – he was the secretary of the Department 
of Defence from 1937 until 1956; he wielded great power in the Defence group 
of departments; he was a key adviser to the prime minister; and he helped 
shape many of the instruments of government. But in other respects he was 
different. Unlike his contemporaries from this period, he had been secretary of 
his department since 1937, that is from before the Second World War. Although 
he had almost completed a university degree in commerce, he was not especially 
concerned with economic issues. By the mid-1950s, his power and influence 
were waning, and he stepped down as departmental secretary almost two years 
before he formally retired. Further, unlike other mandarins, he refused to move 
permanently to Canberra, and worked in Melbourne for his entire career.
While it might be debated as to whether Shedden was actually one of the 
legendary seven dwarfs he was, arguably, the greatest public servant of his 
time. Whether he was the greatest ever, is another matter. Some would give 
that accolade to Sir Robert Garran, the joint author of the classic treatise on 
the new Commonwealth Constitution (1901). Garran was a close adviser to the 
prime minister, W.M. Hughes, during the First World War and was secretary 
of the Attorney-General’s Department for an unrivalled period of 31 years – 
from 1901 to 1932.2 Shedden’s eminence relates only partly to his long 19 years 
as secretary. It is true that Garran, Sir Roland Wilson and Sir Arthur Tange – 
each of whom was a permanent head for some 20 years – served for a longer 
period, and many others served well beyond 10 years: Sir Kenneth Bailey, Sir 
1  This paper is based on D. Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of Australian 
Defence Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000).
2  Sir Kenneth Bailey, a later secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department, wrote that Garran was ‘revered 
in his lifetime as one … of the Fathers of Federation. His repute as the wise and trusted legal counsellor of 
successive Federal Governments, moreover, became almost a legend’. K.H. Bailey, ‘Sir Robert Garran’, The 
Australian Quarterly, xxix, no. 1 (March 1957): 11.
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Henry Bland and Sir Richard Kingsland each served for 18 years, although, 
except for Bailey, they all served in more than one department. To put their 
achievements in perspective, Professor R.N. Spann, an expert on Australian 
public administration, writing in 1979, noted that even ‘in 1965, at a time of 
great government stability, Commonwealth permanent heads had only occupied 
that position in their existing department for an average of 5.5 years; in mid-
1975 it was only 2.7 years’.3
Shedden’s importance relates primarily to the fact that he was defence secretary 
during all of the Second World War, the onset of the Cold War, the Korean War 
and the early part of the Malayan Emergency, rather than to the longevity of his 
tenure. During the Second World War, prime ministers Robert Menzies and John 
Curtin also held the Defence portfolios and Shedden was their key adviser. As 
well as heading his department, Shedden became secretary of the War Cabinet 
and the Advisory War Council and was thus the principal coordinator of the war 
effort. He probably had more influence over the running of the government’s 
main business for a longer period of time than any other public servant; and the 
government’s main business – the conduct of the Second World War – was the 
biggest enterprise in Australian history. The fact that Shedden’s influence had 
declined by the mid-1950s should not detract from his wartime achievements.
Education of a public servant
Shedden was a public servant from the old pre-war school. Educated at Kyneton 
State School and Kyneton Grammar School, in Victoria, he was placed fourth out 
of 300 candidates in the Commonwealth Public Service examination, and began 
work in the Department of Defence, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, in March 
1910. He was aged 16. Apart from service abroad he worked at the barracks in 
the same government department until 1971, that is, for 61 years. It is a record 
unlikely ever to be matched.
In his own time he gained accountancy qualifications and also learned shorthand, 
but the heavy workload caused by the outbreak of the First World War forced 
him to terminate studies for a law degree at the University of Melbourne. 
Promoted in the finance section, he arranged a temporary exchange with a 
member of the pay staff of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) headquarters 
in London, and he served briefly in France. By December 1917 he was back in 
Australia and was discharged from the AIF. In later years he was proud of this 
very limited military experience.
3  R.N. Spann, Government Administration in Australia (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 331.
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Sir Frederick Shedden (centre) with Prime Minister John Curtin and Mrs 
Curtin, 1944
Source: National Archives of Australia, A5954, 661/12
Shedden was promoted further within the Defence finance section, while he 
almost completed, part-time, a commerce degree at the University of Melbourne. 
The Professor of Economics, Douglas Copland, was so impressed that he offered 
Shedden a scholarship to undertake postgraduate studies, but a major change 
in Shedden’s career prevented him taking up this opportunity. In December 
1927 he sailed to Britain to attend the Imperial Defence College. Shedden was 
the first Australian civilian to attend the Imperial Defence College, which had 
opened in 1927 and took senior military and civilian officers from across the 
Empire for its year-long course. He established a friendship with the college’s 
commandant, Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, who reported that Shedden 
had worked ‘indefatigably’ and had entered into all studies with ‘acuteness 
and zeal’.4 Shedden was one of the few public servants of his era who received 
formal training to prepare him to take on leadership of his department. Indeed, 
this was probably only possible in the Defence Department but, even then, few 
public servants received this opportunity.
4  Imperial Defence College, Confidential Report on Mr F.G. Shedden, 19 December 1928, National Archives 
of Australia (NAA) A5954, 46/21.
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After the course, Shedden spent nine months in London preparing a paper on the 
principles of imperial defence with special reference to Australia, and studying 
British public expenditure, under the tutorship of Dr Hugh Dalton, later British 
minister for economic warfare during the Second World War. Returning to 
Melbourne in October 1929, he became secretary of the Defence Committee, 
which included the Chiefs of Staff of the three services. He witnessed the efforts 
of the new Labor Government led by James Scullin to cut costs during the 
Depression and took part in the debates between senior Naval and Army officers 
over the most appropriate strategy for the defence of Australia. Shedden was an 
advocate of imperial defence, which relied on building up the Navy so that it 
could cooperate with the Royal Navy in time of threat.
In 1932, following the defeat of the Labor Government, the new external 
affairs minister, John Latham, was nominated to attend the League of Nations 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Shedden accompanied him as his assistant, 
but Latham was absent for much of the meeting and Shedden acted in his 
stead. Shedden was also secretary to the Australian delegation at the World 
Monetary and Economic Conference in London. In addition, he was appointed 
the Australian representative in the British Cabinet Office and Committee of 
Imperial Defence, where he established a friendship with the legendary Sir 
Maurice Hankey, who showed him how power could be wielded behind the 
scenes and taught him which sort of organisations needed to be developed to 
manage a nation’s security policies.
Back in Australia in September 1933, Shedden resumed work with the Defence 
Committee and accompanied Hankey during the British official’s visit to Australia 
in 1934. Shedden tried to model himself on Hankey and was later nicknamed 
‘the pocket hanky’. In November 1936 Shedden became first assistant secretary 
and prepared the Defence Department’s briefing papers for the 1937 Imperial 
Conference in London. The Australian delegation included the prime minister, 
Joseph Lyons, the defence minister, Sir Archdale Parkhill, and the treasurer, 
Richard Casey. Shedden was the delegation’s defence adviser and had discussions 
with Hankey about preparing Australia for war.
Secretary to the Department of Defence
In November 1937, aged 43, Shedden succeeded Malcolm Shepherd as the 
Defence department’s fifth secretary. Since 1929 he had worked to expand the 
secretary’s influence and authority. He had proven to be a skilful bureaucrat, not 
afraid to challenge the military chiefs, but usually working behind the scenes. 
Preparation for war dominated his first 20 months as secretary. He accelerated 
work on the War Book that set out procedures to be followed on the outbreak 
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of war. He was instrumental in the appointment of inspectors general for the 
Army and for defence works and supplies, and helped to arrange the visit of 
a senior British air force officer to inspect the Royal Australian Air Force. He 
encouraged more frequent meetings of the Defence Council, which included 
senior ministers, military chiefs, defence officials and industry representatives. 
Shedden was its secretary.
As Defence secretary, Shedden was an aloof and distant figure who ‘eschewed 
publicity’. His whole life revolved around his work and he spent most of his 
time at the office. The Sheddens had no children and lived modestly. He was 
short (170 cm), always well dressed in suit and tie, and conscious of his status. 
Some military chiefs such as Major-General John Lavarack and Air Vice-Marshal 
Richard Williams resented his power. In 1936, Lavarack had clashed with the 
government over how to handle Colonel Henry Wynter, who had criticised the 
government’s reliance on the Singapore strategy. The defence minister, Parkhill, 
had recommended that Lavarack be created a Companion of the Bath. Shedden, 
who had not yet been appointed secretary, was instrumental in having the 
recommendation withdrawn. The Navy chief, Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, noted 
that Shedden ‘always had the ear of the Prime Minister and could generally 
get the Chiefs of Staffs view and wishes overridden. Still … he was an able 
and knowledgeable man and though one couldn’t trust him personally his 
views were generally sound.’5 Of course, as Shedden supported the ‘blue water’ 
strategy, he was sympathetic to the Navy’s views.
War Cabinet secretary
The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 brought Shedden 
to the position of Australia’s most important and influential public servant. As 
Defence secretary his role in bringing Australia to a war footing during the 
following months was crucial, but the prime source of his power and influence 
was his role as secretary of the War Cabinet – a post he held throughout the war. 
The prime minister, Robert Menzies, took over the Defence portfolio, now called 
Defence Coordination, and additional ministries were formed to administer 
the three services. Shedden became Menzies’ principal adviser, while as War 
Cabinet secretary he ensured that War Cabinet decisions were promulgated and 
executed by the various government departments. In that sense, he was the 
key coordinator for the war effort. As secretary to the Defence Coordination 
Department he exercised a measure of control over other Defence-related 
departments. Indeed, he was at the heart of the strategic decision-making 
process, coordinating advice from the Service chiefs.
5  R. Colvin, Memoirs (Durley, Hampshire: Wintershill Publications, 1992), 119–20.
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In many ways, Shedden invented the method of conducting Cabinet business. 
Before each meeting he prepared detailed cabinet agendum papers. He attended 
almost all the meetings of the War Cabinet, took notes of proceedings, prepared 
the minutes confirming the outcome of the discussions and then, as mentioned, 
from his position as secretary of the Department of Defence, set about ensuring 
that the decisions were implemented.
Shedden’s orderly mind, unrivalled understanding of bureaucratic processes and 
knowledge of Defence administration resulted in a highly efficient secretariat, 
which gave increased authority to the work of the War Cabinet. Reflecting 
Shedden’s insistence on accurate agenda and minutes of Cabinet submissions 
and decisions, and his highly efficient filing system, Menzies was once quoted 
as saying ‘Documentation, thy name is Shedden’.6 During the war the need 
to house the extensive War Cabinet minutes resulted in establishment of the 
War Archives Committee. This led to appointment of an archives officer in the 
Commonwealth Library, and eventually to the Commonwealth Archives Office, 
now known as the National Archives of Australia.
While not always agreeing with Shedden’s approach as secretary of his 
department, other senior defence public servants have praised him highly. Sir 
Frederick Chilton, who worked under Shedden for more than a decade and was 
later head of the Department of Repatriation, wrote that Shedden:
had a real presence and powerful personality. He was ruthless with those 
who crossed him, and devastating with those in his Department who 
could not rise to his exceptional standards of performance … Shedden’s 
‘forte’ was top level policy and its broad application. He was not a good 
administrator in the sense of leadership of a team … He ruled by fear 
– and this stultified initiative. But as a head of a small policy Dept of 
Defence, he was superb.7
Another senior defence public servant wrote: ‘Shedden’s brilliance as a 
Secretariat Co-ordinator and his tremendous capacity to maintain order in all 
work with which he was associated, more particularly in the chaos of war, was 
a very significant factor.’8
After the September 1940 federal election, in which Menzies retained office 
but was head of a minority government, he and the leader of the Opposition, 
John Curtin, agreed to establish the Advisory War Council in order to involve 
the Opposition in the crucial decisions affecting the nation’s security. Shedden 
6  J.P. Buckley, ‘Sir Frederick Shedden, KCMG, OBE: Defence Strategist, Administrator and Public Servant’, 
Defence Force Journal, 50 (January/February 1985), 27.
7  Letter, Sir Fredrick Chilton to author, 28 July 1979.
8  Transcript of lecture by Garry Armstrong, Australian Staff College, 8 May 1978.
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became secretary of the Advisory War Council. Later, after the outbreak of 
war with Japan, by which time Curtin was prime minister, the Advisory War 
Council took on many of the functions of a War Cabinet.
In January 1941, Menzies departed for a visit to the Middle East and Britain in 
which he hoped to persuade the British Government to reinforce Malaya and 
Singapore. Shedden was his principal adviser throughout this journey. In the 
Middle East they visited Australian troops and discussed war developments with 
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Blamey (GOC AIF) and senior British officers. 
In London, Menzies approved the decision to send forces to Greece. Shedden 
gained first-hand experience of how the British Government was conducting 
the war and was critical of British generalship in the Middle East.
After they returned to Australia, Menzies created five new ministries, and Shedden 
became secretary of the new Department of Home Security, while retaining his 
previous responsibilities. Also, Menzies agreed to allow a minute secretary to attend 
the War Cabinet meetings, thus relieving Shedden of this burden. The hand-written 
notes of the minute secretaries reveal that during the next four years Shedden played 
a significant role in War Cabinet discussions – he was not just a silent secretary.
Advising the Curtin Government
Conservative by nature, Shedden had been a long-time supporter of imperial 
defence, but when the Labor Government came to power in October 1941 he 
soon established himself as the prime adviser to John Curtin, prime minister 
and minister for defence. Shedden helped the new government in its transition 
to power and his influence was demonstrated after the outbreak of war with 
Japan. Following a War Cabinet meeting on 8 December 1941 he advised Curtin 
that the information presented by the Chiefs of Staff was ‘scrappy and meagre 
… the Government must press it right home that this is a new war’.9
When the American general, Douglas MacArthur, became Commander-in-Chief 
of the Southwest Pacific Area in April 1942, Shedden assumed an even more 
important role. Curtin established the Prime Minister’s War Conference, which 
consisted of himself, MacArthur and any other minister he thought should be 
invited. The Prime Minister’s War Conference became the key decision-making 
body with regard to war strategy, exceeding even the War Cabinet. In practice, 
Shedden attended all meetings of the conference. As Curtin advised MacArthur, 
‘if I should not be readily available, Mr Shedden has my full confidence in regard 
to all questions of War Policy’.10
9  Memo, Shedden to Curtin, 8 December 1941, NAA A5954, 555/10.
10  Letter, Curtin to MacArthur, 10 April 1942, NAA A5954, 1598/2.
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In July 1942, MacArthur moved his headquarters to Brisbane and the Prime 
Minister’s War Conference met less frequently. Instead, Shedden travelled to 
Brisbane on several occasions for discussions with MacArthur. In December 
Curtin told Shedden that, but for his assistance, ‘he could not have carried on’, 
and later said ‘that he was his right hand and left hand and head too’.11
In June 1943, Shedden was made a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael 
and St George – the only civilian to be knighted by the Labor Government. He 
received a flood of congratulatory letters from politicians, military leaders, other 
government officials, academics and businessmen.12 General Blamey, for example, 
wrote that the knighthood was ‘fitting recognition of the grand services you 
have rendered during the last few years. All of us who know the background 
of Australia’s effort utter a prayer of thanks for your guiding presence there’. 
Typically, Shedden assembled extracts of these letters and distributed them to 
various people such as S.M. Bruce and Vice-Admiral Richmond, and then sent 
copies of Richmond’s laudatory reply to MacArthur. Professor Kenneth Bailey, 
Dean of Law at the University of Melbourne, might have admired Shedden 
for working ‘anonymously and in silence, without publicity or boosting’, but 
Shedden was making sure that those in influence knew what others thought.
In the second half of 1943 Shedden played an influential role in encouraging the 
War Cabinet to establish principles for reshaping the war effort. In fact, when the 
relevant departments failed to agree, Shedden and his staff drafted the paper that 
was approved by the War Cabinet. He then accompanied Curtin to Washington and 
London in April–May 1944 to seek Allied approval for these measures. On return 
he tried to ensure that manpower was redeployed from the Services to essential 
industries, but his attempts were hindered by Curtin’s illness. Shedden provided 
valuable assistance to the acting prime minister, Ben Chifley, and continued this 
function when, following Curtin’s death, Chifley became prime minister.
Post-war defence policy
During the war Shedden had argued that Australia’s future defence policy should 
be based on three pillars: collective security through the United Nations; British 
Commonwealth cooperation; and local defence. The government approved these 
principles and, after the war, Shedden restructured the Defence Department in 
order to improve cooperation with Britain. Chifley and the defence minister, 
John Dedman, largely gave him a free hand. He accompanied Chifley to a 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London in April–May 1946.
11  Shedden’s Diary, 25 February 1943, NAA A5954, 16/1.
12  Extracts from the letters are in NAA A5954 654/7.
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Shedden continued to gather more power and authority. Early in 1948 he was 
appointed chairman of the Defence Committee – the first non-serviceman to 
hold the position. The Navy chief, Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton, claimed that he 
engineered the appointment so that ‘that little bastard Shedden’ would be locked 
into the Committee’s decisions and would not undermine them.13 In fact, Shedden 
had already arranged his appointment long before Hamilton proposed it.
Lieutenant General Sydney Rowell, who succeeded Vernon Sturdee as Chief of 
the General Staff (CGS) in 1950, but had already been identified by Shedden as 
the next chief, was unwilling to criticise Shedden’s chairmanship too strongly. 
He recalled that Shedden was ‘a great Australian public servant’ with whom he 
had enjoyed the ‘happiest personal relationship’. Shedden: 
had an unrivalled knowledge of matters associated with Commonwealth 
defence and he was a tireless and meticulous worker. If it could be said 
that he had a fault it was in his complete absorption in the work he was 
doing, leaving little time for outside activities. He had critics at home 
and abroad; in the main these were service people who could not match 
his intellect or who were jealous of his power and influence. 
Rowell thought strategy was best left to those ‘who are trained in it, namely 
the Chiefs of Staff’, but saw Shedden as a special case; Australia was ‘not likely 
again to have someone of the calibre and background of Shedden to fill the 
post’.14 It has to be remembered that Shedden had saved Rowell’s career after the 
1942 Kokoda campaign when Blamey had wanted to reduce him to the rank of 
colonel. Shedden played a role in having Rowell appointed Vice-CGS in January 
1946 and recommended him as CGS in 1950. Rowell had good cause to remember 
Shedden favourably.
During 1948 and 1949, Shedden spent much time dealing with a leakage of 
information to the Soviet Union and the consequent reduction in the flow 
of classified information from the United States. He was instrumental in the 
formation of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in March 
1949, and later that year travelled to the United States and Britain in an effort 
to restore the flow of information. Initially he was unsuccessful and access to 
American information only began to be restored after the election of the Menzies 
Government in December 1949.
13  Letters, Hamilton to Foley, 16 August 1947, and Hamilton to First Sea Lord, 27 November 1947, Foley 
Papers (held by Rear Admiral James Goldrick).
14  S.F. Rowell, Full Circle (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1974), 194–5.
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The Menzies Government and the Cold War
Frustrated by the Chifley Government’s reluctance to enter into full-scale defence 
planning with Britain, particularly concerning committing forces to the Middle East, 
Shedden welcomed the election of the Menzies Government. For several years he 
was in his element. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the 
government stepped up defence preparations and Shedden accompanied Menzies to 
a Prime Ministers’ Conference in London in January 1951. On return Menzies claimed 
that the nation had only three years to prepare for war. Eventually, in December 1951, 
the Cabinet agreed to commit forces to the Middle East in time of war. During this 
period Shedden was closely involved in setting up the Australian Secret Intelligence 
Service (ASIS), ensuring that it remained part of the Defence Department.
The strategic situation was changing. The threat of a world war declined and 
the government began to focus more on strategic planning in South East Asia. 
Also, the signing of the ANZUS Pact with the United States and New Zealand 
offered the prospect of increased cooperation with the United States. Shedden 
was closely involved in these aspects of defence planning, but his personal 
influence was waning. He and his department remained in Melbourne, while 
Menzies in Canberra sought advice from the senior ministers and the secretaries 
of his own department and External Affairs located there.
The decline of a mandarin
By 1954 Shedden had lost much of his previous influence and, during a visit 
abroad with Menzies in January and February 1955, was disappointed to find 
that he was upstaged by the External Affairs secretary, Arthur Tange. He had 
to fight off several attempts to remove him from his position as chairman of the 
Defence Committee. Menzies thought that the problem with Defence was ‘the 
dead hand of Fred Shedden’,15 and tried unsuccessfully to persuade Shedden to 
become ambassador to Japan or high commissioner to Canada. Tange later wrote 
disparagingly about Shedden:
Shedden was committed by past decisions and by his war-time 
experience with the War Cabinet, to Australia’s engagement to Imperial 
(later Commonwealth) Defence. Led by Britain, this called for priority 
after the war to blocking Soviet expansion. Within these parameters 
Shedden was vigilant in protecting Australia’s interests, such as control 
of Australian forces, from being submerged by British strategic priorities.
15  Vice Admiral Sir John Collins, interview with author, 9 October 1978.
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When I came to deal with him I noted how much Shedden cultivated 
his personal access to figures prominent in the wartime Anglo-American 
alliance. I perceived no intellectual questioning by him – an industrious 
administrator, rigid in this, and defender of turf …
During the years in which I had discussions with Shedden I did not hear 
any opinion on Australia’s strategic outlook or priorities. In the Defence 
Committee he expected opinion to come up from subordinate committees 
comprised of uniformed officers. Shedden saw his role as chairman being 
to obtain a decision, giving either approval or disapproval without 
encouraging discussion of the substance – an attitude which I could do 
little to resist, as he had the support of the Chiefs.
Tange also criticised the Defence organisation and, by implication, Shedden’s 
role in moulding it:
Defence seemed to value procedure and precedent over analysis and 
rethinking about a vastly changing world.
Defence personnel were a mixture (so it seemed to us in Canberra) of a 
handful of perceptive and questioning officers accompanying a larger 
number exercising the modest role of guiding Service officers in the 
unfamiliar terrain of public administration and accountability.
Shedden’s system laid down the discipline that past opinion should be 
piled one upon the other before reaching a conclusion … There was 
much turgid prose.16
Having read many of the Defence papers from this period I can confirm that the 
usual process was for the documents to work their way though all the previous 
decisions before arriving at their conclusion. While a struggle with the young, 
ambitious, capable and acerbic Tange was probably inevitable, Shedden’s old 
friend, Richard Casey, who was once again a Cabinet minister, was also losing 
patience in him. In February 1953, Casey noted in his diary that he had discussed 
with Shedden ‘the question of speed of decision on strategic questions in the 
Defence Department’.17 On 30 July 1954, after trying for some days to secure 
additional funds for defence, Casey wrote in his diary: ‘The Chiefs of Staff have 
no opportunity to give their undiluted non-political professional advice as to 
what money is necessary for defence. All they have to say is filtered through 
Fred Shedden.’18
16  Sir Arthur Tange, ‘Defence Memoir’, draft manuscript.
17  Diary entry, 13 February 1953, p. 27, Casey Papers, NAA (Melb) M1153/0, 33.
18  T.B. Millar, ed., Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R. G. Casey, 1951–1960 (London: Collins, 
1972), 173.
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In July 1956 the government announced that Shedden would be stepping down 
as secretary in order to write a history of the development of Australian defence 
policy. He would continue on full pay until he reached retirement age in August 
1958. He handed over to Edwin Hicks in October 1956, after serving 20 days 
less than 19 years as Defence secretary. But his retirement made little practical 
difference, as he continued his work for the next decade without obvious change 
in his routine. Each year he continued to advise Hicks when he was going on 
‘annual leave’.19 While researching my biography I had another insight into 
Shedden’s mindset. In the University of Melbourne Archives I found several 
boxes of his papers that had not been included in the much greater number that 
were lodged in the Defence Department. In one of the boxes, which included the 
contents of Shedden’s desk drawer, I found some small cardboard boxes, each 
with its own label – rubber bands, paper clips, pins, etc.
Shedden failed in the task of writing his history but not through lack of 
effort. He carried out research in the United States and Britain in 1958 and 
continued collecting documents, researching and writing. When he submitted 
the first volume (covering the period to 1939) to the publisher in October 1967 
and running to a grand total of 426,431 words, he was advised that it was 
unpublishable; it was more a linking together of documents than a piece of 
historical writing. He kept working until May 1971 – two months before his 
death, by which time he had brought the story (over 2,400 typed pages) up to 
the end of the Second World War. It is preserved in the National Archives of 
Australia along with his official papers, which consist of over 2,400 boxes and 
are the most important documentary source on Australian defence policy from 
the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s.
Shedden’s failure to complete his book should not overshadow his outstanding 
achievements over a long working life. For 20 years he had dominated defence 
decision-making, giving it purpose and consistency. He had shaped a Defence 
organisation that persisted largely unaltered until the 1970s. He had played a 
principal part in the defence of Australia during the war. In the opinion of Sir 
Paul Hasluck, Shedden was ‘one of the few outstanding men in the civil side of the 
Australian war effort. Discretion, orderly arrangement and careful groundwork 
were so large a part of his training and his method that his achievement was 
often hidden.’20 Shedden devoted his life to the defence of Australia, and no 
other person has played, or is likely again to play, such an important part in the 
making of Australian defence policy for so a long period.
19  For example, memos Shedden to Hicks, NAA A5954, 63/4.
20  P. Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939–1941 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), 444.
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Sir Roland Wilson – Primus Inter Pares
Selwyn Cornish1
When Roland Wilson was inducted into the military cadets at age 14 he 
weighed scarcely 25  kg; at full height he was only 158  cm.2 He was clearly 
a person of slight build and short stature. But he frequently reminded those 
who drew attention to these facts that his endowment of brainpower was more 
than adequate compensation. He could run intellectual rings around ministers, 
business leaders, academics, public servants and journalists. Yet he was not 
only highly intelligent; he also possessed moral courage and had a biting wit. 
According to Douglas Copland, Wilson at an early age exhibited ‘force of 
character and capacity for leadership’.3 As to wit, a colleague remarked that 
Wilson used it ‘for many a devastating one liner’, adding that the ‘one-liner 
could be humorous, or it could be like a whiplash’.4
Wilson stood up to some of the most powerful men in this country and abroad, 
including Eddie Ward and John Foster Dulles. Tom Fitzgerald, the finance editor 
of the Sydney Morning Herald, accurately summed up Wilson when he said that 
‘[b]y his intelligence and force of character, Sir Roland Wilson has been the 
outstanding public servant of his generation’.5 John Maynard Keynes, who 
observed Wilson in action at a conference in London during the war, reported 
that he and other Whitehall officials had ‘the greatest respect for his wisdom 
and for his pertinacity’.6
1  This paper draws heavily on the following three publications: S. Cornish, Sir Roland Wilson: A Biographical 
Essay (Canberra: The Sir Roland Wilson Foundation, 2002); W. Coleman, S. Cornish and A. Hagger, Giblin’s 
Platoon: The Trials and Triumphs of the Economist in Australian Public Life (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006); and 
S. Cornish, ‘Roland Wilson’, in J.E. King, Biographical Dictionary of Australian and New Zealand Economists 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007). These publications relied strongly on Roland Wilson’s personal papers, 
which at the time were privately held and not catalogued. The National Library of Australia (MS 1155) now 
holds the papers, and a descriptive list is available. Unless otherwise indicated, quotes are drawn from these 
papers.
2  A. Reid, ‘The Czar of the Treasury’, Bulletin (Sydney), 21 December 1960, 10. See also J. Hetherington, 
‘Roland Wilson: A Matter of Money’, in Hetherington, Uncommon Men (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1965), 187.
3  D. Copland, ‘Confidential Statement’ to Rhodes Scholarship Selection Committee, 28 October 1924, 
University of Tasmania archives, Tasmanian Archive and Heritage Office, file 34/5/50.
4  R.J. Whitelaw, Farewell Address to his Treasury Colleagues, 7 November 1986, held by author.
5  T. Fitzgerald, quoted in John Farquharson, ‘Outstanding Public Servant of his Generation’, Canberra 
Times, 27 October 1996.
6  J.M. Keynes to L.F. Giblin, 13 November 1942, Reserve Bank of Australia Archives, RBAA C. 3.7.6.33.
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Sir Paul Hasluck, a minister throughout the entire period of Wilson’s tenure as 
secretary to the Treasury, wrote that Wilson 
gained in authority among inexpert ministers firstly because he gave 
an impression of having no political motive of his own but a scientific 
detachment when describing the economic outlook and the problems 
to be faced and secondly because he never “squared off” to ministers, 
or flattered, or cajoled them, or tried to ingratiate himself with them. 
He was polite but uncompromising and … left the feeling that he was 
treating them as though they could understand the … issues, even when 
he was exposing the flaws in some remark a minister had made.7
For John Stone, a later Treasury secretary, the predominant reason for the 
Treasury’s power and prestige during the 1950s and 1960s was the fact that, 
with Wilson at its head, it ‘had a brilliant economist and outstanding public 
servant’; ‘one felt that as the head of one’s department, one was extraordinarily 
fortunate to have a highly distinguished man’, for he was 
seen and regarded in and around Canberra, as being not merely … 
an intellectual giant to some degree, but also in the Public Service, a 
bureaucratic giant … That simply derived from his personality and 
his force of mind and indeed, his force of expression also. He was an 
extraordinary lucid thinker and writer, and on occasion, speaker.8 
According to Stone, ‘Wilson’s contribution to the Treasury … was that he gave 
it a sense of being led by an outstanding figure – someone, so to speak, that the 
department could look up to. He gave it intellectual quality.’9
Education
Wilson was born at Ulverstone, Tasmania, on 7 April 1904 and died in Canberra 
on 25 October 1996, aged 92. He was the first of his immediate family to complete 
secondary school and attend university. His formal education began at the 
convent school in Ulverstone, the same school that the state premier and later 
prime minister Joseph Lyons had attended many years before.10 Upon completion 
of primary school he won a junior bursary, which allowed him to proceed to the 
public high school in Devonport. There he topped the state junior examination 
7  P. Hasluck, The Chance of Politics (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1997), 55.
8  J. Stone, interviewed by B. Schedvin, 17 May 1991, National Library of Australia (NLA).
9  J. Stone, Eulogy: Sir Roland Wilson, St John the Baptist Anglican Church, Reid, ACT, 1 November 1996, 
Papers of Sir Roland Wilson, NLA MS 1155.
10  The Wilsons were Protestants. Wilson’s mother thought that by attending the convent school her son 
would associate with a rather more refined group of fellow pupils than he would were he to attend the local 
state primary school.
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and was placed second in the senior (matriculation) examination. Again, he 
secured a state scholarship, which enabled him to enrol for the commerce degree 
at the University of Tasmania. He studied economics under two of Australia’s 
leading economists, D.B. Copland and J.B. Brigden. He had not planned to go to 
university, and his father was reluctant to allow him to do so. It was only after 
Copland came to Ulverstone to meet his father that he was allowed provisionally 
to attend the university for one year, which was extended for a second and then 
a third and fourth year when success followed success.11
Wilson was awarded the 1925 Rhodes Scholarship for Tasmania, the first 
Tasmanian Rhodes scholar to come from a state school, and the first to be 
selected from the Faculty of Commerce. He possessed neither Greek nor Latin. 
For these reasons his selection was attacked in an unsigned letter to the Mercury, 
Tasmania’s leading newspaper. He was so badly stung by the criticism that he 
considered rejecting the scholarship. But he changed his mind after receiving 
a stern lecture on the meaning of moral courage by a member of the Rhodes 
selection committee, the substance of which he was never to forget.
In his referee’s report to the Rhodes committee, Copland wrote that Wilson
is certainly the most brilliant student that has passed through my hands 
since I came to Tasmania. His record of High Distinctions is evidence 
of this, but it does not convey at all an adequate impression of his 
remarkable mental powers.
… His analytical powers are marked, and will eventually give him a high 
place among economists if he continues with the subject. He has shown 
balanced judgements and some degree of original thought which will 
doubtless become more evident as his studies progress. I am convinced 
that he will possess to quite an unusual degree the ability to do higher 
work in economics and that his election to a Rhodes Scholarship will 
ultimately bring distinction to the country.12
When Wilson reached Oxford he discovered that the university did not recognise 
the commerce degree from the University of Tasmania and he was compelled to 
take the Diploma in Economics and Political Science (which he completed with 
distinction) before being permitted to enrol for postgraduate studies. In his 
first year at Oxford he wrote an essay on the subject of ‘Social and Economic 
Experiments in Queensland from 1860’ for the Beit Prize in Colonial History, one 
of the university’s most prestigious prizes. The essay was successful; one of the 
judges considered it to be ‘the best Beit Essay that has been submitted for some 
years’. Having won the Beit Prize, Wilson was then permitted to enrol for the 
11  University of Tasmania archives, Tasmanian Archive and Heritage Office, file 34/5/50.
12  University of Tasmania archives, Tasmanian Archive and Heritage Office, file 34/5/50.
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degree of Doctor of Philosophy (D.Phil). He undertook research on the subject of 
‘The Import of Capital’ and devoted a considerable amount of time to collecting 
statistical data for his thesis. His examiners agreed that he had ‘handled an intricate 
subject with great ability’, and that his work was ‘worthy of publication’.13
Before finishing his degree at Oxford, Wilson was elected to a Commonwealth 
Field Scholarship (later known as the Harkness Scholarship) to undertake 
postgraduate studies at the University of Chicago. There he decided to enrol for 
another doctorate. He chose the topic of ‘Capital Movements and their Economic 
Consequences’, which allowed him to pursue some of the themes that he had 
foreshadowed in his work at Oxford. His supervisor was the redoubtable Jacob 
Viner, who held Wilson to be ‘one of the two or three best students I have ever 
encountered’. He predicted that Wilson would ‘have a highly successful career 
as a teacher and scholar’. According to Viner, Wilson was ‘an exceptionally able 
student and researcher, quick, original, industrious and systematic. He writes 
freely and well, and expresses himself easily and effectively. He has an unusual 
degree of intellectual maturity for a person of his age.’14
Contributions to economic research
After completing his degree at Chicago, Wilson was offered a lectureship at the 
University of Tasmania and returned to Hobart. He commenced publishing 
articles based on the research he had conducted for his doctorates. In 1931, 
Melbourne University Press published a book based on his Oxford and Chicago 
work entitled Capital Imports and the Terms of Trade. Sir Roy Harrod, the 
eminent Oxford economist, reviewed the book in the Economic Journal. He 
wrote that it was ‘a notable contribution to the statistical study of international 
payments’, and ‘a valuable addition to the literature of international trade’.15
Of Wilson’s contributions to economics, perhaps the most arresting was his 
examination in Capital Imports of the effect of capital inflows on the terms of 
trade of the borrowing country. Received accounts asserted that the terms of 
trade – that is, the ratio of export prices to import prices – of the borrowing 
country would improve. In contrast, Wilson found for Australia that the terms 
of trade tended to be correlated inversely with inflows of capital. His main 
interest, however, was not with the external terms of trade, but rather with the 
internal terms of trade: what would happen to the price ratio of ‘domestic’ (or 
non-tradeable goods) to tradeable goods (exports and import-replacement goods) 
13  D.H. Macgregor, Reference for Roland Wilson, 3 December 1931, NAA 1606, AJ25/1.
14  J. Viner, Reference for Roland Wilson, 5 January 1932, Wilson Papers, NLA MS1155.
15  R.F. Harrod, Review of Capital Imports and the Terms of Trade, by R. Wilson, Economic Journal, 42, no. 
167 (1932).
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in the case of a capital importing country? On the basis of hypothetical models, 
supported by empirical data, he concluded that, in Australia’s case, ‘domestic’ 
(or non-tradeable) prices tended to rise relatively to prices for tradeable goods. 
Whereas movements in the prices of internationally traded goods tend to be 
constrained by international competition, there were usually no such constraints 
on the costs and prices for many ‘domestic’ goods and services.16
Professor Trevor Swan argued in his review in 1972 of Treasury Paper No. 1, 
entitled Overseas Investment in Australia, that it should have been called 
Treasury Paper No. 2, since the Treasury’s explanation of the adjustment process, 
by which the balance of payments accommodated overseas borrowing, was the 
same as the one that had been elucidated by Wilson in his book published in 
1931.17 Swan himself had drawn on Wilson’s explanation in his own work on 
internal-external balance. Indeed, H.W. Arndt referred ‘to the quite significant 
Australian contributions – by Roland Wilson and Trevor Swan – to the 
development of the “small country case” in the theory of balance of payments 
adjustment’.18 It has also been claimed that Wilson’s work was the precursor of 
what has since been termed the ‘Dutch disease’ or ‘the Gregory effect’.
Public servant
Wilson was not entirely comfortable working as an academic economist. He 
later admitted that he ‘never felt deeply attracted to scholarship for its own 
sake’.19 Instead of an academic career, Wilson thought he might prefer to 
work as a policy adviser to governments. An opportunity arose in 1932 when 
L.F. Giblin, the acting Commonwealth statistician, invited him to take the 
position of economist in the Statistician’s Branch of the Commonwealth Treasury 
in Canberra. The offer was accepted and he was quickly promoted to assistant 
Commonwealth statistician. He was the first economist to be employed at a 
senior level in the Commonwealth Public Service. His appointment – which was 
to be for six months – was not accepted with equanimity. Several members of 
the Public Service Union who worked in the Statistician’s Branch called a strike, 
and Eddie Ward criticised the appointment in the parliament. Later, however, 
when Ward was minister for Labour and National Service, and Wilson was the 
head of his department, Ward declared that Wilson was ‘the most able man I 
have met’.20
16  R. Wilson, Capital Imports and the Terms of Trade (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1931).
17  T.W. Swan, ‘Overseas Investment in Australia’, Treasury Economic Paper No. 1, Economic Record, March 
1976, 7.
18  H.W. Arndt, ‘Non-Traded Goods and the Balance of Payments’, Economic Record, March 1976, 89.
19  Address at the Commemoration Ceremony, University of Tasmania, Hobart, April 1969.
20  I. Castles, ‘Menzies’ Economic Commander’, Australian, 30 October 1996, 14; Elwyn Spratt, Eddie Ward: 
Firebrand of East Sydney (Adelaide: Rigby, 1965; reprinted by Seal Books, Adelaide, 1978), 70.
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In 1935, after declining the chair of economics at Tasmania and the associated 
post of financial adviser to the Tasmanian Government, Wilson was appointed 
economic adviser to the Commonwealth Treasury. Giblin had urged him to stay 
in Canberra rather than moving back to Hobart, informing Wilson that his work 
for the Commonwealth was ‘the bigger job’. Then, in 1936, at the age of 32, 
Wilson succeeded E.T. McPhee as Commonwealth statistician, a post he was to 
hold until he was appointed secretary to the Commonwealth Treasury in 1951. 
When he was Commonwealth statistician in the 1930s, Wilson created 
the position of ‘Research Officer’, which allowed graduates to enter the 
Commonwealth Public Service on the basis of their university qualifications. 
Until then, graduates could only enter the service as base grade clerks, unless 
they held professional qualifications, such as medical doctors or engineers; 
Wilson himself had been an exception. Among the distinguished graduates he 
recruited to the Bureau were Arthur Smithies, John Burton, Jim Nimmo, Dick 
Heywood, Mick Shann and Lindsay Brand. On a number of occasions he tried 
to attract J.G. Crawford, but without success.
Shortly before the outbreak of war, Wilson was appointed, together with Giblin 
and L.G. Melville of the Commonwealth Bank, to the Advisory Committee on 
Financial and Economic Policy (the F and E Committee). Wilson had himself 
proposed the establishment of this committee and had nominated Giblin to chair 
it. It was to be responsible for planning and coordinating much of the financial 
direction of the war in its early stages, and for investigating possible approaches 
to post-war reconstruction. In addition, as part of Australia’s defence planning, 
Wilson was placed in charge of the National Register of the male population. 
This work included a census of wealth for which Wilson was responsible.
In 1940, Wilson was asked by the government to establish the Department of 
Labour and National Service and to become its inaugural head. He quickly 
created a division of post-war reconstruction in the department. It was here 
that the early planning of Australia’s post-war reconstruction was undertaken, 
and to which Wilson recruited an impressive group of economists and other 
university graduates, including Arthur Tange, Allen Brown, Gerald Firth, 
Fin Crisp and John Burton. Earlier, Wilson had been responsible for bringing 
H.C. Coombs into the Treasury from the Commonwealth Bank in Sydney. It was 
this group, including Coombs, that was to form the nucleus of the Ministry of 
Post-War Reconstruction when it was formed at the end of 1942.
Because Wilson had initiated work on post-war reconstruction in the Department 
of Labour and National Service, he was invited to represent Australia at the 
first British Commonwealth conference on the international economy in the 
post-war era held in London in October 1942. It was at this conference that 
Keynes outlined his proposal for an international monetary institution aimed 
6. Sir Roland Wilson 
131
at securing international financial stability; the idea was to evolve into the 
International Monetary Fund established at Bretton Woods in 1944. Keynes 
informed Giblin that, at the London conference, Wilson had taken a ‘prominent, 
indeed a leading part through all the discussions and played a major role in 
them with the greatest success’.21
Wilson did not attend the Bretton Woods conference, but he was at the conference 
in San Francisco in 1945 that established the United Nations Organization. 
Here again he distinguished himself. It was largely because of Wilson’s skill 
and tenacity that the Australian Government’s objective of full employment was 
successfully incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations (clauses 55 
and 56), the outcome of a battle that Wilson won against powerful American 
opposition led by John Foster Dulles. Paul Hasluck, who also attended the 
San Francisco conference, wrote that, of the large Australian delegation led by 
ministers Forde and Evatt, ‘Wilson was quietly the master’.22
Secretary to the Treasury
Late in 1948 a selection committee for the inaugural chair of economics at 
the newly established Australian National University (ANU), comprising the 
vice-chancellor (Douglas Copland), W.K. Hancock (professor of economic 
history at Oxford and one of the four advisers to the Interim Council of ANU), 
J.R. Hicks (professor of economics at Oxford and a later Nobel Laureate) and Sir 
Henry Clay (warden of Nuffield College, Oxford), decided to offer the chair to 
Wilson. But he declined the offer, explaining to Copland that, although he had 
made some contributions to economic knowledge, he doubted that he had the 
capacity for sustained research in economics of the kind that would be expected 
of a professor in a research school. ‘I do not believe’, he wrote to Hancock, ‘that 
I possess in sufficient measure the scholarly instincts and attributes without 
which one could neither tolerate nor be tolerated in a research school in the 
social sciences.’ Copland, however, tried to reassure Wilson that ‘it should be 
quite possible for you to take charge of a research department in economics 
even though you have, as you say, been immersed in policy administration 
for so many years’. But Wilson was adamant, informing Copland that he had 
‘reluctantly but firmly declined the invitation’. In addition to having ‘a sense of 
inadequacy on the academic side’, Wilson confessed to Copland that he
was also to some extent influenced by my disinclination to break the 
long association I had with the Commonwealth Service. I feel strongly 
21  J.M. Keynes to L.F. Giblin, 13 November 1942, Reserve Bank of Australia Archives, RBAA C. 3.7.6.33.
22  P. Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs, 1941–1947 (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne 
University Press, 1980), 193.
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that I have been too long out of the academic world to make a satisfactory 
research Professor of Economics, and if I accepted such a position I 
should always feel that I was holding it under false pretensions. You will 
have seen enough of Government service yourself to know that one is 
forced to become rather specialized in certain requirements, and that this 
specialization does not contribute much to the breadth and profundity 
of knowledge required in one who is to fill an important academic post. 
You must not conclude that I am suffering from an inferiority complex, 
which is far from true. I am merely trying to be honest about my present 
situation, and to suggest that the National University would be wise to 
seek someone of less questionable suitability for the position which has 
so many potentialities for the future of economics in Australia.23
Following his rejection of The Australian National University’s offer of the 
chair in economics, Wilson was appointed secretary to the Treasury on 1 April 
1951. At 47 years of age, he was the youngest person to hold the position 
until Bernie Fraser’s appointment in 1984. The duration of Wilson’s tenure as 
Treasury secretary – some 15 years – has not been surpassed. Nor have others 
exceeded his reputation. As secretary he was the nation’s senior economic policy 
adviser; indeed, he was the nation’s most senior public servant. These were 
extraordinary years, marked by full employment, relative price stability and 
sustained economic growth. It is sometimes suggested that Wilson’s reputation is 
overestimated because of the favourable circumstances that existed during these 
halcyon days. It is true that Wilson was not confronted with the problems that 
beset his predecessors during the depression of the 1930s or the two world wars. 
Nor did he have to confront the upsurge of inflation that began shortly after he 
left the Treasury. Nevertheless, in an era when public expectations of a benign 
economy were widely prevalent, the impact of each cyclical fluctuation tended 
to be magnified in the minds of many Australians. And since the downturns 
were often policy-induced, as part of the management of aggregate demand 
aimed at dampening inflationary forces and preserving balance of payments 
stability, the Treasury, as the responsible department, was frequently the target 
of public disquiet, and its head was often the subject of personal criticism.
The ‘credit squeeze’ of 1960–61 was arguably the most difficult event that Wilson 
had to contend with during his time as Treasury secretary. The recession of the 
early 1960s was the steepest in 30 years, until it was exceeded by the recession 
of the early 1980s. Both Wilson and the Treasury came in for heavy criticism. He 
never denied his responsibilities as secretary to the Treasury. Nor did he panic. 
Cool as always under pressure, he set about to restore economic stability and the 
Treasury’s reputation. Both objectives were quickly achieved. His close colleagues 
23  S. Cornish, ‘The Appointment of the ANU’s First Professor of Economics’, History of Economics Review, 
no. 46 (2007). See also Australian National University Archives, ANUA 104/1/8 Pt 3.
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wrote to him after the economy began to rebound from the immediate effects of 
the recession to congratulate him on his judgement and courage. Stanley Carver, 
the Commonwealth statistician, wrote to him at the end of 1962, saying that the 
outcome has vindicated your clear vision. I truly believe that you 
averted a boom-collapse of a kind that could have made the burst 
bubbles of Sydney Guarantee, Hooker and Reid Murray [companies that 
had recently collapsed] look like incidents … It is a perilous and painful 
thing to destroy false doctrine – and even harder to revive an economy 
rotten with little South Sea Bubbles. Yet I think you have succeeded – 
and prevented collapse.24
Similarly, his Treasury colleague, Lenox Hewitt, wrote to him in January 1963 
asking 
whether you’ve now looked back, in leisure, over your achievements 
in 1962? They should give you great satisfaction … You’ve built a 
fine organization in a year of quite extraordinary achievement. How 
extraordinary, I feel I am one of those able to judge.25
Wilson chose to leave the Treasury three years ahead of the compulsory retiring 
age of 65. The decision reflected in part his wish to allow his deputy, Sir Richard 
Randall – another of the seven dwarfs – the opportunity to head the Treasury.26 
But there were also other reasons. Menzies had just retired and was succeeded 
as prime minister by Harold Holt who, in turn, was replaced as treasurer by 
William McMahon. With these ministerial changes, Wilson thought it was 
time for a change at the top of the Treasury. Moreover, the chairmanship of the 
boards of Qantas Airways and the Commonwealth Banking Corporation were 
about to fall due and Wilson was ready to take on new challenges.
When he retired from the Treasury in 1966 he had already spent many years on 
the boards of the Commonwealth Bank and Qantas as secretary to the Treasury. 
Upon retirement he was appointed chairman of both these enterprises. In due 
course he was appointed to the chairmanship of the Wentworth Hotel, a fully 
owned subsidiary of Qantas, and to the boards of the insurance company 
Mutual Life & Citizens (MLC), Imperial Chemical Industries (Australia), and 
the Australian-European Finance Corporation. As with everything else he did, 
Wilson took his work as a company director seriously and his contributions 
to strategic thinking were highly praised both by his fellow directors and by 
managers in the companies with which he was associated.
24  S. Carver to R. Wilson, 21 December 1962, Wilson Papers, NLA MS 1155.
25  L. Hewitt to R. Wilson, 14 January 1963, Wilson Papers, NLA MS 1155.
26  S. Cornish, ‘Sir Richard John Randall (1906–1982)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 18 (Carlton, VIC: 
Melbourne University Press, 2012), 324–5.
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Sir Roland Wilson, 1965
Source: National Archives of Australia, A1200, L51130
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Wilson’s legacy
What is the significance of Wilson’s life and work? An obvious one is that high 
intellectual ability and steadfast determination can transcend limited family 
circumstances and the obscurity of the place of one’s birth. Born the son of 
a builder and cabinet maker, in an isolated country town in the smallest and 
least economically equipped of the Australian states, a young man with limited 
physical presence but with considerable academic ability and a courageous 
disposition was able to aspire, and later to be offered and attain, positions 
at the apex of his nation’s academic, bureaucratic and corporate worlds. He 
was fortunate, to be sure, in having as mentors some of the leading names in 
Australian economics and politics, among them Giblin, Copland and Brigden, 
Lyons, Casey, Menzies, Spender, Holt, Fadden, Curtin and Chifley. But he had to 
win their support, which he did as a result of his powerful intellect and strength 
of character.
Of his principal achievements, the most significant was surely the part he 
played in the transformation of the Treasury from its traditional accounting and 
budgetary function to an institution whose chief responsibility was the provision 
of economic advice to government. Wilson did not initiate this transformation. 
Nor was the transformation complete by the time he left the Treasury. But as 
economic adviser to the Treasury in the 1930s and 1940s, and as secretary to 
the Treasury in the 1950s and 1960s, there can be no doubt that he, more than 
any other individual, played the dominant role in the evolution of the Treasury 
from a department of finance and supply to a department of economic policy 
advice. When he was appointed Treasury secretary, the Launceston Examiner 
– the leading newspaper in the region of his birth – drew attention to the fact 
that an economist had succeeded an accountant as head of the department. 
It pointed out that ‘[f]or fifty years Treasury administration has been in the 
hands of persons who were predominantly accountants and graduates from the 
Treasury’s accounting departments’. But Wilson’s appointment was altogether 
different, for it ‘marks the first Australian experiment of this kind, and it is a 
good bet as far ahead as one can see all his successors will be economists, too’.27
Wilson’s direction of the Treasury was heavily influenced by ideas that he had 
developed in the 1930s. It was then that he had taken an interest in aspects of 
policy coordination and planning. He wrote two important papers on the subject, 
one on ‘The Economic Implications of Planning’, for the Australian Institute of 
Political Science in 1934, and the other on ‘Economic Co-ordination’, the Joseph 
Fisher Lecture, which he presented at the University of Adelaide in 1940.28 
27  Launceston Examiner, 2 February 1952, 2.
28  R. Wilson, ‘The Economic Implications of Planning’, in W.G.K. Duncan, ed., National Economic Planning 
(Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1934); R. Wilson, ‘Economic Co-ordination’, Joseph Fisher Lecture in 
Commerce (Adelaide: The Hassell Press, 1940).
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Given the need and inclination of modern governments to intervene in the 
economy, Wilson was concerned about the scope for policy conflict and the 
inconsistencies of objectives and decisions that were likely to occur in these 
circumstances. It was clear to him that planning was required to coordinate 
the various interventions, and to bring about a greater measure of coherence in 
economic policy. Planning, he argued, 
may be regarded as the elaboration of methods for securing wise 
control. Practically, it involves the establishment of some form of central 
‘thinking agency’, which will be better equipped than the existing 
political organization, to direct where direction is necessary, and to 
withhold where intrusion would be harmful.
By planning he did not mean the type of planning that had materialised in the 
Soviet Union. What he had in mind, though of course he could not spell it out, 
was something like the Treasury of the 1950s and 1960s when Wilson himself was 
the secretary – a ‘thinking agency’ that would operate in a market economy and 
would aim to achieve greater consistency between competing policy objectives. 
As he put it, 
the new planning demands a reversal of short-sighted economic policies, 
the abolition of arbitrary and ill-conceived restraints and interferences 
with the free workings of the automatic adjustments, and, above all, a 
more vigorous and rational control of the machinery for creating and 
distributing purchasing power.
The years of Wilson’s headship of the Treasury are often regarded as the 
high watermark of the Keynesian revolution in Australia, and it is sometimes 
contended that Keynesianism was the guiding principle of the department’s 
approach to economic policy. While it might be argued that Wilson was never 
a committed adherent to Keynesianism, he was in some ways a purer adherent 
to the economics of Keynes than many of those who claimed to be dedicated 
Keynesians. Neither Wilson nor Keynes were supporters of direct controls. Keynes 
often referred to them as ‘Bolshevism’, or ‘totalitarian’ devices, and Wilson 
no doubt would have agreed. Like Keynes, he was not attracted to the idea of 
constantly fine-tuning the economy, particularly by manipulating interest rates, 
doubting as he did the potency of monetary policy. Both men preferred instead 
to influence activity by fiscal policy. While agreeing that monetary policy had 
a role to play, where they differed was in their time horizons – Wilson backed 
the Menzies Government’s strong commitment to economic expansion, whereas 
Keynes was more concerned with achieving short-term stability.
Accordingly, some of Wilson’s greatest work was directed at fostering a more 
efficient and dynamic economy. He was opposed to Australia’s high rate of 
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protection, often clashing with the Department of Trade under its minister, 
John McEwen, and secretary, J.G. Crawford. While endorsing the reimposition 
of import controls in the emergency circumstances that prevailed in 1952, when 
a flood of imports inundated Australia following the bursting of the Korean War 
boom, Wilson opposed quantitative import controls in principle as a permanent 
feature of the Australian economy, preferring instead a more adjustable 
exchange rate regime. He was a powerful advocate of the return to convertibility 
of sterling area currencies, arguing that Australia’s adherence to sterling area 
controls was imposing a straitjacket on the nation’s efforts to force the pace of 
economic growth and development. As well as his support for convertibility, 
Wilson was an architect of policy aimed at overcoming the dollar shortage of 
the 1950s by borrowing in the United States, policy advice that the Menzies 
Government received favourably but which had been anathema to the previous 
Chifley administration. On wages policy, Wilson believed that the system of 
arbitration and conciliation, with its support for quarterly adjustments to the 
basic wage according to movements in retail prices, was contributing both to 
inflation and to inefficiencies in the allocation of resources.
There continued to be major differences over policy between the Treasury 
and the Commonwealth Bank/Reserve Bank during Wilson’s time as Treasury 
secretary, particularly between Wilson and Coombs, the heads of the two 
agencies. These difficulties might have had their origins during the war and 
over aspects of post-war reconstruction. They were probably heightened when 
Coombs, shortly after his appointment to the governorship of the Commonwealth 
Bank at the end of 1948, wrote to Wilson saying: 
I have always felt it essential that there should be another source of 
economic advice and some authority concerned with the coordination 
of inter-departmental work other than the Treasury. It seems to me 
inevitable that the Treasury, however good its intentions and however 
able its staff, gradually comes to take the traditional ‘financial’ point of 
view and there are many times when this point of view is not the most 
relevant.29
As an alternative source of policy advice, Coombs proposed that the prime 
minister should have attached to him an economic staff. Wilson was to retain a 
copy of this letter with his personal papers for the rest of his life.
Similarly, Coombs’ decision to invite the nation’s top academic economists to the 
Commonwealth Bank/Reserve Bank twice a year for consultations on the state of 
the Australian economy was regarded with deep suspicion by Wilson, especially 
when an invitation to participate was extended to Crawford and other officials of 
29  H.C. Coombs to R. Wilson, 11 January 1949, in Wilson Papers, NLA MS 1155.
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the Department of Trade. Alarm bells rang even louder when Wilson discovered 
attempts in the early 1950s by Coombs to fund from the Commonwealth Bank 
work at The Australian National University on contemporary economic trends 
and issues, the results of which were to be published on a regular basis. Such an 
exercise, Wilson thought, might cause the government acute embarrassment and 
inevitably weaken the Treasury’s authority as the principal economic adviser to 
the federal government.30
The problem of an alternative source of economic advice to government reached 
its apogee in 1965 when the Committee of Economic Enquiry (the Vernon 
Committee) recommended that an Advisory Council on Economic Growth should 
be established to advise the government on economic matters. The Vernon 
Committee had been established in 1962 in the wake of the credit squeeze of 
1960–61. Crawford had been designated by the prime minister to chair the 
enquiry; when Wilson heard about it he persuaded Menzies to replace Crawford 
with a businessman, Dr James Vernon, much to Crawford’s chagrin.31 By the 
time its report was completed the economy had recovered and the econometric 
forecasts that had underpinned the committee’s analysis of the future seemed 
incongruent with the new economic dispensation. Wilson and his Treasury 
colleagues exploited the factual deficiencies and logical inconsistencies of the 
Vernon Report to impugn its major recommendations, including, above all, 
the arguments supporting the creation of an Advisory Council on Economic 
Growth. In this endeavour, Wilson was highly successful. For when he tabled 
the Vernon Committee’s report in the parliament, Prime Minister Menzies, 
drawing upon a Treasury brief, announced that the government did not accept 
the need for an alternative source of economic advice. For Wilson, there were 
no grounds for creating new sources of policy advice, since the Treasury itself 
evaluated different possibilities. Furthermore, the Treasury was not the only 
public agency advising the government: ‘The problem’, he argued, was ‘not 
how to get advice but how to evaluate it. To set up competitive evaluations still 
leaves the task of evaluating the evaluators.’32 That, Wilson thought, was clearly 
the role of the Treasury.
Wilson’s – and the Treasury’s – difficulties with Coombs, and with Crawford, 
have sometimes been explained simply in terms of powerful egos refusing to yield 
30  Wilson’s contempt for the Bank had already formed before Coombs became governor. In January 1949 
he wrote to Coombs about his return to Australia from the United States and the resumption of his seat on 
the Bank’s Advisory Council. Wilson told Coombs that ‘[t]hese [duties], of course, include at least one lunch 
per meeting, sherry twice a day, afternoon tea once a day, and the frequent use of the Governor’s plane for 
the transport of myself, my Treasury colleagues and my secretary between Canberra and Sydney. In between 
other activities no doubt we will find time at the Council to consider some items of business, if there are any 
on which you have not made up your mind before the Council meets.’
31  Crawford was subsequently appointed vice-chairman, becoming in effect the principal author of the 
Enquiry’s report.
32  Wilson Papers, NLA MS 1155.
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to different points of view. There is something to be said for this explanation. 
After all, Wilson, Coombs and Crawford were the most senior of the seven 
dwarfs. But there was more to it than that, for there were significant differences 
in their approaches to economic policy. The Treasury’s priority under Wilson 
and Randall was to facilitate and enhance economic growth and development. 
Policies that might inhibit this objective were clearly unacceptable to the 
Treasury. The central bank, when Coombs was governor, was more concerned 
with short-term stability, being always ahead of the Treasury in wanting to 
tighten policy for the purpose of reducing inflation. Coombs was generally 
eager to use monetary instruments for this purpose, but Wilson was concerned 
that higher interest rates would increase the cost of servicing government debt, 
much of the debt having accumulated as a result of funding infrastructure 
projects. Moreover, fine-tuning aggregate demand tended to induce stop-go 
cycles in activity, which adversely affected decision-making in the private 
sector of the economy. The Department of Trade, for its part, wanted to provide 
tariff and other protection – and subsidies – to local industries, both export and 
import-replacing industries. For Wilson, however, this meant the diversion of 
resources into less efficient sectors of the economy, a process that would impede 
Australia’s growth and development. 
The Treasury’s Economic Survey, which was published annually from 1956 to 
1973, reveals the department’s overriding commitment to economic growth and 
development. In his Foreword to the first Economic Survey in 1956, the prime 
minister (Menzies) put the Treasury’s view precisely:
By reducing the pressure of home demand the Government has sought to 
reduce the demand for imports, to reduce the external deficit, and at the 
same time to assist in stabilizing domestic costs and prices. Initially, the 
only measures which could be used forthwith to safeguard international 
solvency were negative rather than positive. They included import 
restrictions, and restraint of domestic expenditures through higher taxes 
and ceilings on public works. The Government, however, has always 
been fully alive to the need for a positive strengthening of the bases of 
our domestic economy to provide for continued economic growth. This 
calls for greater productivity and output, especially in those lines of 
activity where our competitive position is strong and through which we 
can hope to improve our balance of payments position; it calls likewise 
for selective basic investment which will contribute to this, and for the 
domestic saving and overseas borrowing necessary to support it.33
33  Commonwealth of Australia, Australia 1956: An Economic Survey (Canberra: Commonwealth Government 
Printer, 1956), 5.
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In the same Economic Survey, the Treasury itself argued that, rather than the 
achievement of full employment, the ‘outstanding feature of the post-war 
Australian economy has been its many-sided and remarkable continuous growth 
… It has had force enough to thrust aside obstacles and keep going in face of 
events which, in other times, would have staggered the economy.’ While some 
aspects of this expansion were due to government policy – such as immigration 
and basic infrastructure – the Treasury asserted that economic expansion
has been a spontaneous movement, drawing its impetus from many 
sources within the economy … there has been nothing in the nature of 
a general plan, drawn up and imposed by the authority of government. 
Throughout the community there has no doubt been something of a 
general conviction that the economy ought to grow, had to grow, 
and should not be hindered from growing and various elements in 
the economy, including governments, have acted in accordance with 
that conviction. But apart from that kind of general belief, it would 
be difficult to say that the movement has had any single source of 
inspiration, energy or sponsorship. It has nevertheless operated most 
powerfully to shape the course of events.34
The Treasury’s enthusiasm for economic growth was expressed dramatically in 
its 1963 Economic Survey: ‘Over the past ten years’, the Treasury wrote, 
and especially over the past three years, Australia has achieved its 
greatest break-through in point of resources since the crossing of the 
Blue Mountains a hundred years ago. That earlier event opened the first 
doorway to the pastoral and agricultural wealth of the continent and the 
growth since built upon it. But until not very long ago it was commonly 
held that Australia could not be a great industrial nation and therefore 
could not support any greater number of people at Western standards 
because it lacked industrial resources. The quick succession of rich 
mineral discoveries – bauxite, copper, iron ore and now oil – go far to 
dispel that view – these new riches do, beyond doubt, lift the horizons 
of Australian growth quite incalculably.35
In its next Survey, the one for 1964, the Treasury identified a problem that 
was to beset the Australian economy in the years to come. There were ‘two 
divergent possibilities’, it said. ‘One is that growth will continue … The other 
possibility is a renewal of inflation and the beginning of a phase of unstable 
34  Ibid., 13–14.
35  Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Economy (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 
1963), 24–5.
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conditions extending far into later years. Clearly there is in this a challenge both 
to government and to the whole community.’36 No one could say that Wilson and 
Randall did not warn Australia of the possible dangers ahead.
Conclusion
In his Giblin Memorial Lecture to the 47th ANZAAS Conference held in Hobart 
in 1976, Wilson chose to reflect upon the qualities and outlook required of 
successful economic policy advisers. Though he was speaking of Giblin, his 
thoughts applied equally to himself:
[H]e [Giblin] would have felt that, in the application of economic theory to 
public policy, the need was greater rather than less for the cultivation of 
people who could combine a basic mastery of theory with knowledge of 
the mysteries of a constantly changing society, with intimate experience 
of business and political realities, with intuitive understanding of the 
behaviour of individuals, and groups within society – and above all 
with humanity.
… He made a unique mark in government, in economics, in central 
banking, in statistics and in war … from his vast knowledge and 
experience was distilled a wisdom which was put without stint at the 
disposal of those who knew and loved him.37
36  Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Economy (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 
1964), 3.
37  R. Wilson, ‘L F Giblin: A Man for All Seasons’, address to the 47th Congress of the Australian and New 
Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, Hobart, 12 May 1976; published in Search (Sydney, 






It is a commonplace fact that H.C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs was among the first 
enthusiastic Australian Keynesians. Groenewegen and McFarlane, in their 
biographical sketch, call Coombs ‘a leading figure in the implementation of the 
“Keynesian Revolution” in economic policy’.2 I would not dispute this, but I do 
not find it very helpful either, partly because in none of the 13 references that 
Groenewegen and McFarlane make to the ‘Keynesian revolution’ do they tell 
you what that ‘revolution’ consisted of. To label Coombs a ‘Keynesian’ is only 
the beginning of an effort to understand him as an intellectual.
A golden moment
The transformative impact of The General Theory on intellectuals such as Coombs 
has been much mythologised. By ‘mythologised’ I do not mean falsely rendered. 
Rather, the phrase ‘Keynesian revolution’ works as a conventional narrative 
device, a shorthand that effectively distances the historian from the people and 
events of the late 1930s and early 1940s, rather than bringing them into sharper 
focus. Furthermore, in the uses to which the name ‘Keynes’ and the soft focus 
phrase ‘Keynesian revolution’ are put I detect a yearning for simplicity, for a 
clear and unproblematic alignment of economic and political reason. The name 
‘Keynes’ and the phrase ‘Keynesian revolution’ evoke a moment in the twentieth 
century that was in two ways a golden moment: first, liberalism seemed to have 
produced a practically workable model of society; and second, economists 
owned that model and were being invited by governments to apply it. The 
yearning for that golden moment is at the heart of the mythologising phrase 
‘Keynesian revolution’.
1  This essay was first published in History of Economics Review, 30 (1999), 108–25. It is reproduced with the 
permission of the History of Economic Thought Society of Australia. Tim Rowse has made minor revisions.
2  P. Groenewegen and B. McFarlane, A History of Australian Economic Thought (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 214.
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One of the most florid recollections of that blessed conjuncture of reason and 
politics – the late 1930s, early 1940s – came from The General Theory’s indexer, 
David Bensusan-Butt. In 1967, he wistfully recalled that he had found in The 
General Theory: 
joyful revelation in dark times. We thought that Keynes had, to put it 
shortly, found the ‘flaw in the capitalist system’, and had proclaimed its 
remedy … The mystery of contemporary iniquity had been unveiled 
by a masterpiece of sustained intellectual effort. All the other tangled 
turgid stuff which lesser men were producing to rationalise the mess 
around us simply faded away.3 
Butt had found in Keynes’ vision of a reformed capitalism
everything and more the Fabian generation had looked for in socialism: 
it was morally speaking egalitarian, it was fully employed, it was 
generous and gay; it was a very new sort of capitalism controlled not by 
the greedy votaries of Mammon but by the intellect and joie de vivre of 
an intelligent and robust democracy.4
The sovereignty of a cheerful reason is Bensusan-Butt’s theme. 
[The General Theory] was to us less a work of economic theory than a 
Manifesto for Reason and Cheerfulness, the literary embodiment of 
a man who, to those who ever saw him, remains the very genius of 
intellect and enjoyment. It gave a rational basis and a moral appeal for 
a faith in the possible health and sanity of contemporary mankind such 
as the youth of my generation found nowhere else.5
In 1967, Bensusan-Butt could distance himself from these youthful faiths and 
yet still find Keynes’ book a wonder. ‘From the grey depths of my cynical middle 
age’, he wrote, ‘I will not let great men account for much in the determinate 
sweep of history, but I keep a soft spot for The General Theory.’6
Three years after Bensusan-Butt’s recollections, Coombs offered listeners of the ABC 
Boyer Lectures similar memories. For many of his generation, it had been hard to see 
‘in Stalin’s Russia the model of a Utopia of which the young could dream and, as for 
revolution, its techniques had been taken over by the irrational right’:
It was at this stage that the star of Keynes emerged as a focus for youthful 
enthusiasm and sense of revolt. Looking back, what he offered (or at first 
3  D. Bensusan-Butt, On Economic Knowledge: A Sceptical Miscellany (Canberra: Research School of Pacific 
Studies, Department of Economics, ANU, 1980), 35.
4  Ibid.
5  Ibid.
6  Ibid., 34–6.
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merely promised in due course to find) was unexciting enough – only a 
new understanding of the workings of the economic system. But it gave 
us justification for and words to express our scorn for the stupidity and 
ineptitude of our elders and the grounds to believe that we who shared 
this new enlightenment could end this miserable mean-spirited chaos of 
the great depression for ever. It made it possible for us to face the war 
without despair, believing that if we survived we could set mankind 
fair with following wind on the way to a new society. It seems to me 
now that the Keynesian reform program was the last hopefully inspired 
youthful revolt.7 
Ten years later, Coombs recalled the publication of The General Theory as ‘for 
me and many of my generation the most seminal intellectual event of our 
time’.8 Though he recalled at first finding the book difficult and deceptive in its 
structure, it ‘did not fail to generate excitement from first contact, and soon I had 
become convinced that in the Keynesian analysis lay the key to comprehension 
of the economic system’. In this conviction he was strengthened by a technical 
breakthrough – the ‘almost simultaneous development of the National Income 
Estimates’.9 Coombs went on to tell the story of the Financial and Economic 
(F and E) Committee, which ‘progressively gave the economic planning of the 
war an essentially Keynesian character’.10
In the published memoirs of Bensusan-Butt and Coombs we find three elements 
of the Keynesian revolution as myth: (1) reasoned iconoclasm, taken up by (2) 
critical youth, and (3) applied to government in a far-reaching and ultimately 
effective shaking up of the system. I remind you that ‘myth’ does not necessarily 
mean ‘untrue’; rather myth is storytelling conventionalised by pleasurable 
reiteration. Let me throw into relief this myth of youthful-reason-triumphant. 
I will do so in three ways. First I will give you an account of a paper ‘Economic 
Theory and Economic Practice’ read by John La Nauze before the Melbourne 
Branch of the Economic Society in May 1937.11 In this paper we find a young 
economist, fresh from reading Keynes, in a highly pessimistic mood about the 
future relevance and public authority of economics. My second strategy for 
highlighting the mythical quality of the memoirs of Coombs and Bensusan-Butt 
will be to show alternative ways of narrating the taking up of Keynes’ ideas 
in Australia. Finally, I will examine some policy contexts in which Coombs 
attempted to apply Keynesian ideas.
7  H.C. Coombs, The Fragile Pattern: Institutions and Man (Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 
1970), 41–2.
8  H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980), 3.
9  Ibid.
10  Ibid., (emphasis added).
11  J. La Nauze, ‘Economic Theory and Economic Practice’, typescript, Governor Herbert Coombs files, 
Reserve Bank of Australia RBA GHC-50-I, (1937).
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Dr H.C. (Nugget) Coombs, 1950
Source: National Archives of Australia, M2153, 4/33
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La Nauze’s pessimism
What could Economics as a discipline do to win the respect of politicians and the 
public?, La Nauze asked. Economists were unworldly and so lacked authority, 
he complained. Orthodox economists condemned ‘protection’ as inefficient, yet 
this had no impact on the politicians’ and the public’s enthusiasm for protection 
policies. La Nauze argued that economists would continue to suffer popular 
incredulity if they accepted Lionel Robbins’ argument that economists were 
value-neutral analysts of the means to attain ends and had no competence 
or duty to discuss those ends. In this they deceived themselves, argued La 
Nauze, for economists did, in fact, employ a conception of human welfare – 
one that equated welfare with monetary income. Such economists supported 
free trade because their theory told them that this would maximise income. 
They failed to realise that people and politicians had other aspirations for their 
nations: security, and safety in war through industrial strength. Economists 
had developed a concept of ‘welfare’ when international peace and prosperity 
could be assumed, and they had failed to adapt their notion of ‘welfare’ to more 
insecure times.
La Nauze offered further explanations of economists’ lack of authority in 
public debate. To the extent that economists spoke in the language of everyday 
affairs, it was possible for every person to hold an opinion about the matters on 
which economists expressed themselves – there was nothing special about what 
economists said. Another problem was that economists devoted their efforts 
to improving existing institutions, but ‘a growing section of the intelligent 
minority … are not interested in the proposals of economists for the better 
working of existing institutions’. Neither of these problems was the fault of 
economists, La Nauze conceded. The problem to which La Nauze gave emphasis, 
however, was in his opinion of economists’ own making. Economists persisted 
in making simplifying free market assumptions and in postulating narrow 
monetary conceptions of ‘welfare’.
La Nauze then raised a second obstacle to economists’ authority: their inability 
to promote, from outside political debate, a consensual view. Keynes was his 
main example. La Nauze disputed not the substance of Keynes’ arguments in 
The General Theory but his polemical manner of expression. By denouncing 
theoretical orthodoxy Keynes risked discrediting, in the mind of the lay public, 
‘all economic theorizing, including that of Mr. Keynes’. In calling for greater 
decorum among economists, La Nauze seemed close to making the opposite 
complaint to that with which his talk had begun – economists were perhaps too 
worldly. Economists were unlikely ever to speak with one voice because they 
held too great a variety of opinions about the good society. As well, Australian 
politicians publicly endorsed the authority of economists whose advice suited 
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their politics and then ridiculed the same economists when they found their 
advice unacceptable. In this politicised atmosphere economists competitively 
solicited support, to the detriment of their ‘true impartiality and detachment’.
After canvassing these explanations for economists’ lack of authority, without 
assigning priority to any one of them, La Nauze was unable to point out 
any way forward in theoretical, methodological, epistemological or ethical 
terms. Rather, his dismal paper led the reader towards the conclusion that 
economists’ authority was ever fragile. Would the demands of the looming 
war lead to a better economics or to better standing for economists? La Nauze 
doubted it. Indeed, ‘I do not think that there is likely to be any revolution by 
which the world will turn from its irrationality to the comparative rationality 
of economic theory’. It is most likely, he thought, that ‘we will be driven to 
escape into the worlds of elegant equilibria, or the history of doctrine, where 
we know we are safe’.
La Nauze was wrong in his prognosis – the Second World War was the making 
of economists, because it forced them into a relatively unified policy stance 
favouring a popular program – full employment – and because governments 
hired economists in order to run the war economy and to project a peace that 
inspired hard-pressed citizens. Nonetheless, La Nauze’s forgotten paper is of 
historical interest because it is a contrary instance to the impression – gained 
from Coombs and Bensusan-Butt – that at the end of the 1930s, early career 
economists were seized with joyous optimism upon reading The General Theory.
Coombs’ unpublished letters, 1936–38
Coombs and La Nauze were good friends in the late 1930s. Since Coombs was 
ambivalent about the Bank and missed the academic life, correspondence 
with La Nauze (then teaching economics at the University of Adelaide) was 
important to him. In his letters to La Nauze he could air – more in jest than in 
earnest – his worries that the bank ethos was eroding his political integrity and 
intellectual vitality. In February 1936 Coombs reported to his friend that he and 
Jock Phillips
lunch together each week and join in a chorus of abuse of Fascists and 
Conservatives. I enjoy meeting him exceedingly – as that is one aspect of 
this job which is less satisfactory than it might be. Apart from discussions 
with Melville on theory – I find it very hard to meet people with whom I 
can talk about things other than Banking. After Universities where one’s 
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contacts are so varied and made automatically, it is hard to have to take 
thought to prevent one’s interests being narrowed. Work at the Bank is 
pretty varied and interesting.12
In Coombs’ letters at this time are scattered references to a number of economists 
he was reading: Bohm-Bawerk, Cassel, Durbin, Hayek. Then, in March 1936:
Have you seen Keynes’ new book? Judging by the summary of it Walker 
used to damn the Commonwealth Bank with recently – it must be 
somewhat iconoclastic.13
Followed by:
A group of us, including Walker, Black, Butlin, Melville and I are 
to meet once a week to chew this book over. So I am reading it with 
some attention – the more particularly since its practical implications 
are important. At the moment I am not impressed – but am trying to 
keep an open mind on the question. It is useful to try and put one’s 
impressions on paper.14
Coombs evidently attached some notes to this letter, but they have not survived. 
Later, he wrote again on Keynes:
I hear from Phillips that you have been wrestling with Keynes and find 
him a pain in the neck. I am struggling with him too … so far I am more 
irritated than anything. His habit of having half a chapter of close and 
difficult analyses and then slipping into general criticism of the system 
which does not follow from the analysis is damned annoying. Of course 
the crux of the business is the theory of interest and there I think he’s 
about half wrong.
And later in this letter:
By the way don’t you think Keynes puts things into the mouths of 
Malthus and others when he seeks for his intellectual ancestors?15
In two subsequent letters, Coombs outlined his doubts and dissatisfactions with 
The General Theory. One was to do with Keynes’ ideas about the rate of interest:
I have been trying to make sense of the theory of interest. Keynes’ work 
I found unsatisfying and yet it seemed to me to have one aspect of truth 
12  H.C. Coombs to J. La Nauze, 12 February 1936, La Nauze Papers, National Library of Australia (NLA) 
MS 5248.
13  Coombs to La Nauze, 18 March 1936, La Nauze Papers, NLA MS 5248. He was referring to Walker’s 
recent appearance before the Royal Commission on Money and Banking.
14  Coombs to La Nauze, 22 June 1936, La Nauze Papers, NLA MS 5248.
15  Coombs to La Nauze, n.d., La Nauze Papers, NLA MS 5248.
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– that interest is predominantly a monetary phenomenon. He goes wrong 
in confining the influence of the quantity of money to the yield on fixed 
money claims. The idea that I have been trying to follow up is that money 
is one form of property – the others being fixed money claims, equities, 
durable consumption goods and goods for immediate consumption and 
that a person at any time distributes his available wealth between those 
different forms in the way which gives him the maximum net satisfaction 
from the point of view of liquidity, income, immediate satisfaction, etc. 
So that the rate of interest will not (as Keynes suggests) merely be the rate 
which will make it worthwhile for people to hold money balances equal 
in aggregate to the quantity of money but that rate which establishes a 
relationship of relative attractiveness of the various forms of property as 
a result of which people will hold money balances equal in aggregate to 
the quantity of money. What this means is:
1. that the changes in the quantity of money affect the attractiveness of 
all forms of property
2. that equilibrium in money holdings is restored not by changes in the 
rate of interest only but by a reshuffling of all the forms of property
3. that the effects of any change in the quantity of money will be different 
according to where they come into the economy.16
In this passage we see Coombs pursuing a line of thought that would later be 
developed by Milton Friedman.17 The theoretical background against which he 
was reading Keynes was certainly eclectic, ‘the result as far as I can trace it of 
reading Cannan, von Mises and Melville’.18
Coombs’ second substantive criticism of The General Theory concerned the 
problem of conceptualising and measuring the propensity to consume – a point 
on which he had published a short article in the Economic Record:19
Since writing the note I have come to doubt whether it is possible to 
speak of the propensity to consume for the community as a whole at 
all. It is clearly possible to compile for an individual a schedule of 
consumption for given levels of income which would be reasonably 
valid for a short range of income on either side of the actual income. 
It is clearly impossible, however, to aggregate schedules of individuals 
16  Coombs to La Nauze, 9 September [1936?], La Nauze Papers, NLA MS 5248.
17  M. Friedman, Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956). I would 
like to thank Sean Turnell, Michael White and Roy Weintraub for helping me to place this line of thought 
within the history of economic theory.
18  Coombs to La Nauze, 9 September [1936?], La Nauze Papers, NLA MS 5248.
19  H.C. Coombs, ‘A Propensity to Consume, a Comment on the Note by Dr. Smithies’, Economic Record, 13 
(June 1937), 250–5.
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whose actual incomes are widely different, since the range of income for 
which their respective schedules would be valid would not coincide. 
At best it may be possible to talk of the propensity to consume of a 
representative individual – a very doubtful concept.20
In Coombs’ letters to La Nauze there is not only evidence that Coombs was 
working his way critically and thoughtfully through Keynes’ General Theory; 
there are also passages of writing which suggest that Coombs found Keynes, for 
all his critique of classical economics, limited by the framework of a discredited 
liberalism. This scepticism about Keynes’ liberalism emerged in two further 
letters from Coombs to La Nauze. The first is a comment on La Nauze’s gloomy 
paper on economics’ lack of authority, in which Coombs put the problem in 
historical terms. Economists’ credibility had been high when their laissez-faire 
assumptions and convictions had expressed the interests of ‘the rising small 
capitalist class … the most dynamic section of the community’, he suggested. 
Now capitalists were bent on maintaining ‘large scale monopolistic units’, and 
they no longer welcomed liberal economists’ strictures against market-distorting 
political privilege. And if Laski was right in seeing the state as the instrument of 
‘predominant groups in the community’ then economists could expect no better 
hearing from governments. Because there could be no return to capitalism’s 
earlier laissez-faire stage, Coombs concluded, it was futile for economists to ‘cry 
for the moon of free competition’. Either economists could cease to make any 
critique of capitalism and simply describe, without judgment, its contemporary 
dynamics; or economists could develop a critical conception of ‘welfare’ and 
throw themselves into the political process. As a bank employee, Coombs was 
clearly inhibited from choosing the second option. In a postscript mentioning 
the possibility of escaping from the Bank to a university job he asked: ‘In view 
of the above can I remain in a bank and retain my integrity?’21
A sequel to this letter, one year later, survives in the La Nauze papers. Coombs 
again wrote down his thoughts about what economics and economists could 
hope to do. He and La Nauze had been reading Barbara Wootton’s recent Lament 
for Economics, and Coombs found that book’s argument ‘hard to answer.’ If there 
were hope for Economics, it lay in:
1. the adoption of a theory of the state
2. the willingness to consider people making economic decisions in 
statistical groups about which it would be possible to make judgments 
as to behaviour which would have [hold?] true for the group but not 
necessarily for the individual
20  Coombs to La Nauze, 20 September 1937, La Nauze Papers, NLA MS 5248. In this comment, Coombs 
parallels such post-Keynesian writers as Kalecki who introduce the complicating factors of class and income 
level into any attempt to measure and predict changes in the propensity to consume.
21  Coombs to La Nauze, 9 June 1937, La Nauze Papers, NLA MS 5248.
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3. the willingness to abandon the search for certainty and to base 
economics consciously upon probabilities.
Of course if Economists will do this – they will reject equally the fictions 
of liberal economics and the limited interventions of Keynes, Meade, 
Harrod and co.22
This is neither as reasoned nor as clear a comment as one might wish to read, 
but it supports my impression that Coombs’ dissatisfactions with economics in 
June 1938 were those of a critical (if not Marxist) realist. As well as a theory of 
the state, a sociology of differentiated economic motivation would be required 
to give economists a purchase on social reality, and even then economists could 
hope only to rest their analysis on ‘probabilities’. If the comment on Keynes, 
Harrod and Meade is a non sequitur, it nonetheless demonstrates that Coombs’ 
restless intellect had yet not found what it sought in Keynes’ liberalism. This 
mid-1938 letter does not sit well with Coombs’ recollections of his Keynesian 
hierophany in Trial Balance, and with Melville’s recollection that ‘Coombs … 
went the whole way with Keynes.’23
If Coombs was going the whole way with anyone in 1938, it was with Barbara 
Wootton. Wootton’s survey of the discipline made a particular target of Lionel 
Robbins’ The Nature and Significance of Economic Science. She began by 
dismissing the assumptions dominant within economics: ‘every encroachment 
of monopoly upon a competitive system narrows the field in which the 
economist’s tools can ever be applied at all.’24 Increasing state intervention 
similarly attenuated economics’ pertinence. A world structured by monopoly 
and by state intervention was less and less amenable to economists’ theory. 
Declining to suggest new theoretical paths for economics, Wootton cited Keynes 
only sparingly, but to good effect. By pointing out the possibility of equilibria in 
the midst of unused resources Keynes questioned economic theory’s assumption 
of scarcity. Sometimes economic analysis could rest on the assumption of 
a prevailing scarcity, but in other situations, the opposite assumption was 
necessary. Keynesians were
at least trying to define the respective spheres in which each of the 
two mutually contradictory assumptions now offered as the basis of 
economic analysis is valid. But until this job has been satisfactorily 
completed, it is not to be wondered at if the economists stand helpless 
before urgent practical problems. Until they know which assumption 
it is appropriate to apply, they cannot even answer such an elementary 
22  Coombs to La Nauze, 4 June 1938, La Nauze Papers, NLA MS 5248.
23  S. Cornish, ‘Sir Leslie Melville: An Interview’, ANU Working Papers in Economic History, 173 (1993), 19.
24  B. Wootton, Lament for Economics (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), 82.
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question as whether an increase in the total volume of employment is 
more likely to be brought about by increasing or by diminishing the 
general level of wages.25
In her third and fourth chapters, Wootton declared herself unconvinced by 
arguments that economics is a science. Rather she sought to expose economists’ 
unreasoned faith that free markets optimised welfare. In her fifth chapter, she 
found fault with the idea that the economic system is shaped by the choices 
made by all those within it; some peoples’ choices, she pointed out, powerfully 
determined the options which the rest of us confront. Finally Wootton outlined 
a charter for economic studies that would require of economists:
a ruthless disregard of present boundaries and definitions. If anything 
substantial is to come out of the economists’ work, he must be allowed 
to poke his nose into questions of the quality of social ends, and of the 
means by which these are formulated. He must retain his freedom to be 
as sceptical as he thinks proper about market optima, and to suggest 
alternative standards by which these may be checked.26
She concluded by stating a research program for the reform-minded economist, 
a program whose breadth would not have shamed a school of social sciences, 
a program as broad as the range of research projects commissioned by the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction after 1943.
Some policy contexts of The General Theory
My second approach to the question of Coombs as exemplar of the Keynesian 
revolution takes us away from intellectual biography in order to emphasise 
the continuity in Australian economists’ policy advice before and after the 
publication of Keynes’ ‘seminal’ book.
Such continuity is Neville Cain’s point. Cain casts Ronald Walker as a leading 
advocate of Keynes to Australian economists, climaxing in his presentation of 
the gist of The General Theory to the Royal Commission on Money and Banking 
in 1936. However, Cain warns not to exaggerate the policy benightedness of 
Australian economists prior to the publication of The General Theory. ‘By 1933 
most of them had abandoned wage-cutting and warmed to treasury-bill financing 
of deficits and “minimal” public works (one or two indeed had pressed for a 
bolder line on works outlays).’ The significance of Walker’s work, Cain argues, 
was in ‘giving intellectual credibility to the policy stance of an emerging group 
25  Ibid., 98.
26  Ibid., 261.
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of expansionists whose political strength was concentrated in Sydney.’ Cain’s 
footnote then lists Bertram Stevens, Alfred Davidson, Torliev Hytten, supported 
by L.F. Giblin and D.B. Copland – all urging the federal government and the 
Commonwealth Bank to loosen expenditure and exchange policies.27
It would be consistent with Cain’s point to emphasise the way that wartime 
circumstances forced governments to behave as if they were converts to 
Keynesian ideas. Recall Walker’s observation in 1943:
In the library of the Australian parliament in Canberra there is a copy 
of the General Theory. The first three hundred pages, in which theory 
is worked out, are of virgin whiteness; the last eighty pages, with the 
practical applications, are well thumbed and heavily scored.28
Sir Leslie Melville, interviewed by Selwyn Cornish, also drew a line between 
those attracted by Keynes’ policy prescriptions and those agreeing with his 
theoretical arguments; the former were not necessarily ‘Keynesian’. Thus, Sir 
Leslie was able to recollect which Australian economists were ‘Keynesian’, and 
to what degree they were ‘Keynesian’, by the Second World War.29 Another 
economist who looked back, after the Second World War, on the Australian 
inception of expansionary economics, Douglas Copland, also seemed to 
distinguish theory from policy:
At the January 1939 meeting of ANZAAS Giblin and I put forward a 
resolution advocating the diversion of public works expenditure to 
strategic defence needs, and although it was received rather timidly it 
was not long before events themselves forced action along the lines we 
had been suggesting.30
Copland went on to caution advocates of ‘full employment’ against placing 
‘too much emphasis on the Keynesian doctrines in circumstances in which it is 
difficult to apply them’:
Full employment during and since the war has been inevitable and has 
not been due to any overt act on the part of economists or governments, 
so that there is no particular justification for self-satisfaction in that 
direction. If one thing is certain, it is this: when full employment ceases 
to be a reality there will be nothing straightforward about the measures 
needed to correct the situation.31
27  N. Cain, ‘Australian Keynesian: The Writings of E.R. Walker 1933–36’, ANU Working Papers in Economic 
History, 13 (1983): 17–18.
28  R.E. Walker, From Economic Theory to Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), 72.
29  S. Cornish, ‘Sir Leslie Melville: An Interview’, 18–19.
30  D. Copland, Expansion and Inflation (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1951), 24.
31  Ibid., 25–6.
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Copland doubted, in 1950, that the lay public who believed in full employment 
had any understanding of the Keynesian measures: ‘We have already seen him 
object when orthodox Keynesian theory, namely high taxation in a boom, 
hurts him.’32 
This alternative way of narrating the Keynesian revolution differentiates the 
theoretical conversion of economists from their endorsement, under well-
defined circumstances, of certain policy prescriptions. Coombs’ doubts about 
The General Theory were thus no obstacle to his pragmatic support, from 1939 
onwards, for macroeconomic policies that managed effective demand in order to 
employ all available resources.
Further insights based on the theory/policy distinction can be found in a study 
of the Labour Movement. Kuhn argues that Labour intellectuals were strongly 
disposed to welcome any theory of the capitalist economy that laid emphasis 
on the problem of effective demand.33 Labour leaders looked not to Marx but 
to the economists of ‘underconsumption’ such as J.A. Hobson. In mapping this 
theoretical tradition Kuhn casts Hobson in the ‘real school’ of underconsumption 
theory – concerned with income distribution – and Keynes in the ‘monetary 
school’ – concerned more with monetary policies. One might argue with such 
a classification of the mercurial Keynes, but Kuhn’s underlying point is that 
Labour Movement intellectuals argued both versions of ‘underconsumption’ 
theory and, in doing so, found convergence with the populist economics that 
depicted the evils of ‘Money Power’.34
Though Labour Movement leaders in the 1930s could have cited Keynes in 
support of the expansionary policies that they favoured, they rarely did so 
until after the publication of The General Theory, argues Kuhn. He cites ‘the 
suspicion of the profession that had been engendered by its behaviour during 
the Depression, and the participation of some of its foremost representatives in 
the preparation of the Premiers’ Plan’.35 A number of events helped to reconcile 
the ‘Laborites’ to the academic economist: the publication of The General Theory 
gave theoretical respectability to the advocates of expansion – Laborites and 
others; the Report of the Royal Commission on Money and Banking endorsed 
Keynes’ and others’ arguments for greater political accountability of finance 
capital (though there remained significant differences as to how to effect that 
accountability); and W.B. Reddaway’s Keynesian analysis led him to advise the 
Arbitration Court in 1937 to grant a basic wage increase in order to dampen 
employers’ inflationary optimism. Kuhn confines his story to the opinions and 
32  Ibid., 26.
33  R. Kuhn, ‘Labour Movement Economic Thought in the 1930s: Underconsumptionism and Keynesian 
Economics’, Australian Economic History Review, 28 (September 1988).
34  Ibid., 59.
35  Ibid., 64–5.
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actions of the leaders of the Labour Movement. Thus, he tells us nothing about 
the reception of Keynesian ideas in the non-Labor governments led by Lyons 
and then Menzies. However, Kuhn does note that Labor and non-Labor were 
converging around a Keynesian centre – at which point stood such figures as 
Bertram Stevens and Ronald Walker.36 From the point of view of moderate Labor 
leaders, this was a welcome development – the tensions between Capital and 
Labour seemed to be eased by Keynes’ theory and policy prescription. Kuhn’s 
narrative of the Keynesian revolution thus brings us back to the mythical 
resonances of the phrase ‘Keynesian revolution’. That is, Kuhn’s account makes 
it clear that Keynes was read as addressing the political anxieties of Labour 
Movement leaders who were struggling against a popular economics still 
saturated with Douglas Credit theory and concerns about ‘Money Power’. 
The phrase ‘Keynesian revolution’ persists as shorthand for an ideological 
conjuncture, when Capital and Labour seemed to be finding a new formula 
for peaceful coexistence. In Trial Balance, Coombs gave expression to such a 
memory – Keynesian analysis ‘seemed to bypass the most divisive issues within 
our society’.37
The war economy and the ‘Keynesian 
revolution’
In a policy-focused telling of the story of the Keynesian revolution, the point 
is to define ‘Keynesian’ contextually. One way to do this is to pay attention to 
Keynes’ 1940 pamphlet, How to Pay for the War. Keynes’ preface sensitises us 
to the political issues of the Australian government’s war-inspired policies of 
economic expansion.
Coombs’ publishers cut from the draft of Trial Balance words that illuminate 
the politics of war finance. For example, when Coombs wrote that the F and E 
Committee ‘progressively gave the economic planning of the war an essentially 
Keynesian character’, he had added the words ‘but success in establishing this 
character was not immediately or easily won’.38 What did he mean? One possible 
answer to that question can be found in Maddock and Penny’s study of the 
F and E Committee, which draws attention to the issue of how to distribute the 
burden of financing a larger government budget.39 In neither the published nor 
the draft version of Trial Balance did Coombs comment on the redistributive 
impact of the Menzies and Curtin governments’ approach to the war economy. 
36  Ibid., 70.
37  H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1981), 146.
38  H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance, unpublished typescript in the author’s possession.
39  R. Maddock and J. Penny, ‘Economists at War: The Financial and Economic Committee 1939–44’, 
Australian Economic History Review, 23 (March 1983).
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From the point of view of any historian who wishes to trace the ‘Keynesian’ 
character of both policy advice and policy this was a significant omission, 
because in How to Pay for the War (1940) Keynes had given prominence to his 
recommendations’ consideration of distributive social justice.40
Keynes argued for an explicit political pitch for the British population’s consent 
to the privations of war. ‘In peace time … the size of the cake depends on the 
amount of work done. But in war time the size of the cake is fixed. If we work 
harder, we can fight better. But we must not consume more.’41 How to get the 
public to swallow this inescapable economic truth? Keynes admitted that in his 
first thoughts on the war economy – three articles in The Times in November 
1939 – he had ignored this issue, for he had been
mainly concerned with questions of financial technique and did not 
secure the full gain in social justice for which this technique opened 
the way. In this revision … I have endeavoured to snatch from the 
exigency of war positive social improvements. The complete scheme 
now proposed, including universal family allowances in cash, the 
accumulation of working-class wealth under working class control, a 
cheap ration of necessaries, and a capital levy (or tax) after the war, 
embodies an advance towards economic equality greater than any which 
we have made in recent times.42 
The concern for social justice was not at the forefront of Australian economists’ 
public consideration of war finance issues. When four Australian economists 
– Butlin, Critchley, McMillan and Tange – reviewed the first 20 months of the 
war economy in 1941, they took little interest in the political question that 
had impressed its importance on Keynes – whether a program of social justice 
was essential to winning popular consent to the war economy. Butlin and his 
colleagues decided to leave to others a study of the distributional effects of 
wartime taxes. They could not ignore completely the political challenges of 
wartime economics, but where Keynes laid out a program that might woo the 
masses, Butlin and his colleagues evinced a fear and loathing of the public. 
Not for them Keynes’ confident appeal to the public’s interest in what he called 
‘social justice’. Such a phrase was not in the four authors’ vocabulary. Rather, 
they expressed fear of the public’s irrationality:
[M]ost are ready to be carried away by muddled catch-cries. The 
economic superstition which passes for theory about the mysterious 
40  For British discussion of the social justice issues of Keynes’ pamphlet see B. Littleboy, ‘The Wider 
Significance of How to Pay for the War’, History of Economics Review, 25 (Winter–Summer, 1996); and J. King, 
‘Oxford versus Cambridge on How to Pay for the War: A Comment on Littleboy’, History of Economics Review, 
27 (Winter, 1998).
41  J.M. Keynes, How to Pay for the War (London: MacMillan, 1940), 4.
42  Ibid., iii–iv.
The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins
158
virtues of the Commonwealth Bank, the sedulously cultivated doctrine 
of ‘maintain private spending’, and the indestructible faith in unlimited 
idle resources, make it extremely difficult for any uncourageous 
government to avoid inflationary finance. Reinforcing the faith in witch 
words are the natural disinclination to face unpleasant readjustments of 
living habits, and the equally natural tendency to identify the interest 
of one’s class with those of the community.43
Butlin and his colleagues favoured taxation as a method of war finance, but they 
did not declare support for any particular mix of taxes and so, unlike Keynes, 
they declined to let the problem of political consent to the war economy shape 
their consideration of that economy’s fiscal techniques. When they turned, 
unavoidably, to the question of how to win popular consent to restrictions on 
consumption, the four Australian economists could only appeal in the most 
general terms to the necessity for government ‘propaganda’44 – a term whose 
lame centrality to their discourse passed unnoticed by whoever compiled the 
book’s index.
Australia Foots the Bill thus departed significantly from its Keynesian precedent 
– How to Pay for the War – in the paucity of its political and social vision, and in 
its effective refusal to consider the psychological and ideological underpinning 
of a war economy. We might say that in being so apolitical, these economists 
were ‘essentially unKeynesian’. That is, until the last few pages of their book. 
There, Butlin and his colleagues did express an opinion about the Menzies 
Government’s taxes – they were too regressive, and this was ‘inefficient’. More 
money could be raised if the government would target the better off. As well, 
the economists were critical of the risk of inflation courted by the Menzies 
Government’s decision to use loans from the Commonwealth Bank. To counter 
the inflationary effects of this increase in the money supply, Australians should 
be required to set aside some of their money until after the war. Less well off 
consumers could be invited to divert their expenditure into ‘contributory 
unemployment and old-age insurance and similar social services’. Whatever 
was done to siphon off the public’s money, its impact should be progressive: 
‘Any scheme of finance which does not conform to these principles is not a 
Keynes Plan.’45 
If progressiveness in taxation and in compulsory levies was the essence of 
Keynesian fiscal policy at this time, then we are in a position to mark one of the 
43  S. Butlin, T. Critchley, R. McMillan and A. Tange, Australia Foots the Bill (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1941), 10.
44  Ibid., 71.
45  Ibid., 122.
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limits of Keynesian influence in Australia. According to Maddock and Penny, 
the F and E Committee’s ‘commitment to equity was never really transferred into 
policy’ by the Menzies Government:
Suggestions for income taxation increases made considerably less 
progress than the Committee had hoped, with indirect taxes assuming a 
correspondingly more important role. Schemes for a national minimum 
income or unemployment insurance also made little headway.46
Whether Australian fiscal policy during the war ever became as ‘progressive’ as 
Keynes hoped is a matter that could be debated. Butlin and Schedvin made no 
explicit evaluation of this point in their War Economy 1942–5. They note merely 
that the Curtin Government lowered the taxation threshold to encompass low 
and middle income earners, while gathering a higher proportion of net company 
income as well.47 Rob Watts’ negative evaluation of the Curtin Government’s 
approach to social equity is based on the former fact.48
Once again, our judgment of the reality and thoroughness of the ‘Keynesian 
revolution’ in wartime economic policy is dependent on our definition of 
‘Keynesian’.
Post-war blueprints
Finally, the theme of Coombs as Keynesian exemplar can be filled out by 
referring to the Keynesian provenance of some of Coombs’ (among others) 
schemes to reconstruct capitalism along more socially equitable lines, chiefly 
by committing governments to practicable policies of ‘full employment’. I make 
two kinds of criticism of this theme: we should not ignore Coombs’ essays on 
future possibilities, which owe nothing to Keynes; and in the politics of the ‘full 
employment’ crusade, there is no clear Keynesian line.
Coombs did not enlarge, in any document that I have seen, on his remark 
that Wootton’s ‘lament for economics’ was ‘unanswerable’. However, I see a 
resonance with Wootton in Coombs’ 1942 paper to a meeting of the Economic 
Society of Australia and New Zealand. His experience of being director of 
Rationing, since the beginning of 1942, deepened his sympathy for the thought 
46  Maddock and Penny, ‘Economists at War’, 39. W. Coleman, S. Cornish and A. Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon: 
The Trials and Triumph of the Economist in Australian Public Life (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006) discusses the 
politics of economic policy at this moment, commenting that ‘the inability to implement a politically acceptable 
policy of war finance was the principal reason for the failure of the Menzies and Fadden governments … Labor 
attacked the Menzies and Fadden Governments unmercifully on the grounds that their financial and economic 
policies – including the compulsory loan – were inequitable’ (p. 193).
47  S.J. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin, War Economy: 1942–45 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1977), 578.
48  R. Watts, The Foundations of the National Welfare State (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987). 
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that ‘experts’ might determine more rationally than markets the allocation of 
society’s resources. Just as Lament for Economics had argued that economists 
made far too much of the sovereignty of the utility-maximising consumer, so too 
had Coombs witnessed and indeed brought about the practical attenuation of 
consumer choice under wartime rationing. Wootton had written that 
the really fundamental choices are made by those who decide what 
options to put before us. We never knew that we wanted cars and 
gramophones and cellophane wrappings until these things were actually 
produced, and we found ourselves buying them.49 
In her view, ‘the right of choice can be an affliction just as much as a privilege’.50 
Coombs applauded the way that rationing relieved consumers from that affliction. 
Was it not possible, Coombs asked, that wartime arrangements demonstrated a 
better way for allocative decisions to be made – the expert estimation of people’s 
needs? ‘The economist has always tended to discount the value of expert opinion 
as a proper basis for action in economic fields’, he suggested. He put it to his 
audience that consumers’ sense of value was, to a significant degree, artificially 
constructed by advertising. It was time that economists dethroned the consumer 
from his/her bogus sovereignty and considered a more rational mechanism for 
the allocation of resources. Wartime management of the economy was already 
demoting those unreliable and irrational figures, the private investors; now 
rationing had begun to rationalise consumer behaviour. He asked: ‘Will we have 
a place for the estimation of people’s needs, of objective standards by appeal to 
experts, and will we find that production can be guided, with the maximum 
social benefits, by objective standards rather than by the private motive?’ 
Leaving that provocative question unanswered, Coombs nonetheless hailed 
rationing as ‘the application to the social problem of cooperative principles’.51
Such opinions are not easy to contain within a formula which characterises 
Coombs as a leading figure in the Keynesian revolution. We might rather call 
this the Fabian Coombs. In contrast, there can be no doubt of the Keynesian 
inspiration of Coombs’ ‘positive approach’ to the international discussions 
about trade liberalisation. Coombs set out to persuade political leaders in 
Australia and abroad that dependent economies such as Australia could accept 
the United States’ wish for free trade if the United States would, in turn, 
commit to domestic policies of full employment. If global ‘effective demand’ 
was sustained by American imports, then all trading nations could be ‘positive’ 
about protecting their domestic markets less.
49  Wootton, Lament For Economics, 203.
50  Ibid., 234.
51  ‘The Economic Implications of Rationing’, n.d., Coombs Papers, National Archives of Australia (NAA) 
CRS M448/1/179.
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What, in Keynes’ view, was the relationship between trade policies and full 
employment? When nations afflicted by the Depression had got together in 
London in 1933, Keynes had dismissed as a ‘waste of time’ the ‘pious resolutions 
concerning the abatement of tariffs, quotas and exchange restrictions’. Protection 
policies he saw as symptoms, not causes. Symptoms of what? Of popular 
economic insecurity. In The General Theory Keynes had argued that if policy-
makers focused on maintaining effective demand they need not be so worried 
about keeping a favourable balance of payments. Keynes was highly critical 
of an economic orthodoxy – associated with Britain’s dominance within the 
global economy – that, in order to keep the nation a net creditor in its financial 
dealings with the rest of the world, it was justified to allow internal interest 
rates to rise (attracting other nation’s currencies) and to push wages (a major 
cost of production) down. High domestic interest rates and low wages enabled a 
nation to attract more currency than it spent. In pre-Keynesian orthodoxy this 
combination of policies had been thought ‘financially sound’. Alternative ways 
to maintain a positive balance of payments, such as altering the value of the 
currency or restricting the flow of money in and out of the country were not so 
‘sound’, according to orthodox opinion, because they compromised the sanctity 
of the pound sterling as a medium in which the value of other currencies was 
to be measured. To Keynes the folly of this high interest/low wages orthodoxy 
had been demonstrated in the economic stagnation of the 1920s and 1930s. 
Recovery from the Depression would have been quicker had interest rates been 
kept low (to encourage investment), had governments spent freely and had the 
value of wages been maintained (to encourage spending on the products from 
which investors hoped to profit). If such recovery policies caused a nation’s 
balance of payments to fall into the negative, then either this was a short-term 
problem which should be tolerated, or, if the problem persisted, it was better 
to change the value of the currency or to intervene in the flow of money in and 
out of the nation.
Nations that refused to manipulate the value of their currency and that wished 
to avoid the social upheavals of a high interest/low wages strategy had only one 
option, Keynes pointed out in the penultimate chapter of The General Theory – 
aggressive trade policies. But aggressive trade policies required some nations to 
fail if others were to succeed, giving rise to ‘increasingly internecine’ international 
relations – war and/or increased protectionism. Keynes insisted that it was 
therefore a mistake for governments to define the national interest too much 
in terms of defending their balance of payments. Better to make it the primary 
objective of economic policy to set interest rates and government expenditure at 
levels that would encourage investment, employment and consumer spending 
consistent with full employment. While the resulting prosperity of the domestic 
market would stimulate imports, this would be balanced by the simultaneous 
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stimulation of the export trade. In a brief and isolated remark on the possible 
future of international trade, Keynes foreshadowed, in very broad terms, 
Coombs’ ‘positive approach’:
And it is the simultaneous pursuit of these policies by all countries 
together which is capable of restoring economic health and strength 
internationally, whether we measure it by the level of domestic 
employment or by the volume of international trade.52
Though Coombs’ positive approach was of Keynesian inspiration, Keynes’ 
internationalism, during the war, was tactically at odds with that of Coombs. 
Preoccupied with arguing for his International Clearing Union, Keynes waited 
until after the war before he promoted his views about trade policy. His sympathy 
for American free trade proposals, according to Harrod,53 did not crystallise 
until late in 1945, when Keynes heard American government officials explain 
the trade policies they would expect Britain to endorse if the American public 
was to support lending Britain billions of dollars for reconstruction. Coombs 
recalled that Keynes was known to be rather contemptuous of economists who 
took a great interest in trade policy.54 For Keynes, the paramount issue for those 
designing the post-war global economy was currency. Britain had damaged the 
social fabric of capitalism, thought Keynes, by trying to maintain sterling as 
the currency in which much of the world’s trading bills were paid. It was not 
necessary, he argued during the war, for any one nation’s currency to be the 
pre-eminent medium of post-war international exchange. Keynes’ proposed 
International Clearing Union would have created a genuinely international 
currency, and it would have set up mechanisms by which no single country 
could hold so much of that unit of exchange that other nations had insufficient 
for their own buying and selling. His scheme can be interpreted as recognising 
the impossibility of Britain maintaining hegemony over the global economy, 
while attempting to make it unnecessary (and indeed impossible) for the United 
States to succeed to that hegemonic position.
Keynes’ diplomatic endeavours in this cause failed, but his pursuit of them 
determined his immediate response to Coombs’ ‘positive’ approach to trade 
policy. Coombs met Keynes in London in June 1943, dining in a restaurant 
off Piccadilly and finding him ‘stimulating and charming’. But a subsequent 
exchange of letters did not produce agreement about how Britain and her 
Dominions should approach the foreseeable agenda of international discussions 
52  J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 1936), 349 
(emphasis added).
53  R. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes (London: Pelican, 1972), 721–2.
54  H.C. Coombs, conversation with the author, 2 September 1995.
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on currency, trade and employment.55 On 3 September 1943, Keynes assured 
Coombs that although ‘we do not differ about the importance of the subject [of 
employment]’, they differed in their tactics:
[A]t this stage more is likely to be achieved by tackling the problem of 
unemployment indirectly than by calling an international conference, 
which might find itself overmuch concerned with what were little better 
than pious resolutions … though it is quite possible that at some later 
stage, when the ground has been more fully prepared, a conference of 
this kind, or possibly one of even wider scope, might be of help both 
in educating public opinion in the various countries and in facilitating 
the international acceptance of whatever plans may ultimately be agreed 
upon in the monetary, commodity, commercial and investment fields.56
Keynes’ sympathy for Coombs’ ‘positive approach’ never made him their wartime 
advocate. Keynes’ focus was on how to modify the American proposals for a 
Stabilisation Fund so that they did not recreate the constraints, on governments 
facing unemployment, of the old gold standard. To advocate an international 
commitment to full employment, to a New Deal administration on the political 
defensive for its leanings towards ‘socialism’, would have seemed to him an 
additional burden on British diplomacy. Indeed, the Australian emphasis on 
‘full employment’ as a condition of free trade was seen by some North Atlantic 
officials as Australia’s ingenious, but disingenuous, way to avoid the challenge 
of free trade. British officials such as Keynes could not afford to be seen to be 
obdurate on trade policy if they were to bargain successfully with the Americans 
on the design of post-war currency arrangements.
My final comparison of Coombs’ and Keynes’ ‘blueprints’ concerns wages. In 
drafting the White Paper on Full Employment in 1944–45, Keynes’ followers 
in the Department of Post-War Reconstruction, including Coombs, were 
attempting to solve one of the unsolvable mysteries of Keynesian economics: in 
an economy in which the demand for labour slightly exceeds supply, how would 
governments limit trade unions’ pursuit of higher money-wages? Without an 
answer to that question, ‘full employment’ would probably bring with it both 
inflation and crises in the balance of payments.
Lord Kahn, Keynes’ colleague, has stalked this issue through Keynes’ published 
and unpublished writings, concluding that Keynes’ thoughts on the money-
wage problem were ‘unsystematic and unsatisfactory’. As Kahn pointed out, 
wage discipline had hardly been threatened by Depression levels of employment, 
when Keynes was writing The General Theory; when war made labour scarce, it 
55  Ibid. I am grateful to Sean Turnell for sharing with me his copies of these letters, which are to be found 
in British Treasury records, Public Records Office (London) T 247/84 15587.
56  Keynes to Coombs, 3 September 1943, NAA CP 43/114311324/1.
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also supplied extraordinary political instruments for labour discipline. In a 1943 
debate with Friedrich von Hayek, Keynes acknowledged that it ‘remains to be 
seen’ whether ‘a capitalist country is doomed to failure because it will be found 
impossible in conditions of full employment to prevent a progressive increase in 
wages.’ In correspondence in 1943 and 1944, he suggested that the problem was 
not one for economic theory but for politicians to solve.57 When the Australian 
White Paper on Full Employment appeared in 1945, Keynes remarked to 
S.G. McFarlane, secretary to the Australian Treasury: ‘One is also, simply because 
one knows no solution, inclined to turn a blind eye to the wages problem in a 
full employment economy.’58
Coombs and his colleagues did not turn a blind eye. Stimulated by another 
of Keynes’ Cambridge colleagues, Joan Robinson, their early drafts of the 
White Paper explored the political economy of wage earnings in the new social 
order. However, the political sensitivities of the Labor Cabinet forbade all but 
cursory mention of full employment capitalism’s most important problem – 
the abandonment of capitalism’s discipline over the working class, the threat 
of unemployment.59 Perhaps this omission is what helps to make the White 
Paper Keynesian – just as Keynes had nothing constructive to say about wage 
and work discipline, so did the Curtin Government, unlike Coombs and his 
colleagues, prefer silence on an issue so provocative to Labor’s constituency. 
Thus, Coombs’ comment in Trial Balance that Keynesian analysis ‘seemed to 
by-pass the most divisive issues within our society’60 takes on a more ironic 
and even critical meaning.61
Conclusion
I began by suggesting that autobiographical accounts of the impact of The General 
Theory can be understood as myths of youthful, critical and relevant Reason. I then 
reviewed some other ways of telling the story of The General Theory’s reception, 
and I suggested that the adjective ‘Keynesian’ begged the distinction between 
57  For references to Keynes see R. Kahn, ‘On Re-reading Keynes’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 60 
(1974), 387–8.
58  J.M. Keynes, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol XXVII (London: Macmillan, 1980); 
Keynes to S.G. McFarlane, 5 June 1945.
59  S. Cornish, Full Employment in Australia: The Genesis of a White Paper, Research Paper in Economic 
History, No. 1 (Canberra: Department of Economic History, ANU, 1971).
60  Coombs, Trial Balance, 146.
61  I have examined the Labor Government’s consideration of this issue in the context of the drafting of 
the White Paper in T. Rowse, ‘Full Employment and the Discipline of Labour: A Chapter in the History of 
Australian Social Democracy’, The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs, 1, no. 1 (July 2000), 
1–13, www.australianreview.net/journal/v1/n1/rowse.html; ‘Curtin and Labor’s Full Employment Promise’. 
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supporting Keynes’ theoretical innovations and being attracted to his policy 
solutions. To what extent was Coombs ‘Keynesian’ by theoretical conviction, and 
to what extent ‘Keynesian’ by force of policy circumstances and opportunities? 
The evidence from the correspondence is admittedly fragmentary, but it does 
not support a story of Coombs’ rapid theoretical conversion to an economics of 
hope, reason and joy. I have noted, with some sympathy, a way of telling the 
story of the ‘Keynesian revolution’ that puts the emphasis less on theoretical 
conversion than on force of circumstances: the war demanded expansionary 
policies. Recall Wootton’s point that economists had been deprived by Keynes’ 
arguments of any firm theoretical conviction about the postulate of scarcity. 
Could we not say that the war economy compelled governments and economists 
to decide that ‘scarcity’ was farther away than anyone had dared, in peacetime, 
to suppose? The phrase, ‘Keynesian revolution’, implies a rationalist view of 
history, raising theory over circumstance and understating the Second World 
War’s contribution to resolving (or perhaps deferring) economists’ doubts about 
the cogency, relevance and authority of their discipline.
I would like to differentiate my approach to ‘the Keynesian revolution’ from 
that of Selwyn Cornish.62 Cornish proposes a tension in the making of public 
policy between adherence to Keynesian theory and susceptibility to political 
exigencies. Thus ‘as with the Labor government, so with the Coalition, political 
dogma and election priorities, rather than Keynesian economics, exercised the 
minds of policy makers’.63 For this to be a sustainable framework, however, 
Cornish would have to be able to specify the ‘Keynesian’ prescription for each 
of the policy conjunctures which he analyses. He is unable to do so because, as 
Cornish points out, in neither his definition of the objectives of good policy – full 
employment without inflation – nor his indication of possible means to determine 
aggregate demand was Keynes clearly prescriptive, though it is plausible to argue 
that for Keynes ‘full employment’ usually meant unemployment of 3 per cent. 
The burden of demonstrating that a policy is/was not ‘Keynesian’ tends to fall, 
in Cornish’s analysis, on adducing two kinds of evidence: material showing that 
politicians took notice of sectional interests when making policy; and quotes 
from reputable economists (Meade, Perkins, Arndt, Coombs) complaining that 
such policies strayed from what they understood to be Keynesian orthodoxy. 
In the post-war years, up to the mid-1950s, such economists characteristically 
complained that more fiscal and monetary restraint was needed to curb the 
inflationary tendencies evident in high levels of demand. Cornish is unable to 
show – only to assert – that these economists were truly ‘Keynesian’ in their 
identification of the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. The precise 
definitions of ‘full employment’ and of ‘inflation’ are essentially political; 
62  S. Cornish, ‘The Keynesian Revolution in Australia: Fact or Fiction?’, Australian Economic History 
Review, 33, no. 2 (1993), 64.
63  Ibid., 64.
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equally, our notion of a successfully managed employment-inflation trade-
off is essentially contestable. Economists’ opinions about these matters are of 
great historical interest, but they do not bind us to any view about what policy 
instruments, rates of inflation and rates of unemployment are truly Keynesian 
and what are not. In the absence of clear prescriptions by Keynes, we are entitled 
to be sceptical before any invocation of the great economist as an arbiter of the 
degree to which a specific policy is ‘Keynesian’.
My understanding of the relationship between ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ 
thus differs from Cornish’s in that I see no basis to judge the former from the 
standpoint of the latter. To judge policy from the standpoint of its fidelity to 
a theory or a theorist is a way of thinking which arouses my curiosity as an 
historian, but I see no good reason why, as an historian, I should see in the 
contingencies of ‘politics’ betrayal of the purity of ‘economics’.
Let me further illustrate my point. I differ from Cornish in my reading of 
Coombs’ paper ‘Australia’s Ability to Avoid Booms and Depressions’.64 We 
agree that Coombs was arguing that the experience of post-war economic 
management had revealed the practical weakness and/or political unavailability 
of some instruments of macroeconomic policy foreshadowed in the White 
Paper (such as large public works and schemes for the stabilisation of export 
incomes). However, Cornish does not point out that Coombs was equally 
concerned to show that other instruments remained, in his opinion, effective 
and politically available. He pointed to ‘automatic’ stabilisers, such as consumer 
spending. ‘So long as people get incomes they tend to spend approximately 
the same proportion of it.’ Social security and taxation policies could also be 
aimed at further stabilising consumption, he hoped. Governments’ spending 
on consumption goods (such as health and education) was another stabilising 
factor. Though private investment was volatile, its gyrations were becoming 
more predictable, with new government surveys of business intentions, and 
the joint stock company was a form of private capital capable of longer-term 
development planning. Could not private investment be encouraged by tax 
incentives? The government, for social reasons unlikely to be challenged, was 
committed to a certain volume of house construction. Finally, the spending by 
governments’ nationalised industries was a factor for stability. 
This list indicates a Keynesianism seasoned in the practicalities of politics 
and administration. Its author celebrated progress – ‘we are certainly better 
equipped than ever before to deal with economic fluctuations.’ Coombs’ survey 
of practicable policy concluded that ‘the difficulties are primarily political and 
social rather than economic and technical’. When Cornish quotes this conclusion 
– ‘It is not always politically practicable to do things which economically appear 
64  H.C. Coombs, ‘Australia’s Ability to Avoid Booms and Depressions’, Economic Papers, 8 (1948).
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necessary’65 – we should not understand it as Coombs endorsing Cornish’s 
generalised tension between the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’. For it is quite 
clear that for Coombs the possibility of doing ‘economically necessary’ things 
was no less an effect of politics than the impossibility or difficulty of doing other 
things. Politics never presents economic rationality with an open and unlimited 
palate of options, but nor do any useable options in economic management 
exist outside of political circumstances. It is not a matter of getting politics 
out of the way of economics, as Cornish’s antithesis implies, but of working 
out politically appropriate instruments of economic management. This essay has 
suggested that there is no theoretical formula which can predictively encompass 
the contingencies of Keynesian politics.
It is therefore fitting to close a paper on the contextual political meanings of 
the phrase ‘Keynesian revolution’ by quoting the most ironical Australian 
Keynesian of all, Trevor Swan. In ‘The Economic Interpretation of J M Keynes’,66 
he delighted in distinguishing Keynes’ theoretical acuity from his political 
banality:
the fact is that the heretical doctrines of The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money are even more revolutionary than their 
author conceives them to be … it is in the direction of revolution that a 
realistic interpretation of the arguments of The General Theory points.67 
War took all participant nations ‘in the direction of revolution’. War necessitated 
the rapid introduction of a new politics of the economy; a reconsideration of the 
social contract, and new controls over investment and consumption, approaching 
a condition which Keynes called – in a teasing adjective – ‘socialisation’. The 
outcomes of such experiments were not predictable in any economic theory. If 
I had to make a case that Coombs was an exemplary Keynesian, I would point 
not to any theoretical conviction nor to any policy preference but to Coombs’ 
willingness – like Keynes in How to Pay for the War – to make political innovation 
integral to his conceptions of economic rationality.
65  Coombs cited by Cornish, ‘The Keynesian Revolution in Australia: Fact or Fiction?’, 50.
66  T. Swan, ‘The Economic Interpretation of J M Keynes’, The Australian Quarterly, 11, no. 1 (March 1939), 
62–70.




Sir John Crawford and Agriculture 
and Trade
David Lee
Sir John Grenfell Crawford was one of the most significant of the seven dwarfs 
– the group of diminutive senior Commonwealth public servants active in the 
period from the 1940s to the 1960s. Agriculture and trade, the two issues with 
which Crawford engaged as a Commonwealth public servant, were closely 
connected. In 1948–49, immediately before Crawford was appointed secretary 
of the Department of Commerce and Agriculture, agricultural commodities still 
amounted to 85 per cent of Australia’s exports. Moreover, wool alone made up 
between 40 and 50 per cent of the total in the 1940s and 1950s. Until the Second 
World War the domestic aspects of Australian agriculture were matters within 
the exclusive concern of the states, while the marketing of agricultural exports 
was a matter for the Commonwealth. But during the Second World War, when it 
acquired a monopoly of income taxes under the Uniform Taxation Act and with 
the aid of the defence power, the Commonwealth became much more active and 
interventionist on the domestic aspects of agriculture as well its trade aspects. As 
agricultural economist and policy-maker, Crawford’s innovation was to integrate 
agricultural economics within public administration and policy making.
This chapter will discuss how Crawford’s formative years equipped him for his 
leadership role in the Commonwealth Public Service and then examine how his 
contribution as a public servant to agricultural and trade policy qualified him to 
belong to the elite grouping of Australia’s most powerful mandarins.
The formative years
John Crawford was born in Hurstville, Sydney, in 1910, the tenth of 12 children 
of Henry Crawford, a stationmaster.1 The young Crawford was forced to leave 
school at the age of 16 when his father left his employment in the railways, 
failed in an effort to set up a commercial enterprise, and was forced to labour 
in a quarry. Returning to school in 1927, John Crawford gained the Leaving 
1  R.M. Crawford, ‘My Brother Jack: Background and Early Years’, in L.T. Evans and J.D.B. Miller, eds, Policy 
and Practice: Essays in Honour of Sir John Crawford (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1987), 1.
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Certificate and was employed by day as a junior clerk in the New South Wales 
Public Service while studying at the University of Sydney for Bachelor’s 
(1932) and Master’s (1940) degrees in economics. Crawford taught in schools 
in Stanmore and Temora before holding a research fellowship and part-time 
lectureship in rural economics at the University of Sydney in the middle to late 
1930s. The Depression left its mark on the young man – he was without a job 
for several months and sympathy for his stationmaster father having to work in 
a quarry left him with a ‘broad sympathy with underdogs’.2
In Sydney in the 1930s Crawford was imbued with Keynesian economic ideas, 
a set of ideas which provided an intellectual framework for all of the dwarfs. In 
1938 he wrote The National Income of Australia with Colin Clark.3 In this book 
Crawford and Clark suggested:
the framework of a policy which will mitigate or even overcome 
depression arising from the fall in export income. This is a planned 
expansion of public works to keep pace as far as possible with the 
decline in export income … it may be desirable that Commonwealth and 
State Governments should deliberately plan for budget deficits.4
A reviewer in the Economic Journal described the book as combining ‘skilled 
research with something of the excitement of a detective novel and an occasional 
flavour of the political pamphlet’.5
Crawford’s predisposition towards government intervention in rural affairs and in 
the broader economy was strengthened after 1938 when he won a Commonwealth 
Fund Fellowship to the United States. From 1938 to 1940, Crawford studied 
American agriculture intensively. He saw first hand the influence of active rural 
policies by the US Federal Government and was inspired to follow the American 
example by establishing a Bureau of Agricultural Economics as an agency of 
the Australian Government. J.D.B. Miller later commented on the importance of 
Crawford’s American sojourn: 
It was the vitality of American society which excited him; and the fact 
that he had gone to the United States for postgraduate work, rather than 
Britain, as most Australian academics then did, influenced much of his 
thinking about the two countries.6
After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Crawford was appointed as rural adviser to 
the Commonwealth Department of War Organisation of Industry and in the next 
2  Ibid., 14.
3  C. Clark and J.G. Crawford, The National Income of Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1938).
4  Ibid., 107.
5  Review in The Economic Journal, 49, no. 193 (March 1939), 142.
6  J.D.B. Miller, ‘The Man’, in Evans and Miller, eds, Policy and Practice, 196.
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year as Director of Research in the Department of Post-War Reconstruction. In 
1945 he became founding director of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE), 
which was transferred to the Department of Commerce and Agriculture in 1946.
Sir John Crawford, 1967
Source: National Archives of Australia, A1200, L68147
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Director of the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics
Crawford’s period in Post-War Reconstruction and the BAE coincided with 
publication of 10 separate reports by the Rural Reconstruction Commission (RRC), 
a commission established by the Curtin Government in 1943. The reports dealt 
with soldier settlement, land tenure and environmental issues, social amenities, 
rural credit and commerce. Although written in the last years of the Second 
World War, the reports were framed against the conditions of the 1930s rather 
than wartime developments.7 Conveying the enthusiasm of the Hot Springs 
Conference of 1943 that established the Food and Agriculture Organization, 
they highlighted the government’s obligations to raise the levels of nutrition 
and standards of living of its people, to improve the efficiency of agricultural 
production and distribution, and to foster international collaboration to achieve 
those ends. Crawford supported their clear assumption that government should 
intervene in rural affairs, particularly in marketing.
In a contemporaneous article, he had observed that ‘the rural economy was 
not able, without assistance from the State, to maintain all our farmers and 
farm workers at a satisfactory living standard’.8 Crawford was orthodox in the 
Second World War and early post-war years in believing in the necessity for 
state intervention at the domestic level. But he also urged that Australia should 
cooperate with other nations to create conditions internationally where states 
could improve the living standards of their citizens. In this sense he pursued, 
in a different way, what European officials such as Jean Monnet were trying to 
achieve (European economic collaboration to improve standards of living within 
European states). Later academics would describe the sorts of ideas supported 
by Crawford as ‘embedded liberalism’, namely the idea that the only way ahead 
for the post-war world was to construct the right blend of state, market, and 
democratic institutions to guarantee peace, inclusion, well-being and stability.9
Both the Chifley and Menzies governments, advised by broadly the same 
mandarins, subscribed to this view. The post-war Labor Government’s White 
Paper on Full Employment had, as its main objective, the attainment of full 
employment for a growing Australian population with rising standards of living. 
These objectives required a much higher level of imports. Crawford identified 
increased agricultural production as a way of earning the export income to pay 
7  A.W. Martin and J. Penny, ‘The Rural Reconstruction Commission 1943–47’, Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, 29 (1983), 218–36; T. Whitford and D. Boadle, ‘Australia’s Rural Reconstruction Commission, 
1943–46: A Reassessment’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 54, no. 34 (December 2008), 525–45.
8  J.G. Crawford, ‘Rural Reconstruction’, Australian Journal of Science, 5 (October 1943), 37.
9  For example, J.G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36, no. 2 (1982), 379–415.
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for these imports. As director of the BAE he recommended to the government 
ways of achieving this expansion through acceleration of land clearing and land 
settlement; better stock watering facilities; development of irrigation; improved 
pest control; more flexible credit facilities; and more orderly marketing 
arrangements domestically and internationally.
Crawford’s framework was accepted not only by the Chifley Labor Government 
but also by the Country Party. In the immediate post-war period up to 1950, 
despite the Chifley Government’s best efforts, agricultural exports stagnated and 
markets for Australian exports were secured by bilateral inter-governmental 
contracts with the United Kingdom, which would be Australia’s best customer 
until the late 1960s.
Permanent secretary
When the Liberal and Country parties came to office in December 1949 under 
the prime minister, R.G. Menzies, the deputy leader of the Country Party, 
John McEwen, became minister for Commerce and Agriculture. Crawford was 
appointed secretary in 1950, an office he held until 1956 when, after a major 
reorganisation, he came to McEwen’s new Department of Trade. Crawford formed 
a constructive relationship with McEwen and with his department. In doing so, 
Crawford conducted himself according to the dictum of Sir Paul Hasluck that if 
any attempt was made by a minister ‘to exercise close control over a department 
in such a way as to make a department the acquiescent echo of a Minister’s will, 
the Service is being debased’. On the other hand, wrote Crawford,
the Permanent Head has the obligation of the security he enjoys to 
maintain his intellectual integrity and to make sure that his Minister’s 
policy views are subjected to critical but friendly and constructive 
analysis. On the other hand, having done his best to persuade his 
Minister that a proposed line of action is wrong, a Permanent Head must 
carry out that policy loyally and as efficiently as possible. If he cannot 
do this a difficult situation can arise, one which might well lead to a 
change of position, preferably by agreement.10
When Crawford took up his position as secretary of the Department of 
Commerce and Agriculture, administrative responsibility for trade was divided 
between a protectionist Department of Trade and Customs and a more liberal 
Department of Commerce and Agriculture, which was responsible for securing 
10  J.G. Crawford, ‘Relations Between Civil Servants and Ministers in Policy Making’, Public Administration, 
19, no. 2 (June 1960), 104.
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markets abroad.11 The Korean War was sparking a worldwide boom in the prices 
of commodities. A particularly dramatic increase in the price of Australian 
wool in 1950 and 1951 sparked an import and inflationary boom, which later 
engendered a significant balance of payments crisis in 1952 when the price of 
wool and Australia’s export income collapsed.
Crawford helped the Menzies Government in two respects, first by representing 
the Australian delegation at a (British) Commonwealth–United States wool 
conference in London in September 1950. At this conference he successfully 
resisted American pressure to abandon the auction system for wool and to 
purchase Australian wool at ceiling prices. He later described the issue as a 
policy problem ‘out of the blue’ and one that imposed a great strain on the 
department and its permanent head. As he elaborated:
The auction system for wool is almost certainly the golden calf of the 
Australian economy, and certainly of the wool industry. Yet there were 
pressing questions to be answered. They mostly boiled down to this: 
Was it practicable – politically, legally and economically – to suspend 
auctions wholly or in part, and were requests for a price ceiling 
practicable or justified? Who caused the price boom anyhow – the buyer 
or seller? In all this there was a conflict of known policies: the economic 
and political importance of maintaining our wool marketing system 
versus the desire to co-operate internationally if important allies needed 
our help.12
In that same year, Ronald Walker, executive member of the National Security 
Resources Board (NSRB), invited Crawford to advise the board on how the 
anticipated outbreak of a major world war might affect Australia’s agricultural 
industries.13 Menzies had established the NSRB in December 1950 to advise the 
government on how to rebalance the civil and military economies. As a result of 
extensive examination, Crawford concluded that, in the event of war, Australia 
would be called on to supply additional food to India and the countries of South 
East Asia, whose food supply would be affected. He added that Australia would 
probably be asked also to fill the gap caused by reduced exports of food from 
Western Europe to the United Kingdom. Later in the year Crawford visited 
Britain and the United States to investigate the defence aspects of Australian 
food production.14
11  R.P. Deane, The Establishment of the Department of Trade: A Case Study in Administrative Reorganization 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1963).
12  J.G. Crawford, ‘The Role of the Permanent Head’, Public Administration, 13, no. 3 (1954), 161.
13  D. Lee, ‘The National Security Planning and Defence Preparations of the Menzies Government, 1950–
1953’, War & Society, 10, no. 2 (October 1992), 123.
14  Savingram no. 28 Crawford to McEwen, 19 July 1951, National Archives of Australia (NAA) A1604/1, 
5164 part 1; ‘Report on Overseas Discussions – Defence Aspects of Food and Agricultural Policy by 
J.G. Crawford’, n.d. [1951], NAA A1604.1, 51/64 part 2.
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On returning to Australia he advised the Menzies Government to urgently 
develop a concrete program of expanded agricultural production on the basis 
of complete understanding between the Commonwealth Government, leaders 
of primary industries and the states. On 26 April 1952, McEwen submitted a 
five-year plan that was hoped to add £A100,000,000 – or nearly a tenth – to 
Australia’s income and to save £A7,000,000 of imports, particularly of tobacco, 
cotton and linseed.15 McEwen’s general aim was achieved well before 1957–58. 
While some of the subsequent increase in agricultural production was 
attributable to good seasons, the various policy measures recommended by 
Crawford and administered by the Department of Commerce and Agriculture 
stimulated enlarged investment in improved farming. Crawford wrote in 1968 
that: ‘All told the policies of 1952 did contribute to expansion without which 
the balance of payments situation would undoubtedly have proved even more 
serious than it has been on occasions in the last fifteen years.’16
In 1952, Crawford helped the government to frame a system that established a 
regime of import licensing which would last until 1960. One anecdote pertaining 
to Crawford’s role in the administration of the import licensing system well 
illustrates his authority with ministers and his determination to protect his 
department. In 1957 Crawford was attending a meeting with Prime Minister 
Menzies, ministers and senior public servants. At this meeting Menzies attacked 
a deputy secretary from Trade for taking action that had previously been 
approved by Menzies. Crawford answered the criticism by pointing out that 
there had been agreement beforehand with Menzies based on a Cabinet decision 
that Crawford as secretary of the Department of Trade had opposed and then 
accepted after it had been made. Crawford told Menzies that he was ‘fed up’ 
with attacks on his officers for implementing decisions made by ministers. He 
was prepared to resign and make public his reasons unless the prime minister 
apologised to the deputy. Menzies did apologise and this ended Menzies’ attacks 
on Crawford’s department and its head in that area of policy.17
The shift from bilateralism to multilateralism
Crawford’s greatest achievement as a senior official in Commerce and Agriculture 
and, then, Trade was to help both Labor and Liberal–Country party governments 
manage the transition from a bilateral to a multilateral framework in Australian 
trade policy. It is first necessary to sketch the historical background in order to 
put this achievement in context.
15  ‘Australia Sets the Sights’, The Economist, 26 April 1952, cited in J.G. Crawford, ed., Australian Trade 
Policy: 1942–1966 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968), 450.
16  Crawford, ed., Australian Trade Policy, 438.
17  D.B. Williams, ‘Contributions to Agricultural Economics’, in Evans and Miller, eds, Policy and Practice, 18.
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In reaction to the Depression, Australia in 1932 had signed a trade agreement 
with the United Kingdom at Ottawa. The Ottawa Agreement was based on the 
exchange of tariff preferences between Empire (later Commonwealth) countries. 
The Depression years also saw the emergence of a currency area, the sterling 
area, to which Australia belonged. Members of the sterling area conducted their 
trade in sterling, pegged their currencies to the pound, maintained sterling 
reserves in London and collectively rationed their use of hard currencies such 
as the US dollar.
When, in 1942, both Britain and Australia signed the Mutual Aid Agreement 
with the United States (in return for Lend-Lease aid), they both agreed to 
participate in long-term arrangements under Article VII of the agreement for 
the reduction of barriers to world trade. Crawford later wrote that ‘[a]ll major 
developments in Australian post-war trade policy, at least up to the late 1950s, 
can be traced back to the commitment in Article VII’.18
The Article VII commitments led in due course to the establishment of the 
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a provisional instrument 
to provide rules for international trade based on the principle of non-
discrimination. The GATT was immediately successful in framing rules for, 
and helping reduce, tariffs on manufactured goods. But agriculture was largely 
exempted from its rules and, in the early 1950s, this situation was exacerbated 
when the United States received a waiver from what disciplines there were on 
agriculture. Doubly irksome for Australia as an agricultural exporting country 
was the GATT’s decision to limit Australia’s benefits from imperial preference by 
a ‘no-new preference’ rule.19
In 1953, the prime minister (Menzies) announced that Australia would be 
seeking major changes in the GATT to secure flexibility to make changes to 
the tariff; to gain some relaxation of the GATT’s no-new preference rule; and 
to remedy the imbalance in the GATT by addressing such issues as protection 
of agricultural subsidies, surplus disposal and state trading. Crawford was 
successful in gaining some flexibility for the operation of Australia’s tariff 
system with its independent Tariff Board; was unsuccessful in modifying the 
no-new preference rule; but made some progress in improving the effectiveness 
of the GATT.20
18  Crawford, Australian Trade Policy, 8. Crawford modified the statement by acknowledging that ‘Australia’s 
propensity for fairly high tariffs for some industries [was] not altogether consistent with the spirit of Article 
VII, although it [was] quite within the framework of tariff-making machinery allowed by GATT’.
19  Under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) rules no new preferences could be extended 
where none existed before and existing preferences could not be widened beyond their October 1946 absolute 
level.
20  S. Harris, ‘Managing Australia’s Shift to Multilateralism’, in Evans and Miller, eds, Policy and Practice, 
58–61.
8. Sir John Crawford
177
Indeed, Crawford was the driving force in persuading the GATT to adopt a more 
specific approach against subsidies insofar as his general criticism of agricultural 
protection culminated in the 1957 Haberler Report. The Haberler Committee 
was appointed as a result of an Australian initiative in the GATT to review 
agricultural protectionism as it affected exporters of primary products. This 
report vindicated what Crawford and others had been saying about agricultural 
protection by noting how domestic attempts to create price stability created a 
greater degree of price instability in international markets.21
Crawford helped to persuade the Menzies Government to remain supportive 
of the GATT despite its imperfection and its imbalance as far as Australia’s 
trade interests were concerned. Previously, in 1952, the Menzies Government 
had debated whether Australia should be looking for some more tightly 
integrated British Commonwealth economic bloc or moving towards more 
rapid convertibility of sterling with the US dollar. Crawford advised the 
government that autarky was impossible for the (British) Commonwealth. Many 
of the Commonwealth’s members, including Australia, were dependent on non-
Commonwealth markets for important exports, in Australia’s case for wool, 
wheat and minerals. Crawford later wrote, 
[the] 1952 conference really turned its back on the hopes of some 
(including those held by the Australian Prime Minister) that the Ottawa 
road would be further explored, turning the Commonwealth into a more 
tightly integrated economic unit. The debate was not difficult nor was 
it prolonged, but it was decisive … simply because the case against was 
overwhelming.22
This advice influenced his attitude to the 1956 review of the Ottawa Agreement. 
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference of 1952 had made it clear that 
adding to the mutual preference structure was not an acceptable option for the 
Commonwealth as a whole. Moreover, the 1955 GATT Review had decisively 
rejected Australia’s attempt to gain even minor latitude in its enjoyment of 
preferences. The Menzies Government and its advisers therefore looked at all 
options in expanding its overseas trade, including the Ottawa Agreement.
Crawford had formed the view by that time that the agreement was imbalanced 
in Britain’s favour. British exports to Australia were expanding much faster than 
Australian exports to the United Kingdom. Put another way, the market in the 
United Kingdom for Australian goods was a declining one.23 Accordingly, on 
24 May 1956, Menzies announced that trade discussions would take place with 
21  Crawford, Australian Trade Policy, 133–4.
22  Ibid., 101.
23  Ibid., 321.
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British ministers to review the Ottawa Agreement.24 Crawford and McEwen 
adopted a clear-eyed bargaining position to these negotiations by being willing 
to have no agreement at all rather than one in which Britain accepted little or 
no revision to an agreement deemed to be out of balance. The result was an 
agreement under which Britain used its best endeavours to maintain imports of 
Australian wheat and flour to no less than 28 million bushels a year and to reduce 
the preferential margins granted to British imports.25 The latter concession was 
significant in forming part of Crawford’s plan to gain negotiating coin in trade 
negotiations with Japan. Crawford emphasised the symbolic importance of the 
renegotiation of Ottawa as a signal of Australia’s retreat from Empire in the post-
war period.
Crawford had always been prescient about Australia’s long-term trading interests 
– in foreseeing the opportunity for Asia to compensate for limited markets in 
Europe. This was exemplified in a chapter he wrote in a book published in 1938 in 
which he called for ‘economic appeasement’ of Japan.26 The article was written at 
a time when orthodox opinion was that Australian security would be secured by 
cooperating with Britain in the Singapore strategy and when Australia was just 
recovering from a disastrous attempt to shift purchases of imported textiles away 
from Japan towards the United Kingdom. In the 1938 article, Crawford argued 
that Australia stood to gain from Japan’s peaceful economic expansion and that 
Japan was already becoming as a trading partner for Australia, what Japan, 
China and the rest of East Asia might in the future collectively become. The 
young economist argued for a system of ‘collective agreements’ to take the place 
of ‘power politics’. By collective agreements he envisaged an acknowledgement 
of trading rights and freedoms within accepted rules.27
In the 1950s, Crawford followed on his earlier thoughts by pressing for a trade 
agreement with Japan at a time when powerful interest groups in the community 
and within the bureaucracy were opposed to such a course. Under Article 12 of 
the Peace Treaty signed by Japan in 1952, Japan was obliged to accord Allied 
Nations, including Australia, most-favoured-nation status with respect to trade. 
What would happen in four years time touched a real difficulty for Australia 
which not only did not accord Japan most-favoured-nation treatment with 
regard to the tariff but, in addition, extensively discriminated against Japan in 
its licensing of imports.
24  Press statement by R.G. Menzies, 24 May 1956; Crawford, Australian Trade Policy, 336–7.
25  Harris, ‘Managing Australia’s Shift to Multilateralism’, 55–8.
26  J.G. Crawford, ‘Australia as a Pacific Power’, in W.G.K. Duncan, ed., Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1938), 69–121.
27  P. Drysdale, ‘The Relationship with Japan: Despite the Vicissitudes’, in Evans and Miller, eds, Policy and 
Practice, 66–71.
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Crawford was concerned by an outcome after 1956 in which Japan retaliated, 
as it had during the Trade Diversion dispute of the 1930s, by restricting access 
of Australian primary products to the Japanese market. At the same time, 
Crawford well appreciated that the objective of reaching a trade agreement 
with Japan was affected by powerful currents in Australia, including the bitter 
legacy of the Pacific War and the concern by Australian manufacturers at having 
to compete against cheap Japanese imports. As a Sydney Morning Herald leading 
article commented on 17 August 1955, ‘Japanese trade is associated in the 
minds of Australians with cheap labour, price undercutting, shoddy goods and 
“dumping”, just as Japanese “defence policy” still tends to be envisaged in 
terms of brutal militarism’.28
Crawford discounted the idea that Australia could continue to enjoy the 
advantages of an expanding market in Japan while denying benefits to the 
Japanese in the Australian market. For one thing, the United States was able 
to sell Japan wheat from production and surplus stocks; for another, Crawford 
feared that Japan might give strong preference to synthetics over purchasing 
wool from Australia.29 In June 1953, Crawford participated in a meeting of the 
permanent heads of Commerce and Agriculture, Trade and Customs, External 
Affairs and the Treasury to prepare a document for the Cabinet Committee on 
Overseas Commercial Relations being held on 23 June, a document that would 
be submitted to full Cabinet on 2 July.
Crawford regarded the statement emerging from the heads of department 
meeting, which urged an easing of the highly restrictive import licensing 
of Japanese goods, as the ‘important document’ in the process leading up to 
trade talks with Japan.30 The recommended course of action led to a significant 
increase in Japan’s access to the Australian trade market but not towards trade 
talks with Japan on the basis of non-discriminatory treatment. This was because 
of the reservation of Frank Meere, comptroller-general of Customs, who argued 
that further liberalisation was ‘impracticable at this stage’; Meere was an ardent 
advocate of tariff protection.31
Cabinet did not respond to a further request for trade talks with Japan made 
strongly by McEwen and Crawford in January 1954 (elections were scheduled 
for May 1954). By November of that year, however, Cabinet had agreed to 
28  Sydney Morning Herald, 17 August 1955.
29  Crawford, Australian Trade Policy, 352–3.
30  Drysdale, ‘The Relationship with Japan’, 75; ‘Note for Ministers agreed by Departments of Commerce 
& Agriculture, External Affairs, Trade & Customs and Treasury’, 23 June 1953, in Wendy Way, ed., The 
Australia–Japan Agreement on Commerce 1957 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1997), 
54–8.
31  Drysdale, ‘The Relationship with Japan’, 75.
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proceed to trade talks with Japan. In October 1955, Crawford wrote to Meere 
with an outline of what he hoped could be achieved in trade negotiations with 
Japan and commenting:
I believe that there is some importance in our being amongst the first 
to initiate talks with the Japanese and also being able to say at G.A.T.T. 
that we are, in fact, both willing and currently undertaking talks with 
the Japanese, and I wonder if you could give me a call when you have a 
chance to look at this.32
Crawford hoped that Australia would be able to negotiate fair and reasonable 
access to the Japanese market in the form of most-favoured-nation treatment on 
the tariff and non-discriminatory treatment in regard to import licensing.
Crawford’s campaign to conclude a trade agreement with Japan was greatly 
assisted when the Department of Trade and Customs and the Department 
of Commerce and Agriculture merged in 1956 into a single Department of 
Trade with Crawford as secretary; customs administration was assigned to a 
Department of Customs and Excise and the Department of Primary Industry 
was created at the same time. On 25 October 1956, the acting Trade minister, 
William McMahon, announced that trade negotiations between Australia and 
Japan would commence. A year later, a satisfactory outcome was reached. It 
encompassed non-discriminatory access to Australian markets for Japanese 
exports; guaranteed access to Japanese markets for Australian primary products 
and assured safeguards for Australian industry.
The Australia–Japan Agreement on Commerce was a landmark agreement 
under which, within a decade, Japan would overtake Britain as Australia’s 
major trading partner. The agreement, however, was concluded in the face of 
hostility from sectional interests who subjected Crawford personally ‘to what 
he has described as the worst personal attack he experienced during his public 
career’.33
Conclusion
In 1960 Crawford left the public service to become in due course vice-chancellor 
and chancellor of The Australian National University. He built a career as an 
academic and university administrator which was as successful and influential 
as his career as a mandarin from 1945 to 1960. J.D.B. Miller has described his 
essential character in both his bureaucratic and academic careers:
32  Crawford to Meere, 14 October 1955, Crawford Papers, National Library of Australia, MS 4514/9/33.
33  Drysdale, ‘The Relationship with Japan’, 77.
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He endeared himself to those with whom he worked because he seemed 
moderate in opinion though extreme in concentration; because he was 
essentially fair-minded in his approach to problems; because he liked to 
help lame dogs over stiles; and because, when roused, he could speak 
boldly and with much effect.34
As public servant and mandarin, his loyal and dispassionate approach to serving 
government had made him equally valued by both Labor and Liberal–Country 
party governments, and the ministers he admired most, J.B. Chifley and John 
McEwen, came from both sides of politics. While he continually searched for 
agreed principles in politics, his success as a public servant also came from his 
recognition that politics was the art of the possible. ‘He was’, as Miller put it,
A natural politician who knew, almost by instinct, what would work 
and what would not, whether it was a ploy at a meeting, a resolution 
which required acceptance, or an overall policy which had to satisfy 
various groups which normally would not agree with one another.35
34  Miller, ‘The Man’, 192.




Sir Allen Brown:  
An Exemplary Public Servant
Sir Peter Lawler
Allen Brown was described – I suspect by Fin Crisp – as Nugget Coombs’ 
Vicar-General. This is an insightful and appropriate ecclesial analogy. Allen’s 
appointment as Vicar-General marked the beginning of a 16-year career as one 
of the key players at the centre of Commonwealth Government administration. 
This was a watershed time of change in the reach of federal government and 
the nature of its administrative arrangements. When Coombs was commissioned 
to create the Department of Post-War Reconstruction, he already knew Allen 
Brown as a staff member and colleague in the wartime Rationing Commission. 
He had evidence of Allen’s strength as an administrator – just the man to get 
the machinery of Coombs’ ad hoc enterprise up and running for the effective 
discharge of the varied and nationwide activities assigned to it. Nugget also 
knew that his Vicar-General could and would as necessary fill the director-
general’s shoes. He knew Allen was a top-class policy thinker with remarkable 
vision and a sure sense of the department’s specific mission – someone who 
could help identify and set in motion major initiatives and projects in the 
service of that mission.
Brown did not meet all the canonical requirements for Vicar-General. He did 
not have the tonsure and he was not celibate – he had a wife, Hilda, and three 
children to whom he was devoted. But he was over 25 years of age (33 in fact) 
and was certainly commendable for the probity of his life, for his prudence, and 
for his knowledge of the law. He had an excellent academic pedigree: Caulfield 
Grammar, Wesley College, and Queen’s College at the University of Melbourne, 
from where he gained a Master’s degree in law. Better still, he had had the 
best part of a decade in the real world as a practising, successful and well-
liked solicitor in country Victoria. In Post-War Reconstruction and the Prime 
Minister’s Department, Allen Stanley Brown’s staff knew him affectionately as 
ASB. Menzies came quite quickly to refer to him, also affectionately, as Bruno 
(‘Where’s Bruno?’) or, less frequently, as ‘le brun’. Menzies was fond of such 
tags: ‘Black Jack’ McEwen was ‘le noir’.
The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins
184
Sir Allen Brown, 1958
Source: National Archives of Australia, A1200, L27006
9. Sir Allen Brown
185
There were two segments of ASB’s 16-year career at the centre of Commonwealth 
administration and political affairs: first, from 1944, some five-and-a-half years 
as deputy director-general and a few final months as director-general of Post-War 
Reconstruction; and, second, his 10 crucial years from 1949 to 1959 as permanent 
head of the Prime Minister’s Department. In each of these career segments ASB 
faced a similar administrative challenge – to create a Department of State. In 
the one case the department was a temporary creation set apart from regular 
Commonwealth departments. Few of the staff in Post-War Reconstruction had 
started their public service careers as telegraph messengers. It was an exciting, 
vibrant and constantly changing enterprise of young men (and some women), 
with a mission to promote ways and means for a better Australia. By early 1950, 
its work was over and it was abolished. In the second case, an existing central 
department was to be created anew to serve the prime minister and cabinet as 
one of the key departments at the top level of the departmental hierarchy. As it 
was, the Prime Minister’s Department had been allowed to become something of 
a non-entity – a mere handful of staff tucked away in a few rooms in West Block. 
It needed to be thoroughly and permanently transformed. Brown was highly 
successful in each of these two career segments, but it is for his re-creation of 
the Prime Minister’s Department that he best deserves to be remembered. In 
this he is a standout amongst the seven dwarfs – whichever seven is identified.
What sort of man was ASB? What was he like to know? Menzies is quoted as 
saying of Brown, ‘He can see further through a brick wall than anyone else 
I know’. I would add that ASB could also see through people. He has been 
characterised as a naturally taciturn man with a laconic style of communication. 
I found him a cheerful, warm, caring, rather unassuming and humble person. 
He had a nice sense of humour. He was quick to see the droll side of things and 
would sometimes exploit it to defuse awkward situations. He had a protective 
amount of cynical streak. Here was a quiet man with great strength of character.
His personal secretary from the early days, Nalda Richards, remembers Brown as 
a man who never lost his temper and who, when he came as secretary to Prime 
Minister’s in West Block in 1949, would take his turn in preparing morning and 
afternoon tea for the total staff – gathered in one room. I remember how, as deputy 
director-general in 1944, ASB batched with three decent but lower-level young 
public servants in a scruffy flat in Civic. This accommodation was above Charlie 
Thompson’s Chemist Shop; it was known simply but ominously as The Flat. Some 
thought the deputy director-general should have booked into Beauchamp House 
or Acton Hotel but others saw the flat as a nice democratic touch.
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It was said of one of the dwarfs that he had a tongue barbed with fishhooks 
and no respect for anybody – an uncharitable caricature surely, but it could 
apply to more than one of them. But it certainly did not apply to Allen Brown. 
He was courteous and respectful – and at ease – whether with prime ministers 
and royals or with the lowliest clerk. I recall how ASB used to joke that when 
making his final notes after the Cabinet meeting, alone at his little side table in 
the Cabinet Room, with ministers tucking into food and pouring drinks in the 
Ante-Room, he would write down ‘what he thinks they thought they ought to 
have said’.
At times ASB was known to indulge in doggerel or word play as, indeed, was 
Menzies. Researchers in the archives of the Prime Minister’s Department will 
likely come across examples. When the Queen Mother came to Australia in 1958, 
ASB found favour with her and her entourage. Somehow the Queen Mother 
must have encountered some of ASB’s doggerel and enjoyed it. Later, when 
calamity struck and the Queen Mother found herself marooned in Mauritius – 
the cowling having fallen off the engine of the Qantas plane taking her home 
via South Africa – she called for the solace of some of Sir Allen’s ‘poetry’. And, 
solemnly, over the airwaves, went ASB doggerel of doubtful quality. It began: 
‘A cowling is a piece of tin, To keep an aircraft engine in’; it later featured 
something about ‘When you’re in Mauritius, And you’re feeling rather vicious’. 
These anecdotes illustrate something of what ASB was like to know.
Allen Brown deserves great credit for his essential share in the successes of 
Post-War Reconstruction; not only the large administrative successes such as 
the Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme, but project and policy 
successes as with The Australian National University; or in the department’s 
economic section and its White Paper on Full Employment; or in the ‘missionaries’ 
that Post-War sent out into various parts of Commonwealth administration.
ASB was decisively involved in two notable projects. Sir William Hudson’s name 
comes to mind when the Snowy Scheme is mentioned, and rightly so, but ASB 
in Post-War and later as secretary of Prime Minister’s played a decisive part 
in making the scheme happen. He identified its huge possibilities and was an 
advocate from the very beginning. He then worked with Commissioner Tom 
Lang to lock in vital United States expertise, and, finally, he was a persuasive 
adviser with the 1950s Coalition Government to ensure that the Snowy Scheme 
continued to completion as planned.
The other project I want to underline is of more than passing interest but 
perhaps less well known. This is Post-War’s studies and discussions about the 
administrative arrangements that ought to be developed to service government 
at the centre – that is the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the committees of 
Cabinet. Chifley, prime minister and treasurer in 1945, felt both the administrative 
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and the political need for an efficient Cabinet Office system and for quality 
alternative sources of advice in his own department. Allen Brown turned to the 
British Cabinet Office as a model and to the Cabinet secretary, Sir Norman Brook, 
for ideas and staff exchanges. So when Chifley appointed ASB in mid-1949 to be 
secretary of Prime Minister’s Department, it was not exactly without preamble 
or out of a clear blue sky.
When the Coalition Government under Menzies came to power in December 
1949, Allen Brown had been secretary of Prime Minister’s for only six months. 
He had already begun to build up staff numbers by transfers from Post-War and 
especially from its Economic Section. The Coalition had believed, not without 
reason, that Post-War had harboured a nest of Labor Party supporters. Now 
they were similarly suspicious of Prime Minister’s. This presented a problem 
with which ASB had to deal.
Brown might have had another problem – old Frank McKenna, the deputy 
secretary he inherited in Prime Minister’s. McKenna had firmly believed that 
Chifley was going to appoint him as the secretary, so Brown might have had 
a disaffected deputy secretary on his hands. McKenna had lived through 
many trials in the Prime Minister’s Department – a period of banishment to 
the Defence Department when the Prime Minister, William Morris Hughes, had 
purged Catholics from his department in 1917, and various heads of department 
of indifferent quality.
McKenna had begun his career as a telegraph messenger. He had no academic 
qualifications, yet he had progressed on-the-job to be an eminent public servant 
of the old school: dignified; of great courtesy; careful about due process and 
detail; deploying abundant common sense; shrewd and capable in the cut 
and thrust of debate; accurate and candid in his assessment of personalities. 
McKenna’s disappointment, when told by Chifley that young Mr Brown from 
Post-War Reconstruction was to head up Prime Minister’s Department, was 
something ASB could feel with him. ASB told me that Frank had every reason 
to expect to succeed Strahan and could have filled the position with credit.
The outcome speaks for the human quality of each of these two men. They 
developed the warmest regard for each other. McKenna saw that young Brown 
could make the department what it ought to be and what he, McKenna, wanted 
it to be. McKenna welcomed that and gave ASB whole-hearted support. Brown 
was always ready to recount with gratitude how Frank had insisted when the 
election results in December 1949 were clear, that ASB must not, as he was 
proposing, wait until the new prime minister called him, but should go to the 
Canberra Airport to welcome his new prime minister. Brown went. Menzies was 
appreciative. Allen Brown was off to a good start with his prime minister.
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The Coalition would have known that amongst the staff already transferred 
from Post-War was the active president of the ACT Branch of the Labor Party. 
It might have been this knowledge that prompted Menzies to ask Brown, 
somewhat diffidently, whether Brown was a member of the Labor Party. Brown 
replied, ‘I wouldn’t be seen dead in the Labor Party.’ As Menzies expressed 
relief, Brown added, ‘And I wouldn’t be seen dead in the Liberal Party either.’ 
This reply captured Menzies’ fancy. It also accorded with the position Menzies 
felt a public servant should take. It fortified his acceptance of ASB and of the 
plans ASB had to develop the Prime Minister’s Department.
Menzies accepted Bruno as a perfected public servant who had taken the oath of 
office and set store by its meaning. He could tell that ASB studied deeply, gave 
advice freely, and accepted responsibility cheerfully. As with any perfected 
public servant, these criteria existed within an envelope of vocation and mission; 
Bruno was the trusty custodian of the conventions and due process required by 
tradition, the Constitution and the rule of law. I remember an episode where, 
exceptionally, one of the Cabinet decisions recorded and issued by Brown was 
challenged. Brown had no doubt that the decision accurately reflected the 
Cabinet discussion and conclusion. However, the prime minister – as chairman 
of Cabinet – on being consulted had his own reasons for thinking otherwise. 
This did not present a problem for ASB. He simply signed off a decision that 
read: ‘The Prime Minister has directed me to issue a decision in the following 
terms Quote … Unquote’. Researchers looking over Cabinet decisions when 
the archives are released can find at least one other case where this format is 
invoked; there may be more.
ASB proceeded as quickly as he could to develop the Secretariat for Cabinet 
and its committees and to build up the department’s advising capability. He had 
instituted the practice of Cabinet Notebooks from about the mid-1950s. Using 
his contact with Sir Norman Brook, ASB sent Ken Herde to the British Cabinet 
Office to get experience of the workings of their Secretariat. Cedric Cliffe came 
on short-term secondment from that Secretariat to Prime Minister’s. I myself 
was sent for a somewhat longer posting to be under Robert Hall in the separate 
Economic Section of the British Cabinet Office. I saw Brown and Brook together 
in London at a foursome lunch hosted by ASB at Pruniers. They discussed the 
wine list. Brown selected a red – it may have been a Bordeaux 45. Brook thought 
the wine excellent but the price exorbitant. Brown quelled Brook’s concern 
with ‘Norman, we don’t do this very often’.
I must mention one inspired intervention by McKenna, which Brown was pleased 
to support, and which paid huge dividends. This was the appointment of Jim 
Scholtens, later Sir James, KCVO, to fill a vacancy as Head of Ceremonial and 
Hospitality. McKenna said, ‘Young Jim Scholtens could do that job.’ ASB said, 
‘Frank, he’s only an accountant, but if you think he can head CERHOS, we’ll 
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give him a trial.’ It happened that Scholty had a remarkable likeness to Danny 
Kaye. Brown had occasion to chuckle some years later when on a visit to Japan 
the Japanese Major Domo made the famous introduction, ‘The Prime Minister of 
Australia, Sir Robert Menzies, Dame Pattie Menzies and Mr Danny Kaye.’
The early 1950s were turbulent times politically with the Communist Party 
Dissolution Bill and its surrounds. Allen Brown negotiated this terrain with care. 
He had a keen sense of the proper role of a permanent public servant under a 
system of constitutional monarchy, democratic government and the rule of law. 
He had his counsels of perfection but also knew the real world. His first duty, 
consonant with his oath and pledge of office, was to provide honest, efficient, 
impartial administration and some assurance for the community of continuity in 
such administration. ASB recoiled from any politicisation of the public service. 
He stood ready to serve to the best of his ability, responsively and loyally, 
whatever political party might be in government. He would master the facts of 
an initiative or an issue and their analysis. He would ensure that his minister, 
in this case the prime minister, was fully informed on that basis – pointing out 
alternative courses of action and their consequences, not neglecting political 
consequences. He would present matters as they were with firm advocacy of 
courses of action but with this advocacy not pressed beyond the point where, 
aware of consequences, the minister takes a different view. Nevertheless, he 
was vigilant to identify where, by law or convention, matters fell within his 
responsibility and where they fell within the minister’s. He would never usurp 
or intrude on the minister’s responsibility or allow the minister or the minister’s 
office to intrude on his.
By July 1955 Brown was sufficiently satisfied with the department’s progress 
to marshal virtually its whole staff for a photo opportunity on the steps of 
Parliament House. I know of no other occasion when a secretary of a department 
arranged such a photograph. The assembly numbered 74, mostly young, and 26 
of them women. The front row exquisitely reflects transition; it consists of ASB 
flanked by two old hands, Frank McKenna and Stan Temby, and on either side 
of them, the new generation, Jack (later Sir John) Bunting, whom Brown, in 
wise succession planning, was grooming to follow him, and Bob Durie who, but 
for his untimely death in the midst of a posting to Australia House, would have 
been returning to Australia to be Bunting’s deputy.
In 1959, Brown decided on a career change. He became deputy high commissioner 
at Australia House. I had, and have, difficulty in understanding this move – 
exceptional talent diverted to lesser purposes. He was only 48 years of age. 
Allen Stanley Brown was the most exemplary public servant I encountered in 




Sir Frederick Wheeler:  
Public Servant
Ian Hancock
On 16 July 1975, Sir Frederick Wheeler, secretary to the Treasury, was summoned 
before the bar of the Senate to be questioned about the Loans Affair. Asked to 
state his name and occupation, he replied: ‘Frederick Henry Wheeler, public 
servant.’ Four years later he attended the magistrate’s court in Queanbeyan to 
give evidence in a private prosecution brought against four former ministers of 
the Whitlam Government. Asked to state his name and occupation, he replied: 
‘Frederick Wheeler. Superannuated public servant.’ On both occasions Wheeler 
was not merely identifying himself, he was asserting his identity. His career, his 
perspective, everything about him, spelt ‘public servant’.
Frederick Henry Wheeler was born on 9 January 1914 and attended Scotch 
College, Melbourne. Cyrus Lenox Hewitt was a junior boy at the same school; in 
time they were to become, in the words of Patricia Hewitt, ‘the best of enemies’.1 
After taking a Bachelor of Commerce degree, part-time at the University of 
Melbourne, Wheeler worked for 10 years at the State Savings Bank of Victoria 
(1929–39) before joining the Treasury as a research officer. He was promoted 
to assistant secretary in 1946 and to first assistant secretary in 1949. Wheeler 
was a member of the Australian delegation to the Bretton Woods Monetary 
Conference, attended several conferences of British Commonwealth finance 
ministers between 1944 and 1951, and played a key role in preparing the Labor 
Government’s banking legislation and its White Paper on Full Employment in 
Australia. As Fin Crisp has pointed out, he had ‘a very special place in Chifley’s 
confidence’.2 Wheeler expected, and was expected, to succeed Norman Watt 
as Treasury secretary in 1951 but the Menzies Government preferred Roland 
Wilson for the post. Wheeler subsequently left the public service to become 
treasurer of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva. Returning to 
Canberra he was, in succession, chairman of the Public Service Board (1960–71) 
and secretary to the Treasury (1971–79). Appointed OBE in 1952 and CBE in 
1  Patricia Hewitt, personal communication through Philip Wheeler, 1 September 2007.
2  L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Biography (Croydon: Longmans, 1961), 258.
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1962, knighted in 1967 and appointed AC in the year of his retirement, Wheeler 
was suitably rewarded as befitted a leading and respected member of the 
mandarinate.
When Wheeler first went to Canberra he was one of the 30 or more young 
officers who formed the ‘kindergarten’ of the ‘official family’ in the 1940s. Many 
of them held economics degrees and were committed Keynesians whose task 
was to help shape wartime and post-war Australia.3 Employed or advising in 
various official bodies, they socialised as well as worked together and established 
personal relationships that proved important in promoting and protecting 
their careers in the public service. Among them, and among those above them, 
Wheeler acquired a reputation as a principled yet shrewd operator, endowed 
with a powerful mind and an acute sense of what was possible, ever-ready to 
defend Treasury’s territory but always measured in approach and well prepared 
in detail.
Wheeler exhibited many of these characteristics when he became involved in 
preparing the White Paper on Full Employment. The paper was intended to be 
a bold statement of the Labor Government’s commitment to full employment 
in the post-war world, accompanied by a detailed account of how this 
objective would be achieved. H.C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs, the director-general of the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction, was its principal promoter.4 Copies of 
an amended draft reached the Treasury in February 1945 and, believing the 
paper to be ‘of the greatest importance’ to the department, Wheeler wanted ‘the 
greatest possible amount of work’ to be done on it immediately. He feared that 
the Treasury’s maturing role in providing economic advice to the government 
would be diminished, and he harnessed the Financial and Economic Committee, 
where he was assistant secretary, along with sympathetic outsiders, to resist 
interlopers. During the following month he also queried or successfully removed 
some of the paper’s ‘bold futurism’, its ‘cure-all’ mentality and the ‘unnecessary 
provocation’ of its language. Wheeler won agreement not to publish the proposed 
appendix of statistics on the grounds it would mean nothing to the majority and 
would be misused by a minority. Above all, perhaps, he focused attention on 
the more limited exercise of outlining general government policy and dealing 
with the practical problems of a transition to peacetime. He could claim that the 
next draft was a ‘very great improvement’ and met ‘a large number of Treasury 
objections’, but continued to argue against premature publication and to apply a 
critical and pragmatic approach to policies he thought would arouse opposition 
in the community. Significantly, while the ‘kindergarten’ concentrated on 
3  N. Brown, Richard Downing: Economics, Advocacy and Social Reform in Australia (Carlton South: 
Melbourne University Press, 2001), ch. 3.
4  S. Cornish, Full Employment in Australia: The Genesis of a White Paper, Research Paper in Economic 
History, No. 1 (Canberra: Department of Economic History, ANU, 1971), 1ff.
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what government might do, he called for more emphasis on private rather 
than public investment because the Australian economy was still based on 
private enterprise. Overall, as Coombs recognised, ‘Wheeler’s contribution was 
especially important’ in ensuring that the published version was a compromise 
expressing what could be supported by consensus and avoiding issues which 
would cause controversy.5
It is unclear whether or how far Wheeler’s closeness to Chifley explains Menzies’ 
preference for Wilson as secretary to the Treasury. The certainty is that Wheeler 
almost immediately began looking for alternative employment. He briefly 
considered private enterprise, but told his parents he did not want ‘to break 
entirely with Governmental work and the sort of people you find in that field’. 
At the ILO, when approached by the Vickers Company, Wheeler said he was 
‘not interested in anything which was wholly or primarily based on lobbying 
and general contact’. Although he regarded ‘the Geneva venture’ as ‘a great 
success’, he was determined it would be ‘an interlude and not a permanency’. 
He did not want to become an expatriate. At the same time he had a good idea 
of his own strengths: an ability ‘to make good use of staff for substantive work 
in association with a lot of negotiating and committee work’. His reputation, he 
thought, ‘is not based on any great ability to impress in general, but on steady 
work in a substantial field which brought a wide range of associations in its train 
without my seeking them out’. Wheeler liked the excitement and importance 
of what he called ‘negotiating and representational work’, though both had to 
be undertaken on ‘a firm base of substantive work and responsibility’. Without 
spelling it out, his understanding of his own abilities pointed to a senior position 
in public service.6
Wheeler’s friends and former colleagues in Canberra – they included Sir William 
Dunk, the chairman of the Public Service Board (PSB), Sir John Crawford, 
secretary of the Department of Trade, and John Bunting, the recently appointed 
secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department – wanted to reclaim the man they 
felt had been wrongly turned away. Frederick Wheeler was, after all, one of 
them. Dunk approached Wheeler as early as 1957 to ask if he would consider 
succeeding him at the PSB, while Crawford wanted Wheeler to become chairman 
of the Tariff Board. Despite receiving offers from industry, Wheeler could tell 
Dunk he preferred ‘to remain a civil servant’.7 He would be pleased to accept 
either the PSB or the Tariff Board.
5  For Wheeler’s many interventions and comments, see esp. National Archives of Australia (NAA) A571, 
1945/574, Part 1, and A981, 1945/638. See also, H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance: Issues of My Working Life (South 
Melbourne: Sun Books, 1981), 52.
6  For the above paragraph, see Wheeler’s private correspondence in Wheeler Papers, National Library of 
Australia (NLA) MS 8096/2/3.
7  Wheeler to Dunk, 20 December 1957, Wheeler Papers, NLA MS 8096/2/3.
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Frederick Wheeler, 1959
Source: State Library of Victoria, H38849/4871
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Dunk proceeded to work on Prime Minister Menzies. He described Wheeler as 
‘one of the bright boys’ picked out by Stuart McFarlane (secretary to the Treasury, 
1938–48), and ‘no-one in my very extensive experience of war administration 
came through with the sureness and ability of this young man’. Six years at 
the ILO ‘does not usually provide a good atmosphere for development’, and 
the organisation may have left a mark on him, but ‘it has not destroyed his 
perception, his penetration or his keenness’. Crawford and Dunk both thought 
he was ‘still first class material’.8 They continued to work hard on his behalf, 
seemingly untroubled by what Henry Bland, the secretary for Labour and 
National Service since 1952, who had his own claims for the post, saw as ‘the 
hanky-panky that is going on about F.W.’.9 According to Dunk, Wheeler passed 
the test of ‘acceptability’ because his ‘very sound reputation, while he was in 
the Public Service, is built around the personal attributes of a keen intelligence, 
reliability, following government policy, co-operation with his associates, and a 
natural as well as proven integrity’. Bland was not ‘acceptable’ because he had 
a reputation for being ‘something of an intriguer’; he had a ‘quick intellect’ but 
was ‘slick’ and talked too much. His only lead over Wheeler was his current 
knowledge of the public service.10 Dunk advised Menzies to tell his Cabinet 
colleagues that a panel had produced three names – Wheeler, Bland and Keith 
Grainger (one of the two other serving commissioners on the Board) – and gave 
Menzies career notes on each so fashioned that Wheeler looked the obvious, 
indeed the only, choice.11 In the event, Menzies and John McEwen, the Trade 
minister and Country Party leader, carried the day in Cabinet over three very 
senior ministers who had their reservations.
Frederick Wheeler’s subsequent career in the public service followed two paths: 
the one, creative; the other, defensive. It is tempting to relate the one to his time 
at the Public Service Board and the other to his years at the Treasury. It is also 
tempting to equate the creative years to the period when Menzies, Holt and 
McEwen held prime ministerial office and to associate the defensive period with 
the Gorton, McMahon, Whitlam and Fraser years. There were, however, too 
many instances of overlap to adopt such hard-and-fast distinctions. It remains, 
however, that he did have two quite different experiences.
Wheeler began work as chairman of the Public Service Board on the 
morning of 2 January 1961. Although the board had seemingly wide powers 
and responsibilities – the supervision of personnel administration, the 
determination of pay and of conditions of employment, and the pursuit of 
8  Dunk to Prime Minister, February 1959, Wheeler Papers, NLA MS 8096/2/3, 4.
9  George Sutcliffe (a Board commissioner) to Chairman, PSB, 21 August 1959, Wheeler Papers, NLA MS 
8096/2/3.
10  Dunk to Prime Minister, 31 August 1959, Wheeler Papers, NLA MS 8096/2/3.
11  Ibid., 10 September 1959.
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economy and efficiency – it was a free agent only in the case of the first.12 The 
board’s jurisdiction was to an extent circumscribed by statute and convention. 
In practice, it relied heavily on conciliation and persuasion, especially in its 
dealings with the permanent heads who were responsible for the management 
of their departments. The board also had to bend to the government’s will over 
pay and conditions of employment, take account of the Determinations of the 
Public Service Arbitrator and of the Awards handed down by the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Court (or Commission as it became in 1956), and deal with a 
myriad of staff associations.
Whereas Dunk had settled for expedient compromises, Wheeler approached 
his inheritance ‘attached to first principles’.13 He was about to enter the most 
constructive period of his life for which he was prepared to put in the long 
hours and to pursue every detail, while bringing with him the necessary 
administrative and ‘political’ skills and the staying power to win through.
Napoleon Bonaparte would have approved of Frederick Wheeler. He was a lucky 
general. His creative period began with two strokes of good fortune, and he 
exploited both to the full. First, in 1960 the Menzies Government amended the 
Public Service Act to implement those parts of the Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into Public Service Recruitment (the Boyer Report) that the government 
and the PSB could accept. Two changes were critical: henceforth, the Leaving 
Certificate or its equivalent was required for entry into the third division, and 
modern selection techniques replaced the exclusive reliance on examination 
marks. In November 1961, Wheeler’s board introduced the Commonwealth 
Selection Test constructed by the Australian Council for Educational Research. 
This test measured abilities appropriate to routine clerical duties and to higher-
level positions in the public service. All applicants within the prescribed age 
limit were required to take it, and offers of employment were made on an order 
of merit determined by the results achieved.
Wheeler believed the new system would improve the quality of recruits 
who would now be better placed according to their abilities. It would also 
enhance the principle of open competition and ensure greater accuracy and 
consistency in setting minimum standards. Thereafter, Wheeler and his fellow 
commissioners regularly provided commentary and statistics to bear out claims 
that the selection tests, being constantly updated and revised, were proving to 
be what the board’s 1966–67 Annual Report called ‘a satisfactory instrument’. 
But Wheeler remained circumspect. He was well aware that the success of the 
tests could not be established until the chosen ones had reached the middle and 
12 G.E. Caiden, Career Service: An Introduction to the History of Personnel Administration in Commonwealth 
Public Service of Australia 1901–1961 (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 1965), 433.
13  S. Encel, Equality and Authority: A Study of Class, Status and Power in Australia (Melbourne: F.W. 
Cheshire, 1970), 271.
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senior levels of the public service. In the meantime, however, Wheeler could 
go armed into an increasingly competitive market to attract a decent share of 
the post-war baby boom, provided he could also match some of the salaries and 
promotion opportunities of private enterprise.
In June 1961, in what became Wheeler’s second piece of good fortune, the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (CCAC) handed down 
its long-awaited decision on the Engineers’ classification structures of the 
public service.
The public service at the time consisted of a highly varied and technically 
complex workforce, but its pay and classification structures were rightly 
described as ‘monolithic’.14 The cumulative effect of policy decisions, industrial 
pressures and arbitral decisions meant that the remuneration of all staff moved 
more or less in lock step. There was little scope for adjustment of particular 
occupations based on rates of pay in comparable outside labour markets. In 
addition, the many salary classification levels within occupational groups – 14 
for the engineers – were complicated by overlapping and extended pay ranges. 
Relatively lowly paid classifications were included in the second division 
management group while others, which should have been, were not. The 
excessive layering and fine distinctions in classification may have increased the 
need for promotion but promotions did not necessarily mean significant pay 
increases. Wheeler, therefore, inherited a pay-fixing system that was rigid and 
a classification structure that hampered efficiency. He also faced the problems of 
recruitment and retention, particularly in the specialist occupations where the 
private sector was offering better opportunities and remuneration.15
The decision in the Engineers’ case became the circuit breaker. The CCAC raised 
the annual salary range for a recruitment-grade engineer and replaced the 
table of uniform incremental steps with one varying from £140 to £180pa.16 
Its stated assumption was that the engineers constituted ‘a special case’. 
Wheeler’s strategy in response was twofold: the board would use the ‘special 
case’ argument to oppose an automatic flow-on of the engineers’ pay increases 
to other occupational categories; and it would compress and simplify the salary 
classifications in the second and third divisions. Ever the careful planner, 
Wheeler held a series of meetings with the interested parties in the CPS to 
find out what they were thinking and, in part, to implicate them in moves the 
PSB might later make. His memos to the prime minister during the following 
year record his successful attempts to reclassify and reduce salary grades, to 
ensure the doubters among the permanent heads ‘were not hostile’, and to stand 
14  I am grateful to Paddy Gourley for his assistance in preparing the following paragraphs.
15  For a typical statement of the problem, see Thirty-Seventh Report of the Public Service Board, 1959–60, 16.
16  For Wheeler’s reaction and the immediate aftermath of the Engineers’ Determination, see Wheeler Papers, 
NLA MS 8096/4/3.
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firm against staff association demands for automatic adjustments. Wheeler had 
the perfect riposte for staff association objections: the board had ‘no option’ 
but to follow the commission’s line ‘to reject any notion of automatic or semi-
automatic lateral flow-on’. The commission’s ‘status and authority’ meant that 
its ‘clear policy guidance’ should be followed unless there were compelling 
reasons not to do so. Besides, Wheeler’s political instincts told him that ‘broad 
community considerations’ militated against a sudden and substantial increase 
in public service salaries. Patient negotiations and ‘sniffing the air’ would carry 
the day. Following the CCAC’s second Determination in the Engineers’ case of 
June 1962, Wheeler could tell Menzies that the permanent heads regarded the 
reclassifications already undertaken as ‘a genuine improvement’, while some 
union representatives privately agreed even though they publicly attacked the 
board for attempting to defeat ‘salary justice’.
The CCAC’s decisions had important unintended consequences. The board 
ensured that a number of occupational groups, especially the engineers, became 
more professionalised through introduction of precise and externally certified 
educational prerequisites provided by the universities. The Commonwealth, 
as a result, became an exemplar for the rest of the community in graduate 
recruitment and became more competitive in the market place. The PSB itself 
became what Wheeler liked to call ‘a primary wage fixing authority’. It now 
made decisions without direction from the government and, on occasions, caused 
the government some discomfort in doing so. Furthermore, Wheeler utilised the 
board’s enhanced role as a primary wage-fixing authority, and other unrelated 
mechanisms, to advance his own power and influence within the public service, 
extending his reach into the more distant areas of Commonwealth employment 
where the board had no legal standing.
Throughout his career as a public servant, Sir Frederick Wheeler espoused 
a number of clear and generally consistent views about the role of public 
servants, especially of those in the first and second divisions. Definitions used 
in the Public Service Act were invoked to support his central assumptions. For 
example, officers in the second division ‘are required to exercise executive or 
professional functions in the more important offices of the Service’. He noted 
how this definition adopted the ‘modern view’ where ‘top management and 
policy formation is a distinctive and integrated function and … even where 
a top management job does have technical content the choice of appointees 
should primarily be on the basis of managerial and administrative abilities’. 
Wheeler was not interested in specialists becoming permanent heads unless 
they had proven experience. Youthful appointments (that is, men below the age 
of 45) should be made only where they were clearly outstanding and a more 
mature alternative was lacking. Five requirements for appointment had to be 
met – integrity, judgment, maturity, leadership and experience – of which the 
10. Sir Frederick Wheeler
199
first four came within the meaning of ‘men of affairs’.17 With these principles 
in mind, he was often direct in his confidential minutes to the prime minister 
and ministers. One minister’s nomination to head his department (he was aged 
42) ‘was not yet ready’ and ‘would be badly received, both in the Service and 
in relevant circles in the community’.18 Wheeler kept his best, however, for 
another contender: ‘Able and ambitious but inflexible in approach; penetrating 
and hardworking but aggressively self-assertive and personal relations very 
abrasive over a wide field; has not shown up well as a leader or developer of 
his team; not suitable for [Secretary of Defence] position’.19 Wheeler’s view 
prevailed in both the above cases.
One of his working rules was that ‘the maintenance of the tradition of loyalty 
to the Government of the day is vital’. Accordingly, he secured the demotion 
of the director of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories (CSL), a popular 
hero for his work on the Salk anti-polio vaccine. Dr Bazeley had campaigned 
publicly against the Commonwealth Government’s decision to hand over the 
administration of the CSL to a five-member statutory commission.20 As Wheeler 
explained in a later minute to Harold Holt, the then prime minister, in 1967, 
‘senior public servants should maintain a proper reticence in matters of public 
and political controversy, and … should not normally take an active part in a 
matter which is, or could be, one of public and political controversy’.21 Wheeler 
regarded entry into senior management as the equivalent of joining a monastic 
order, carrying with it a vow of silence. Public servants should be politically 
neutral and officially anonymous.
Loyalty to a government in public did not preclude giving ‘frank and fearless’ 
advice in private. Wheeler had few problems in his dealings with prime 
ministers Menzies, Holt and, briefly, McEwen. But he had a host of difficulties 
with the maverick John Gorton (1968–71) who had little respect for public 
service conventions and who could be so unpredictable. The two men clashed 
repeatedly over issues ranging from handling postal disputes to making 
appointments. Wheeler was particularly upset when the prime minister sought 
to remove Bunting as secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department. Gorton 
believed that Bunting had exposed Harold Holt to political danger and ridicule 
during the ‘VIP affair’ in 1967.22 Wheeler fought hard for his friend but lost. 
Worse, Gorton insisted on installing Lenox Hewitt as secretary of the Prime 
Minister’s Department. The prime minister also overrode Wheeler’s repeated 
17  Wheeler to Prime Minister, 4 March 1963, Wheeler Papers, NLA, MS 8096/4/6 (original emphasis).
18  Ibid., 12 December 1966.
19  Ibid., 29 November 1967, 7.
20  Ibid., Wheeler’s participation in this case can be followed in 4/3-4.
21  Ibid., Wheeler to Prime Minister, 15 May 1967, 7 (original emphasis).
22  See I.R. Hancock, ‘The VIP Affair 1966–67: The Causes, Course and Consequences of a Ministerial and 
Public Service Cover-Up’, Australian Parliamentary Review, 18, no. 2 (2004), vi–xiii, 1–106.
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advice and appointed A.B. ‘Tich’ McFarlane, the secretary of Air, who had 
assisted Gorton over the VIP affair, to a vacant commissionership on the board. 
Wheeler had earlier dismissed the idea of McFarlane becoming secretary of 
Defence with the brusque comment: ‘Relatively narrow experience; lacks the 
stature for a position of this type.’23
Despite some disappointments during his later years at the Board, Wheeler’s 
record placed him next to the outstanding Duncan McLachlan, ‘the Father of 
the Commonwealth Public Service’,24 as a reformer. He saw his task as one of 
preparing the Service to lead the Commonwealth through the final decades 
of the twentieth century. To this end, he improved the quality of the Service 
through the active encouragement of graduates, staff development and trainee 
schemes, he modernised the pay and classification structures, promoted the 
leadership roles of senior management, eliminated unnecessary regulations, and 
played a leading role in removing the bar that prevented married women from 
being appointed or retained as permanent officers.
At the behest of William McMahon, Gorton’s successor, Wheeler moved to the 
Treasury in 1971. Clyde Cameron, the Labor frontbencher and hardened warrior, 
greeted his appointment with approbation. Cameron imagined the pleasure it 
would give ‘Old Chif’, and thought Wheeler would be ‘the greatest asset the 
next (Labor) Government will have’.25 Whitlam and many of his ministers soon 
demonised the ‘greatest asset’ as ‘obstructionist’. Overshadowed as an economist 
by John Stone, whose appointment he secured in Treasury as a third deputy 
secretary, and by others he had appointed and encouraged, Wheeler spent much 
of his time mentoring the brightest of the incoming generation and defending 
the department from its critics both in Cabinet and in the public service.
Wheeler had to fight on several fronts in protecting his fiefdom and maintaining 
the Treasury’s role as principal economic adviser to the government. The 
Whitlam Government brought in all manner of advisers and staffers some of 
whom saw themselves as Treasury’s rivals. More seriously, the Treasury and 
the big spenders of the Whitlam Government were soon at loggerheads over 
strategies for dealing with inflation. During the budget discussions of 1973 
Wheeler and two other Treasury officials attended a meeting of economic 
ministers ‘to be’, in Stone’s words, ‘dressed down’, in part because they kept 
urging expenditure cuts.26 Wheeler probably tested the credulity and patience 
of ministers by insisting that Treasury’s officials were merely technicians who 
were asking for the clear and consistent policy direction they were not receiving. 
The 1974–75 budget discussions were even more fraught because the economic 
23  Wheeler to Prime Minister, 29 November 1967, Wheeler Papers, NLA MS 8096/4/6.
24  Caiden, Career Service, 15.
25  Cameron to Wheeler, 15 September 1971, Wheeler Papers, NLA MS 8096/5/2.
26  NAA A5931, CL740; Stone to Secretary, 28 April 1975, Wheeler Papers, NLA MS 8096/5/8.
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ministers and Caucus, fearing widespread unemployment, rejected the Treasury 
line of fighting inflation first and cutting government expenditure. After 
initially supporting Wheeler, Whitlam joined the growing band of ‘Treasury 
bashers’ and presided over a nominal increase of 32 per cent in budget outlays 
(Treasury had recommended a figure of 27 per cent). Wheeler and the Treasury 
were subsequently, if briefly, consigned to the margins for refusing to provide 
the advice the government wanted.
At a meeting of the Executive Council on 13–14 December 1974 four ministers 
– Whitlam, Dr Cairns (deputy prime minister and treasurer), Rex Connor 
(Minerals and Energy) and Lionel Murphy (Attorney-General) – agreed to 
borrow US$4 billion ‘for temporary purposes’. The mid-1974 fall-out between 
the Treasury and the government and continuing suspicions between the two, 
as well as bureaucratic and personal rivalries (Hewitt was secretary to Connor’s 
department), were important components in the bizarre, secretive excursion 
into the world of Tirath Khemlani, ‘carpet-baggers’ and ‘funny money’.
Wheeler and the Treasury were deliberately excluded from the loan discussions 
until shortly before the Executive Council meeting. When apprised of what 
was in progress, and realising that it was designed to avoid ‘due process’ – by 
circumventing the Loan Council and parliament – Wheeler orchestrated a series 
of moves over an intense few days. He ordered enquiries to be made of the 
Bank of England and Scotland Yard about Khemlani. John Stone was assigned 
to raise questions about the wisdom and legality of the whole enterprise.27 But 
Wheeler could not stop or divert Connor, who had Whitlam’s backing if not his 
full attention – the prime minister had overseas travel plans in mind – while 
Murphy was probably as much attracted by the unconventional proceedings 
and Cairns was otherwise preoccupied. Challenged by Wheeler’s persistent 
objections during the drawn-out, intense meetings of 13 December, Connor at 
one stage declared: ‘I am a Minister of the Crown.’ To which Wheeler replied: 
‘Yes, Minister, and I am the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury.’ The Treasury 
secretary also upset the prime minister. Wheeler had observed how the proposed 
borrowing was far in excess of the remaining statutory authority, which stood 
at $610 million. Whitlam accused the secretary of sitting quietly for an hour-
and-a-half before revealing this information. An angry prime minister turned 
on him: ‘Fred, you are on the skids.’ Wheeler’s reply was prescient: ‘Prime 
Minister, I simply wish to inform you of facts your ignorance of which will 
bring you down.’28
27  A copy of Stone’s minute was published in A. Reid, The Whitlam Venture (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 
1976), 9–11.
28  D. Rose, ‘Transcript’, Sankey v Whitlam and others, January–February 1979, 671.
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Although the government would not be restrained, Wheeler did achieve some 
victories. He ‘protected’ Cairns by persuading him not to sign the Executive 
Council minute as treasurer, and campaigned successfully between 14 and 
21 December to have Connor’s authority rescinded. Two commentators later 
depicted Wheeler as ‘a master of guerrilla warfare’ for his marathon telephone 
efforts on 20 December where, fuelled by drams of whisky and operating inside 
clouds of cigarette smoke, he proffered ‘a remarkable picture of a bureaucratic 
virtuoso at work’.29 Connor did obtain a second Executive Council minute 
on 28 January, albeit for just US$2 billion, so Wheeler, the Treasury and the 
Reserve Bank had to keep up the pressure to expose the dangers of dealing with 
Khemlani. They pointed out how the ‘funny money’ had never materialised and 
how Connor’s activities and the very existence of the Executive Council minute 
were jeopardising a much-needed American loan and other future borrowings 
by the treasurer. When the Executive Council finally revoked the minute on 
20 May, the secretary thought he had achieved his dual purpose: the restoration 
of the Treasury as the focal point of overseas borrowing; and elimination of 
Khemlani and his associated carpetbaggers as intermediaries. He did not know 
– nor did anyone in the government know – that, once again, Rex Connor did 
not accept ‘No’ for an answer.
Even so, Wheeler was about to have an enduring victory. Earlier in 1975, Cairns 
had secured the approval of the Labor Party Conference to form a separate 
Department of Economic Planning to advise the government on medium and 
long-term priorities. Wheeler and the Treasury were profoundly disturbed 
by the implications. On 31 March the secretary handed Cairns a Treasury 
memorandum.30 It was a clever document, fulfilling the duty of public servants 
to implement, or showing how to implement, government or ruling party 
policy, while making the task of implementation look well nigh impossible and 
even faintly preposterous. Wheeler’s fear was that Treasury might be split and 
challenged, if not displaced, as the government’s source of advice on economic 
and financial matters. To defeat the scheme, he adopted three strategies. 
First, he argued that the new ‘Department’ should be just a ‘Unit’ or ‘Office’ 
separated from Treasury but located within the treasurer’s portfolio. This done, 
a substantial part of Treasury would not be transferred to the new body while 
the Treasury’s traditional short-term planning role would be separated from 
any pie-in-the-sky long-term projects. Secondly, Wheeler highlighted the 
practical problems arising from the sheer complexity of the exercise. The Office 
would have to cover social as well as economic issues, cooperate with many 
departments, agencies and community groups, and ‘would need experts from a 
29  B. Toohey and J. Longstreet, National Times, 14 November 1982.
30  Wheeler to N. Hyden, 1 April 1975, Wheeler Papers, NLA MS 8096/5/3.
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wide range of disciplines’. To achieve cooperative and unified action from such 
a multitude of egos, organisations and disciplines would require the resurrection 
of both Solomon and Job.
Thirdly, Wheeler applied his trademark tactic of delay. Just as he had done 
in 1945, he set about extending the boundaries of consultation, building a 
respectable and respected opposition, and uncovering further impediments. 
By early June 1975 he had successfully obfuscated the issue and slowed down 
the decision-making. When, in that month, the treasurer was dismissed over 
his separate participation in the Loans Affair, Cairns remained the lone senior 
advocate of his proposed new department.
Yet as one threat to the Treasury was removed another emerged. Following 
the double dissolution of May 1974 Whitlam announced the establishment of 
the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) to 
conduct a wide-ranging examination of Australian government administration. 
Many Labor ministers and members of Caucus believed that Labor’s reform 
program was being stymied by a public service either unaccustomed to carrying 
out rapid change or unwilling to do so.
The Treasury submission to the commission of 17 November, which Wheeler 
signed, sought to establish three central points: the Treasury ‘has become 
the primary economic policy adviser to the Government’; ‘all the activities 
of the Treasury are closely inter-related and inter-woven’; and the Treasury 
did not exist to make policy but to administer existing policy and to offer 
advice on possible new policy.31 Characteristically, Wheeler adopted a tone 
of reasonableness during his day-long appearance before the commission and 
the questioning by its chairman, H.C. ‘Nugget’ Coombs. He tactfully deflected 
criticisms of his domain and gently lauded the Treasury’s achievements. Wheeler 
stressed, correctly, how the Treasury maintained a non-hierarchical structure 
and actively encouraged younger talent. Not surprisingly, he rejected Coombs’ 
proposal of a formally established board, to include heads of statutory bodies 
and academics, to advise the treasurer. It was necessary in management terms 
‘to have a focus of authority’; a board would slow everything up and ‘not add 
anything’. Just as Wheeler had expressed doubts about ‘bold futurism’ in 1945, 
he questioned the emphasis on long-term objectives when governments had 
to deal with the ‘volatility’ of policy on a day-to-day basis. It was the ‘worst 
thing’ for officials to advise on macro-economic management ‘from an ivory 
tower divorced from grass roots realities’. Wheeler sensibly sidestepped the 
issue of advisers. Ministers, he said, should decide what they wanted. He was 
forthright, however, about claims of a ‘Treasury line’ on economic theory and 
31  NLA MS 8096/5/3; The Treasury, Submission to the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration, November 1974, 8.
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principles; the notion was ‘nonsense’. There was a diversity of opinion within 
the Treasury, and it was made known to treasurers. But there was a doctrine of 
another kind: ‘all issues should be looked at on the basis of hard work … really 
turning propositions over, collecting the relevant data, and testing them rather 
than merely tossing them about at a high level of generality unalloyed by hard 
detailed examination.’32 The secretary, as in 1945, probably had Dr Coombs in 
mind.
The Treasury’s defence of the status quo was constantly questioned in the course 
of the commission’s hearings and, not least, by Lenox Hewitt. Classified now as 
‘an enduring problem’, Wheeler’s Treasury looked to be in trouble, most of all 
for its centralised control mechanisms, which were deemed to hinder efficiency. 
But the passing of the Whitlam Government meant that most of the commission’s 
findings and proposals would be left well alone.
Nevertheless, the Fraser Government delivered a sharp blow. On 18 November 
1976, the prime minister announced that the Treasury would be divided into 
two departments.33 A new Department of Finance would take over the financial 
management and control activities of the Treasury whose responsibilities were 
now centred on broad economic policy analysis including taxation matters and 
on giving advice to the government. Fraser claimed that the objective was to 
provide for more effective management of the business of government, and 
to strengthen the government’s decision-making processes. Very few believed 
his explanation. The prime minister was furious about the Treasury’s delay in 
providing advice, about the quality of advice received, and about an alleged 
leak over Fraser’s support for the devaluation of the Australian dollar.
Wheeler was not caught unawares. As early as mid-1973 he had asked for some 
‘boy scout’ work to be done after learning of a senior adviser’s interest in a split 
and, a year later, with the Coombs Commission in mind, he asked for the relevant 
papers to be retrieved.34 Soon after the dismissal of the Whitlam Government, 
Wheeler sought evidence from within the Treasury to show how the work 
was closely interwoven and how it was both necessary and desirable for such 
work to be interwoven. The secretary wanted to highlight the problems at the 
ministerial as well as the departmental level should the Treasury be split.35 
Wheeler did not know, however, of the prime minister’s specific intentions until 
Sir Alan Cooley, the chairman of the Public Service Board, contacted him two 
days prior to Fraser’s announcement.
32  RCAGA, Transcript of Proceedings, 28 November 1974.
33  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 November 1976, 2898–99.
34  See NAA A6385/236.
35  Cole to McBurney and others, 3 November 1975, NAA A6385/236.
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Cooley was a surprise appointment as Wheeler’s successor. He owed his 
elevation almost entirely to Wheeler’s patronage, and Cooley worked hard on 
his benefactor’s behalf. The prime minister had sought the chairman’s advice 
on possible changes and, though directed not to consult Treasury beforehand, 
he made the Treasury’s case for doing little or nothing.36 If the prime minister 
felt he could not achieve his requirements within the present framework, then 
‘various steps can be taken to improve matters’. After listing several options, 
Cooley delivered a clear message: do not divide what is, and should remain, 
indivisible. At the very least, before making a decision, Fraser should talk to 
Wheeler.
After Cooley advised Wheeler of his exchanges with the prime minister, 
the secretary sent Phillip Lynch, the treasurer, four separate minutes on 
17 November in a last ditch effort to avert the split.37 Judiciously, he agreed that 
a split would have advantages as well as disadvantages at both the ministerial 
and public service levels. Yet, in his ‘considered judgement’, splitting Treasury 
‘would produce very substantial confusion and inefficiencies in the period 
immediately ahead and continuing inefficiencies in the longer term’. Wheeler 
canvassed every possible objection and looked everywhere for alternatives. He 
envisaged several problems: two ‘sectional advisings’ would not constitute ‘two 
“overview” options’; the speed of communication and consultation between 
the areas would be diminished and ‘would increasingly tend to produce 
“ivory-towerism” in the economic areas and “narrowness of thinking” in 
the expenditure areas’; any restructuring would disrupt ongoing work and 
there would be longer-term implications; the ‘short and long effects on staff 
morale would be serious’; and there would be a need for more staff of the kind 
that is ‘very scarce’. Wheeler also invoked, as he often did, broader political 
considerations: the media might fasten onto the failure to pursue the avowed 
aim of ‘slim government’. To avoid controversy and catastrophe, therefore, the 
government might agree to the appointment of a fourth deputy secretary in 
Treasury.
If Fraser even saw these minutes there was no chance of him changing his mind. 
Wheeler’s one victory was the appointment of a favoured Treasury official, Bill 
Cole, the Australian statistician, to head the new Department of Finance. Yet, 
typically, in defeat he worked diligently over the following weeks grappling 
with the technical details involved in formally dividing up the department. 
Moreover, on 6 December, the day before the split was to come into effect, he 
wrote the following in a staff notice:
36  A. Cooley to Prime Minister, 12 November 1976, NAA A6385/238, Part 5.
37  Wheeler to Treasurer, 17 November 1975, NAA A6385/238, Part 5.
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In the sense in which I have used that expression in the past, the splitting 
of the Treasury, while certainly meaning a different order of things for 
the future, is not in my view to be taken as signifying an end of the 
underlying concept. The two Departments will be working, under a 
common Minister, the Treasurer, in close collaboration with each other.
The sanguine underpinnings of this note left open at least two possibilities: 
either the Treasury secretary was deluding himself or, more probably, he was 
typically making the best of a situation he did not like, while hoping it would 
not get worse.38
As Wheeler fought to protect Treasury he had, on occasions, to protect himself, 
particularly during 1975. His own position came under scrutiny after Cairns 
was dismissed as treasurer. Before that, Whitlam had tried to shift him from the 
Treasury to the governorship of the Reserve Bank. Determined to remain where 
he was until reaching retiring age, Wheeler once again relied on holding up the 
decision-making process while projecting Lenox Hewitt’s name to the forefront 
of any discussions of a successor at Treasury. He soon discovered that Whitlam’s 
desire to remove him was not matched by the will to act. Further, he knew he 
could rely on fellow mandarins and respected figures outside the public service 
to say how inappropriate ‘King Cyrus’ would be as secretary. Peter Karmel, the 
chairman of the Australian Universities Commission, probably expressed the 
prevailing view among the well informed in declaring the ‘obnoxious’ Hewitt 
would be a disaster in Treasury. ‘There must’, he said, ‘be something wrong 
with a man who is so universally disliked.’39 It was soon evident to Whitlam 
that Wheeler was not going to move of his own volition, and that the secretary’s 
intense lobbying – assisted by his friends – had rendered a Hewitt appointment 
impossible and of anyone else improbable. In the absence of an unanswerable 
case for shifting him, the prime minister simply folded.
Sir Frederick Wheeler was both a survivor and a survival. His value system 
belonged to an era preceding the one where advisers, consultants, and staffers, 
short-term contracts, performance bonuses, impermanent heads and media-
conscious officials, would become the norm. Since 1961, Wheeler had nurtured 
and promoted the next generation but his perspective remained that of an older 
public service where powerful men – whatever their height – were used to 
getting their way and staying where they were, while insisting they were there 
only to serve. As they genuflected in the direction of their ministerial masters, 
the best of them, and Wheeler was among the best of the best, practised politics 
with a skill and know-how which many professionals admired.40 No doubt, 
38  NAA A6385/238, Part 5. For the last days before the split see parts 3 and 4.
39  Trevor Swan to Wheeler c. 3 April 1975. Swan was reporting his conversation over lunch with Karmel.
40  Sir John Carrick, interview with author, 31 January 2009.
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Wheeler tested his own ethics in going beyond the role of adviser. Yet he could 
always claim that, throughout his career, he never abandoned nor compromised 
his core belief: public servants and ministers and prime ministers should all, 




Paul Hasluck with  
Dr Evatt at the United Nations
Geoffrey Bolton
Assessments of Dr H.V. Evatt’s performance in the formative years of the United 
Nations from 1945 to 1947 have drawn on the critical comments voiced by Paul 
Hasluck in several publications.1 Hasluck wrote with the authority of one who 
served in the Department of External Affairs with Evatt for more than five years, 
and had a justified reputation as a scrupulous historian whose judgments tried to 
avoid political bias. This essay, drawing on unpublished material in the Hasluck 
family archives, will show that for much of their association at External Affairs, 
Hasluck’s outlook on foreign policy was closer to Evatt’s than his subsequent 
writings might suggest.2
A successful Western Australian journalist, poet, drama critic and historian, Paul 
Hasluck was recruited to the Department of External Affairs in February 1941 
on a temporary basis. He found his early months in Canberra undemanding and 
disappointing, but allowed himself to hope for improvement in October 1941 
when the Curtin Labor Government took office and Dr Evatt was appointed 
minister for External Affairs. A former judge of the High Court, Evatt was 
known to be an intellectual with broad cultural sympathies. Disillusion came 
soon. A fortnight after Evatt’s appointment Hasluck wrote in his diary: ‘He has 
not come near us yet, has upset the Department on several matters and generally 
shows a disposition to try and find something to reform or “squash” rather than 
to understand.’3
Hasluck thought seriously of returning to Perth, but all changed in December 
when Japan entered the war and he saw it as his duty to stay at his post. During 
1942 he became officer-in-charge of a new section of the Department of External 
Affairs on post-war policy and came to be seen as the department’s authority 
in the field. He was good at his job, though he often fretted about bureaucratic 
1  P. Hasluck, Workshop of Security (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1948); ‘Australia and the formation of 
the United Nations’, Royal Australian Historical Society, Journal and Proceedings, xl, no. iii (1954), 133–78; 
Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941–1947 (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1977).
2  Some of the material covered in this chapter is also addressed in G. Bolton, Paul Hasluck: A Life (Crawley, 
WA: UWA Publishing, 2014).
3  P. Hasluck, Diary 1941–42, 20 October 1941, Hasluck MSS, Claremont.
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in-fighting.4 When Evatt went to the Food and Agriculture Conference at Hot 
Springs in Virginia in April 1943, instead of taking Hasluck with him, he borrowed 
Hasluck’s friend, Dr H.C. Coombs, from the Department of Labour and National 
Service. At the conference Coombs distinguished himself by his advocacy of full 
employment as a post-war objective. To represent External Affairs, Evatt took 
with him his recently appointed private secretary, Dr John Burton.
With Hasluck, like himself an appointee from outside the departmental cadre, 
Burton was at first on friendly terms to the extent of suggesting that during his 
absence abroad Hasluck might escort his wife Cecily to the cinema. They shared 
little jokes about Evatt: ‘I find the Minister rarely has much idea of the line he wants 
to follow,’ Burton wrote to Hasluck, ‘and he will accept a draft quite easily. I have 
not had so many ideas put over for a long time! The boss has behaved quite well 
and everyone is commenting that he is much less difficult this time than last.’5 But, 
Burton reported, Evatt wanted him to report to him personally: ‘in other words, he 
refuses to allow me to be an officer of the Department.’6 Burton was soon colluding 
with Evatt’s tendency to work outside official channels of communication and 
keep his permanent officials in the dark, and this was to cause friction.
Hasluck shared to the full Evatt’s mistrust of American ambitions for post-
war hegemony in the South Pacific, especially after the Cairo Conference of 
November 1943 when the United States, Britain and Nationalist China took 
decisions about the future of Japan’s colonies without consulting Australia and 
New Zealand.7 To protect their interests, Evatt convened a conference between 
the two governments at Canberra on 21 January 1944. Hasluck was put in charge 
of the arrangements and appointed secretary to the conference.
The result was an unprecedented formal treaty in which Australia and New 
Zealand agreed to consult regularly about regional foreign policy, defence, 
commerce and the fostering of full employment. They claimed a place at any 
peace-making conference table and a voice in deciding the future sovereignty 
of any of the Pacific islands.8 Although Hasluck later commented that the 
calling of the conference reflected Evatt’s ‘almost psychological antipathy to 
any power that was greater than Australia’,9 he described his own standpoint 
as ‘offensively Australian’10 and fully shared Evatt’s view that Australia should 
shape its own foreign policy in accordance with its own regional interests. The 
United States should not be encouraged to seek hegemony in the South-West 
4  P. Hasluck to H.C. Coombs, 29 April 1943, National Archives of Australia (NAA) M1942 [36].
5  J.W. Burton to P. Hasluck, n.d. [May 1943], NAA M1942 [36].
6  Burton to Hasluck, 16 June 1943, NAA M1942 [36].
7  Hasluck to Watt, 30 July 1943; Hasluck to Brigden, 29 November 1943, NAA CRS M1942 [36].
8  P. Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1942-1945 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1970), 479–85, 
495–99.
9  Hasluck, ‘Australia and the Formation of the United Nations’, 154.
10  Hasluck to Brigden, 28 November 1943, NAA CRS M1942 [36].
11. Paul Hasluck with Dr Evatt at the United Nations
211
Pacific but need not be provoked unnecessarily. Here he differed from Evatt in 
tone rather than substance. Hasluck was already aware that, in an international 
community shaped first and foremost by power relationships, Australia must 
use judgment in achieving effect while working within its limitations.
Paul Hasluck, 1954
Source: National Archives of Australia, A1200, L16892
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Hasluck’s great contribution to the Canberra conference lay in his skill as a 
draftsman, finding forms of words that would reconcile differing points of view. 
In such exercises he found some of the same intellectual pleasure as he did in 
writing poetry, especially when he was teamed with an expert jurist in Kenneth 
Bailey. He was formidably hardworking, at least once working throughout the 
entire night. His colleague, Patrick Shaw, wrote: ‘Everyone attributes a large 
part of the speedy agreement to the preparatory work, and that means you and 
your section.’11 In old age John Burton commented that Hasluck was a very 
good bureaucrat with no sign of an underlying philosophy.12 As Peter Edwards 
has suggested, Hasluck and Burton supplied different needs for Evatt, ‘the one 
relatively orthodox, the other more idealistic and adventurous’.13
The rivalry between Hasluck and Burton grew during 1944, as it was never 
made clear whether the Economic Relations section of External Affairs headed 
by Burton was separate from Hasluck’s Post-War Hostilities Division or 
subordinate to it. Ric Throssell, then a diplomatic cadet, recalled:
And you had this ludicrous situation going on, with Hasluck writing 
on cables, ‘Dr Burton, please advise’, and Burton would screw ’em up 
and throw ’em into the waste paper basket and then go down and get 
another clean copy for himself … There was a huge rivalry between 
them.14
In September 1944, fed up with the wrangling, Hasluck submitted his 
resignation, but Evatt persuaded him to withdraw it. Hasluck was still a 
temporary appointee to the Department of External Affairs, expecting to serve 
until 1947 when he would start work on writing the home front section of the 
official history of Australia in the Second World War.15 For the present he was in 
Evatt’s good books, and Evatt placed increasing reliance on him.
When the Great Powers met at Dumbarton Oaks in August–September 1944 
to plan the structure of the United Nations, the British delegation took care 
to consult Australia. Evatt concerned himself mostly with broad principles 
and left the detailed submissions to be drafted by Hasluck and Bailey.16 At 
the Wellington conference between Australia and New Zealand in November 
1944, Evatt was ill and it was left to the departmental officers, Hasluck, Burton 
11  P. Shaw to P. Hasluck, 26 January 1944, NAA CRS M1942 [36].
12  J.W. Burton interview with author, 26 May 2004.
13  P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901–1949 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), 147.
14  Don Baker oral history interview, 30 January – 3 March 1992 (National Library of Australia).
15  For the attempt at resignation Hasluck to Dunk, 25 March 1947, NAA CRS M1943 [16]; for his 
appointment to the Official War History, Long to Hasluck, 27 August 1943; Hancock to Long, 3 September 
1943; Long to Hasluck, 13 October 1944; official contract, Hasluck MSS, Claremont.
16  Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, 145.
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and W.D. Forsyth, to exercise their own discretion; Hasluck thought that this 
made for greater precision in the conference’s statements about international 
organisation, trusteeship and colonial policy.17
For the San Francisco conference setting up the United Nations, Curtin decided 
to send the deputy prime minister, Francis Forde, together with Evatt, but 
never clearly spelt out which of the two should lead the delegation. With both 
men out of the way the ailing Curtin could give the treasurer, Ben Chifley, a clear 
run to establish his credentials as acting prime minister and likely successor. 
Evatt’s response was to mobilise the strongest possible support team, including 
Hasluck, Burton, Bailey, Watt and Forsyth.
Before the San Francisco conference the Australian delegation went to London 
between 4 and 13 April. It was meant to be ‘a rather mild family talk, at which the 
United Kingdom … would give information and explanations to the Dominions 
and answer their questions in order to assist their preparations’.18 Evatt changed 
that. Comprehensively briefed by Hasluck and Bailey and working with furious 
concentration, he soon made it clear that he controlled Australia’s policy and 
that Australia would not always comply with Britain. The patriot in Hasluck 
was not unhappy with this state of affairs, though he disagreed with Evatt’s 
thinking on colonial issues. To his wife Hasluck wrote: ‘Australia took quite a 
prominent part … and in this case I think it can be fairly stated that Australia 
was Evatt, Bailey and myself.’19
The San Francisco conference began on 25 April and was scheduled to close 
at the end of May; in the event it was prolonged until 15 June. Very quickly 
Evatt and his officials, augmented by Bailey, established themselves as the 
makers of Australian policy. The work of the conference was divided between 
four commissions. Evatt ensured that one of his officers was appointed secretary 
and executive officer of each of the Australian delegations to these commissions. 
Hasluck’s duties included the daily coordination of committee meetings and the 
briefing of Australia’s representatives. In the eyes of an observer who saw much 
of the action at this time:
Hasluck, I think, more than anybody, was responsible for framing the 
policies that Evatt followed in the post-war world. From the time in 1943 
when Evatt fastened his attention to what the post-war world would be 
like – what Australia’s role should be in it – Hasluck was the principal 
guide that fed the ideas into him. There were others such as Bill Forsyth, 
Ken Bailey, etc. etc. but Hasluck was the main one, the main architect of 
policies. And he worked like a Trojan for Evatt …20
17  Ibid., 148; Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, 164.
18  Ibid., 193 and ch. 17 generally.
19  P. Hasluck to A. Hasluck, 17 April 1945, Hasluck MSS, Claremont.
20  Alan Renouf, oral history interview, 23 November 1993, National Library of Australia (NLA) TRC 2981/6.
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Early in the San Francisco discussions Hasluck succumbed to a mood of 
disenchantment. He told his wife: ‘I become more and more cynical watching 
this crowd at work and less certain that truth is ever to be found from the 
lips of man.’21 From this abyss of pessimism he soon raised himself by a 
growing realisation that all the desperately hard work by Evatt and his team 
was producing positive results. In a later letter describing the delegates as ‘a 
collection of monomaniacs all trying to put something across their neighbours’, 
he also wrote, ‘the Australian delegation is going pretty well and is getting a 
great number of things it wants, so although the spiritual climate is not very 
exhilarating there is a certain amount of good humour around the place’.22 Under 
the intensive pressure of working for a common goal, the Australian delegation 
suspended most of their office jealousies. Hasluck found himself praising Evatt’s 
tremendous capacity for work, forming close alliances with Bailey and Watt, 
and even writing about Burton in complimentary terms.23
When the time came to set up a 14-nation committee to integrate the findings of 
the working parties into the text of the United Nations charter Hasluck and Bailey 
were nominated to membership. Evatt told them: ‘Go ahead and use your own 
judgment.’24 The task was completed after days of intense pressure. Hasluck’s 
mood was one of relief and elation. Evatt, he wrote, ‘has certainly made his 
mark in this conference and established Australia as, next to the Great Powers, 
one of the most important and influential delegations at the conference’.25 ‘The 
effort has been worth it … [Evatt] has made me proud to be an Australian and 
particularly to be one of the same team. He really has fought magnificently and 
with great judgment in very difficult circumstances.’26
These comments made to his wife in the immediate aftermath of the San 
Francisco conference contrast with Hasluck’s verdict in later years:
 [Evatt] was working for a success at San Francisco rather than addressing 
himself to the continuing tasks of good international relations. He was 
eager to play a leading role in making the Charter and of being the 
champion of small powers. His ambition was clearer than his policy.27
For the present, the halcyon mood continued. On the voyage home across the 
Pacific the Evatts, Hasluck, Burton and Sam Atyeo and his wife settled down to a 
peaceful existence of relaxation and reading, the greatest antagonisms arising from 
that most competitive of shipboard games, deck quoits. Never previously close, 
21  P. Hasluck to A. Hasluck, 9 May 1945, Hasluck MSS, Claremont.
22  P. Hasluck to A. Hasluck, 26 May 1945.
23  P. Hasluck to A. Hasluck, 5 May 1945 and 1 June 1945.
24  P. Hasluck to A. Hasluck, 1 June 1945 and 18 June 1945.
25  P. Hasluck to A. Hasluck, 13 June 1945.
26  P. Hasluck to A. Hasluck, 25 June 1945.
27  Hasluck, ‘Australia and the Formation of the United Nations’, 177.
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Hasluck and Sam Atyeo discovered a common enthusiasm for jazz. Even the news 
that Curtin had died and that Chifley had been elected leader by a substantial 
margin over Forde did not long disturb the tranquillity of the voyage.28
During the next 18 months, relations soured between Hasluck and Evatt. It is 
not necessary to seek an explanation by casting Burton as an Iago figure fanning 
suspicion in Evatt’s mind, although undeniably Burton’s propensity for gossip was 
unhelpful.29 But as Hasluck gained in experience and confidence his views were 
diverging from Evatt’s. His idealism was giving way to a cold-eyed pragmatism. 
He questioned Evatt’s attempts to limit the authority of the Great Powers, doubted 
the practicality of a commitment to full employment, and thought Australia was 
over-extending its interventions into other nations’ affairs.30
Dr H.V. Evatt at the United Nations, 1949
Source: National Archives of Australia, A6180, 23/8/79/118
28  Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, ch. 21.
29  I do not have space in this paper to give examples, but evidence may be found not only in Hasluck’s 
writings but also in L.F. Crisp’s San Francisco diary (NLA) and in Alan Renouf’s correspondence (Renouf to 
Hasluck, ‘Paris/Sunday’ [August 1946], NAA CRS M1943 [12]).
30  Hasluck, Workshop of Security, 178.
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These divergences did not surface while Hasluck was in London between August 
1945 and February 1946 for the preliminary discussions setting up the United 
Nations. Hasluck shepherded Evatt’s interests devotedly, pressing his claims for 
the first presidency of the General Assembly.31 In the event, Paul-Henri Spaak 
of Belgium was chosen. Hasluck thought that British disapproval might have 
prejudiced Australia’s chances.32 The Australians were no more successful in 
the debate about the future site of the United Nations headquarters. Evatt was 
eager for San Francisco, a venue that he thought would ensure attention to the 
Pacific region. The Great Powers, the Europeans and the Latin Americans all 
preferred a site on the Atlantic coast of the United States. Hasluck found himself 
in a minority of one.33 The choice soon went to New York. However, Australia 
gained one of the elected seats on the Security Council after Canada gracefully 
withdrew from contesting it.34
Hasluck’s performance at London sufficiently commended itself to Evatt 
for his appointment as counsellor-in-charge of the Australian mission to the 
United Nations and acting representative on the Atomic Energy Commission. 
The leadership of the delegation went to Norman Makin, newly appointed 
ambassador to Washington, who found himself thrust into the chairmanship of 
the Security Council as the result of a decision that each delegation should hold 
the office for a month in turn in alphabetical order. Makin was a modest, decent 
old warhorse of the federal Labor Party who had been speaker of the House of 
Representatives when the Scullin Government held office and minister for the 
Navy under Curtin but had no more experience of foreign affairs than Forde. 
‘Makin thanked the Council effusively for being first chairman. While Hasluck’s 
face preserved an oriental calm, Watt’s constantly moving with nervous coughs, 
and Bailey’s showed absolute disbelief, there was raucous comment and 
guffaws of laughter from Sam Atyeo.’35 But Makin showed himself prepared 
to take advice and express appreciation, and the work of the Security Council 
proceeded smoothly. Colonel Hodgson, formerly secretary of External Affairs 
and now ambassador to France, was sent to New York to take over from Makin, 
but he returned to Paris because of his wife’s serious illness, leaving Hasluck to 
head the delegation.
In May 1946, Australia was represented on two committees dealing with major 
issues of contention. One concerned the fitness of Spain, then under the Franco 
dictatorship, for admission to the United Nations. The other was examining 
an Iranian complaint about a perceived Soviet threat in the border region of 
31  Hasluck to Evatt, 12 December 1945, NAA CRS M1942 [22]; also Hodgson to Evatt, 14 December 1945, 
NAA CRS M1774 [23].
32  Hasluck to Evatt, 12 December 1945, NAA CRS M1942 [22].
33  Ibid.; see also Evatt to Hodgson and Hasluck, 20 December 1945, NAA CRS M1774 [23].
34  Hasluck to Dunk, 19 January 1946, NAA CRS M1943 [1].
35  A. Renouf, The Champagne Trail: Experiences of a Diplomat (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1980), 19.
11. Paul Hasluck with Dr Evatt at the United Nations
217
Azerbaijan. The Russians walked out of the Security Council in protest against 
the discussion of this topic. Evatt gave no instructions to the Australian 
delegation, and Hasluck used the debate to attack the Soviet Union for opting 
out of the processes of international peacemaking. His speech made a strong 
impact in the press; the evening papers in New York carried photographs of him 
with glowing references to him as a young diplomat.36
Evatt was not pleased. Renouf later reported: ‘He maintains that this was a 
breach of instructions and Molotov was very incensed with it. I think the real 
reason, however, is the publicity you received for your work.’37 Evatt asked 
Renouf to send him a weekly report on ‘what Hasluck was up to’, adding, ‘I 
think he’s building himself up, not me’. When Renouf refused, Evatt said: ‘I’ll fix 
you.’ But there was no showdown when Evatt arrived in New York later in May. 
He concentrated on the Atomic Energy Commission, keeping Hasluck extremely 
hard at work as Evatt’s draftsman, sometimes in all-night sessions. Hasluck was 
unimpressed with Evatt’s performance as temporary chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission. He seemed ‘hell bent’ on securing a treaty creating an 
international atomic energy authority and a system of control without building 
up understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. Evatt left 
at the end of June with the central issue unresolved, leaving Hasluck, assisted 
by Ralph Harry and two distinguished scientists, George Briggs and Mark 
Oliphant, to spend the rest of the year working on many technical problems.38
For the rest of 1946 Hasluck worked ceaselessly, took part in a busy social 
round, and gained more publicity, although he swore that he tried to deflect 
the media to Evatt.39 In December it was once again Australia’s turn to chair the 
Security Council. Evatt sent word that Makin, and not Hasluck, would fill the 
role. Hasluck snapped. In his eyes Makin’s nomination undermined his standing 
and suggested that he lacked the government’s confidence: ‘If it signifies my 
replacement I would appreciate plain advice to that effect.’40 Mainly because 
of Makin’s tact the tensions subsided for a while. Hasluck refused an offer 
of appointment as head of the European section of the United Nations, with 
headquarters in London and a salary of US$10,000 a year. Trouble erupted again 
in February 1947 when word arrived that Burton would become the secretary of 
the Department of External Affairs.
Hasluck sent in his resignation, stating that he was not influenced by issues 
of salary or status, nor because of lack of promotion, nor because of the strain 
on his health, but because ‘by Burton’s appointment Cabinet set its approval 
36  A. Hasluck to E. Darker, 22 May 1946, Hasluck MSS, Claremont.
37  Renouf to Hasluck, ‘Paris/Saturday’ [August 1946], NAA CRS M1943 [12].
38  Ibid., 279.
39  Ibid., 282.
40  Hasluck to Evatt, 14 December 1945, NAA CRS M1943 [16].
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on a whole system of petty intrigue, talebearing, favouritism and personal 
attachment to the Minister which as an Australian citizen I consider contrary to 
public service principles.’41 Evatt told Hasluck that his judgment was affected 
by personal feelings, and there was perhaps just enough truth in the comment 
to make it rankle. A journalist who observed Evatt closely remarked that ‘he 
had a rough, sometimes precise insight into those who worked for him. He 
seemed to know the exact tactic or word likely to reduce them to size.’42 But in 
his own family circle Evatt uttered no criticism of Hasluck harsher than that he 
was ‘pernickety’.43
Hasluck’s wife Alexandra, a dismayed spectator of her husband’s treatment, 
thought of an elegant rejoinder. She told her mother that Paul should go into 
parliament and become minister for External Affairs. ‘He is fed up with the 
diplomatic life … but I think he would like the running of foreign policy.’44 
From his previous stance as a middle-of-the-road agnostic in politics, Hasluck 
was now moving towards support of the Liberal Party under Robert Menzies. 
Eventually the scenario unfolded as Alexandra Hasluck had predicted, though 
it is debatable whether it benefited either her own personal happiness or her 
husband’s sense of achievement. As the old Chinese proverb has it: ‘Be careful 
what you wish for, as your wish may be granted.’
Hasluck was returned to the House of Representatives for the safe seat of Curtin 
in December 1949, taking his seat on the government back benches opposite 
Evatt in his new role as deputy leader of the Opposition. Parliamentary legend 
has it that whenever Hasluck was scheduled to speak Eddie Ward would tell 
Evatt that Hasluck was about to ‘spill the beans’ about his past experiences in 
External Affairs, and Evatt would rush into the House in a state of perturbation. 
But Clyde Cameron, that devoted historian of the federal Labor Party, told a 
kindlier story. Years later in the 1960s, when Evatt’s powerful intellect had been 
brought low by illness, only two members of parliament came to visit him in 
his twilight world. One was Justin O’Byrne, a notably good-natured Tasmanian 
senator. The other, by now a busy Cabinet minister, was Paul Hasluck. Patiently 
he sat with Evatt yarning about their experiences in San Francisco and trying to 
rouse him with talk of men and events whom they both knew.45 It was a graceful 
conclusion to a sometimes fraught relationship.
41  Hasluck to Dunk, 25 March 1947, NAA M1943 [16].
42  R. Donnington, ‘Evatt at Large’, Observer, 15 September 1958.
43  Interview with Mrs Rosemary Carrodus, 29 November 2009.
44  A. Hasluck to E. Darker, 17 February 1947 and 23 April 1947, Hasluck MSS, Claremont. John Burton 
(interview, 26 May 2004) thought that when Hasluck resigned he was aware that Menzies was interested in 
him as a possible recruit to parliament, but I have found no evidence for this.
45  Interview with Clyde Cameron, 12 November 2002.
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12 
John Burton:  
Forgotten Mandarin?
Adam Hughes Henry1
John Burton was part of a young generation of talented recruits into the 
Australian public service during and after the Second World War. This influx 
was mainly due to the manpower shortages caused by the strains of war. By 
late 1941 and certainly by 1942, the unfavourable strategic circumstances of 
the war encouraged the John Curtin Labor Government to seek more self-
assertive and independent foreign policy relationships with Great Britain 
and the United States. This attitude would be continued after the war by the 
Chifley Labor Government. The new direction of Australian foreign policy and 
its brash spokesperson Dr H.V. Evatt (the minister for External Affairs) was 
not always well received by the British or the Americans. During this time 
Burton eventually found himself in the role of personal secretary to Evatt and 
was therefore well placed to observe the changing tide. Traditional reliance of 
Australian diplomacy on the British Foreign Office had been well established for 
decades, but as Burton noted, ‘Evatt changed all that’.2 
Yet Evatt clearly trusted Burton enough during his time as foreign minister 
to delegate responsibilities at certain times for such things as reading and 
responding to incoming diplomatic cables.3 Evatt’s approach to international 
affairs was thus compatible with Burton and no doubt encouraging of new 
perspectives. Burton’s own support for this new independence of diplomatic 
thought was not an unusual trait among those who served throughout the war 
and into the post-war period. A similar attitude was shared by departmental 
colleagues such as Paul Hasluck, Arthur Tange and James Plimsoll, who all rose 
quickly through the ranks of the Commonwealth Public Service (CPS) during the 
1  A version of this essay was first published in ISAA Review, 12, no. 1 (2013), 67–84. It is reproduced with 
the permission of the editor, Susan Steggall.
2  Dr J.W. Burton, interview with author, Canberra, 19 February 2009. I am grateful for the opportunity 
to interview Dr Burton. It is a lamentable and indeed puzzling shame that more academics writing about the 
period, and often based in Canberra, failed to take any opportunity to interview him. I take the opportunity 
also to thank the Burton family and the Independent Scholars Association of Australia for publishing this 
essay in an earlier form.
3  Ibid.
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1940s. However, in their later attitudes towards communism, or more precisely 
Cold War anti-communism, a professional and political dividing line emerged 
during the 1950s.
Here we can make a brief, but important, comparison between Burton and 
Hasluck. Both men were quite similar in certain respects, but ultimately 
had very different experiences of Australian bureaucratic and political life. 
Differing attitudes towards anti-communism, war and the philosophical 
world of foreign policy led each to seek profoundly different careers and life 
experiences. By the early 1950s, Hasluck was already carving out what would 
prove to be a long career in federal politics as a member of the Liberal Party, 
while Tange and Plimsoll found themselves fast tracked into positions of pre-
eminence within the Department of External Affairs, particularly after Tange 
became secretary in 1954. By the end of 1951, Burton had already failed in his 
attempt to move from the bureaucracy and into federal politics as a member 
of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), and his career with the Department of 
External Affairs was over.
Burton would later play an important role in the development of peace and 
conflict studies during his long overseas academic career. He certainly left a 
well-respected academic legacy in the United States and the United Kingdom 
in the disciplines of international relations and peace and conflict studies. 
While this is known in his homeland, it seems that he is primarily remembered 
in Australia as being a controversial former secretary of the Department of 
External Affairs. During his early post-diplomatic years, he took tentative steps 
towards an academic career, but continued to be engaged in Australian foreign 
policy debates. It was Burton’s philosophical attitudes towards the nature of 
the Cold War and his ongoing questioning of strident anti-communism that 
made him memorable within the bitter ideological politics of the 1950s. For 
ardent anti-communists (particularly on the non-Labor side of Australian 
politics), Burton represented a controversial and troubling sort of intellectual 
liberalism towards South East Asia and the Cold War. 
After leaving the department in 1951 nothing Burton undertook diminished 
this negative interpretation. For example, when his book The Alternative 
was published in 1954, he merely reinforced the attitudes of critics.4 In this 
book Burton critiqued the philosophical and intellectual basis of the Menzies 
Government’s approach to foreign policy (especially in South East Asia). Rather 
than seeing communism as being nothing more than subversion directed 
from Moscow or Peking, Burton linked the growth of communism in South 
East Asia with nationalist struggles against European colonialism and other 




forms of Western interference.5 This was primarily an important intellectual 
argument about the assumptions guiding Australian security thinking towards 
South East Asia under the Menzies Government. That is, to ignore, reject or 
attempt to suppress legitimate Asian aspirations for freedom from Western 
domination (whatever forms it took), did little to enhance Australian security, 
in fact, this was more likely to promote continuing uncertainty. This was not 
the sort of analysis that was very popular with ardent anti-communists. Given 
the political context of the Cold War in Australia, the surveillance Burton 
(and his family) endured at the hands of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) after he left the Department of External Affairs, and the 
saga of the Petrov Affair, The Alternative remains a fascinating book.
My own introduction to John Burton came during the course of my master of 
arts honours thesis where I examined cables from and to Burton regarding the 
situation in South East Asia; particularly the Netherlands East Indies during 
1945 to 1947.6 This was my introduction to Burton the bureaucrat, diplomat 
and so-called protégé of Evatt. In the course of my doctoral research examining 
Australian foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s, I examined archival materials 
and media sources that have hinted, implied and indeed slandered men such 
as John Burton as left-wing sympathisers, or even secret communist traitors. 
These issues shall be dealt with in more detail towards the end of this chapter. 
This was my introduction to Burton, the public intellectual and Cold War 
political dissenter. During my doctoral research I interviewed Burton (then 
aged in his 90s) to discuss the late 1940s, Indonesia, communism, Evatt, 
Australia, and his concepts of conflict resolution for international affairs.7 This 
was my introduction to John Burton, the reflective elder statesman.
The life story of Burton is intriguing, but as yet it has failed to be the subject 
of a major biographical study. He was born in Melbourne on 2 March 1915. His 
father was a noted Methodist minister unafraid to be controversial in pursuing 
ethical ideals in his own life. Burton rejected Methodism (and religion) as a 
basis for his own philosophical and ethical thinking and did not follow in his 
father’s religious footsteps, yet it is difficult not to see something of a Methodist 
influence in him. For example, the characteristic of following through on one’s 
ethical and intellectual convictions in spite of strident criticism.
5  Burton’s general view was that growing Asian nationalism and anti-colonialism (communist or otherwise), 
was a legitimate phenomenon. For his views on the implications of a nationalist or communist China in 1948, 
see D. Lowe, Menzies and the Great World Struggle 1948–1954 (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 
1999), 35–36.
6  See A.H. Henry, Independent Nation – Australia, the British Empire and the origins of Australian–Indonesian 
Relations 1901–1946 (Darwin: Charles Darwin University Press, 2010).
7  Dr J.W. Burton, interview with author, 19 February 2009.
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Dr John Wear Burton, c1951
Source: Courtesy of Pamela Burton
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Educated at Newington College (1924–32) and then at the University of Sydney, 
Burton entered the CPS in 1937. He was the first to be granted a Commonwealth 
Scholarship, through which he pursued a doctorate at the London School of 
Economics.8 Burton entered the Department of External Affairs in 1941 in the 
role of private secretary to Dr Evatt. The relationship between Burton and 
Evatt would prove to be both significant and at times controversial. In 1947, 
Burton became secretary of the Department of External Affairs and he served 
in this capacity until mid-1950. His elevation by Dr Evatt to this position at 
such a young age angered senior diplomats such as Alan Watt. This might also 
be a significant source of the professional friction between Evatt, Burton and 
Hasluck. Burton admitted that his handling of the notoriously sensitive Hasluck 
as secretary might have been a tipping point for the latter’s resignation from the 
department. He reflected that he should not have denied Hasluck a permanent 
posting to the United Nations. Yet he was surprised by Hasluck’s decision to join 
the Liberal Party of Australia and enter federal politics – he had always assumed 
that Hasluck was ‘a Labor man’.9
After the election of the Menzies Government in 1949, Burton worked well 
by all reports with the new minister, Percy Spender. Yet the new government 
was also quickly moving into Cold War foreign policy directions that would 
eventually be quite incompatible with his own views. He was also weary of the 
bureaucratic life.10 In 1950 he left his role as secretary of the department and 
later briefly held the position of Australian High Commissioner to Ceylon during 
1951. He would famously resign from this position to stand unsuccessfully for 
election in Australia as a Labor candidate. This failed attempt to enter federal 
politics confirmed for Burton’s critics their negative perceptions of him, and 
Burton continued to be a particularly maligned figure among conservative 
figures within Australian politics. 
Despite his brief flirtation with politics, after 1951 he began a journey of 
transition from politics and bureaucracy towards new intellectual pursuits, 
which pushed Burton towards an academic career. After failing to win a seat 
in the federal parliament, he continued with his farming enterprises, but it was 
during this time of introspection that Burton worked with the ideas that would 
become The Alternative. It is from the time of the publication of this book in 
1954 that we really see Burton moving more towards academia. By 1960 he was 
a fellow at The Australian National University; in 1962 he received a Rockefeller 
8  For this information I am indebted to John Nethercote (Adjunct Professor, Canberra Campus, The 
Australian National University), for his detailed knowledge of Australian bureaucratic history.
9  Dr J.W. Burton, interview with author, 19 February 2009.
10  Ibid. Burton indicated to me that after such frantic years of working in the Department, he had 
developed a growing weariness and fatigue with his bureaucratic life. The combination of weariness, his new 
role in distant Colombo as high commissioner, and the changing political environment in Australia after the 
election of Menzies obviously made 1951 a time of serious personal and professional reflection.
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Foundation grant to study African neutralism; in 1963 he was a reader of 
international relations at University College London. It was also at this time that 
he established a centre for the analysis of international conflict. The emphasis on 
negotiation, discussion and peaceful resolution (instead of militaristic strategy) 
remained central to Burton’s thinking. By 1965 he had published two original 
books: Peace Theory and International Relations: A General Theory.11
Later in his academic career Burton would leave the field of international 
relations to become a founding figure in the development of peace and conflict 
studies. He would help to establish centres for this new discipline in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. His ‘human needs theory’ also provided a non-
militaristic framework for conflict resolution built on structured dialogues and 
negotiated settlements.12 One of the best descriptions of the logic of the human 
needs concept was provided by Doug Cocks:
[B]ullying people does not make them behave the way you want them 
to behave, at least not for long; bullying does not get rid of conflicts. 
Burton’s second article of faith is that conflicts between individuals, or 
collectives of individuals, will often resolve themselves if the disputants, 
with or without some outside help, can come to see each other as 
having, and seeking to satisfy, similar fundamental needs … if people’s 
fundamental needs are being met, they will be less conflictual … It is 
Burton’s conclusion, after long observation, that people most commonly 
come into conflict because they feel that their identity is not being 
recognized, that they are not being treated with dignity and respect 
for who they are; even when the conflict appears to be about something 
much more material such as land or resources.13
In retrospect this style of thinking can also be seen in aspects of Burton’s earlier 
role as secretary of the Department of External Affairs, particularly towards the 
question of Indonesian independence.
11  For examples of publications during Burton’s engagement with international relations (prior to his 
involvement in peace and conflict studies) see Peace Theory (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962); International 
Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965); Systems, States, Diplomacy and 
Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Conflict and Communication (London: Macmillan, 1969); 
World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Deviance, Terrorism and War (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1979). For an overview see D.J. Dunn, ‘John Burton & The Study of International Relations: An 
Assessment’, The International Journal of Peace Studies, 6, no. 1 (2001), www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/
vol6_1/Dunn.htm.
12  For a detailed overview of Burton’s work in the field of peace and conflict studies see D.J. Dunn, From 
Power Politics to Conflict Resolution: The Work of John W Burton (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Dunn 
highlights that Burton developed the ‘needs’ idea around the same period that psychologist Abraham Maslow 
was developing his own theory of ‘human nature’.
13  D. Cocks, Learning from John Burton, www.labshop.com.au/dougcocks/BURTONREVIEW.htm. See also 
J.W. Burton, ed., Conflict: Human Needs Theory (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
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What then can we learn from Burton in the context of Australian diplomatic, 
political and administrative history of the late 1940s and early 1950s? First, he 
worked in a small and at times amateurish department; it lacked funds, skilled 
manpower and prestige. Yet the Second World War had done much to encourage 
new directions for Australian foreign policy and it was during the Chifley-Evatt-
Burton period that the fledgling Department of External Affairs began its long 
process of professionalisation. Working closely with Evatt, Burton was actively 
involved in this revolutionary yet sometimes chaotic process.
It was with the Dutch–Indonesia dispute that Burton saw at first-hand the 
merits of adhering to peaceful negotiated settlements. He shared this vision 
with Chifley, the Australian prime minister. To the horror of non-Labor critics, 
by 1946–47 Australian diplomacy (guided by Chifley, Evatt and Burton) began 
to view Dutch colonialism and its propensity for violence with great negativity. 
There was also growing sympathy towards the aspirations of Indonesians 
for freedom. Such attitudes were motivated by strong ethical and strategic 
considerations. The experiences of Indonesia’s war of independence against the 
Dutch (1945–50) were profound for Chifley, Evatt and Burton. These policies 
resulted in Australia and India defending Indonesian republicanism through 
the United Nations from 1947.14
As secretary, Burton wrestled with implementing what I would see as the 
‘Chifley-Evatt’ line on international affairs. This was an Australian foreign 
policy energised by the more nationalist legacy of the Second World War, social 
justice, the economic development of post-war Australia, engagement with the 
Asia-Pacific region, the centrality of the United Nations Charter and peaceful 
negotiations. This approach viewed nationalistic and anti-colonial ferment in 
South East Asia as being a reaction to European colonialism and not Soviet or 
Chinese directed subversion. Evatt and Burton’s ‘open diplomacy’ approach 
certainly sought to introduce circuit-breaking dialogues and relationships into 
Australia’s foreign policy thinking. Diplomatic dialogues and discussions with 
Soviet diplomatic officials might be open to criticism, but they only appear 
sinister if this approach was not also applied to dealings with other nations. 
The Chifley-Evatt-Burton style of foreign policy did not automatically accept 
Anglo-American attitudes towards the Cold War, international economics, full 
employment, Asian nationalism, European colonies, China, or defence planning. 
This approach was not popular with the non-Labor side of politics, nor with the 
British or Americans. Such attitudes certainly caused Burton to clash with Sir 
Frederick Shedden (secretary of the Department of Defence) over their differing 
attitudes towards foreign policy. For example, a major source of tension with 
the Department of Defence had been that in 1948 Shedden accepted British 
14  For an extensive examination of the genesis of such attitudes towards Indonesian independence see 
Hughes, Independent Nation.
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assessments that Moscow was directing communist subversion in South East 
Asia.15 Evatt, Chifley and Burton were far more circumspect. Yet this clash was 
also connected to a bureaucratic rivalry between Defence and External Affairs 
over the administration of Australian foreign policy itself. Burton’s efforts to 
centralise all cable communications about Australian foreign affairs through the 
Department of External Affairs was an attempt not just to modernise, but to 
break a stranglehold long held by the Department of Defence under Shedden.16 
In short, Burton had begun transforming the robust independence of diplomatic 
action generated by the Second World War into new administrative reforms and 
this development was not always welcomed.
Returning now to The Alternative, I would like to highlight in more detail 
possible reasons why Burton’s ideas were unable to find lasting traction within 
the Department of External Affairs, at The Australian National University where 
he had been a fellow in the Department of International Relations, or within the 
foreign affairs thinking of the Australian Labor Party. Why did this unique and 
talented man, who rose to the heights of bureaucratic power so rapidly and with 
such immediate impact for Australian public policy, eventually leave Australia 
to forge an academic career in the United Kingdom and United States?
In his second career, Burton was viewed internationally as a former high-ranking 
Australian diplomat who became a cutting-edge scholar of new thinking. This 
respected status within international circles was shown by the almost instant 
and heartfelt expressions of thanks and condolence from all over the world on 
the sad news of his passing. The reaction was no less heartfelt in some Australian 
circles, but was generally more muted in his homeland. To explain this contrast 
one must delve back into Cold War politics and the Australian political scene of 
the late 1940s and 1950s. Burton’s ideas in The Alternative seem relatively tame 
to modern eyes, but they (like Burton himself) were considered unacceptable 
to men such as Robert Menzies (prime minister), Richard Casey (minister for 
External Affairs, 1951–60) or Charles Spry (second director-general of ASIO) 
during the 1950s. His less rigid attitude towards Asian communism and anti-
colonialism was an affront to the strategic thinking of such Cold War warriors. 
Certain factors conspired to make Burton’s liberal views little more than poison 
in the minds of his critics. First, there was the revelation in the late 1940s of 
information leaks to Moscow from Canberra uncovered by the Venona cryptology 
operation.17 In response, the Americans cut off the flow of classified intelligence 
material from the United States to Australia. This was problematic for the British 
who were hopeful of cooperating with the Australians on the development of 
15  See Lowe, Menzies and the Great World Struggle, 28.
16  Dr J.W. Burton, interview with author, 19 February 2009.
17  F. Cain, ‘Venona in Australia and Its Long-Term Ramifications’, Journal of Contemporary History, 35, 
no. 2 (April 2000): 231–48.
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long-range weapons and testing. Due to the American intelligence ban, technical 
information from the United States that was highly advantageous to the future 
development of British weaponry was either being denied to the United 
Kingdom or could not be shared with the Australians when it was. The Venona 
operation highlighted that certain employees of the Department of External 
Affairs were possible sources of these leaks. In their book Breaking the Codes, 
Desmond Ball and David Horner have speculated that at least 10 individuals (not 
all in External Affairs) were involved in an operation that resulted in thousands 
of cables being sent to Moscow.18 Despite the severity of the American reaction, 
there were actually only two classified British documents that have been cited 
in scholarly articles as being leaked to Moscow from Canberra in their entirety 
via sources in the Department of External Affairs.19 The revelations about the 
leaks eventually led to the establishment of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) in 1948; a counter-intelligence agency that initially operated 
under judicial oversight. The Moscow leaks, or ‘The Case’ as it was known, 
became something of a Holy Grail to men such as Richard Casey, Charles Spry 
and Robert Menzies.
In the 1950s, the saga of ‘The Case’ became publicly connected to the Petrov 
Affair in 1954. After the defection of Vladimir Petrov, third secretary at the Soviet 
Embassy, and his wife Evdokia, the Menzies Government utilised a very public 
royal commission to examine espionage issues effectively inspired by Venona-
related intelligence. This was all designed to uncover communist traitors and 
they seemingly hoped to ensnare even Burton himself. It is in Burton’s attitudes 
and responses to these smears and allegations that a less sensational picture 
emerges. Burton was highly contemptuous about the value of ASIO, sceptical 
of its potential role and dismissive of the alleged extent and damage caused by 
the known Moscow leaks. He was equally unimpressed by Petrov whom he 
thought ‘too stupid’ to be a master spy.20 The use of smear and innuendo still 
connected to ‘The Case’ is also instructive of the political climate that faced 
Burton in the late 1940s and increasingly into the 1950s. Rumours about the 
troubled Australian relationship with US intelligence had certainly found their 
way to the Menzies’ Opposition by the late 1940s.21 In 1948, when Chifley 
18  D. Ball and D. Horner, Breaking the Codes: Australia’s KGB Network (St Leonards, NSW: Allen and 
Unwin, 1998).
19  In all the scholarly materials I have encountered on this topic these are the only two full documents 
cited: ‘Security in the western Mediterranean and Eastern Atlantic’, Public Records Office UK, CAB 79/34/8, 
PHP (45)6(0), 19 May 1945; ‘Security in India and the Indian Ocean’, PRO CAB 79/34/8, PHP (45)15(0). See also 
National Archives of Australia (NAA) A5954/1, Item 848/1.
20  Dr J.W. Burton, interview with author, 19 February 2009.
21  The issue of Venona (and the US intelligence embargo) certainly provided opportunities for domestic and 
international critics of the Chifley Government. There is intriguing circumstantial evidence that news about 
the intelligence embargo could have been passed to Menzies or the non-Labor Opposition by US, or most 
likely UK sources. For one, the British had already supplied classified information to Menzies in 1948 while 
he was still Opposition leader. Furthermore, the leaking of information to the Australian press suggesting 
that the Americans were refusing to share atomic secrets with Australia (see the Sydney Morning Herald in 
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attended the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference in London, Menzies 
also visited Europe. During his time in London classified British assessments 
about communism in South East Asia were shown to him.22 These assessments 
(which saw the hand of Soviet subversion as the root cause of political ferment 
in South East Asia) were supported by the Attlee Labour Government. Such 
assessments diverged strongly with those of Chifley, Evatt and Burton, but were 
highly compatible with the views of Menzies.
While British intelligence informed Chifley of the leaks, they were initially 
under instructions from the Americans not to disclose the true origins of this 
information, that is, the cryptology operation named Venona. Intense American 
hostility towards Evatt and Burton and the Australian Labor Party meant that 
they, including Chifley, were initially provided with an MI5 cover story about 
the Moscow leaks. Once Chifley was in possession of the full story he embarked 
on the establishment of ASIO (if somewhat reluctantly) to restore American faith 
in the Australian Labor Government. Although sceptical of the true importance 
of British documents leaked to Moscow, Burton nonetheless approved a joint 
Commonwealth Investigation Service and MI5 counter-intelligence operation 
against a visiting Russian delegation during 1948.23 He also appeared as a witness 
before the Petrov Royal Commission providing detailed evidence of his side 
of ‘The Case’ story. Burton’s testimony was taken ‘in camera’ and therefore in 
complete secrecy from public scrutiny. His ‘in camera’ testimony did not appear 
in the published proceedings of the royal commission, nor were they publicly 
available for decades.24
There has also been something of a selective airbrushing of history in regards 
to ‘The Case’ and its ‘nest of traitors’. When the National Archives of the United 
Kingdom released a large amount of material connected to ‘The Case’ in April 
2011, this speculation re-emerged. Professor Desmond Ball (of The Australian 
National University) made an allegation, reported in a national newspaper, that 
either Burton or Evatt were ‘agents of Soviet influence’.25 Historians as diverse 
as Peter Edwards, Gregory Pemberton, Robert Manne, and even former New 
South Wales premier Bob Carr were unconvinced by Ball’s speculations. Ball’s 
allegations seem connected to revelations in the British documents that in 1958 
July 1948), and subsequent questions raised in parliament (for example Arthur Fadden in September 1948), 
seem to indicate Opposition awareness of some of the issues. This was all highly embarrassing for the Chifley 
Government.
22  See ‘Minutes of Defence Committee Meeting DO (48) Meeting 13 August 1948, Minute 3 Prem 8/1406 
Part 1’, PRO cited by Lowe, Menzies and the Great World Struggle 1948–1954, 192. Lowe also refers to the 
document ‘Russian Interests, intentions and capabilities’, 23 July 1948 J.I.C (48)9(0).
23  L. Maher, ‘The Lapstone Experiment and the Beginnings of ASIO’, Labour History, no. 64 (May, 1993): 
103–118, available from www.jstor.org/stable/27509168.
24  See ‘Extracts from the Official Transcript of Proceedings taken In Camera, 2 November 1954 – Dr Burton’, 
NAA A6215, 10.




Spry had told the British that should Evatt win that year’s federal election they 
should withhold classified intelligence, and that Menzies apparently handed 
over classified intelligence files connected to espionage in Australia to the British 
and the Americans in fear of Evatt.
Spooked by signs that Evatt might win the November 22 election, 
Menzies secretly ordered ASIO to hand sets of top-secret documents 
to Britain and the US for safe-keeping because of his fear that Evatt 
would bury or destroy the material if he became Prime Minister. Until 
then the Australian government had refused for four years to give the 
British and US governments full access to the material, a pile of Russian 
documents handed over by former KGB man Vladimir Petrov when he 
defected in 1954. 
But two days before the election Menzies suddenly decreed that Britain’s 
spy services MI5 and MI6 should each be given a complete copy of the 
documents and two more sets should go to the CIA. The originals were 
held in the PM’s office. The copy given to MI5 filled nine envelopes and 
was among the material released on Monday by the spy service.26
The ironies of Menzies’ extraordinary actions have seemingly been missed. 
Menzies had after all handed intelligence documents about Soviet espionage 
to MI5. According to a range of sources, including Peter Wright’s Spy Catcher, 
MI5 was an organisation that had been spectacularly penetrated at very high 
levels by Soviet spies from the 1940s, throughout the 1950s, and into the 1960s. 
There were opportunities for Ball to have put forward these allegations in the 
book Breaking the Codes while Burton was still alive, but such allegations were 
removed from the original book draft after receiving ‘legal advice’.27 
Such controversy has tended to obscure Burton’s thinking about foreign policy. 
There were of course others during the late 1940s and 1950s who, like Burton, 
considered Asia to be vital to Australia’s future interests – men such as Richard 
Casey, Arthur Tange, Tom Critchley, MacMahon Ball, Richard Kirby, James 
Plimsoll or Alan Watt, but there are distinctions to be made. Casey’s approach 
to Asia was built first and foremost on adoption of an anti-communism strongly 
connected to Anglo-American approaches towards the Soviets and later the 
Chinese. Australian diplomacy was therefore designed to build dialogues (often 
26  Ibid.
27  Ibid. Wilson writes that: ‘Dr. Ball said the only previous time he had expressed this view was in a draft of 
Breaking the Codes, which was published when Burton was still alive, but the reference was removed on legal 
advice.’ It would appear that it was wise that this legal advice was heeded. For an examination of the merits of 
raising this issue again only after Burton passed away see G. Pemberton, ‘Old Gossip, but No Evidence John 
Burton was a Spy’, Australian, 18 January 2012. See also P. Burton, ‘Burton Was a Patriotic Public Servant, 
not a Traitor’, Australian, 30 April 2011. While researching The Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 
1949–1963 (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2014), David Horner did not seek an interview with Burton.
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with non-communist regimes) in South East Asia against the hidden hand of 
Soviet-Chinese subversion. While Tange oversaw this process, he himself largely 
credited Casey with the expansion of Australian diplomatic missions into South 
East Asia. James Plimsoll was interested in aspects of Asia, particularly South 
Korea, but was very fearful of the Chinese. Crucially, Burton was highly critical 
of concepts and assumptions that placed military technology, military covenants 
and the threat of force at the heart of American, Soviet, and European (let alone 
Australian) foreign policy planning. This highly negative view of militarism can 
be seen in Burton’s early work on international relations theory and later in his 
work on peace and conflict studies. Such attitudes are highly incompatible with 
military interventionism in Asia and by implication, covert interventions by 
either communist or Western powers against third world nations. These actions 
were unable to resolve the root cause of political and social conflicts and as such 
they would remain effectively unresolved. In retrospect, some of this style of 
thinking is present during his tenure as secretary of External Affairs. 
Another reason that the Burton legacy in Australia is ambiguous is that after 
leaving the department he did not go off silently into the sunset; he continued 
his independent commentary on Australian foreign policy. This was an 
irritating trait from the perspective of his many enemies. His trip to China in 
1952 as leader of a self-styled Australian peace delegation and public speaking 
engagements did little to soothe the tempers of the critics. A particular issue of 
contention in Australia was Burton’s public questions regarding the possible use 
of germ warfare by the US military in the Korean War.28 Another case in point 
was his attendance as an observer at the Bandung (or African-Asian) Conference 
in April 1955; the neutralist tendencies of the conference were viewed with 
great alarm by ardent anti-communists in Canberra, London and Washington. 
Burton was surprised by the Indonesian reception at Bandung and he recalled 
the hospitality and excellent accommodation he received. The Indonesians 
remembered Burton’s diplomatic support during their struggles against 
the Dutch. He noted with some amusement that his warm welcome (and the 
excellent accommodation he enjoyed in Bandung) contrasted with Australia’s 
official diplomatic representatives within Indonesia at that time.29 Burton’s 
liberal attitudes and the legacy of ‘The Case’ made him a continued high profile 
28  In 1952, these allegations found widespread currency. See T. Buchanan, ‘The Courage of Galileo: Joseph 
Needham and the Germ Warfare Allegations in the Korean War’, History, 86, no. 284 (October 2001): 503–22. 
Phillip Deery notes that we now seemingly have confirmation that these biological warfare allegations were 
part of a communist disinformation campaign. See ‘New Evidence on the Korean War’, Cold War International 
History Project Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996). See also P. Deery ‘“Behind Enemy Lines”: Menzies, Evatt 
and Passports for Peking’, vuir.vu.edu.au/571/1/Behind_Enemy_Lines’.pdf. It is possible that conditions 
suitable for the outbreak of contagious diseases existed at that time in various parts of Korea; see Shu Guang 
Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1995), 184–185.
29  Dr J.W. Burton, interview with author, 19 February 2009.
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target of ASIO well past any conceivably valid timeframe.30 Yet Burton’s approach 
to foreign policy, his attempt to implement ethical dimensions sympathetic to 
peaceful conflict resolution through the United Nations into the External Affairs 
culture, his rejection of strategic militarism (most often favoured by his critics as 
central to international affairs), is profound. This assessment is neither romantic 
nor uncritical. Burton made mistakes and was not afraid to admit shortcomings 
in his reflections of his period as secretary. Yet the loss of Burton to academia 
overseas was also a great loss to Australian public policy and ultimately to 
national knowledge. He was the mandarin that might have been, if only the 
shifting political sands of anti-communism in the late 1940s and 1950s had not 
moved with such ruthless and unforgiving speed.
30  For reactions to Burton’s criticisms of Australian foreign policy after his resignation from the Department 
of External Affairs, see ‘Chapter 12, The Nest of Traitors’, in D. McKnight, Australia’s Spies and their Secrets 




Sir Arthur Tange:  
Departmental Reformer
Peter Edwards
Sir Arthur Tange was remembered, especially in Canberra, long after his 
retirement, but very largely for his last position, as secretary of the Department 
of Defence throughout the 1970s. There are many in the military who have still 
not forgiven the author of ‘the Tange report’ and the instigator of ‘the Tange 
reforms’, which resulted not only in a fundamental reorganisation of the Defence 
group of departments but also in major changes to Australian strategic policies. 
Particularly among left-leaning journalists, there was a longstanding belief that 
Tange was the crucial link between the CIA and the Governor-General that led 
to the dismissal of the Whitlam Government in November 1975. Others long 
contended that he played a dishonourable role at the time of the deaths of five 
Australia-based journalists at Balibo, Portuguese Timor, in October 1975. Within 
the public service, anecdotes long endured of Tange’s style, which would today 
be described as unacceptable bullying. Tange was capable of browbeating 
officers, even senior officers, in front of their subordinates, stopping just short 
of physical contact, throwing down files so that they disintegrated on the floor – 
and then, in a split second, turning to welcome a visiting dignitary with wit and 
charm. Ever conscious of the importance of his own time, he would insist that a 
lift was kept available for his use, and Heaven help anyone who encroached on 
his parking space, even at a weekend. Wits liked to describe the Chinese floor 
vases outside his office as ‘Late Tang – slightly cracked’.
The focus and span of this volume offer an opportunity to look anew at Tange’s 
career as if, as very nearly happened, it had come to an end in the late 1960s, 
before his appointment to Defence. A study of Tange’s career in the 1940s, 1950s 
and 1960s adds further evidence and nuances to some of the themes under 
consideration. These include the importance of the new cohort of university 
graduates, especially in economics, in the Commonwealth Public Service; the 
dedication to institution-building, especially strong departments, as a mark of 
the professionalism of the public service; and the simultaneous adherence to 
both the concept of an independent public service, giving frank and fearless 
advice to governments of whatever party, and a broadly social democratic 
ethos, embodied in the great project of post-war reconstruction. If we, for the 
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moment, leave aside Tange’s work in Defence in the 1970s, he remains important 
and distinctive, albeit not unique, for his role in taking these themes into the 
relatively new area, for the Commonwealth Public Service, of foreign policy.
Tange was born in the fateful month of August 1914.1 Although the youngest 
of seven siblings from his father’s two marriages, Arthur was in many ways 
more like an only child than a member of a large family, and he long retained 
the psychological outlook of a loner. His grandfather, Anton Tange, migrated 
from Denmark in the 1850s and prospered as a tea merchant in Sydney; the next 
generation lost much of the family’s fortune. Arthur’s father, Charles, attended 
The King’s School, Parramatta, and graduated from the University of Sydney, 
where he was a resident of St Paul’s College, but discarded his promising practice 
as a lawyer in Sydney, with a house on the upper North Shore, to go on the land, 
establishing an orchard near Gosford on the Central Coast. This venture failed and 
Arthur’s early years, when he attended Woy Woy Primary School and Gosford 
High School, were shaped by the impecunious circumstances. Tange was never 
close to his father, who was 54 when Arthur was born, but was always loyally 
supportive to his mother during her 40 years as a widow. The spur to Arthur’s 
ambition was his determination not to fail his dependents in the way that his 
father had.
Despite good results in his matriculation examination, at the age of just 16, 
Arthur would have had little chance of following his father to university but 
for a stroke of fortune. His eldest sibling, his half-sister Dorothy, 22 years his 
senior, had married Alfred Davidson, who rose spectacularly in the 1920s to 
become general manager of the Bank of New South Wales, the position known 
today as the Chief Executive Officer of Westpac. Davidson, a dominant figure in 
Australian finance in the 1930s and early 1940s who did much to shape Australia’s 
response to the Depression, became employer and mentor to his young brother-
in-law. He gave Arthur a base-grade job in the bank, and then transferred him 
to the Perth branch so that he could attend the University of Western Australia, 
the only free university in Australia. Davidson was especially impressed with 
the dynamic professor of history and economics, E.O.G. (Ted) Shann.
In later life Tange liked to speak of the three great achievements of his time 
as a student in Perth. He gained post-graduate qualifications (as an honours 
degree was then regarded), gaining a Bachelor of Arts with first class honours 
in economics, with a thesis on the Australian capital market. (Essentially he 
argued that Australian banks were unduly conservative in lending to business; 
plus ça change.) Secondly, he became an outstanding rugby player, representing 
Western Australia against the visiting Springboks. Thirdly, he won the heart 
1  For a fuller account of Tange than is provided here, see P. Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins 
(Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2006).
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and, when he could afford it, the hand of Marjorie Shann, one of Professor 
Shann’s three daughters. (Keith Shann, better known as Mick, was Marjorie’s 
first cousin.)
After graduating, Arthur and Marjorie were both employed by Davidson in the 
bank’s Economics Department, an in-house think tank established by Davidson 
with considerable influence from Ted Shann. Arthur was then posted to Fiji, 
where the bank had a profitable business in foreign exchange, and where Tange 
saw no reason to hold British colonial officials in high esteem. From there he was 
recruited to become what his employer and mentor, Davidson, had long held in 
low esteem – a Canberra public servant. Tange became a lowly research officer 
in that section of the Department of Labour and National Service, which was 
already looking at post-war policies. Later this became the Department of Post-
War Reconstruction.
In Post-War Reconstruction, Tange became one of the team of officials working 
under senior economists such as Leslie Melville, L.F. Giblin and Douglas Copland. 
A principal focus was Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreement, which made 
American aid conditional upon working towards free trade. The Australians 
sought to reconcile this with their traditional policies of protectionism and imperial 
preference. In 1944 Tange, with Melville and his friend and contemporary Fred 
Wheeler, were the only three officials on the absurdly small and overworked 
delegation to Bretton Woods, which laid the foundations for the post-war 
international economic order. In all this work, Tange’s admiration for the British 
and American officials fell short of being overawed. Neither then nor later would 
he be one who naturally genuflected before great and powerful friends and allies.
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, Australia had been developing the 
basis of a foreign office and diplomatic service, known as the Department of 
External Affairs. This was another channel through which bright young 
graduates – mostly men, in the days of the marriage bar – were recruited into the 
Commonwealth Public Service. That department was also giving attention to the 
problems of the post-war world, with Paul Hasluck the central figure. The two 
departments worked separately, but in the latter years of the war, when Evatt 
and his closest adviser, John Burton, became aware that the proposed United 
Nations Organization was likely to have an economic component, they realised 
that External Affairs needed to boost its economic capacity. For a time Arthur 
Tange was shared 50/50 between Post-War Reconstruction and External Affairs.
Immediately after the war, Tange was recruited full-time to a position in 
External Affairs at the diplomatic level of first secretary, then quite senior in 
the departmental hierarchy. He was promptly despatched to the Mission to the 
United Nations in New York. There, while Hasluck worked on Security Council 
and related matters, Tange worked not only on international economic questions 
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but also on other fields. This was an era of international conferences establishing, 
and writing constitutions for, international organisations in a diverse range of 
fields. Tange rapidly developed expertise in these new aspects of international 
diplomacy, a new field for the Commonwealth Public Service.
Tange had thus joined the cohort of bright young graduates in External Affairs, 
but he was, from the start, a little apart from the rest. He had been laterally 
recruited, rather than coming up through the department’s own cadet scheme, 
and his expertise was primarily in economics, unlike most of his new colleagues. 
He remained a little apart.
From New York, Tange returned to Canberra. Soon after the change of 
government in December 1949, the new minister for External Affairs, Percy 
Spender, recruited Tange as his principal adviser at the conference that devised 
what became the Colombo Plan. He was not, however, part of the official team 
who worked with Spender on what became the ANZUS Treaty, although he had 
some marginal involvement in those negotiations. Without over-emphasising 
the point, it is probably fair to say that, of the two pillars of Australian foreign 
policy that were erected during Spender’s short but highly creative term, Tange 
remained closer to that which prescribed engagement with the region than to 
that of the US alliance.
Tange’s next diplomatic posting, at an unusually senior level for someone of 
his years and experience, was as deputy head of mission at the embassy in 
Washington, where Spender had been made ambassador. Here his unwritten 
brief was to try to restrain Spender, who seemed (in the eyes of many in Canberra) 
to think that he was still minister rather than one of the new minister’s official 
servants. In this exercise, Tange did not have much success, but the experience 
of working in Washington during the time of Senator Joe McCarthy did nothing 
to raise his estimation of American officialdom.
The age structure of External Affairs in the early 1950s was very unusual, with 
a tiny handful of diplomatic officers over the age of 40 and burgeoning numbers 
in their twenties and thirties. It was highly likely, therefore, that when one of 
the senior men, Alan Watt, retired as secretary in 1954, the baton would be 
passed to one of the junior men. In the event, the minister, R.G. Casey, evidently 
considered two of the senior men, Keith Officer and Alfred Stirling, but both 
wisely considered that they were not well suited to the post. Casey chose Tange, 
just ahead of Jim (later Sir Laurence) McIntyre and the three who would become 
Tange’s principal lieutenants, Keith Waller, Pat Shaw and James Plimsoll. Others 
in the same cohort included Peter Heydon, Keith ‘Mick’ Shann and Ralph 
Harry, all of whom became departmental heads and/or senior ambassadors in 
the coming years. (Waller, Shaw, Plimsoll, Heydon and Shann were all later 
knighted; Harry was appointed AC.)
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Sir Arthur Tange, 1965
Source: National Archives of Australia, A8947, 45
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Tange remained secretary of the Department of External Affairs for 11 years, 
starting with the Petrov Affair and the rupture of relations with the Soviet Union 
and ending just as Australia was about to commit combat troops to Vietnam. 
Typically, for a man who liked to work with the written word, Tange wrote two 
papers early in his tenure, one on administration and one on policy, which did 
much to establish the framework for his term as secretary.
Tange spent much of his time reorganising the department’s structures and 
methods, with the aim of turning a group of more or less talented individuals 
into an effective and cohesive foreign office and diplomatic service. He initiated 
a wide range of major and minor reforms, some of which were remarkable 
largely for their previous absence – systems for appointments and promotions, 
performance appraisal, records of conversations, financial management and so 
on. Tange made it clear that he wanted the officers in External Affairs to put 
aside some of the pretensions to which ambitious diplomats were susceptible 
and to think of themselves first and foremost as public servants, competent and 
qualified in all the skills and responsibilities of good public servants, and then 
applying those skills and meeting those responsibilities in the field of foreign 
policy. At a time when the department was explicitly divided into Group A, 
the diplomatic officers, and Group B, the administrative and consular officers, 
this approach won the respect of the Group B officers but did not always endear 
Tange to the diplomats.
In establishing a professional foreign office and diplomatic service, Tange was 
obliged to accept three elements in the department that he thought did not 
properly belong there. In each case Tange’s reservations, shared by his diplomatic 
colleagues, were overridden by Casey, a much admired and personally respected 
minister but one whose enthusiasms often frustrated his officers. These three 
elements were the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Antarctic Division, 
and the implementation of the Colombo Plan. Tange would doubtless approve 
of the current situation, under which ASIS is an autonomous agency, separate 
from the department but reporting to the same minister, while the Antarctic 
Division is placed in the Department of the Environment. It is less likely that 
he would have approved of the 2013 decision to re-integrate AusAID into the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Whatever setbacks he may have had, the department was certainly far more 
effective at the end of his 11 years as secretary than it had been at the beginning.
Tange’s policy document was notable for the priority it gave to relations with Asia 
and the comparative downplaying of relations with the United Kingdom and 
the United States, at a time when Prime Minister Menzies and his government 
placed pronounced emphasis on these ‘great and powerful friends’. In policy 
matters, Tange and the department experienced both success and failure. 
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An early attempt to have the government reconsider its attitude towards the 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China was clumsily handled by Casey 
and the department, setting back policy on this critical issue for many years. 
Perhaps the greatest achievement was the handling of Konfrontasi, the low-level 
conflict between Indonesia and the new federation of Malaysia between 1963 
and 1966. The minister, Garfield Barwick, the department in Canberra, and the 
missions in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur worked extremely effectively to shape and 
implement a policy that was by no means always consistent with the instincts 
and attitudes of the long-serving and dominant prime minister, Menzies.
Tange’s ministers during his term as secretary were some of the most significant 
Liberals of their era – Casey, Menzies himself, Barwick and Hasluck. His relations 
with them ranged from cordial to frosty, illustrating the degree to which the 
relationship between departmental head and minister depended on matters 
quite separate from party. Tange and his officers, for example, found Barwick 
almost an ideal minister, whereas their relations with their former colleague, 
Hasluck, when he returned as minister, were highly strained. I have considered 
these relationships in some detail in Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins. The 
relationship between Tange and Hasluck over some four decades would make 
an interesting study in itself.
Tange’s relations with other public servants covered in this volume also ranged 
widely, from emulation through admiration and friendly, or not so friendly, 
rivalry to hostility and even contempt. He greatly admired H.C. ‘Nugget’ 
Coombs from his first exposure to Nugget’s persuasive ways with Wall Street 
bankers; he thought that Frederick Shedden by the 1950s was well past his 
wartime prime and a failure at running the post-war Defence Department; he 
clashed with Wilson and his deputy, Lenox Hewitt, over the Treasury’s control 
of departmental finances; he had a complex friendship-cum-rivalry with Fred 
Wheeler and a more distant respectful rivalry with J.G. Crawford (Tange and 
Crawford were knighted on the same day); and he thought Ken Bailey was able 
but weak in standing up to ministers.
Tange had been highly regarded by Menzies in the late 1950s, but by the early 
1960s the prime minister was clearly seeking to move him onwards. Tange 
resisted this pressure, as a permanent head could do in those days, but he 
finally agreed in 1965 to become high commissioner to India. For some years, 
he thought that his career might end there, as he was determined not to accept 
any position below what he thought appropriate. Then, in what reads like an 
episode of Yes, Minister, he was rapidly offered the embassy in Washington, a 
return to his position in External Affairs, and the secretaryship in Defence. He 
spent the last 10 years of his career in the last position, undoubtedly the most 
remarkable occupant of the position to that point – and perhaps ever, because 
the public service reforms of the 1980s were brought in precisely to ensure that 
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no departmental secretaries would ever again have the clout that was held, in fact 
and even more in reputation, by Tange, Wheeler and a handful of their cronies. 
That is why my biography of Tange is subtitled The Last of the Mandarins; but 
it is timely to recall that he contributed much to the strengths and, indeed, the 
weaknesses, of the public service in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.
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Sir James Plimsoll:  
Mandarin Abroad
Jeremy Hearder1
James Plimsoll’s life and career had similarities with others featured in this volume, 
but also significant differences. The main difference was that for two-thirds of 
his time he was abroad. Dwarfs and mandarins succeeded in part because they 
had effective communication with the ministers for whom they worked; that is, 
mutual comprehension, trust and respect. For the mandarin based abroad this 
was more difficult, given distance, poor communications, and being less aware of 
the atmospherics at home. Provision of frank and fearless advice was hard from 
afar, when such advice clearly was not going to be well received and even harder 
when you do not personally know the minister or Snow White. So the ideal was 
for the ambassador to feel confident in knowing Snow White’s mind, and for 
Snow White to have personal confidence in the ambassador.
Let me tell you a true fairy story. Once upon a time, in 1962, Snow White 
decided to go to New York without any of the dwarfs, because Snow White 
knew he would be well looked after by that mandarin over there, Plimsoll. 
In New York, Snow White found that Plimsoll kept on trying to bring up the 
subject of Rhodesia. An increasingly prominent and sensitive issue, it had 
been inscribed as an agenda item to be debated in the United Nations General 
Assembly in a few days time. Plimsoll was getting no guidance from officials in 
Canberra on what he should say. Snow White kept fobbing him off. Eventually, 
when Snow White was about to board a plane to return home, Plimsoll implored 
him once again for guidance about what he should say about Rhodesia. Snow 
White clapped him on the shoulder and said: ‘My boy, I’m glad you’re making 
[the speech], not me’, and climbed aboard. Plimsoll took it that he could say 
what he wanted to.2
That sort of latitude extended to a diplomat abroad is rare. Menzies knew what 
he was doing. Plimsoll was someone whose judgment he had come to respect 
during Plimsoll’s earlier six years in Canberra. Menzies knew that during the 
1  The following is based on the author’s research for his book Jim Plim Ambassador Extraordinary: 
A Biography of Sir James Plimsoll (Ballarat, VIC: Connor Court Publishing, 2015).
2  James Plimsoll in conversation with Clyde R. Cameron (1984), National Library of Australia, nla.oh-
vn677900, transcript, Vol. ii, 6–7.
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past three years Plimsoll’s duties had taken him on three extensive visits through 
Africa – in those days he had seen more than most of the Unknown Continent. 
More recently, Menzies had approved of the way that Plimsoll, in transiting 
London, had handled an unexpected meeting with the British Secretary of State 
for Colonies, Duncan Sandys, at Sandys’ request. Sandys had told Plimsoll that 
the United Kingdom intended to make Rhodesia independent soon. To Sandys’ 
chagrin, Plimsoll had quoted the relevant passage from the United Nations 
Charter to him and said he doubted that Australia would agree to the grant 
of independence to a minority government.3 Menzies had also approved other 
things Plimsoll had done at the United Nations when unable to get instructions 
in time.4 With no other prime minister did Plimsoll enjoy such a close working 
relationship.
Years later, in 1974, Plimsoll called on Menzies in retirement, days after the 
announcement of the new governor-general, Sir John Kerr. Menzies said he 
thought this appointment was a mistake, without saying why. If he had still 
been in office, he would have recommended Plimsoll for the post – but that is 
another story.5
For nearly 35 years, Jim Plimsoll was one of Australia’s leading diplomats. He had 
an exceptional career. He was secretary of the Department of External Affairs in 
Canberra from 1965 to 1970. He served as ambassador no less than eight times, 
all in places of major importance to Australia – Korea, the United Nations in New 
York, New Delhi, Washington, Moscow, Brussels, London, and Tokyo.
Unlike other dwarfs and mandarins, Plimsoll spent only one-third of his career 
in Canberra. He was posted abroad for the remainder. He tolerated rather than 
liked living in Canberra, and bought no real estate. Canberra was all about 
the job, not a home. It was only the personal persuasion of Dr Evatt, the then 
minister for External Affairs, that led him to come to Canberra and join the 
department in the first place in 1948. His ambitions did not lie in power, or 
management of a large organisation. This was ‘not his cup of tea’.6
Plimsoll was passionate about the task of representing Australia abroad. He 
declined offers to take high level posts in the Secretariat of the United Nations, at 
twice the pay. After reaching the pinnacle, first as secretary then as ambassador 
in Washington, when he could have gone into other things, he stayed on as a 
diplomat. Instead, he accepted posts of slightly lower status – indeed, he wanted 
to be first high commissioner in Papua New Guinea.
3  Ibid., 5–6.
4  See Menzies’ reply to a parliamentary question from Dr J.F. Cairns on 17 October 1961. Current Notes on 
International Affairs, 32, no. 10 (October 1961), 54–7.
5  Plimsoll in conversation, 377.
6  Sir Garfield Barwick, conversation with author, December 1996.
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Sir James Plimsoll, 1965
Source: National Archives of Australia, A1200, L52865
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Plimsoll’s upbringing was similar to a number of the other dwarfs and mandarins 
– attendance at a leading selective state school, and an economics degree as 
an evening student. But there were some differences. Over the next few years, 
Plimsoll went through further education and an unusually stimulating on-
the-job training in research, analysis, communication and representation. He 
remained at Sydney University for eight years, during which he added an arts 
degree, had extensive debating experience in the University Union, and was 
elected president of the Union. By day he worked in the Research Department 
of the Bank of New South Wales, the first of its kind in Australia. In order 
to accomplish all this, he developed an almost monastic approach to living. 
Work came first, an approach he never lost. His father could have paid for full-
time university study, yet with an accountant’s caution after the Depression 
he insisted Plimsoll get a job and study in the evening. During the Second 
World War, as a captain, he worked with Alf Conlon, a fellow Sydney student 
politician, in the Directorate of Army Research in Melbourne, with all those 
often brilliant, eccentric colleagues. In 1945 he went to the United States to 
attend a school in military government. Out of 350 students, mainly American, 
British and Canadian officers, he came second. Then, as Major Plimsoll, he was 
Australia’s representative on the Far Eastern Commission in Washington. Other 
differences were that he remained single, and although the youngest of the 
dwarfs/mandarins, he died the earliest, except for Crawford – I think due to 
overwork.
As a diplomat, Plimsoll developed a standing that made key foreigners not only 
happy to see him, but sometimes want to seek him out to discuss their own 
problems. In Korea during the Korean War, Plimsoll at age 33, and with very 
limited experience, had President Syngman Rhee, a much older man, often ask 
his advice. Plimsoll so impressed the Americans that when he was transferred 
to Canberra, the Americans, most unusually, requested Australia to send him 
back, which it did. In Washington in 1973, during a particularly difficult 
time when the newly elected Whitlam Government’s foreign policy approach 
enraged President Nixon, the Australian Embassy had its normal access to 
the US Administration frozen. But the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, 
and his senior people, as well as other members of the Administration, openly 
flouted this prohibition, such was their desire to maintain communication with 
Plimsoll. In Moscow in 1977, a group of very senior officials of the Foreign 
Ministry called Plimsoll in to seek his personal advice about how the Soviet 
Union should react to Indira Gandhi’s shock loss in the Indian elections, which 
had just occurred. His access to key people enhanced the value of the reports 
that he sent home – brief, clear, timely. They were closely read at all levels.
It was a great disappointment to Plimsoll that Menzies retired within a year of 
his becoming secretary in Canberra. Although on good terms with Holt and 
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then Gorton, privately he was critical of both. Like others, he was contemptuous 
of McMahon. With the election of Whitlam, Plimsoll hoped for better things. 
He had known Whitlam and his wife for some time. His hopes were quickly 
dashed. It was the immaturity of style in foreign policy; and early on Plimsoll 
detected Whitlam’s ignorance and lack of interest in economic policy. But they 
remained friends. Plimsoll and Fraser did not know each other well. Fraser was 
critical of Plimsoll’s views about the Soviet Union. When Plimsoll became the 
first career officer to be high commissioner in London, after only six months 
Fraser announced that a politician would take his place.
Another way in which Plimsoll differed from the dwarfs and mandarins was in 
public relations. In those days dwarfs and mandarins were self-effacing, in the 
background. They rarely if ever uttered a word in public; public relations was 
up to the minister. Plimsoll was cast in that mould, but with a difference. He 
was ahead of his time as a public servant who was a confident communicator, 
who understood the importance of public relations, and was prepared to talk 
to journalists. When secretary of the department in November 1965 he gave 
the Norman Smith Memorial lecture on journalism at Melbourne University 
about Asian issues and the press; he appeared in a television documentary 
on the department; and, visiting Delhi in 1967, he appeared with his Indian 
counterpart in a press conference after annual official talks with the Indians. 
That Paul Hasluck, who as minister was hostile to the very existence of the 
media section of the department, was prepared to countenance the secretary 
engaging in these activities underlined his trust in Plimsoll. Plimsoll 
substantially ghostwrote two books by ministers he served, one by Dr Evatt in 
1949, The Task of Nations,7 and one in 1954 by Casey, Friends and Neighbours.8 
The first was about the United Nations by Evatt in his capacity as President 
of the United Nations General Assembly. Plimsoll, based in New York, also 
conducted negotiations on behalf of Evatt with the US publisher, compiled 
the index and checked the proofs. The second by Casey emphasised the 
importance of the Asian region to Australia.
Plimsoll had the usual attributes of a good diplomat, although to this should 
be added that he worked exceptionally hard, was endlessly curious, had a 
photographic memory, and was always very well informed on a wide variety of 
issues. And he had a certain gravitas in his bearing, partly because he looked 
older than he really was, which was helpful in his thirties and forties when 
dealing, as he frequently had to, with people who were 20 or more years older. 
On the other hand he was very private, upright, and socially conservative; and, 
while approachable, he often had difficulty with small talk. He was somewhat 
unworldly, and absentminded about details of daily living, such as depositing 
7  H.V. Evatt, The Task of Nations (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949).
8  R.G. Casey, Friends and Neighbours: Australia and the World (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1954).
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cheques that he received. His monastic, simple way of living, owning neither 
property nor car, often only one suit, did not change, like his absorption in his 
work. Plimsoll approved of the following description of John Crawford: ‘a very 
intense man who lived his work day and night, and was always thinking when 
he was walking around.’9 The description fits Plimsoll also.
When he had time, Plimsoll’s main interests outside work were art, literature 
and music, in all of which he had considerable knowledge that he was 
sometimes able to deploy to advantage in his work. In art, while secretary of 
the department, he served on the interim committee of the National Gallery 
of Australia. In Moscow, he made a special personal contribution to fostering 
cultural relations. At Moscow State University he befriended the professor and 
dean of English and, at her invitation, he delivered a seminar a week for six 
months to graduate students and faculty members on various kinds of literature 
– English, Australian, American, other Commonwealth – also on punctuation 
and grammar. The dean was a strong personality, and she was of sufficient 
clout in the Communist Party to override objections to a Western ambassador 
lecturing the cream of Russian students during the Cold War.
Plimsoll was a major figure in what was an early, formative period in Australian 
foreign policy. He made a major contribution towards a greater realisation of the 
importance of Asian countries, notably India – about which he was ahead of his 
time in trying to raise interest. He was a considerable figure in the relationship 
with the United States. On the other hand, he held considerable reservations 
about China. Abroad, the post-war period was a time when Australia was a 
middle ranking country that had only recently found its voice in international 
affairs, but was little known. Filling this void was a task for many, but Plimsoll 
contributed significantly because of his stature and that he was so widely 
respected. Diplomacy was a little known profession in Australia when Plimsoll 
started during the 1940s. He helped set standards and style. At home he was 
in the vanguard in making Australian ministers and prime ministers come to 
realise the value to them of this new professional foreign service.
9  Plimsoll in conversation, 16.
